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ABSTRACT 
 
A widely held view is that in the process of effective corporate governance, poor firm 
performance triggers CEO removal. As a result, previous research has investigated the 
relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. This study complements but 
significantly adds to this research by examining the impact of relative performance and 
the social and political processes accompanying this in the monitoring and removal of 
CEOs.   
 
In this research, it is proposed that a board’s perception of firm performance based on 
comparisons with its aspiration level affects its decision on CEO replacement. In addition, 
CEO turnover is also treated as a social and political process, involving power struggles 
and contests between the CEO and other organisational entities. This study focuses on the 
determinants of CEO turnover of listed companies in China, the largest transitional and 
developing economy in the world, where governance institutions and structures are 
evolving. Drawing on the strategic change, aspiration, and CEO power literature, a CEO 
turnover model and a set of hypotheses have been constructed. 
 
A panel data set of 325 Chinese listed companies for the period 1997-2006 was collected 
from published sources. Innovative econometric methodologies were used to model a 
range of relationships between CEO turnover and the board’s aspiration level and CEO 
power. The statistical approach used in this study is Generalised Estimating Equations 
(GEE), which is a powerful tool for examining panel data where the independence of 
explanatory variables over time is not assumed. This approach is supported by the random 
effects method. The empirical results support the major hypotheses in this study. The 
board’s aspiration level is found to be influential in its decision on CEO turnover; CEOs 
are more likely to be replaced involuntarily where firm performance is below the board’s 
aspiration level. CEO structural power affects the likelihood of both forced and voluntary 
CEO turnover, while CEOs’ ownership power, prestige power, and tenure power 
influence the likelihood of forced CEO turnover, but not the likelihood of voluntary CEO 
turnover.  
 
   iii 
The study extends our understanding of the role of the CEO in the strategy of 
organisations significantly, and has significant implications for governance, managerial 
capitalism and the theory of the firm. 
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Chapter Four: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development  
4.1 Introduction  
On the basis of the review of relevant literature in the previous chapter and the gaps 
identified in it, a theoretical framework describing the process of boards’ decisions 
pertaining to CEO turnover based on their perceptions of firm performance and CEO 
power is proposed below in Section 4.2. Following this, a set of research hypotheses is 
developed for these relationships in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents the concluding 
remarks on the chapter. The structure of this chapter is depicted in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 Structure of Chapter Four 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Theoretical framework: a model of CEO turnover 
This research focuses on exploring the determinants of CEO turnover from the 
perspective of organisational decision making. CEOs provide valuable human capital for 
organisations and thus the decision to change a CEO is one of the most important made 
by a board of directors (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006). The board’s perception of firm 
performance based on comparisons with its aspiration level has an impact on its decision 
on CEO replacement. However, CEO turnover is also treated as a social and political 
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process, involving power struggles and contests between the CEO and other 
organisational entities. Given this setting, this study also explores the impact of CEO 
power on CEO turnover.  
Discerning the formation and the key factors of these two perspectives may shed more 
light on the causes of CEO turnover. Based on the literature review and the gaps 
identified in Chapter Three, a three-stage model of CEO turnover is proposed, as 
presented in Figure 4.2. The first stage is the process of boards’ problemistic search, in 
which a board perceives a firm’s current performance by comparing it with its aspiration 
level. Performance below the aspiration level triggers problemistic search and a search for 
a solution. CEO turnover is often used as a way to rectify poor performance and adapt to 
environmental conditions (e.g., Friedman & Singh, 1989). Consequently, boards are 
likely to treat CEO turnover as a solution for poor performance and, therefore they decide 
to replace underperforming CEOs. By comparison, performance above the aspiration 
level triggers slack search. According to Greve (2003b, p. 1053), organisations also 
search when they have slack resources, such as extra time and funds that could be used 
for generating innovation or investing in future competitiveness. However, slack search is 
unlikely to lead to CEO turnover. According to agency theory, performance is an 
indicator of a CEO’s effectiveness and the board becomes relaxed and less vigilant in 
monitoring the CEO once the CEO has met or exceeded its expectations (Lorsch & 
Maclver, 1989; Shen, 2003). In the second stage, the impact of the aspiration level on the 
risk preference of boards is explored. In general, CEO turnover is a risky decision for any 
organisation and thus boards’ risk preference largely determines their willingness to make 
a decision on CEO turnover. In terms of the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert & 
March, 1963) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), decision makers’ risk 
preference increases when they fail to fulfil their aspiration level. In the case of the 
decision on CEO turnover, a board is more risk-preferring and thus it is likely to initiate 
CEO turnover when firm performance is worse than its aspiration level. Finally, 
resistance to CEO turnover is explored from a perspective of CEO power in stage three.  
The third stage is the board’s action, when the board has decided to replace a CEO. The 
firm performance below aspiration level not only triggers the board’s problemistic search, 
but also enhances the board’s preference for risks. As a result, the board is likely to take 
action to replace the CEO. However, whether the board can successfully replace the CEO 
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is largely determined by the CEO’s power. As Pfeffer (1981) suggests, the dismissal of 
the CEO is a unique and infrequent event, requiring the exercise of power. For the CEO 
to be dismissed, he or she must lack sufficient power to prevent his or her own ousting 
(Tushman et al., 1989). If the CEO is powerful, it is unlikely that he or she will acquiesce 
to dismissal efforts, even during the period of poor performance (Allen & Panian, 1982; 
Boeker, 1992). 
Figure 4.2 A model of CEO turnover 
 
One feature of this model is that it applies prospect theory and the behavioural theory of 
the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) to a board’s decision to keep or replace a CEO. 
According to the literature review, existing research on the performance-turnover 
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resource dependence theory and agency theory, but it has not explained how poor 
performance causes boards to make a decision on CEO turnover. Under this model, 
decisions on CEO turnover will be explained from the perspective of boards’ cognition by 
introducing “aspiration level”, a key concept in prospect theory and the behavioural 
theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963). How boards perceive firm performance and 
adjust their risk preference according to their aspiration levels and eventually make a 
decision on CEO turnover will be explained.  
Another feature of this model is that the impact of CEO power is investigated as an 
inertial factor that moderates the action of CEO turnover. Existing studies on 
organisational change as the response to performance feedback have assumed and proven 
the effect of organisational inertia that moderates the implementation of organisational 
changes for performance below the aspiration level. Using similar logic, CEO power is 
treated as a moderator of CEO turnover in this model as powerful CEOs can insulate 
themselves from performance pressure (Ocasio, 1994).  
Based on previous research on CEO power, this study explores CEO power and its impact 
on CEO turnover from four perspectives, that is, structural power, ownership power, 
prestige power, and tenure power. The first three types of CEO power are adopted from 
the typology of four types of executive-level power proposed by Finkelstein (1992). 
Tenure power depicts CEO power from a dynamic perspective, that is, how CEO power 
develops with the lengthening of CEO tenure. It is worth noting that CEO tenure is also 
used as an indicator of the fourth type of power proposed by Finkelstein (1992), expert 
power, in current research (e.g., Oler, Olson, & Skousen, 2007; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). 
The reason for this is that long tenure in the CEO role confers expert power through an 
increased familiarity with the firm’s resources and methods of operation (Westphal & 
Zajac, 1995). Given this situation, CEO tenure is also a proxy for expert power in this 
study. 
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4.3 Development of hypotheses 
4.3.1 Performance relative to a given aspiration level and CEO turnover 
Performance relative to aspiration levels affects CEO turnover by influencing the board’s 
problemistic search and risk preference.1
Organisational changes are often triggered by problems, particularly when the problems 
are easily recognised and visible (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963, p. 169; Kiesler & Sproull, 
1982). A significant negative difference between achieved performance and the aspiration 
level triggers an extensive problem based search.  
 2 
One of the important jobs of a board is to control the CEO and other managers by 
assessing and replacing them in an effort to align managerial interests with those of 
shareholders (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Pursuing profit is the fundamental interest of 
shareholders. Therefore, shareholders and the board focus their expectations and 
objectives on firm performance. The board’s aspiration level for firm performance is set 
relative to the firm’s prior performance and the performance of similar firms (Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan, 2006). 
The aspiration level is an important tool for a board to use to perceive firm performance 
in an effort to assess a CEO. In reality, it is very difficult for a board to assess accurately 
and properly the efficacy of a CEO and other managers due to information asymmetry. A 
CEO generally has knowledge about the company that directors, especially outside 
directors, do not have (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006) because the CEO can limit the 
amount and type of information that directors have access to (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989). 
The CEO can often attribute poor performance to factors beyond his/her control, such as 
                                                 
1 The main focus of the thesis is on the impact of performance on CEO turnover. However, it is suggested 
that mergers and acquisitions events could affect CEO turnover. For example the empirical results of Gao 
and Kling (2008) show that about 50% of all CEOs leave after acquisitions.  
2 In the early 1990s, China launched its stock markets with the intent of restructuring ailing SOEs into modern-form 
corporations with a Western-style corporate governance structure (Shi & Weisert, 2002). In terms of the Chinese 
Company Law enacted in 1993, the CEO is monitored by the board of directors, who are appointed at the shareholders’ 
general meeting. In addition, listed firms are charged with making profits and maximizing shareholders’ wealth (Firth et 
al., 2006). Under this circumstance, firm performance has become an important criterion used by boards of directors to 
evaluate CEOs’ effectiveness. This implies that, like Western countries, firm performance is likely to affect CEO power 
and the likelihood of CEO turnover in the Chinese context. Although the corporate governance of Chinese listed firms 
is far from perfect, some China-related studies have reported that firm performance is negatively related to executive 
turnover (e.g., Fan, Lau et al., 2007; Kato & Long, 2006). Given the aspiration level is relative performance, it is 
anticipated that the impact of the aspiration level on CEO turnover in the Chinese context is similar to Western 
countries. 
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industrial contexts, or by making their subordinates into scapegoats (Boeker, 1992). 
Therefore, it is easier for the board to assess the CEO by using the aspiration level, as it is 
difficult for the CEO to manipulate. 
A board uses its aspiration level as the boundary line to judge whether a given firm’s 
performance is satisfactory or unsatisfactory. When firm performance is better than or 
equal to the board’s aspiration level, the board regards this as a successful or acceptable 
situation and assigns low priority to searching for problems. This is because once a CEO 
has met or exceeded the expectations of the board and powerful stake holders, the board 
will have increased confidence in the CEO and may become relaxed and less vigilant in 
monitoring (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989; Shen, 2003). However, when firm performance is 
below the board’s aspiration level, this is viewed as an unacceptable situation or a failure 
and triggers a problemistic search (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003c) or failure-
induced search (Hendron et al., 2005). 
This problem search continues until a solution to the problem has been found (Cyert & 
March, 1963). Changing a CEO is an important mechanism for correcting mistakes and 
improving firm performance, as a CEO is the agent who is ultimately responsible and 
accountable for organisational performance (Kesner & Sebora, 1994, p. 328). As Vancil 
(1987) points out, the title “CEO” has come to signify the individual who has ultimate 
legal authority and responsibility in the corporate hierarchy. This status is reflected in the 
empirical results of a paper published recently by Mackey (2008) which reveals that 
CEOs have significant impacts on firm performance, with the CEO accounting for 29.2% 
of the variance in corporate profitability. According to the adaptive view of succession, 
CEO turnover is a rational, deliberate effort to realign the organisation with its 
environment as the incumbent CEO is replaced with one who provides a more appropriate 
match of individual attributes to organisational needs (Virany et al., 1992). Therefore, 
performance below the aspiration level acts as a cognitive motivator to drive board 
members toward CEO dismissal so as to improve performance (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 
2006). 
The performance relative to the aspiration level affects not only the board’s problemistic 
search but also its risk preference, a critical determinant in decision making. CEO 
turnover is one of the most important and risky decisions for boards (Kesner & Sebora, 
1994). Although CEO turnover generally is regarded as the rectification of poor 
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organisational performance or strategic directions, it is undeniable that CEO turnover is a 
disruptive and traumatic event for any organisation. It may trigger other dramatic changes, 
such as additional executive departures, significant fluctuations in stock price, and shifts 
in a firm’s strategic directions (Kesner & Sebora, 1994), which may eventually cause 
poorer firm performance (Allen et al., 1979; Beatty & Zajac, 1987). Therefore, the event 
of CEO turnover is a very risky decision that may have both significant positive and 
negative implications for organisational performance, and sometimes organisational 
survival (Carroll, 1984; White et al., 1997).  
The aspiration level strongly affects boards’ willingness to take risks. In terms of prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), decision makers use the aspiration level to code 
outcomes into losses when the performance is below the aspiration level, and gains when 
the performance is above the aspiration level. In a similar way, the behavioural theory of 
the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) suggests that the performance above the aspiration level 
is interpreted as success, while the performance below the aspiration level is understood 
as failure. Decision makers have a stronger desire to overcome a performance failure than 
to extend success (Audia & Greve, 2006). As a result, when performance is below the 
aspiration level, decision makers are willing to accept risks and make changes in an effort 
to improve performance. In contrast, when performance is above the aspiration level, 
decision makers are unwilling to accept risks and make changes. In relation to CEO 
turnover, it is anticipated that performance above the aspiration level reduces the board’s 
risk preference and the likelihood of CEO turnover. However, performance below the 
aspiration level enhances boards’ risk preference and the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
In summary, a board will be inclined to initiate a problemistic search and take a risk to 
change a CEO when performance is below its aspiration level, while it has no incentive to 
search for a problem or take a risk to change a CEO when performance is above the 
aspiration level. CEO turnover is classified as forced or voluntary according to 
antecedents (Florou, 2005). Forced CEO turnover is driven by various forces, such as 
policy or personality disagreements and scandals (Florou, 2005; Warner et al., 1988; 
Weisbach, 1988), and poor firm performance (Li, 2005), which are related with 
organisational objectives or aspiration levels. Nevertheless, voluntary turnover is a 
normal succession process (e.g., a planned CEO’s retirement) and happens regardless of 
whether an organisational objective or aspiration level has been achieved or not. Given 
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the different impacts that a given aspiration level has on these two types of CEO turnover, 
it is expected that the likelihood of voluntary CEO is not influenced by the aspiration 
level, while forced CEO turnover increases when firm performance is below the board’s 
aspiration level. These arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.1a: The likelihood of CEO turnover increases when performance is below 
the board’s aspiration level. 
Hypothesis 1.1b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover increases when performance is 
below the board’s aspiration level. 
Hypothesis 1.1c: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to whether 
performance is below the board’s aspiration level. 
In addition, extant research suggests that decision makers’ willingness to change not only 
depends on whether firm performance is above or below aspiration levels, but also the 
distance from aspiration levels (Baum & Dahlin, 2007). As stated by Baum et al. (2005, p. 
542), “problem- and slack-driven search suggest that the likelihood of decision makers 
taking risky actions is positively related to the discrepancy between their organisations’ 
performance and aspiration levels, albeit the slopes of the relationship may be different 
above and below aspiration levels.” 
Both prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and the behavioural theory of the 
firm (Cyert & March, 1963) suggest that decision makers in an organisation performing 
slightly below the aspiration level are less likely to pursue risky behaviour than when they 
are far below the aspiration level. When the performance is slightly below the aspiration 
level, decision makers need only small improvements to reach their targets and thus they 
may be likely to focus on local search anchored in current solutions and minor 
adjustments that promise small improvements (Baum et al., 2005). In other words, 
performance near the aspiration level promotes decision makers’ refinement of current 
practices and strategies (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). In contrast, when the performance is 
far below the aspiration level, decision makers are unlikely to achieve their targets 
through small adjustments, which triggers problemistic search for alternatives (Baum et 
al., 2005). A range of empirical studies have supported that the likelihood of 
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organisational changes increases along with organisational performance falling further 
below aspirations (e.g., Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998). 
Unlike decision makers in organisations performing below the aspiration level, decision 
makers in organisations performing above the aspiration level are unwilling to take risks 
and make changes in response to the fall of firm performance as long as the performance 
is still above the aspiration level.3 It is because decision makers generally react more 
strongly to threats than opportunities and are unlikely to take risks in order to improve 
performance further above the aspiration level (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
 
Figure 4.3 Proposed functional forms for the relationship between performance relative to a given 
aspiration level and probability of changes 
 
However, firm performance far above the aspiration level may trigger slack search. The 
behavioural theory of the firm suggests that organisations with slack resources have 
incentives to search for new business opportunities and to initiate experimentation and 
organisational change (Cyert & March, 1963). The reason for this is because successes 
provide managers with less strict performance monitoring and greater opportunities to 
access additional or lower-cost resources (Baum et al., 2005). As a result, both Baum et al. 
(2005) and Baum and Dahlin (2007) propose that the likelihood of decision makers taking 
risky actions is positively related to the discrepancy between firm performance and the 
                                                 
3 However, in his study of radio stations, Greve (1998) argues that increasing performance further above the 
aspiration level significantly reduces decision makers’ willingness to take risks and make organisational 
changes. In addition, due to the organisational inertia, the probability decreases as the increase in firm 
performance is slower in the failure range (below the aspiration level) than in the success range (above the 
aspiration level) (Greve, 2003b).  
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aspiration level regardless of whether firm performance is above or below the aspiration 
level, as depicted in Figure 4.3a. 
In relation to CEO turnover, performance far below the aspiration level is more likely to 
trigger the board’s problemistic search and willingness to take a risky action to replace 
the CEO than performance slightly below the aspiration level. The reason for this is that 
decision makers are generally reluctant to search for alternative courses of action unless 
they are motivated by a salient performance shortfall (Cyert & March, 1963). However, it 
is unlikely that the slack search would lead to a CEO turnover when firm performance 
exceeds the aspiration level by a substantial margin. According to power theories, CEOs 
in firms with relatively better performance are generally more powerful and at less risk of 
being replaced (Ocasio, 1994). As stated by Shen (2003), once a CEO has met or 
exceeded the expectations of the board, the board’s confidence in the CEO will increase 
and it may become relaxed and less vigilant in its monitoring. Agency theory has a 
similar view that well performing CEOs are less likely to be replaced because the board is 
unlikely to punish CEOs for their good performance (Jensen, 1994). For these reasons, it 
is suggested that the likelihood of CEO turnover does not change with increases in the 
discrepancy between firm performance and the aspiration level, as described in Figure 
4.3b. Based on these arguments and the nature of voluntary CEO turnover, two sets of 
hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 1.2a: The further an organisation’s performance is below the board’s 
aspiration level, the greater the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
Hypothesis 1.2b: The further an organisation’s performance is below the board’s 
aspiration level, the greater the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. 
Hypothesis 1.2c: When firm performance is below aspiration levels, the likelihood of 
voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to the discrepancy between firm performance and 
the board’s aspiration level. 
Hypothesis 1.3a: When firm performance is above the aspiration level, the likelihood of 
CEO turnover is unrelated to the discrepancy between firm performance and the board’s 
aspiration level. 
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Hypothesis 1.3b: When firm performance is above the aspiration level, the likelihood of 
forced CEO turnover is unrelated to the discrepancy between firm performance and the 
board’s aspiration level. 
Hypothesis 1.3c: When firm performance is above the aspiration level, the likelihood of 
voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to the discrepancy between firm performance and 
the board’s aspiration level. 
4.3.2 CEO power and CEO turnover 
According to the analysis above, performance below the aspiration level triggers not only 
boards’ problemistic search but also their willingness to take a risk, which increases the 
likelihood of CEO turnover. However, a CEO is the most powerful individual within any 
corporation (Allen, 1981; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002; 
Michels, 1991; Pearce, 1981) and CEO turnover is a social and political process involving 
power struggles between the CEO and other organisational entities, that is, the board, 
shareholders, and even non-CEO executives (Boeker, 1992; Ocasio, 1994; Shen & 
Cannella, 2002a). The successful replacement of incumbent CEOs depends in part on 
how powerful they are, and the basic principle is that more powerful CEOs are less likely 
to be replaced. 
4.3.2.1 Structural power and CEO turnover 
CEO power stems from organisational structure and hierarchy. Formal structures, such as 
the joint CEO/chairperson, the proportion of executive directors, and the size of board, all 
have an impact on CEO power.4 
Proportion of outside directors 
The board of directors’ ability to oust a CEO is conditional upon its independence 
(Mizruchi, 1983). The ratio of outside to inside board members is an indicator of the 
                                                 
4 CEO compensation is often used as a proxy for CEO structural power. However, in China, monetary 
incomes form only a portion of the total income of management and employees and a significant proportion 
of total income accrues in non-monetary forms such as access to highly subsidised social provisions 
(housing, health care, etc.) and other fringe benefits (Lin, 2001). In addition, listed companies were not 
required to disclose executive compensation until 1998. Furthermore, before 2005, annual reports did not 
disclose the compensation of the CEO although they disclosed total compensation for the highest-paid three 
executives, total compensation for the highest-paid three directors, and total compensation for all directors, 
supervisors, and senior managers. Given this circumstance, CEO compensation is not utilised in this study.  
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independence of the board of directors. In terms of agency theory, inside directors may 
serve as pawns of the CEO as they are a part of the management team and more loyal to 
CEOs than outside directors (Ocasio, 1994). By contrast, in prior research outside 
directors have commonly been regarded as an important mechanism to monitor and 
control CEOs and other senior managers (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Geddes & Vinod, 
1997). The reason for this is that outside directors are independent of the influence of the 
CEO as their career fortunes are linked to their reputation in the managerial market 
instead of the CEO, which enables them to limit the CEO’s power on behalf of 
shareholders’ interests. In other words, a CEO in a firm with a greater proportion of 
outside directors has less structural power over the board than one in a firm with a lower 
proportion of outside directors and is therefore more likely to be replaced involuntarily. 
This view has been supported by the positive relationship between the proportion of 
outside directors and the likelihood of CEO turnover that has been commonly found in 
empirical research (e.g., Boeker, 1992; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Weisbach, 1988).  
According to Chinese law and to the official codes of corporate governance, directors are 
supposed to play a role similar to their counterparts in Western countries (Firth et al., 
2006). Given the monitoring role of outside directors and the nature of voluntary CEO 
turnover, three hypotheses are advanced: 
Hypothesis 2.1a: The likelihood of CEO turnover is positively related to the proportion of 
outside directors. 
Hypothesis 2.1b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is positively related to the 
proportion of outside directors. 
Hypothesis 2.1c: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to the proportion 
of outside directors. 
Duality  
Duality is another important indicator of the independence of the board over CEOs. From 
the perspective of power theory, when serving simultaneously as CEO and chairperson of 
the board, the CEO has greater formal authority and informal stature relative to board 
members (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). This suggests that in such 
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settings CEOs can exert greater political influence over board members and undermine 
the independence of the board of  directors (Ocasio, 1994). The reason for this is that the 
joint service enables CEOs to control the agenda of board meetings, determine what 
information directors receive in advance of meetings, and lead board meeting discussions 
(Daily & Johnson, 1997, p. 102; Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1994). Consistent with this, 
agency theory emphasises that when CEOs also hold the position of chairperson of the 
board, internal control systems fail, as the board cannot effectively perform its key 
functions including those of evaluating and firing CEOs (Jensen, 1993). Goyal and Park 
(2002) find that CEOs are less likely to be replaced following poor firm performance 
when the CEO and chairperson duties are combined in one person. In terms of this 
argument, the following hypotheses are presented: 
Hypothesis 2.2a: The likelihood of CEO turnover decreases where CEOs jointly serve as 
chairpersons of boards. 
Hypothesis 2.2b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover decreases where CEOs jointly 
serve as chairpersons of boards. 
Hypothesis 2.2c: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to whether or not 
CEOs jointly serve as chairpersons of boards. 
Board size 
Board size is an important structural determinant in the distribution of power between the 
CEO and the board of directors (Yermack, 1996). Agency theorists emphasise the 
increased inertia and ineffectiveness of a board as it grows in size. Compared with a large 
board, a small board is a more effective overseer of the CEO, particularly in response to 
poor performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Wu, 2000; Yermack, 1996). The reason 
for this is that directors on a large board are less capable of holding frank discussions, feel 
more anonymous and are less responsible (Hengartner, 2006). In contrast, directors on a 
small board are more effective at obtaining inside information and less likely to be 
affected by free-riding or otherwise plagued with inertia (Hermalin, 2003). Therefore, 
CEOs in firms with smaller boards have less power and are more likely to be replaced 
than those in firms with large boards. 
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An opposite view from power circulation theory suggests that CEOs are less powerful on 
large boards because alternative political coalitions that challenge CEOs and take control 
over firms are more likely to be generated (Ocasio, 1994). In addition, CEOs are less 
likely to exert their social influence to maintain power in firms with large boards. As 
Grinstein & Hribar (2004, p. 136) pointed out, “when the CEO is more involved in 
choosing board members, a smaller board might actually mean that the CEO has more 
managerial power”. In terms of this view, CEOs in firms with small boards have more 
power and, consequently, are less likely to be replaced than those in firms with larger 
boards. 
Based on these contradictory views, two sets of opposing hypotheses are presented: 
Hypothesis 2.3a: The likelihood of CEO turnover is negatively related to the number of 
directors on a board. 
Hypothesis 2.3b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is negatively related to the 
number of directors on a board. 
Hypothesis 2.3c: The likelihood of CEO turnover is positively related to the number of 
directors on a board. 
Hypothesis 2.3d: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is positively related to the 
number of directors on a board. 
Given that voluntary CEO turnover is not determined by any force, it is anticipated that:  
Hypothesis 2.3e: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to the number of 
directors on a board. 
4.3.2.2 Ownership power and CEO turnover 
Ownership represents a source of power that can be used either to support or oppose 
management (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980). Agency theory implicitly acknowledges the 
existence of power in the relationship between executives and shareholders (Grabke-
Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). Thus, executive power can arise from an ownership 
dimension. CEOs gain power from their ownership or founder status, but also from share 
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ownership distribution among shareholders, such as state shareholders, non-CEO 
executives, and block shareholders. 
CEOs’ shareholdings 
The agency relationship suggests that shareholdings are relevant indicators of power 
(Finkelstein, 1992). In terms of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
which came into force on January 1, 2006, all shareholders have rights to elect and 
change directors and to vote and influence corporate strategic decisions through the 
shareholders’ meeting, which is the highest authority of the company. A CEO who is also 
a shareholder has the same rights. Moreover, as an inside shareholder, a CEO represents 
both management and shareholders and thus has the ability to influence directors’ 
decisions and their performance criteria through both the ownership and management 
capacities (Daily & Johnson, 1997). Therefore, it is expected that CEOs with significant 
shareholdings will be more powerful and less likely to be replaced than CEOs without an 
ownership interest in the firm (Zald, 1969).  
The view that CEOs acquire power from their ownership status can also be explained by 
the entrenchment view of agency theory, which indicates that large equity ownership can 
insulate CEOs from internal monitoring efforts. This is achieved either through the voting 
control with which it is associated or through the correlation between equity ownership 
and other conditions conducive to managerial entrenchment (Conyon & Florou, 2002; 
Morck et al., 1988). In addition, executive ownership has been advocated as a means to 
solve the agency problem and reduce agency costs because it ties executives’ interests to 
shareholders’ (Fama & Jensen, 1983). It indicates that the higher the extent of executive 
ownership, the lower the need for disciplining top managers, as they become shareholders 
and are penalised by the declining value of their wealth. Existing research has shown that 
executive ownership insulates a CEO from the pressure of being replaced. For example, 
Denis et al. (1997) report that the likelihood of top executive turnover is significantly less 
sensitive to stock price performance in firms with a higher level of managerial ownership.  
In terms of both power theory and agency theory, two hypotheses are proposed as follows: 
Hypothesis 3.1a: The likelihood of CEO turnover decreases when the CEO holds shares 
in the company.  
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Hypothesis 3.1b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover decreases when the CEO holds 
shares in the company.  
Given that voluntary CEO turnover is not determined by any force, it is anticipated that:  
Hypothesis 3.1c: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to whether or not 
the CEO holds shares in the company.  
Proportions of state-owned shares, legal person shares, and tradable A-shares  
In China, most listed companies have been corporatised from state-owned enterprises and 
a typical listed company has on average 30% state-owned shares and 30% legal entity 
shares, with the remainder being individual shares (Fan et al., 2007). These three types of 
shareholder have different interests and abilities to monitor CEOs and other managers. 
Thus, the distribution of shares among these categories influences CEO power. 
The proportion of state-owned shares  
In China, the government remains the largest shareholder in most listed companies, either 
by direct state ownership or by indirect ownership through legal person shares (Kato & 
Long, 2006a). The shareholder rights of the state are represented by the central 
government, local government, or solely state-owned enterprises (Xu & Wang, 1999). In 
other words, there are two types of state shareholder. One is government shareholders, 
which are government agencies (or institutions) constructed from former government 
agencies including central government ministries and commissions, national industry 
groups, local government bureaus, local state assets management bureaus, and local state 
assets management companies. The other is other domestic institutions indirectly owned 
by the government, such as business agencies and enterprises of local government (Kato 
& Long, 2004). Wang, J. (2003a) defines these non-government agencies, such as SOEs 
and other market-oriented economic entities, as corporate state shareholders. 
Correspondingly, the shares held by these two types of state shareholder are state shares 
and state-owned legal person shares respectively (Kato & Long, 2004). 
Current research has commonly argued that state shareholders are ineffective in 
monitoring CEOs and other senior managers in China for three reasons. First, state 
ownership suffers from the separation between ownership by the general public and 
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control by the bureaucrats in charge of the daily operation of the firm (Kato & Long, 
2006a). Therefore, state shareholders, especially government shareholders, are not 
adequately motivated to monitor managers closely because their well-being is not tied to 
the performance of state-controlled listed firms. Second, most government shareholders 
do not have sufficient ability to monitor managers as they are understaffed and the 
existing staff have limited expertise in modern finance and investment theories and 
practices (Lin, 2001). Third, both government shareholders and corporate state 
shareholders suffer from the problem of multi-goals, that is, social and political goals (Lin, 
J.Y., 2004a). As a result, it is expected that CEOs in firms with a greater ratio of state-
owned shares have more power than those in firms with a lower ratio of state-owned 
shares. Based on these premises, it is anticipated that: 
Hypothesis 3.2a: The likelihood of CEO turnover is negatively related to the proportion 
of state-owned shares. 
Hypothesis 3.2b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is negatively related to the 
proportion of state-owned shares. 
However, prior research has failed to distinguish the motivations and incentive structures 
of different types of state shareholder, which may have different impacts on corporate 
governance and firm performance. Thus, Duan (2009) points out that the lumping of all 
types of state ownership into one group obscures the real impact of the state as a 
shareholder. It is imperative to determine who the real share owners are, and what their 
motives are. Moreover, Firth et al. (2006) point out that the current breakdown of 
ownership type into state agencies and other shareholders is rather broad, and thus they 
call for further research on corporate governance in China so as to enable better 
distinctions between state agencies. 
According to Wang, J. (2003a), government shareholders and corporate state shareholders 
of companies listed on the Chinese stock markets may have different levels of 
effectiveness in monitoring CEOs and other executives because they exert different 
degrees of political interference. Government shareholders are expected to be detrimental 
to firm performance and corporate governance because they are purely government 
agencies and exercise a high degree of government intervention (World Bank, 1997a). 
Government shareholders have the right to select the board of directors and managers of 
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SOEs, but bear no risks for the consequences of their selections because they are paid by 
the government and their remuneration and rewards are not determined by the 
performance of the listed companies which they monitor (Duan, 2009). In addition, the 
promotion of government officials depends largely on how well they execute the 
instructions of the government rather than on how much they contribute to creating firm 
value and dividend revenues (Xu & Wang, 1999).  
In contrast, corporate state shareholders are subject to less government intervention 
because they have much more autonomy. In addition, to some degree, corporate state 
shareholders’ goals are different from those of government shareholders (Wang, J., 2003a). 
In China, managers of SOEs have opportunities to be promoted to a government position 
if SOEs under their control improve their performance. Hence, the corporate state 
shareholders have an incentive to monitor the decision-making process and make it more 
efficient. Although final decisions about top management are still made by the 
government, corporate state shareholders can exert pressure to replace poorly performing 
managers. Thus, government shareholders have a greater negative impact on corporate 
governance than the corporate state shareholders although both types of state shareholders 
have a negative impact on corporate governance. Given these circumstances, a set of 
hypotheses is proposed:  
Hypothesis 3.2c: The negative relationship between the proportion of shares held by 
government shareholders and CEO turnover is greater than the negative relationship 
between the proportion of shares held by corporate state shareholders and CEO turnover. 
Hypothesis 3.2d: The negative relationship between the proportion of shares held by 
government shareholders and forced CEO turnover is greater than the negative 
relationship between the proportion of shares held by corporate state shareholders and 
forced CEO turnover. 
Given that voluntary CEO turnover is not determined by any force, it is anticipated that:  
Hypothesis 3.2e: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to any of the 
proportion of state-owned shares, the proportion of shares held by government 
shareholders, or the proportion of shares held by corporate state shareholders. 
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The proportion of legal person shares  
Legal person shares are held by domestic institutions with a legal personal status, such as 
collectively owned enterprises, township and village enterprises 
1F2F3F4F5F6F7F8F9F10F11F12F13F14F15F16F17F18F19F(TVEs), non-bank financial 
institutions, private companies, or joint stock companies (Wang, Z.M., 2003b). Legal 
person shareholders emerged as a form of ownership with the aim of creating a group of 
shareholders that had a profit-oriented objective when China’s central government 
established its domestic stock markets in the early 1990s (Delios & Wu, 2005). Compared 
to state shareholders, legal person shareholders are motivated to pursue the goal of profit 
maximisation as they do not have to consider the political or social objectives which are 
important considerations faced by state shareholders (Delios & Wu, 2005). In addition, 
they have the power and ability to monitor CEOs due to the large proportion of shares 
that they hold (Tan, 2002). Unlike the representatives of state shareholders, who are 
appointed by the government, representatives of legal person shareholders are elected to 
the board of directors and the supervisory committee (Delios & Wu, 2005). Their 
directorships enable them to have access to corporate inside information and provide 
them with the right to question CEOs at any time about the operations of the firm (Delios 
& Wu, 2005; Xu & Wang, 1997). A positive relationship between the proportion of legal 
person shareholdings and firm performance can be found in empirical research from Xu 
and Wang (1999) and Sun et al. (2002). These results indicate that legal person 
shareholders are an effective mechanism for improving the quality of corporate 
governance. Therefore, CEOs of firms with a higher proportion of legal person shares are 
less powerful and more likely to be replaced. That is: 
Hypothesis 3.3a: The likelihood of CEO turnover is positively related to the proportion of 
legal person shares. 
Hypothesis 3.3b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is positively related to the 
proportion of legal person shares. 
Given that voluntary CEO turnover is not determined by any force, it is anticipated that:  
Hypothesis 3.3c: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to the proportion 
of legal person shares. 
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The proportion of tradable A-shares  
Tradable A-shares are the only type of equity that is traded among domestic investors at 
the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges, and they are held and traded mostly by 
individuals (some by domestic institutions) (Xu & Wang, 1999). The total number of 
investors on the Shanghai Stock Exchange was 37.87 million in 2004. Of these, only 0.12 
million accounts belonged to institutional investors, accounting for just 0.32% of all 
investors. Although institutional investors have grown rapidly since 1998, they are still 
yet to play an active monitoring role in corporate governance (Kling & Gao, 2008a; 
Research Center of the SHSE, 2003). This is because the high ratio of non-tradable shares 
in stock markets hampers institutional investors’ ability to monitor managers by obtaining 
control of companies. 
In relation to individual investors, the vast majority of them are small shareholders in 
China. Even for those individuals in the top ten largest shareholders, the ratios of shares 
held by them are normally less than 0.5% of total shares, which is extremely small 
compared to the average large stakes held by the state and legal persons (more than 30%) 
(Xu & Wang, 1999). This low ratio of individual shares means that individual 
shareholders have no incentive and power to oversee CEOs and other managers. 
According to Lin, J.Y. (2004a), individual shareholders do not care about the management 
of the enterprise and seldom hold stocks for a long period, which is evidenced by the high 
turnover rate on China’s stock markets. Gao (2002) has shown that during the eight years 
from 1994 to 2001, the average turnover rate of the Chinese stock markets was 504.7%. 
Gao (2002) also suggests that individual shareholders only care about the stock prices and 
the frequent exchanges are primarily for speculation. Therefore, they have no influence 
on the strategy and the appointment and removal of company personnel. Given the 
characteristics of individual and institutional investors, it is anticipated that the proportion 
of shares held by them is not related to CEOs’ power and the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
Therefore, three hypotheses are presented as follows: 
Hypothesis 3.4a: The likelihood of CEO turnover is unrelated to the proportion of 
tradable A-shares. 
Hypothesis 3.4b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is unrelated to the proportion of 
tradable A-shares. 
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Hypothesis 3.4c: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to the proportion 
of tradable A-shares. 
Ownership concentration  
Berle and Means (1932) suggest that the influence of owners on the actions of managers 
is limited when the ownership of the firm is dispersed (Boeker, 1992). According to 
agency theory, monitoring executives is costly, and small shareholders who do not have 
incentives or power to monitor executives often “vote with their feet” when firm 
performance is poor. In contrast, if large shareholders sell their shares they will influence 
the market and the price of their shares. As a result, they have incentives and power to 
monitor CEOs and senior managers either through their voting power or through their 
representation on the board, or both (Hengartner, 2006). Accordingly, a concentrated 
ownership may align the interests of the management with shareholders’ interests.5 
Following this logic, it has been suggested that dispersed ownership dilutes shareholders’ 
power and provides CEOs with greater power and discretion, while ownership 
concentrated in the hands of a few individuals (other than the CEO) may limit CEOs’ 
influence over the organisation (Boeker, 1992; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). 
Existing studies have found evidence of large shareholders’ monitoring role in firms by 
finding a positive effect of large shareholders on the CEO turnover-performance 
relationship (e.g., Kang & Shivdasani, 1995; Kaplan & Minton, 1994; Renneboog, 2000; 
Volpin, 2002). In addition, the empirical result of Boeker (1992) indicates that poorly 
performing firms with dispersed ownership are significantly less likely to dismiss CEOs 
than poorly performing firms with concentrated ownership. Based on this view, it is 
anticipated that CEOs in firms with concentrated ownership are less powerful and more 
overseen by shareholders than those in firms with dispersed ownership. Consequently, 
hypotheses are proposed as follows: 
                                                 
5 Although concentrated ownership can effectively reduce the traditional principal-agent problem, it may 
give rise to another agency problem between large shareholders, especially controlling shareholders, and 
small shareholders, namely principal-principal conflicts (Johnson, Porta, & Shleifer, 2000; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). The increased shareholding can lead to 
large shareholders extracting private benefits by taking a disproportionate amount of the corporation’s 
ongoing earnings, or freezing out the minority, or selling control (Gilson & Gordon, 2003).  
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Hypothesis 3.5a: The likelihood of CEO turnover is positively related to the concentration 
of share ownership. 
Hypothesis 3.5b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is positively related to the 
concentration of share ownership. 
Hypothesis 3.5c: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to the 
concentration of share ownership. 
Representatives of large shareholders  
Besides ownership structure, ownership power of CEOs also stems from their status as 
representatives of large shareholders, or ‘blockholders’ (Holderness, 2003). As 
representatives of large shareholders, CEOs are entitled to substantial voting power to act 
on behalf of these shareholders. In this situation, CEOs represent both management and 
large shareholders, and have more ability to influence important firm decisions than other 
CEOs. In the empirical study of the relationship between CEO power and tenure 
conducted by Allen (1981), CEOs who either control or represent a significant block of 
stock are found to be more powerful and have longer tenures than other CEOs.  
From an agency theory point of view, large shareholders may choose to pursue their own 
interests at the cost of other shareholders when their interests are not well aligned, which 
causes a new type of agency problem between large shareholders and small shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Large shareholders are found to have incentives to use their 
voting power to consume corporate resources and to enjoy corporate benefits that are not 
shared with minority shareholders, such as excess salary for an individual large 
shareholder and synergies in production for a corporation’s large shareholders 
(Holderness, 2003). Large shareholders are likely to appoint their representatives as CEOs 
in an effort to preserve their ability to extract those benefits at the cost of other 
shareholders’ interests and firm performance. In other words, large shareholders entrench 
with management in an effort to pursue their interests. 
In China, the largest shareholders have an enormous amount of influence on the listed 
companies due to the highly concentrated ownership. In terms of the July 2001 issue of 
China Securities, the largest shareholders 26F(typically government) held on average 
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44.9% of the shares in listed companies. However, the proportion of shares held by the 
second-largest shareholders was on average 8.2% (Shi & Weisert, 2002). Under this 
circumstance, the largest shareholders, namely the controlling shareholders, dominate the 
shareholders’ meeting, the board of directors, and management in an effort to pursue their 
own interests at the cost of minority shareholders’ interests. According to Kato and Long 
(2006a), between 1998 and 2002, CEOs of 41% of China’s listed companies 
simultaneously held executive positions in the controlling shareholder companies. In 
doing so, CEOs are expected to serve the interests of the largest shareholders rather than 
the listed firms. Kato and Long (2006a) also suggest that, for both private-controlling 
shareholders and state-controlled firms, the objective of appointing CEOs as their 
representatives is to serve their interests through wealth transfer activities, that is, 
tunnelling activities (Gao & Kling, 2008a). For private-controlling shareholders, the 
major incentive is to steal wealth from the firms. For state-controlled firms, goals, such as 
providing social welfare and political stability, provide an incentive to transfer wealth 
from the firm. Using the scenario of the entrenchment effect, large shareholders are 
unlikely to replace CEOs who are their representatives. These have given rise to the type 
II agency problem (Young et al., 2008) and the severe issue of insider control, namely the 
entrenchment between the largest shareholder and management. Using the scenario of the 
entrenchment effect, in the Chinese context the largest shareholders are unlikely to 
replace CEOs who are their representatives in an effort to pursue their interests. 
Compared to the largest shareholder, other large shareholders have relatively lower 
impacts on the firm partly due to the smaller amount of shares held by them. Hence, they 
may provide little power for their representatives. By this token, the following hypotheses 
are proposed: 
Hypothesis 3.6a: The likelihood of CEO turnover decreases when a CEO is the 
representative of the largest shareholder. 
Hypothesis 3.6b: The likelihood of CEO turnover is unrelated to whether a CEO is the 
representative of any other large shareholder. 
Hypothesis 3.6c: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover decreases when a CEO is the 
representative of the largest shareholder. 
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Hypothesis 3.6d: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is unrelated to whether a CEO is 
the representative of any other large shareholder. 
Hypothesis 3.6e: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to whether a 
CEO is the representative of the largest shareholder. 
Hypothesis 3.6f: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to whether a CEO 
is the representative of any other large shareholder. 
4.3.2.3 Prestige power and CEO turnover 
CEOs also acquire power from their prestige or status (Finkelstein, 1992). Prestige 
portrays to others that the executive has powerful acquaintances and can obtain 
information from important external sources (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). 
Daily and Johnson (1997, p. 102) also point out that prestigious CEOs can aid in 
establishing firms’ legitimacy and provide firms with access to other prestigious 
individuals. Research has suggested that CEOs may derive prestige power by having 
graduated from an elite educational institution6 (e.g., Daily & Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 
1992), or their celebrity status (e.g., Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004; Wade, Porac, & 
Pollock, 2006). 
Elite education  
Educational institutions which are generally regarded as prestigious transfer that prestige 
to the individual (D'Aveni, 1990; Daily & Johnson, 1997). In addition, CEOs’ elite 
educational backgrounds provide them with opportunities to contact other individuals 
from elite institutions, which may yield information of value to their firms because of the 
dominance of the educational elite in institutional governance (Useem, 1979). 
Correspondingly, Daily and Johnson (1997), in their empirical study, find CEOs with 
prestigious educational backgrounds are granted wide discretion. This leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
                                                 
6 Serving as a board member of other organisations, including for-profit organisations and not-for-profit 
organisations, has also been considered an important proxy for prestige power in prior research (Finkelstein, 
1992; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). However, this proxy is not investigated in this study 
because the information is unavailable in annual reports in the Chinese context. 
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Hypothesis 4.1a: The likelihood of CEO turnover is lower where CEOs have elite 
educational backgrounds. 
Hypothesis 4.1b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is lower where CEOs have elite 
educational backgrounds. 
Hypothesis 4.1c: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to whether or not 
CEOs have elite educational backgrounds. 
CEO celebrity status  
Celebrity status can be seen as an “intangible” asset for a firm as celebrity increases a 
CEO’s ability to access resources (e.g., human capital, capital markets, and raw materials) 
and exploit opportunities that may increase a firm's competitive advantages (Ranft, Zinko, 
Ferris, & Buckley, 2006). Although CEOs with celebrity status are more closely 
scrutinised by the board of directors, shareholders, and media because of their celebrity 
status, it is suggested that celebrity CEOs have more power and autonomy as celebrity 
status brings them an increased latitude and an amount of permissible managerial 
discretion to deviate from normally expected rules of conduct (Ferris, Blass, Douglas, 
Kolodinsky, & Treadway, 2003; Ranft et al., 2006). Similarly, Hayward et al. (2004) 
make the point that a celebrity CEO may lead stakeholders to believe that he/she indeed 
has great control over organisational actions and should be granted such control, thereby 
increasing the CEO’s actual, as well as perceived influence. The following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
Hypothesis 4.2a: The likelihood of CEO turnover is lower where CEOs have celebrity 
status. 
Hypothesis 4.2b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is lower where CEOs have 
celebrity status. 
Hypothesis 4.2c: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to whether or not 
CEOs have celebrity status. 
4.3.2.4 CEO tenure power and CEO turnover 
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CEO tenure  
A pervasive view is that CEO power increases steadily over time (Shen, 2003) due to the 
institutionalisation and perpetuation of power (Pfeffer, 1981). In terms of this view, CEOs 
manage to accumulate power over their tenure from a variety of means. For example, 
CEOs may gain power by influencing the nomination of new board members or the 
appointment of new top management members and the removal of troublesome ones 
(Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). In addition, CEOs’ expert power increases as their tenure 
lengthens. As Zhang and Wiersema (2009) stated, as a CEO’s tenure increases, a CEO’s 
human capital becomes more specific to the top position in the particular company and 
less generic. Both Shen (2003) and Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) depict how CEOs’ 
task knowledge accumulates along with the lengthening of their tenure. New CEOs have 
a relatively low level of task knowledge even if they are promoted from within the 
organisation or have been a CEO before they took office. As stated by Shen (2003) and 
Harris and Helfat (1997), promotion to the CEO position brings significant changes to the 
executives’ tasks, responsibilities, and skill requirements. At this stage, they have a very 
low level of expert power and are closely watched by the board of directors. As their 
tenure lengthens, their task knowledge also increases although the growth rate may 
decline. As a result, they possess more expert power. In supporting this view, a positive 
relationship between CEO power and the length of their tenure has usually been found in 
previous studies by measuring power as the level of shares owned by CEOs (Allen, 1981), 
the compensation of CEOs (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998), and CEO turnover (Shen & 
Cannella, 2002a).  
In contrast to the view of institutionalisation of power, the concept of power circulation 
posits that there will be contestation from senior managers who have high needs for 
power and achievement (Shen & Cannella, 2002a). According to this view, the 
obsolescence of a CEO is likely to increase over his/her tenure, which increases the 
opportunities for the CEO’s power to be contested (Ocasio, 1994). Therefore, under this 
theory, it is expected that the length of tenure of the incumbent CEO will increase the rate 
of CEO succession (Ocasio, 1994). Based on these two contradictory views, this study 
proposes the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5.1a: The likelihood of CEO turnover is negatively related to the length of the 
incumbent CEO’s tenure. 
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Hypothesis 5.1b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is negatively related to the 
length of the incumbent CEO’s tenure. 
Hypothesis 5.1.c: The likelihood of CEO turnover is positively related to the length of the 
incumbent CEO’s tenure. 
Hypothesis 5.1d: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is positively related to the length 
of the incumbent CEO’s tenure. 
In relation to voluntary CEO turnover, it is expected to be positively associated with the 
length of CEO tenure due to the relationship between CEO tenure and CEO age. Many 
scholars have suggested and found evidence that older CEOs often have longer tenure 
(e.g., Goyal & Park, 2002; Hubbard, Edwards, Gresswell, & Kent, 2002). It is commonly 
accepted that an older CEO is more likely to depart his/her position for reasons related to 
age; for example, retirement and illness. As a result, it is anticipated that:  
Hypothesis 5.1e: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is positively related to the 
length of the incumbent CEO’s tenure. 
Proportion of interdependent directors  
Interdependent directors are directors appointed by the incumbent CEO (Daily & Johnson, 
1997) and the proportion of them reflects the board’s loyalty to the incumbent CEO. 
According to the view of institutionalisation of power, a CEO’s influence over the board 
increases with his/her tenure partly because the CEO has power and opportunities to 
influence the appointments of board members as the CEO’s tenure increases (Ocasio, 
1994). Initially, a new CEO may have little influence over the board as his/her 
predecessor presumably nominated most board members who, therefore, have little 
personal loyalty to the new CEO (Hill & Phan, 1991). However, over time, CEOs are 
likely to gain power over boards by appointing directors with whom CEOs feel 
comfortable (Boeker, 1992). Directors appointed by they feel some loyalty to those CEOs 
responsible for their appointment to their boards of directors (Daily & Johnson, 1997). 
The potential for these loyalties and personal ties between board members and CEOs 
increase CEOs’ influence over boards’ decisions. In the case of CEO turnover, a greater 
proportion of current board members being appointed during the tenure of the current 
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CEO decreases the likelihood of CEO turnover (Boeker, 1992). Both Ocasio (1994) and 
Boeker (1992) find in their empirical studies that CEO turnover is less likely to occur in 
firms with a greater proportion of directors appointed by incumbent CEOs, even 
following poor performance. Therefore, the following hypotheses are provided: 
Hypothesis 5.2a: The likelihood of CEO turnover is negatively related to the proportion 
of interdependent directors. 
Hypothesis 5.2b: The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is negatively related to the 
proportion of interdependent directors. 
Hypothesis 5.2c: The likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to the proportion 
of interdependent directors. 
4.4 Chapter conclusion 
Chapter Two introduced the Chinese context and Chapter Three reviewed the literature on 
the antecedents of CEO turnover from perspectives of firm performance and CEO power, 
and organisational decision making as a response to performance feedback. On the basis 
of these two chapters, the emphasis of this thesis is on whether CEO turnover, especially 
forced CEO turnover, is an adaptive response for firm performance, namely, how a 
board’s perception of firm performance affects CEO turnover under the impact of CEO 
power in the Chinese context. 
This chapter has developed a model of CEO turnover in an effort to investigate the role of 
the board’s aspiration level relative to firm performance and CEO power in CEO turnover, 
including both forced and voluntary CEO turnover. Based on this model, 57 hypotheses 
have been presented. The methodology, research design, and analysis method used in this 
study will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Five: Research Methodology, Design, and Process 
5.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, a theoretical framework was established and 57 hypotheses were 
developed. This chapter explains the research methodology applied to this study. The 
objective of this chapter is to select the most suitable research process to identify the 
antecedents of CEO turnover for companies listed on the China’s stock markets.  
Figure 5.1 Structure of Chapter Five  
 
According to Creswell (2003), there are three elements or steps to the design of research, 
that is, knowledge claims, strategies, and methods. The preliminary step in designing a 
research proposal is to assess the knowledge claims brought to the study. Following this, 
researchers need to consider the strategy of inquiry that will be used. This is the plan of 
action, process or design that links methods to outcomes (e.g., experimental research and 
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survey research). The third step is to identify specific methods, which involve how to 
collect and analyse data. This chapter justifies the research methodology from these three 
perspectives. 
The structure of this chapter is summarised in Figure 5.1. The knowledge claim and 
research strategy used in this study are justified in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. 
Subsequently, the research methods, namely the detailed procedures and techniques used 
in this study, are explained in Section 5.4. This includes explanations for data collection, 
definitions of variables, data analysis, and modelling. Finally, a summary of this chapter 
is presented in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Justification of the knowledge claim: a positivist perspective 
A knowledge claim means that researchers start a project with certain assumptions about 
how they will learn and what they will learn during their inquiry (Creswell, 2003). 
Knowledge claims are also called paradigms (e.g., Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000), which reflect a basic set of philosophical beliefs about the nature of the 
world and help researchers to define problems which may arise from research and find 
tools for solving these problems (Kuhn, 1970). Sandelowski (2000, p. 247) explicitly 
defines paradigms of inquiry as world-views that signal distinctive ontological 36F(view 
of reality), epistemological (view of knowing and the relationship between knower and 
what is to be known), methodological (view of mode of inquiry), and axiological (view of 
what is valuable) positions. Researchers need to identify which knowledge claim they 
have chosen because a paradigm provides guidelines and principles concerning the way 
that research is conducted within the discipline (Veal, 2005). 
Positivism, interpretivism, and critical science are the three traditional research paradigms 
in the social sciences (Benbasat, 1984; Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran, 2001; Fink & 
Gantz, 1996). Of these, most ongoing social research is based on the first two research 
paradigms, while critical social science rarely appears in scholarly journals (Neuman, 
1997). For this reason, this study only considers the first two paradigms and critical 
science is not included this study. These two types of paradigm are different in terms of 
ontology, epistemology, and methodology, as presented in Table 5.1.  
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Positivism has a long history in the social sciences although it is rooted in the natural 
sciences.7 Its ontological stance is that there is a single reality which exists “out there” 
and is waiting to be discovered (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Neuman, 1997). Conversely, 
interpretivism assumes there is no single reality and the world is largely what people 
perceive it to be, therefore, reality is subjective and exists only in reference to the 
observer (Neuman, 2006).  
Table 5.1 Comparisons of positivist and interpretivist paradigms 
 Positivist paradigm Interpretivism paradigm 
Ontology There is a single reality. There is no one single reality. 
Epistemology Objective point of view. The 
knower and the known are 
independent. 
Subjective point of view. Knower and 
known are inseparable. 
Axiology  Inquiry is value free. Inquiry is value-bound. 
Logic  Deductive.  Inductive. 
Methods  Quantitative.  Qualitative. 
Aim To discover universal laws that 
can be used to predict human 
activity. 
To uncover the socially constructed 
meaning of reality as understood by an 
individual or group. 
Causal linkage Real causes temporally precedent 
to or simultaneous with effects. 
All entities simultaneously shape each 
other. It is impossible to distinguish 
causes from effects. 
Research methods 
and types of analysis 
Experiments; questionnaires; 
secondary data analysis; 
quantitatively coded; statistical 
analysis. 
Ethnography; participant observation; 
interviews; focus groups; 
conversational analysis; case studies. 
Goodness or criteria 
of quality 
Conventional benchmarks of 
“rigour”; internal and external 
validity; reliability and 
objectivity. 
Trustworthiness and authenticity. 
Research plan Rigorous, linear and rigid, based 
on research hypothesis. 
Flexible, and follows the information 
provided by the research subject. 
Sources: Cavana et al. (2001) and Crotty (1998) 
From the perspective of the epistemological stance, namely, the relationship of knower to 
what is to be known (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), positivists believe that the knower and the 
known are independent because reality exists apart from the operation of any 
consciousness and is capable of being seen by all (Crotty, 1998). In contrast, for 
interpretivists, reality can only be grasped partially because all understanding is 
incomplete and is conditioned by the researcher’s own perspective. Thus, there is no 
                                                 
7 Positivism originated in the nineteenth century as an attempt to apply the methods of the natural sciences 
to social phenomena. In 1822, the French philosopher Auguste Comte created the term sociologies and 
further classified social interactions as physical science-like phenomena to be investigated so as to find their 
universally governing rules (Babbie, 2004; Kim, 2003). 
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objective knowledge which is independent of a thinking, reasoning human (Gephart, 
1999). 
The different ontological and epistemological stances of these two paradigms cause them 
to differ in their axiological positions. Positivists believe that researchers are independent 
of the research project, consequently they should be value and bias free, with no influence 
on the collected data or research results (Creswell, 2003). In contrast, interpretivist 
researchers are seen to be part of the research process, rather than being independent of it. 
In other words, researchers’ values are included (Cavana et al., 2001). 
The fourth distinction between these two paradigms lies in the research process. Positivist 
research starts from formulating a hypothesis, then attempts to prove or disprove these 
assumed relationships by using precise, objective measures, which are usually associated 
with quantitative data (Cavana et al., 2001). This research process is called deductive 
reasoning or logic (Crotty, 1998) and in Figure 5.2, it can be described as starting at point 
C, and moving to A and then to B. On the other hand, the process of interpretive research 
begins with observation and data collection, then moves to analysis, and ends with 
explanation or theory building, namely, moving from A to B to C. This process is called 
inductive reasoning or logic (Crotty, 1998; Veal, 2005). 
Figure 5.2: Circular model of the research process: induction and deduction 
 
Source: Adapted from Veal (2005) 
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These two central paradigms have a long history in the social science area and have 
suffered criticisms.8 To some degree, the choice between these research paradigms will be 
based on the individual researcher’s personality, past experiences and training. However, 
it may also be determined by the research topic and objectives (Cavana et al., 2001). 
Likewise, as Benbasat (1984) points out, given the richness and complexity of the real 
world, the research methodology best suited to the problem under consideration, as well 
as the objectives of the researcher, should be chosen. In relation to this research, 
positivism seems to be a suitable paradigm for following reasons. 
First, from the ontological perspective, the research objective of this study is to 
investigate relationships between CEO turnover (including forced and voluntary CEO 
turnover) and performance relative to an aspiration level (PRA) and CEO power. In other 
words, these relationships are reality and objectively exist “out there”, waiting to be 
discovered. In addition, this research assumes that there are causal relationships between 
the phenomena of CEO turnover and PRA and CEO power. From the positivist point of 
view, the social world, like the natural world, comprises phenomena that are causally 
related to each other and positivistic knowledge seeks to determine how change in one 
variable will produce change in another, namely causal relationships (Kim, 2003). For 
this reason, the research objective can be fulfilled through the correlational design of 
positivism. 
Second, the epistemological stance of interpretivism, which is contextual and subjective, 
creates obstacles for the research findings being generalised, as what is true in one 
situation or context may not be true for another (Kim, 2003). In contrast, the aim of 
positivist research is to discover universal laws that can be used to predict human activity 
(Cavana et al., 2001), which indicates that the research findings can be generalised and 
applied beyond the situation in which the study is initially carried out. Thus, this research 
has generalisability by adopting the positivist paradigm. 
Third, from the research process perspective, this research aims to test those hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter Four based on relevant theories by using data on listed companies in 
China, namely, this research uses deductive reasoning, a typical research logic of the 
positivist paradigm.  
                                                 
8 For details, see Cavana et al. (2001). 
 50 
5.3 Justification of research strategy: quantitative research and secondary data 
The second element of a research design is to select an appropriate strategy of inquiry or 
methodology (Mertens, 1998) that provides a specific direction for procedures in a 
research design (Creswell, 2003). In general, there are two types of approaches: 
quantitative strategy and qualitative strategy (Veal, 2005). 9  The philosophies, data 
collection methods, analysis methods, and other characteristics of both strategies are 
presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Comparisons of quantitative and qualitative methods 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Philosophical 
assumption 
Positivist Constructivist/Advocacy/ 
Participatory 
Employed methods Closed-ended questions Open-ended questions 
Formation of data Numeric data Text or image data 
Data collection method  Survey, experiments, secondary 
data 
Case study, narrative 
Data analysis method Statistical analysis Thematic analysis 
Sample size Large number of cases Small number of cases 
Use these practices of 
research, as the 
researcher: 
tests or verifies theories or 
explanations 
generates theory 
identifies variables to study collects participant meanings 
uses an unbiased approach collaborates with the participants 
is independent of the context brings personal values into the study 
uses standards of validity and 
reliability 
validates the accuracy of findings 
seeks to generalise to whole 
population 
acknowledges that findings typically 
not generalisable 
    Sources: Adapted from  Bryman (2001), Creswell (2003) and Veal (2005) 
The quantitative research approach is based on the philosophical assumptions of a 
positivist paradigm to collect numeric data by survey, experiments, or secondary data, and 
uses statistical analysis to test theories or explanations. By comparison, the qualitative 
approach is underpinned by the philosophical assumptions of interpretivism or critical 
science to collect text or image data by case study, and uses thematic analysis (Creswell, 
2003; Neuman, 2006; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). 
The quantitative research approach is employed in this study for the following reasons:   
                                                 
9 Recently, in the social science research area, there have been calls for using a mixed methods approach, 
that is, a means for seeking convergence across qualitative and quantitative methods (e.g., Creswell, 2003; 
Mertens, 2003; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). 
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• This research is based on the positivist paradigm, for which the quantitative 
method is most suitable. 
• According to Gay and Diehl (1992), quantitative research is most suitable when 
variables can be quantified and measured. In this study, the event of CEO turnover 
and its antecedents, namely performance relative to an aspiration level and CEO 
power, can be quantified. 
• The main purpose of the research is to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 
Four based on relevant theories.  
• T he quantitative research strategy has commonly been used in prior research on 
the issue of CEO turnover, such as Denis and Denis (1994), Jenter and Kanaan 
(2006), Maury (2006), and Weisbach (1988). 
 
There are many strategies associated with a quantitative research approach, including 
experimental designs and non-experimental designs 10  (Creswell, 2003). Experimental 
designs are usually associated with the natural sciences and laboratories, but in 
management settings, researchers do not have the degree of control that is available in a 
scientific laboratory (Veal, 2005). For this reason, this research adopts a non-
experimental design. More specifically, the analysis of secondary quantitative data, a 
common and generally accepted mode of inquiry (Heaton, 1998; Hinds, Vogel, & Clarke-
Steffen, 1997), is used in this study.  
 
Secondary data analysis involves the use of existing data, collected for the purpose of a 
prior study, in order to pursue a research interest which is distinct from that of the original 
work (Heaton, 1998; Hinds et al., 1997). These existing data or secondary data have many 
different forms, such as expressive documents, mass media reports, and official records 
(Forcese & Richer, 1973). In contrast, many other non-experimental designs, for example, 
survey design and observation, involve collecting primary data and utilise new data 
specifically collected in a current research project in the form of questionnaire-based 
surveys (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Veal, 2005). 
                                                 
10 Besides these two types of design, there are some other quantitative research designs called quasi-
experiments and specific single-subject experiments. Compared to true experimental designs, they are less 
rigorous (Creswell, 2003). 
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Unlike primary data, secondary data are existing data collected for some other purposes. 
For this reason, secondary data may create some problems, such as ethical issues and a 
lack of real control over data quality. This is because, to some degree, secondary data are 
influenced by the predispositions and ideals of those who originally collected them. In 
addition, using secondary data may not fully match the particular requirements of a 
research project (Neuman, 1997; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003).  
However, it is worth noting some advantages of using secondary data. Compared to 
collecting new information to obtain primary data, collecting secondary data is generally 
quicker and less costly. Thus, if existing secondary data can wholly or partially answer 
the research question at hand, there is a certain professional obligation for a researcher to 
utilise them, rather than going to the expense of collecting new data (Veal, 2005). In 
addition, in some cases, secondary data may have a higher quality than primary data. In 
particular, secondary data within organisations, such as sales and profit figures, can 
provide unobtrusive measures because they have already been collected (Stewart & 
Kamins, 1993). Another advantage of secondary data is that they can provide comparative 
and longitudinal data which facilitate comparative and longitudinal studies (Saunders et 
al., 2003). 
With respect to this study, secondary data have been used for several reasons. The first 
reason is the availability of secondary data. The research subject is public companies, 
which are required by law to disclose detailed information concerning their finances and 
structures in their annual reports. Annual reports and other company data are lodged 
annually at the stock exchanges, which have become a major source of company 
information for business researchers. The second reason is the low cost of collecting 
secondary data, which includes both time and the financial resources that need to be 
devoted to obtaining the data. In China, annual reports of listed companies are published 
on line and it is free to download them. More importantly, annual reports provide almost 
all the information that this study needs.  
5.4 Research method 
The third element of a research approach is the specific research method, which is the 
techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data related to the research questions 
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or hypotheses (Creswell, 2003). It involves three parts: data collection, definitions of 
variables, and data analysis. 
5.4.1 Data collection 
5.4.1.1 Defining population and sampling  
The population for this study consists of all listed firms from non-financial sectors on the 
Chinese stock markets, namely the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. Financial 
sector firms including commercial banks, financial companies, and finance and securities 
companies were excluded from the sample. This is because the corporate governance 
requirements (Campbell & Keys, 2002), accounting standards for determining income 
and profit (Lukviarman, 2004), and the financial statements contents of these financial 
sector firms tend to differ from those of industrial firms. 
In China, the stock markets were not established until early 1990s and lacked a set of 
institutions and regulations in the early stages. According to Heilmann (2002), various 
national regulatory institutions for the stock markets were gradually established from 
1993 to 1997. Given this, the early development stage of the stock markets has been 
excluded and 1997 to 2006 is the period examined in this study.11 
The sample was selected according to the following criteria: 
• Companies must have existed for the entire period of this study. 
• Companies must be in industries that have at least five companies. 
The initial sample of this study comprises all of the listed companies on the Chinese stock 
markets during the period 1997 to 2006. The final sample was determined in several steps 
as follows: 
The first step was to eliminate all the companies listed after December 31, 1996. The first 
sampling criterion was that companies must have complete data for all variables. Since 
                                                 
11 According to Firth et al. (2006), 1991-1997 is the early period of the listed company reforms. During this 
period, senior managers and chairpersons were often incumbents from the SOEs and their appointments and 
turnovers were based on political considerations. Moreover, new accounting standards and the development 
of an independent auditing profession were introduced into the Chinese stock markets after 1994. In order 
to maintain consistency of the accounting data used in this study, the earliest year of accounting data should 
be no earlier than 1995. Three-year average accounting performance is also used in this study; therefore, the 
period examined could be not earlier than 1997. 
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the examination period was from 1997 to 2006, companies listed after December 31, 1996 
would have incomplete data and were therefore excluded. After applying this criterion, 
505 listed companies were included in the sample. 
The second step was to exclude companies that were de-listed from the Chinese stock 
markets during the examination period. The reason for doing this was because a full data 
set was required for each sample company over the entire period of the study, as per the 
first sampling criterion. This led to the exclusion of an additional 20 companies, leaving 
485 in the sample. 
According to the requirement of the second sampling criterion of this study, the third step 
was to exclude companies that are in industries which have fewer than five listed 
companies. Measures for aspiration levels are transformed from historical aspiration 
levels and social aspiration levels, which are determined by the average performance of 
other companies in the industry. The average performance of peers is likely to be 
dominated by the extreme good or poor performance of a company where few companies 
are available in an industry. Given this, five was considered to be the minimum number of 
companies for an industry to be included in this research. 
In this study, sample companies were classified according to the Guidelines on Industry 
Classification of Listed Companies, issued by the CSRC on March 25, 2005.12 Under this 
system of classification, companies are classified into Category, Type, and Class 
according to nature of their economic activity. However, not all industries are classified to 
the “Class” level of detail. Instead these are classified to the less-detailed “Type” in the 
Guidelines. Industries in this category include electronic equipment manufacturing (G30), 
software (G60), commercial brokerage and agency service (H21), and real estate 
development and operation (J01).  
According to the diversification classification system proposed by Rumelt (1974), firms 
with more than a 95% specialisation ratio (based on a firm’s total sales in a discrete 
business area) are classified as single businesses. However, the information on sales is not 
                                                 
12 In terms of the Guidelines on Industry Classification of Listed Companies issued by the CSRC, the 
economic activities of the listed companies are classed into Category, Type, and Class. The overall coding 
follows the hierarchy coding method and the class coding follows the sequence coding method: ascending 
single letter for Category, single letter plus digit coding for Sub-category under manufacturing industry, 
single letter plus two digits coding for Type, single letter plus four digits coding for Class. 
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compulsorily disclosed for listed companies on the Chinese stock markets. According to 
the Guidelines, a firm is identified as being in the corresponding industry of the business 
according to following criteria:  
if the ratio of the operating income of a company in a certain business is 
more than or equal to 50% of the total operating income, or 
when the ratio of the operating income of a company in any business is less 
than 50% of the total operating income, the ratio of the operating income in 
a certain business is higher than that of other businesses by 30%, the 
company is identified as the corresponding industry of the business;  
otherwise, the company is identified as the comprehensive type. 
In this study, the criteria contained in the Guidelines have been adopted. It is worth 
noting that some listed companies that only announce their operating incomes at the level 
of Category or Type are indentified into corresponding Category and Type industries 
based on the above three criteria, for example, Wholesale and retail trade industry (H) 
and Civil engineering works construction (E05). 
After having excluded from this study all industry groups with fewer than five companies, 
only 325 listed companies remained in the sample. Therefore, the final sample for this 
study consists of 325 listed companies from non-financial sectors on the Chinese stock 
markets. 
5.4.1.2 Data sources  
In their present form, the Chinese stock markets have only been developed since the early 
1990s. In recent times, some databases have been digitised, such as the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR), China Center for Economic 
Research Database (CCER), and the Taiwan Economic Journal Great China Database 
(TEL). These databases provide most financial data and some corporate governance data 
in TXT, CSV, and Excel formats. Although most financial data can be acquired from 
these databases, revenues of the largest and second largest business segments of a 
company are unavailable. In addition, some corporate governance data required for this 
study cannot be derived from these databases. These include the number of directors who 
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are members of the top management, the reasons for CEO turnover as announced by 
listed companies, the type of largest shareholders, and the number of years that a CEO 
had been a director when assuming the position. Most importantly, some databases do not 
provide the data for the whole period being examined. For example, CSMAR only 
provides corporate governance information from 1999.  
Given this, financial data except for revenues of the largest and second largest businesses 
of companies were downloaded as an Excel file from one of these databases, CCER. Its 
website URL is http://www.ccerdata.com/. All other information related to CEOs, boards 
of directors, shareholders, and revenues of the largest and second largest businesses of 
companies were collected manually from annual reports published by listed companies. 
Most annual reports were downloaded from the Stockstar website (www.stockstar.com) 
in webpage format. In the case of annual reports that were not available on the Stockstar 
website, the stocksection of the Sina website (http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/index.shtml) 
was used to collect annual reports. The numbers of non-financial companies and annual 
reports collected for each year are presented in Table 5.3. A total of 11,218 annual reports 
were collected. 
Table 5.3 The number of non-financial companies on the Chinese stock markets: 1997-2006 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Number of non-financial 
companies on the Chinese 
Stock Markets 
721 830 922 1053 1133 1200 1259 1340 1341 1419 11218 
Number of non-financial 
companies on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
348 405 453 495 497 499 496 524 528 593 4838 
Number of non-financial 
companies on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 
373 425 469 558 636 701 763 816 813 826 6380 
Number of annual reports 
collected 721 830 922 1053 1133 1200 1259 1340 1341 1419 11218 
 
5.4.1.3 Data description  
For this study, data were collected from two perspectives. First, all the general company 
information and financial information were collected for all non-financial listed 
companies on the Chinese stock markets from 1997 to 2006 and 11,218 company-year 
observations were collated. Based on these data, almost all companies were classified into 
corresponding industries and their aspiration levels calculated. Second, for 325 listed 
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companies in the sample, all general information on CEOs and CEO power has been 
collected for the whole examination period. Based on these data, three dependent 
variables, twenty-one independent variables, and three control variables were generated. 
The data on each listed company each year has been organised according to the following 
four information categories: 
1. Company general information (all non-financial listed companies from 1997-
2006) 
2. Financial information (all non-financial listed companies from 1997-2006)  
3. CEO general information (325 sample companies from 1997-2006) 
4. CEO power information (325 sample companies from 1997-2006): 
 Structural power 
 Ownership power 
 Prestige power 
 Tenure power 
Company general information  
Company general information, summarised in Table 5.4, provides the Chinese name of 
the listed company (NAME_C), the English name of the listed company (NAME_E), the 
numerical code of the listed company (CODE), the year to which the data relate (YEAR), 
the year in which the company was listed (YEAR_L), and the origins of the listed 
company (ORIG). Each data entry is identified by the company code and year of data. 
Year of listing was one of the criteria for sampling, that is, companies with year of listing 
later than 1996 were not included. In addition, nine year-dummy variables (i.e., S1998, 
S1999 … S2006) were developed from year of data. These five sets of information were 
manually collated from 11,218 annual reports for 11,218 company-year observations. 
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Table 5.4 Company general information 
Raw data Code Transformation Name of variables Proxy for 
Company name in Chinese NAME_C - - - 
Company name in English NAME_E - - - 
Company code CODE - - - 
Year of Data YEAR 
1 for year of data equals 
1998 and 0 otherwise. S1998 
Year-dummy 
variable 
1 for year of data equals 
1999 and 0 otherwise. S1999 
Year-dummy 
variable 
1 for year of data equals 
2000 and 0 otherwise. S2000 
Year-dummy 
variable 
1 for year of data equals 
2001 and 0 otherwise. S2001 
Year-dummy 
variable 
1 for year of data equals 
2002 and 0 otherwise. S2002 
Year-dummy 
variable 
1 for year of data equals 
2003 and 0 otherwise. S2003 
Year-dummy 
variable 
1 for year of data equals 
2004 and 0 otherwise. S2004 
Year-dummy 
variable 
1 for year of data equals 
2005 and 0 otherwise. S2005 
Year-dummy 
variable 
1 for year of data equals 
2006 and 0 otherwise. S2006 
Year-dummy 
variable 
Year of listing YEAR_L - - - 
Origins ORIG - - - 
Company financial information 
Company financial information, summarised in Table 5.5, provides financial data for total 
revenue (RE), net profit (NP), total assets(TA), revenue of the largest business (RE_1), 
and revenue of the second largest business (RE_2). All these data were collated for all 
11,218 company-year observations. Since three-year moving average financial measures 
were used in this study, total revenue, net profit, and total assets were collected from 1995 
to 2006 in an effort to avoid having missing data for sample companies in years 1997 and 
1998. For total revenue, net profit, and total assets all observations were directly 
downloaded from the CCER Database in an Excel file. The other two sets of data, 
revenues of the largest and second largest businesses, were manually collated from the 
subsection operation of the company in the section report of directors in the annual 
reports.  
All financial data are expressed in the Chinese currency (RenMinBi or RMB) and 
expressed in a standard Chinese value unit of “Yuan” or RMB$1.00. The value numbers 
have been rounded to two decimal points.  
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Table 5.5 Financial information 
Raw data Code Transformation Name of variables Proxy for 
Total Revenue RE - - - 
Revenue of the 
largest business RE_1 RE_1/RE - - 
Revenue of the 
second largest 
business 
RE_2 RE_2/RE - - 
Net profit NP - - - 
Total assets TA 
( NPt + NPt-1+ NPt-2) / 
(TAt+ TAt-1+ TAt-2) 
ROA3 Firm performance 
- DP_ROA3* Performance relative to an  aspiration level 
- PRA3+* Performance relative to an aspiration level 
- PRA3-* Performance relative to an aspiration level 
ln TA SIZE The size of a company 
* The specific process of this transformation is explained in section 5.4.2.2 Definitions of independent 
variables. 
Total revenues and revenues of the largest and secondary businesses were used to identify 
companies into corresponding industries. Net profit and total assets were used to generate 
two control variables, ROA3 and SIZE, and three independent variables of performance 
relative to an aspiration level, DP_ROA3, PROA3-, and PROA3+.  
General information on CEOs  
The CEO information presented in Table 5.6 provides three different sets of raw data, 
namely CEO name (NAME), CEO age (AGE), and reasons for CEO turnover (REAS) 
disclosed by listed companies. All of these data were collected for 325 sample companies 
for the whole period examined.  
Table 5.6 CEO general information 
Raw data Code Transformation Name of variables Proxy for 
CEO name NAME Comparing CEO names in successive years ACT 
Whether the event of CEO 
turnover has happened or not 
Reasons for 
CEO 
turnover 
REAS - 
FCT* Whether the event of forced turnover has happened or not 
VCT* 
Whether the event of 
voluntary turnover has 
happened or not 
CEO age AGE 1, if AGE ≧60; 0, otherwise DAGE 
CEO age dichotomous 
variable 
* The criteria for identifying forced and voluntary CEO turnover in terms of the reasons for CEO turnover 
published by listed companies are discussed in Section 5.4.2.1 Definitions of dependent variables. 
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After comparing CEOs’ names in successive years for every company, a dependent 
variable, CEO turnover (ACT) was generated. The other two dependent variables, namely, 
forced CEO turnover (FCT) and voluntary CEO turnover (VCT), were derived based on 
reasons for CEO turnover. In addition, CEO age is used to generate a control variable, 
CEO age dichotomous variable (DAGE), which was coded as 1 if the CEO age was equal 
to or above 60. Otherwise, it was coded as 0. 
CEO power information 
CEO power was explored from four perspectives: structural power, ownership power, 
prestige power, and tenure power in this study. Correspondingly, the information on CEO 
power was collated from these four perspectives. A total of seventeen categories of raw 
data were collected in an effort to construct eighteen variables of four types of CEO 
power. All these data were collected for 325 listed companies for the whole period 
examined. 
CEO structural power 
Raw data for CEO structural power are presented in Table 5.7, comprising the number of 
directors on the board (SIBO), the number of directors who are senior managers (SI_TM), 
the number of independent directors (SI_IN), and whether there is a joint 
CEO/chairperson (JOIN). 
Table 5.7 CEO structural power information 
Raw data Code Transformation Name of variables Proxy for 
The number of 
directors on the 
board 
SIBO - SIBO The size of a board 
The number of 
directors who are 
senior managers 
SI_TM 1-SI_TM /SIBO RBOU The proportion of outside directors 
The number of 
independent 
directors 
SI_IN 
SI_IN/SIBO RBIN The proportion of independent directors 
(SIBO-SI_TM-
SI_IN)/SIBO RBMI 
The proportion of affiliated 
outside directors 
Joint  
CEO/chairperson JOIN 
1 if yes, 
otherwise 0 DUAL 
The concentration of chairperson 
and CEO positions 
 
The number of directors on the board has been used directly as the proxy for the size of 
the board. Three variables of CEO structural power were derived from the numbers of 
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directors on the board, directors who are senior managers, and independent directors and 
they are the proportions of outside directors (RBOU), independent directors (RBIN), and 
affiliated outside directors (RBMI). In addition, a dichotomous variable of CEO duality 
(DUAL) was transformed from joint CEO/chairperson. 
CEO ownership power 
Nine categories of raw data were collected in an effort to construct nine variables of CEO 
ownership power, as presented in Table 5.8. These are the total number of shares 
(S_TOT), the number of shares held by a CEO (S_CEO), the number of shares directly 
held by government agencies (S_GOV), the number of shares held by state-owned legal 
persons (S_SLE), the number of shares held by legal persons (S-LP), the number of 
tradable A-shares (S_TRA), the number of shares held by the largest shareholder (S_LA), 
and the CEO being the representative of the largest shareholder (RP_LA) or of any other 
top ten largest shareholders (RP_OT).  
Table 5.8 CEO ownership power information 
Raw data Code Transformation data Name of variables Proxy for 
Total number of 
shares S_TOT - - - 
Shares held by a 
CEO S_CEO 1 for S_CEO>0; otherwise 0 DRSCE 
CEOs’ 
shareholdings 
Shares directly held 
by government 
agencies 
S_GOV S_GOV/ S_TOT RSTA_ST 
The proportion of 
shares held by 
government 
shareholders 
Shares held by state-
owned legal persons S_SLE 
S_SLE / S_TOT RSTA_LE 
The proportion of 
shares held by 
corporate state 
shareholders 
(S_GOV+ S_SLE)/ S_TOT RSTA The proportion of state-owned shares 
Shares held by legal 
persons S_LP S_LP / S_TOT RSLE 
The  proportion of 
legal person shares 
Tradable A-shares S_TRA S_TRA/ S_TOT RSCA The proportion of tradable A-shares 
Shares held by the 
largest shareholder S_LA S_LA/ S_TOT CONC 
Share ownership 
concentration 
The CEO  is the 
representative of the 
largest shareholder 
RP_LA 
1 for CEOs who are 
representatives of the largest 
shareholder; otherwise 0 
RELA 
Representative of 
the top largest 
shareholder 
The CEO is the 
representative of any 
other top ten largest 
shareholders 
RP_OT 
1 for CEOs who are 
representatives of any other 
top ten largest shareholders; 
otherwise 0 
REOT 
Representative of 
the top ten largest 
shareholders 
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These nine categories of raw data provide information on ownership structure, 
concentration, and relationships between CEOs and large shareholders in companies. 
Based on seven categories of raw data on ownership structure and concentration, seven 
continuous variables were generated, namely CEOs’ shareholdings (DRSCE), and 
proportions of shares held by government shareholders (RSTA_ST), shares held by 
corporate state shareholders (RSTA_LE), state-owned shares (RSTA), legal person shares 
(RSLE), tradable A-shares (RSCA), and ownership concentration (CONC). In addition, 
CEOs were coded according to their association with large shareholders in companies by 
two dichotomous variables: representative of the largest shareholder (RELA), and 
representative of any other top ten shareholders (REOT). 
CEO prestige power 
Table 5.9 presents two categories of raw data, CEO education (ELIT) and CEO celebrity 
status (CELE). Two dichotomous variables of CEO prestige power were derived from 
these raw data: one is EDUC, which represents whether a CEO has an elite educational 
background, and the other one is ORDE, which indicates whether a CEO has celebrity 
status.  
Table 5.9 CEO prestige power information 
Raw data Code Transformation Name of 
variables 
Proxy for 
CEO education ELIT 
1 for CEOs having either a 
doctoral degree or a master 
degree; otherwise, 0 
EDUC Elite education 
CEO celebrity CELE 1 for CEOs who have celebrity status; otherwise 0* ORDE CEO celebrity status 
* The definition of CEOs’ celebrity status in this study is discussed in 5.4.2.2 Definitions of independent 
variables. 
CEO tenure power 
Two categories of raw data collected in an effort to construct variables of CEO tenure 
power are presented in Table 5.10, that is, the number of years that an incumbent has 
served as a CEO (TENU) and the number of directors who were first appointed during the 
incumbent CEO’s tenure (DICE). The number of years that an incumbent has served as a 
CEO has been taken to be the length of CEO tenure (TENU). The number of directors 
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who were first appointed during the CEO incumbent’s tenure was used to generate the 
proportion of interdependent directors (RBCE). 
Table 5.10 CEO tenure power information 
Raw data  Code  Transformation Name of 
variables 
Proxy for 
The number of years that an 
incumbent has served as a CEO TENU - TENU CEO tenure 
The number of directors 
appointed during the incumbent 
CEO’s tenure 
DICE DICE/SIBO RBCE 
The proportion of 
interdependent 
directors 
5.4.2 Definitions of variables 
This section discusses definitions of dependent variables, independent variables, and 
control variables used in this study, and it explains how they are measured. The 
discussion is based on Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11 A summary of variables 
 Names of 
variables 
Proxy for Type of 
variables 
Three dependent 
variables 
ACT The event of CEO turnover occurs Dichotomous 
FCT The event of forced CEO turnover occurs Dichotomous 
VCT The event of voluntary CEO turnover occurs Dichotomous 
Three variables of 
performance relative 
to aspiration an level 
DP_ROA3 The performance above an aspiration level Dichotomous 
PRA3+ The performance above an aspiration level Continuous  
PRA3- The performance below an aspiration level Continuous  
Five variables of 
CEO structural 
power 
RBOU The proportion of outside directors Continuous  
RBIN The proportion of independent directors Continuous 
RBMI The proportion of affiliated outside directors Continuous  
DUAL Joint CEO/chairperson Dichotomous 
SIBO The total number of  directors on the board Continuous  
Nine variables of 
CEO ownership 
power 
DRSCE CEOs’ shareholdings Dichotomous 
RSTA The proportion of state-owned shares Continuous  
RSTA_ST 
The proportion of shares held by 
government shareholders 
Continuous  
RSTA_LE 
The proportion of shares held by corporate 
state shareholders 
Continuous 
RSLE 
The proportion of shares held by legal 
person shareholders 
Continuous 
RSCA The proportion of tradable A-shares Continuous 
CONC 
The proportion of shares held by the largest 
shareholder 
Continuous 
RELA Representative of the largest shareholder Dichotomous 
REOT Representative of any other top ten largest Dichotomous 
 64 
shareholder 
Two variables of 
CEO prestige power 
EDUC Elite educational background Dichotomous 
ORDE Celebrity status Dichotomous 
Two variables of 
CEO tenure power 
TENU CEO tenure Continuous 
RBCE 
The proportion of directors appointed 
within the CEO’s tenure 
Dichotomous 
Twelve control 
variables 
ROA3 Firm performance Continuous 
SIZE Firm size Continuous 
DAGE CEO age Dichotomous 
S1998-
S2006 
Year-dummy variable 
Dichotomous 
5.4.2.1 Definitions of dependent variables 
CEO turnover (ACT) is a dichotomous dependent variable in this study. “General 
Manager” is the statutory title used in China’s Company Law, which came into effect in 
April 1994, and is equivalent to “Chief Executive Officer” (CEO) in the West. According 
to China’s Company Law, all limited liability companies must have a general manager, 
who is appointed by the board and is in charge of “the management of the company’s 
production and operation, and organising the implementation of board resolutions”, 
among other authorities and duties. Consequently, in this study the term “CEO” refers to 
the general manager. 
 To discern CEO turnover, the names of general managers in successive years over the 
sample period were compared. If the names of CEOs changed between the successive 
years, it was identified as being a CEO turnover and valued as 1, otherwise 0.  
A CEO turnover event is classified as either “voluntary” or “forced” by examining the 
reasons disclosed in the annual reports published by listed companies. A CEO turnover 
event has been identified as voluntary (VCT) for any of the following reasons disclosed 
by listed companies: (1) retirement; (2) health; (3)further education; (4) death; (5) age; (6) 
corporate governance reform;13 (7) any other circumstance that led them to being too busy 
to fulfil a CEO’s job; (8) dual CEO-chairperson resignation from the position of CEO; 14 
                                                 
13 In 1999, the CSRC introduced regulations that require Chinese listed companies to keep their financial 
accounts, assets, and personnel separate from those of their parent companies in an effort to minimise the 
conflicts of interest between holding firms and minority shareholders. In response to this, some CEOs who 
also held senior managerial positions in the parent firms relinquished either position (Chang & Wong, 
2009). 
14 At the end of the 1990s, the CSRC strongly recommended the separation of the chairperson of the board 
and CEO positions (but it is not mandatory to do so). In response, some CEOs who also served as the 
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and (9) CEOs departing their positions for reasons of “change of job”, “expiry of 
contract” and “resignation”, are categorised as voluntary turnover for two situations: the 
first is that the CEOs relinquished their positions to assume the role of chairperson on the 
board; the other situation is that CEOs who also served as the chairperson on the board 
relinquished the position of CEO but still served as the chairperson.15 All other turnover 
cases are identified as forced CEO turnover (FCT).  
5.4.2.2 Definitions of independent variables 
Performance relative to a given aspiration level  
Three variables of performance relative to a given aspiration level, namely DP_ROA3, 
PROA3-, and PROA3+, were used in this study. These three variables were derived from 
a continuous variable, performance relative to a given aspiration level (PRA), which has 
been defined in previous research as firm performance minus aspiration level (Greve, 
1998; Kyung Min, 2007). This variable is calculated as: 
PRA = Firm performance – Aspiration level 
In order to calculate this variable, it is necessary to compute firm performance and 
aspiration levels, which are explained respectively in the following discussion. 
Firm performance measurements 
In Western countries, most studies employ stock price measures, for example, stock 
returns (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Gilson, 1989; Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993; Warner 
et al., 1988) and accounting performance measures, such as ROA, ROS (return on sales) 
(Bhagat et al., 1999; Goyal & Park, 2002; Lau et al., 2006), to evaluate the relationship 
between firm performance and CEO turnover. However, on the Chinese stock markets, 
the stock price might not reflect companies’ true value for two reasons: one reason is the 
existence of the strong speculative atmosphere16; the other reason is that one company can 
                                                                                                                                                  
chairperson in the same company resigned from the CEO position in the name of “improving corporate 
governance”  (Firth et al., 2006). 
15 It is assumed that any assumption of positions other than the chairperson of the board within the firm 
generally means a demotion (Cheng et al., 2008).  
16 The turnover rate in China’s stock markets is very high. According to Lin, J. (2004a), from 1994 to 2001, 
the average turnover rate of the Chinese stock markets was 504.7%, which indicated that on average one 
stock was exchanged five times per year. This was much higher than that of other international stock 
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have several types of shares17 with different share prices. Therefore, stock price measures 
have not been employed in this study.  
In previous research, various measures have been used as proxies for firms’ accounting 
performance. These include return on equity (ROE) (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991), return on 
assets (ROA) (Huson et al., 2001; Weisbach, 1988), and sales growth rate (SGR) 
(Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Firth et al., 2002). This study employed return on assets for 
several reasons. The first reason was that, compared to ROE, ROA is less sensitive to 
heterogeneity in financial structure, for example, the equity to debt ratio. The second 
reason was that sales are often not available from annual reports as their disclosure is not 
compulsory for listed companies, although the total revenue is available. The third reason 
was that ROA has been commonly used in studies on the relationship between aspiration 
levels and organisational changes as it captures such information as capacity utilisation 
and profit margin rate (Kyung Min, 2007). In addition, ROA  has also been widely used 
in prior CEO power and CEO turnover studies (e.g., Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 
2002a)18. The formula for ROA is as follows: 
                                           Return on assets (ROA) =
t
t
TA
NP
                                   (5.4.2.1) 
As stated by Bhagat and Jefferis (2002), managers have an incentive to manipulate 
accounting measures of performance because their own interests, such as their 
remuneration, and career prospects, are tied to firm performance. Bhagat & Jefferis (2002, 
p. 39) also suggest that although managers can manipulate accounting performance for a 
given year, their ability to do so for a longer period, such as five years, is quite limited. 
Chinese managers are no exception. The China National Audit Office (CNAQ) stated in 
December 1998 that “cooked books”, embezzlement, fraud and “irregularities” in 
financial management were widespread among Chinese firms. Its scrutiny in 1998 of 110 
                                                                                                                                                  
markets, such as New York (87% in 2001), London (84% in 2001), Singapore (59% in 2001), and Thailand 
(91% in 2001). 
17 The Chinese stock markets are divided into A-shares, which are shares in Chinese companies available 
only to Chinese investors and purchased in RenMinBi (RMB), and B-shares, which are available to 
foreigners or Chinese investors and purchased in foreign currencies. A-shares are comprised of four sub-
categories, namely, state-owned shares, legal person shares, employee shares and the tradable A-shares 
mostly held by individuals. 
18 “Excess cash in China” is not examined in this study. Because the return on assets is a measure that has 
been commonly used in previous studies as I have discussed in Chapter three (Literature review), The other 
important issue is that  “cash & cash equivalents” is not compulsory to report in annual reports in China. 
To include it would have caused major “data missing”problems. 
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trust and investment companies and 88 securities companies and life and property 
business subsidiaries of the People’s Insurance Company of China led it to conclude that 
the financial management of many of these firms was “chaotic and inaccurate”. Many 
securities companies engaged in the misappropriation of clients’ money and illegal fund 
raising (Lin, 2001). Given these circumstances, in this study a three-year average return 
on assets has been used in an effort to avoid the impact of managers’ manipulation of 
accounting measures.19 In the same manner, Shen and Cannella (2002b) also used three-
year average return on assets as the firm performance measurement in their empirical 
study on the performance consequences of CEO turnover. The formula used for three-
year average ROA is as follows: 
                Three-year return on assets (ROA3) =
21
21
−−
−−
++
++
ttt
ttt
TATATA
NPNPNP
                 (5.4.2.2) 
In general, the profit concept used in calculating ROA is earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT)20 because ROA aims to measure the results of a firm’s investment decisions 
irrespective of how the investments are financed (so the profit figure before net finance 
income or expense is used), and to exclude the effects of taxation policy, over which the 
firm has no control (so the profit figure before tax is used) (Birt, Chalmers, Beal, Brooks, 
Bryne, & Oliver, 2008). However, the EBIT figure is not published in Chinese annual 
reports. For this reason, net profit was employed as the substitute for EBIT. Therefore, 
ROA stands for the number of dollars of net profit that is generated by a dollar of total 
assets in this study. A high ROA ratio indicates a high level of profit and vice versa. 
Aspiration level measurements 
Calculating the aspiration level is important because many organisational measures of 
performance come without clear definitions of what performance level is acceptable, 
namely, what is the aspiration level (Greve, 2003b). Previous studies have suggested that 
                                                 
19 In this study, the reason that five-year average performance variables are not used is that annual reports 
disclose firm performance for the current year, prior year, and second prior year of companies. Therefore, 
for companies listed in 1996, there were fewer than five years’ data available in year 1997. In order to avoid 
missing data in year 1997, three-year average performance variables are used. 
   
20 EBIT is not sensitive to financing policy, tax regime, windfall profits or extraordinary losses. It is argued 
that the use of operating income rather than net earnings after tax reduces the impact of “earnings 
management” (Denis & Denis, 1994). Therefore, it has been commonly used in previous studies, for 
example, Weisbach (1988) and Renneboog (2000). 
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an aspiration level is determined by the social aspiration level (SA) and historical 
aspiration level (HA) (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998; Levinthal & James, 1981). 
Social comparison theory suggests that aspiration levels are determined by the 
performance of similar others (Cyert & March, 1963; Festinger, 1954). Other firms in the 
same industry have been commonly considered to be “similar others” (Greve, 1998; 
Haveman, 1993). Many researchers have compared the focal firm’s performance with 
other companies in the same industry. One example is Greve (2003a), who calculates the 
social aspiration level as the mean return on total assets (ROA) of all large shipbuilders 
except the focal firm. In terms of the theory of aspiration-level adjustment (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Greve, 1998; Lant, 1992), the performance history of the focal firm also 
determines its aspiration level. It is widely recognised that organisations learn from their 
experience (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998; Levitt & March, 1988) and the recent 
performance history of the focal firm sets a standard for what performance levels are 
possible and desirable (Greve, 2003b; Mezias et al., 2002). For this reason, the one year 
lag performance is used as the proxy for the historical aspiration level in extant research, 
for example, Bromiley (1991) and Kyung Min (2007).21
               SA_ROA3 it = 
 Following previous research, the 
social aspiration levels and historical aspiration levels of the three-year average are 
defined as follows: 
n
ROA
nj
jt∑
= ...1
3
                  (5.4.2.3) 
               HA_ROA3 it = ROA3it-1                           (5.4.2.4) 
where SA_ROA3it is the social aspiration level of firm i at year t measured by the three-
year average ROA. The subject jt is another company in the same industry at time t, and n 
is the number of the companies other than the focal company in the industry. HA_ROA3it 
is the historical aspiration level of firm i at year t measured by the three-year average 
ROA. 
                                                 
21 Some researchers suggest that the historical aspiration level is specified as an exponentially weighted 
average of earlier performance of the firm (Greve, 1998; Levinthal & James, 1981). The formula of this 
definition is HA t= a HA t-1 + (1-a)P t-1, where HA is the historical aspiration level, P is firm performance, t is 
a time subscript, and a is the weight given to the most recent aspiration level. 
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There are several ways to measure aspiration levels based on the social and historical 
aspiration levels. A commonly used way is based on the assumption of shifting attention 
between different aspiration levels depending on firm performance (Bromiley, 1991; 
March & Shapira, 1992).22
          SA            (if P<SA) 
 According to Bromiley (1991), firms performing below their 
social aspiration levels aspire to achieve their social aspiration levels and firms 
performing above their social aspiration levels aspire to improve their current 
performance, namely, the historical aspiration levels. He further suggests that 
organisational aspiration level is the social aspiration level when firm performance is 
below the social aspiration level and is 1.05 times the historical aspiration level when firm 
performance is above the social aspiration level (Equation 5.4.2.5).  
                                              Aspiration =                                                                                             (5.4.2.5) 
          1.05 × HA  (if P≧SA)     
Following this, the aspiration level measured by the three-year average performance was 
calculated as: 
            Aspiration_ROA3i,t = I (ROA3i,t < SA_ROA3i,t) × SA_ROA3i,t+ 
                                               I (ROA3i,t≧ SA_ROA3i,t) ×1.05 × HA_ROA3i,t                                     (5.4.2.6) 
where Aspiration_ROA3i,t is the aspiration level of firm i at time t measured by the three-
year average performance, and I (.) is an index function whose value is 1 if the statement 
is true, and 0 if it is not (Kyung Min, 2007).  
Based on firm performance and aspiration level variables above, performance relative to 
an aspiration level measured by the three-year performance was calculated as: 
                                             PRA_ROA3i,t = ROA3i,t - Aspiration_ROA3i,t                                                              (5.4.2.7) 
where PRA_ ROA3 i,t is the performance relative to a given aspiration level of firm i at 
time t measured by the three-year average performance. 
                                                 
22  Besides this method, some scholars integrated the historical and social aspiration levels into one 
aspiration level, such as Cyert and March (1963) and March (1988). Some other scholars maintained the 
separation of the historical and social aspiration levels, and investigated their impacts on organisational 
decisions separately, for example, Greve (1998) and Audia and Greve (2006). 
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Based on PRA_ROA3i,t, three variables were constructed in this study. The first variable 
is a dichotomous variable, DP_ROA3, which was coded as 1 where PRA_ROA3it was 
above 0 and 0 if it was otherwise. This dichotomous variable is used to investigate the 
differences in the likelihood of CEO turnover for performance above or below aspiration 
levels. The other two variables, PROA3+ and PROA3-, were constructed in an effort to 
examine different effects of CEO turnover on the discrepancy between firm performance 
and the aspiration level by using a linear spline function for PRA_ROA3i,t with a knot at 
zero.23
CEO Power measurements 
 PRA3+ is performance relative to the aspiration level that is above zero, while 
PRA3- is performance relative to the aspiration level that is below zero. 
CEO structural power 
Proportion of outside directors (RBOU) Inside directors have generally been defined 
in existing studies as directors who are also members of the corporation’s management 
(e.g., Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002a). Hence, outside directors tend to be 
defined as directors who are not currently executives in the company (e.g., Johnson, 
Ellstrand, & Daily, 1996). In this sense, outside directors are equivalent of non-
executive directors (Higgs, 2003), or non-management directors in the work of Clarke 
(2006).  
However, this traditional insider/outsider dichotomy has been challenged for failing to 
consider potential conflicts of interest when directors are not insiders but still have 
affiliations with the firm (e.g., Byrd & Hickman, 1992). As a result, some scholars have 
proposed a trichotomous scheme by further categorising outside directors. An example is 
Baysinger and Butler (1985), who classify the board of directors into three components, 
namely executive, monitoring, and instrumental on the basis of director affiliations and 
the functions that they perform. Directors in the executive component are inside directors, 
who are closely aligned with the top management of the corporation. The monitoring 
component is comprised of truly “independent” or “outside” directors, that is public 
directors, professional directors, private investors and independent decision makers, 
whose primary function is to police managers’ behaviour and make sure that it stays 
aligned with shareholders’ interests. Directors in the instrumental component consist of 
                                                 
23 For the details of linear spline function, see Greene (1993, p. 235-238) and Greve (1998). 
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financiers, consultants, legal counsel, and interdependent decision makers, who are 
associated with the firm in some ways. Following this classification, Byrd and Hickman 
(1992) classify directors into inside directors, independent outside directors, and affiliated 
outside directors, which are the equivalents of directors in executive, monitoring, and 
instrumental functions respectively. In a similar way, Peng (2004) divides outside 
directors into affiliated outside directors and non-affiliated directors, and Agarwalla (2008) 
divides them into non-executive but non-independent directors and independent directors.  
Given all the discussion above, both the traditional two-way classification and three-way 
classification have been used in this study. In terms of the former, outside directors have 
been defined as those directors who are not members of top management in the company 
and their proportion (RBOU) is measured as the number of directors who are not 
members of top management in the company divided by the total number of directors on 
the board (see Equation 5.4.2.8).  
RBOU = 
SIBO
TMSI _1−                                                             (5.4.2.8) 
In light of the latter, outside directors have been classified into independent directors and 
affiliated outside directors. An independent director is a director who has been disclosed 
as an independent director in the annual reports published by listed companies and an 
affiliated outside director is a director who is neither a member of top management nor an 
independent director in the company. Based on these definitions, the proportion of 
independent directors (RBIN) has been calculated as the number of the independent 
directors divided by the total number of board members, and the proportion of affiliated 
outside directors (RBMI) has been measured as the number of outside directors minus the 
number of independent directors of the company divided by the total number of directors 
on the board. These two variables can be calculated in Equations 5.4.2.9 and 5.4.2.10 
respectively as follows: 
         RBIN = 
SIBO
INSI _
                                                                   (5.4.2.9) 
RBMI = 
SIBO
INSITMSISIBO __ −−                                       (5.4.2.10) 
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Board size (SIBO) is the total number of members on the board of directors in a company. 
CEO Duality (DUAL) is a dichotomous variable, which is coded as 1 if the CEO is also 
the chairperson of the board of directors and 0 otherwise. 
CEO ownership power 
CEOs’ shareholdings (DRSCE) have usually been calculated in extant research as the 
proportion of the CEO’s shares to total number of shares, for example, Boeker (1992) 
and Daily and Johnson (1997). However, the proportion of shares held by CEOs is 
highly skewed and its skewness in this study was shown to be 12.03. In addition, the 
proportion of shares held by CEOs was very low and the average and highest ratios of 
shares held by CEOs in this sample were 0.0066% and 0.47% respectively. Therefore, 
CEOs’ shareholdings have been measured by a dichotomous variable which was coded 
as 1 if the CEO holds the company’s shares and 0 otherwise.  
Proportion of state-owned shares (RSTA) is often measured as the number of shares 
owned by states and state-owned legal persons divided by the total number of shares (e.g., 
Sun et al., 2002; Xu & Wang, 1999). It is expected to have a positive impact on CEO 
power and be negatively related to the likelihood of CEO turnover. In terms of this 
definition, the proportion of state-owned shares was calculated as shown in Equation 
5.4.2.11: 
RSTA = 
TOTS
SLESGOVS
_
__ +                                          (5.4.2.11) 
According to Kato and Long (2004), state ownership exists for both direct government 
ownership through state shares and indirect state ownership via legal person shares. State 
shares represent the equity interest of a government department attributable to state equity 
investment or lawful transfer of stock, and are owned by government departments (Paul, 
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, & Garrison, 2002). Legal person shares represent equity 
attributable to investment of discretionary funds by, or a lawful transfer to, entities that 
are formal “legal persons”, such as companies and certain institutions and social groups. 
When legal persons are state-owned or state-controlled, the share capital they hold is 
known as “state-owned legal person shares” (Paul et al., 2002). Thus, the state shares and 
the state-owned legal person shares are used as the proxy for the shares held by 
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government shareholders and corporate state shareholders, respectively. Thus, in this 
study, two other variables of state ownership, the proportion of shares held by 
government shareholders (RSTA_ST) and the proportion of shares held by corporate state 
shareholders (RSTA_LE) have been calculated as the state shares and state-owned legal 
person shares divided by the total amount of shares respectively. They are calculated in 
Equations 5.4.2.12 and 5.4.2.13 respectively:  
RSTA_ST = 
SLES
GOVS
_
_
                                           (5.4.2.12) 
RSTA_LE = 
TOTS
SLES
_
_                                              (5.4.2.13) 
Proportion of legal person shares (RSLE) is measured as the number of shares owned 
by legal persons (S_LP) divided by the total amount of shares (see Equation 5.4.2.14). 
Shares held by state-owned legal persons have not been included as legal person shares in 
this study. This is a proxy for a type of ownership structure and it is hypothesised to have 
a positive effect on the likelihood of CEO turnover.  
RSLE = 
TOTS
LPS
_
_
                                                (5.4.2.14) 
Proportion of Tradable A-shares (RSCA) is the number of tradable A-shares divided by 
the total amount of shares in Equation 5.4.2.15: 
RSCA = 
TOTS
TRAS
_
_                                                   (5.4.2.15) 
Share ownership concentration (CONC) Shareholders’ concentration ratio has been 
widely used as the measurement of share ownership concentration. In Boeker’s (1992) 
study, this is the proportion of the total firm ownership held by the four largest owners. In 
addition, some China-related studies have used the ratio of shares held by the top five 
shareholders (Hovey, Li, & Naughton, 2003) and some have extended the analysis 
beyond the top five shareholders. For example, Xu and Wang (1999) use the proportion 
of shares held by the top 10 shareholders as the measurement of  ownership concentration. 
But in the Chinese context, the stake of the largest shareholder in listed companies is 
often very substantial. For example, the  largest shareholders held on average 44.9% of a 
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company’s total shares in 2001 (Shi & Weisert, 2002). Therefore, the ratio of shares held 
by the largest shareholder is the proxy for the share ownership concentration used in this 
study (see Equation 5.4.2.16). In a similar way, Ding, Zhang, and Zhang (2007) also use 
the shares held by the largest shareholder as a measure of the sample companies’ 
ownership concentration. Its coefficient is expected to carry a positive sign as more 
ownership provides the largest shareholder with more power and incentive to monitor the 
incumbent CEO.  
CONC = 
TOTS
LAS
_
_
                                                                 (5.4.2.16) 
It is worth noting that in spite of the popularity of using a ratio which reflects the 
concentration of ownership, some research has used the Herfindahl Index (HI), which is 
the sum of the squared ownership shares, to measure ownership concentration (e.g., 
Hovey et al., 2003; Xu & Wang, 1999). The HI places a greater weight on stockholders 
with large shareholdings, so that it takes more account of the size distribution problem 
(Hovey et al., 2003). In this study, ownership concentration has been measured by the 
proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder; therefore, the Herfindahl Index is the 
square of the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder. The proportion of 
shares held by the largest shareholder and the square of it was found to be highly 
correlated, being 0.9766. Given this circumstance, the Herfindahl Index was not used in 
this study. 
Representative of large shareholders Two variables relating to representative of large 
shareholders have been used in this study, representative of the largest shareholder 
(RELA) and representative of any other of the top ten shareholders (REOT), in an effort 
to distinguish between the impact of the largest shareholder and that of other large 
shareholders on CEO power.  
The variable RELA has been coded as 1 for CEOs who either are current employees or 
were employees before taking office in the largest shareholder’s companies and 0 
otherwise. Similarly, the variable REOT has been valued as 1 for CEOs who either are or 
were employees in any companies of the top two to top ten largest shareholders and 0 
otherwise.  
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CEO prestige power  
Elite education (EDUC) Having received a doctoral degree or a master’s degree is 
generally regarded as prestigious in China, thus these two types of degree are considered 
in this research to be evidence of elite education. This variable has been coded as a 
dichotomous variable with 1 for CEOs who have either a doctoral or master’s degree and 
0 otherwise. Elite education is expected to enhance CEO prestige power and is therefore 
hypothesised to have a negative impact on CEO turnover. 
CEO celebrity status (ORDE) Hengartner (2006) considers CEO celebrity status is 
evident when a CEO appears in the top ten ranking of the best entrepreneur in the Swiss 
weekly business publication Handelszeitung. Similarly, according to an empirical study 
on the relationship between CEO celebrity status, firm performance and executive 
remuneration conducted by Wade et al. (2006), CEO celebrity status is determined by 
whether the CEO had won a medal awarded by the business magazine Financial World 
during the examination period. However, in China, there is neither a well-recognised 
award for entrepreneurs nor an authorised ranking of the best entrepreneur that covered 
the whole period examined in this study.  
In contrast, people who have made a significant contribution during their careers might be 
awarded an honorary title by the Chinese central government or elected as a deputy of the 
National People’s Congress (NPC, 全国人大代表) or a deputy to the National Committee 
of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC, 全国政协代表). The 
two titles that have the highest honour are “National Model Worker” (全国劳动模范) and 
“the 1st of May Labour Medal” (全国“五一”劳动奖章获得者).24
                                                 
24 The National Model Worker is awarded by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and 
State Council, while the 1st of May Labour Medal is awarded by the National Federation of Trade Unions. 
 In addition, since 1990 
the Chinese State Council started to provide renowned scientists, experts, professors and 
scholars who had made an outstanding contribution with a “Special Allowance”, which 
provided them with a monthly stipend. People who have been awarded these highly 
prestigious titles, or are recipients of the Special Allowance of State Council, or have 
been elected as a deputy of either NPC or CPPCC are considered to be part of the social 
elites because only the most outstanding people in their areas can achieve these honours. 
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Therefore, in this study CEO celebrity status has been defined as being evident in any of 
the following cases: 
A CEO has been awarded the “National Model Worker” or “the 1st of May 
Labour Medal”; or, 
has been chosen as a deputy to the National People’s Congress or a deputy to the 
National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference; 
or, 
has been awarded a Special Allowance of State Council. 
Therefore, this variable has been coded as a dichotomous variable with 1 for CEOs who 
have been granted at least one of these forms of recognition; otherwise 0. 
CEO tenure power 
CEO Tenure This is measured as the number of years that an incumbent CEO has served 
as a “general manager”. It is worth noting that some CEOs assumed office before 
companies were listed. Some of these CEOs had the title of “general manager”, while 
some of these CEOs had the title of “factory director” (Changzhang) before companies 
were listed. Since CEOs refer to general managers in this study, only the number of years 
served as “general managers” before and after the companies were listed has been 
calculated as CEO tenure, while the number of years served as factory directors has not 
been counted as CEO tenure.25
Proportion of interdependent directors This has been commonly measured as the 
proportion of directors who were first appointed during the incumbent CEO’s tenure in 
extant research, as described by Ocasio (1994) and Daily and Johnson (1997). This study 
also follows this definition and thus the proportion of interdependent directors has been 
calculated as the number of directors who were first appointed during the incumbent 
 
                                                 
25 The mean values of CEO tenure excluding and including the number of years serving as factory directors 
were 3.44 and 3.61 respectively. The directions and significances of all estimated coefficients in models 
using CEO tenure excluding the number of years serving as factory directors were the same with those in 
models using CEO tenure including the number of years serving as factory directors. Thus, there is not a 
significant difference between the two variables. 
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CEO’s tenure divided by the total number of directors on the boards, as in Equation 
5.4.2.17. 
RBCE = 
SIBO
DICE                                                            (5.4.2.17) 
5.4.2.3 Definitions of control variables 
Firm performance has been measured by a variable, namely three-year average return on 
assets (ROA3). For the rationale and calculation of this variable, see Section 5.4.2.2. 
Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the logarithm of the total assets in Equation 5.4.2.18. 
Firm size is typically associated with the degree of formalisation, bureaucracy, and 
requirements of managerial expertise of a firm (Hamori, 2006), which affects not only the 
efforts needed to replace a CEO, but also the availability of candidates for the CEO 
position.  
SIZE = TAln                                                               (5.4.2.18) 
CEO age (DAGE) is a dummy variable, coded as 1 for CEOs who are 60 years old or 
above and 0 otherwise. This variable was included because it might have had a positive 
impact on CEO turnover, especially voluntary turnover, because older CEOs are more 
likely to depart their positions for retirement or health reasons.  
Year-dummy variables In order to control for the yearly time effect common to all 
companies in the sample on dependent variables (i.e., any consistent differences between 
years), nine year-dummy variables for each year from 1998 to 2006 (i.e., S1998, S1999, 
S2000, S2001, S2002, S2003, S2004, S2005, S2006) were used in this study. 
5.4.3 Data analysis  
After data collection, the process of analysis was begun with a variety of techniques to 
obtain the results to be used for testing the hypotheses. This section presents the 
justification for the selection of those statistical techniques. 
5.4.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
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Descriptive statistics are techniques used to summarise large amounts of information 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). They provide basic features of the sample and variables. 
The measures of descriptive statistics used for continuous variables in this research were 
mean, minimum value, maximum value, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. The 
minimum value, maximum value, and standard deviation were used to represent the 
variability of variables, namely how dispersed variables were. The mean was used to 
reflect the “location”, that is, central tendency, of data. Skewness and kurtosis reflect 
whether a variable is normally distributed as skewness is a measure of symmetry and 
kurtosis is a measure of whether a variable is peaked or flat relative to a normal 
distribution. For categorical variables, frequency statistics, such as frequency and 
percentage, were calculated. 
5.4.3.2 Inferential statistics  
Inferential statistics are used to make judgements or probabilistic statements about a 
population on the basis of a sample. Correlation coefficient analysis and regression 
analysis are two important inferential statistics. 
Correlation analysis for variables 
Correlation analysis measures the degree of association between two or more variables. 
Three types of correlation coefficient, namely the Pearson correlation coefficient, 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, and the point biserial correlation coefficient, 
were used in an effort to estimate relationships between dependent variables (DVs), 
independent variables (IVs), and control variables (CVs). In this study, two types of 
variables were used, that is, continuous variables and dichotomous variables. Therefore, 
there were three combinations between two variables: continuous variable and continuous 
variable; dichotomous variable and dichotomous variable; and continuous variable and 
dichotomous variable (see Table 5.12).  
Table 5.12 Types of correlation coefficients as a function of scale properties of observed variables  
 Dichotomous variable Continuous variable 
Dichotomous variable Spearman’s rank correlation Point biserial correlation 
Continuous variable Point biserial correlation Pearson correlation 
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Different correlation coefficients should be used to assess the relationship between two 
variables in the light of their attributes. The Pearson correlation coefficient is often used 
to estimate the relationships between two continuous variables as it is a parametric 
statistic and requires normal distribution for the two variables. For variables that are not 
normally distributed (such as categorical variables), the Pearson correlation coefficient 
may be less useful than non-parametric correlation methods, such as Chi-square, point 
biserial correlation, and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (i.e., Spearman’s ρ), 
Kendall’s tall rank correlation coefficients (i.e., Kendall’s T), and Goodman and 
Kruskal’s lambda.  
Spearman’s ρ and Kendall’s T are the two non-parametric correlation methods that are 
often used to estimate the relationship between two dichotomous variables. According to 
Field (2005, p. 131), Kendall’s T should be used rather than Spearman’s ρ when there is a 
small data set with a large number of tied ranks. The sample in this research consists of 
3,250 observations, which is a relatively large sample size. In addition, Spearman’s ρ is 
the more popular of the two coefficients (Field, 2005). Given the large sample size in this 
research and the popularity of Spearman’s ρ, the relationships between two dichotomous 
variables have been estimated by Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. 
Biserial and point biserial correlation coefficients are the two non-parametric correlation 
methods used to estimate the correlation between a dichotomous variable and a 
continuous variable. Field (2005) explains the differentiation between the use of biserial 
and point biserial correlations depends on whether the dichotomous variable is discrete or 
continuous. A discrete dichotomy is one for which there is no underlying continuum 
between the categories (e.g., gender), while a continuous dichotomous variable is one for 
which a continuum does exist. An example is that in passing or failing an exam, some 
students will only just fail whilst others will fail by a large margin. Point biserial 
correlation coefficient is used when one variable is a discrete dichotomous variable, while 
the biserial correlation coefficient is used when one variable is a continuous dichotomy. 
In this study, all the dichotomous variables were discrete and therefore the point biserial 
correlation coefficient was applied. It is worth noting that point biserial correlation is 
mathematically equivalent to the Pearson correlation, that is, point biserial correlation is 
calculated by the Pearson correlation in SPSS (Field, 2005). 
Regression methods: GEE analysis with the logit link function 
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A characteristic of the data used in this study is that they contain 325 companies, each 
with a ten-year record (see Table 5.13). In other words, all variables (three dependent 
variables, 21 independent variables, and 12 control variables) have two dimensions: 
company and year. That is, the data set combines cross-sectional (325 companies) and 
time series (ten years) observations. In statistics, this type of data is defined as panel data 
or longitudinal data (Park, 2005).  
Table 5.13 Panel data structure of sample companies 
Subject 
(Company) 
(i=325) 
Year 
(t=10) 
Dependent 
Variables 
(DV=3) 
Independent  
variables 
(IV=21) 
Control variables 
(CV=12) 
C1 
C1 
…… 
C1 
1997 
1998 
…… 
2006 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
C2 
C2 
…… 
C2 
1997 
1998 
…… 
2006 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
C325 
C325 
…… 
C325 
1997 
1998 
…… 
2006 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
…… 
The panel data in this study can be represented as follows. Let Y be a matrix of dependent 
variables (three DVs) while X is a matrix of independent variables and control variables 
(three PRA variables, eighteen CEO power variables, and twelve control variables). The 
panel data is a matrix of {Yit, Xit}, in which each row is made up of the vectors Yit, and 
Xit representing the data for a given subject represented by i (i.e., company) in a 
particularly period of time represented by t, (i.e., year). N is the number of companies 
(which is 325) and Ti is the number of years (which is 10) of data for company i (Ti≤T). 
The total number of rows in the data is ∑
=
325
1n
iT or 3,250 rows of company-year (325 
companies times 10 years). In statistics, the panel data set is described as balanced when 
all the companies in the data set have cross-sectional observations for the same number of 
years (Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). The data set in this study has been treated as 
balanced panel data because all companies have observations for the same number of 
years. 
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Panel data provide two types of information: the cross-sectional information reflecting the 
difference between subjects, and the time-series or within-subject information reflecting 
the changes within subjects over time (Frees, 2004). Both the between-subject effects and 
the within-subject or time effects have a dramatic influence on the interpretation of the 
results of panel data. Therefore, it is necessary to disentangle the effects of subjects and 
time in an effort to estimate accurately the impact of predictors on the dependent 
variables (Twisk, 2002). 
However, traditional aggregated or pooled data analysis (such as ordinary multiple 
regression techniques) ignores the impact of these two types of effect. In terms of the 
traditional pooled data analysis, the dependent variable Y is a function of a series of 
predictors, namely Xi. As a result, only the impact of predictors is considered, while the 
between-subject effects and the within-subject effects are omitted. This gives rise to 
serious problems, such as neglected heterogeneity and continuous endogenous 
explanatory variables (Frees, 2004), as some assumptions of traditional analysis are 
violated. In the case of a logistic regression model, it assumes that no important variables 
are omitted and that observations are independent. A neglected heterogeneity problem 
arises when those omitted important variables are independent of the included 
explanatory variables (Baltagi, 2005). When a pooled regression model is used to analyse 
a panel data set, the effect of different subjects is omitted. As a result, the failure to 
include these omitted variables gives rise to the problem of omitted-variable bias. Another 
assumption of a logistic regression model is that observations are independent. Violations 
of this assumption can have serious effects, that is, parameters’ standard errors may be 
either overestimated or underestimated. In other words, the parameters’ standard errors 
may be biased. However, a subject (e.g., a company) is observed repeatedly in a panel 
data set, resulting in correlated relationships within observations of the same subject. 
Specifically, the modelling of time-invariant covariates (e.g., participants’ gender in a 
longitudinal study) usually results in underestimated standard errors, hence inflated Type 
I error; and time-varying covariates (e.g., age assessed at each occasion in a longitudinal 
study) usually result in overestimated standard errors causing Type II error inflation 
(Ghisletta & Spini, 2004; Hu, Goldberg, Hedeker, Flay, & Pentz, 1998). 
Compared to traditional aggregated or pooled data analysis, panel data analytic 
techniques can effectively avoid these problems because they can disentangle both the 
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subject effects and time effects at the same time. According to Twisk (2002), a typical 
panel data set with a categorical dependent variable can be modelled as follows:  
∑∑∑
===
++++=
=−
= M
m
imm
K
k
iktk
J
j
itjj
it
it GZtX
Y
Y
1
4
1
32
1
10])1Pr(1
)1Pr(
ln[ βββββ           (5.4.3.1 a) 
In a different notation: 






++++−+
==
∑
=
∑
=
∑
=
)(exp1
1)1Pr(
1
4
1 1
3210
M
m
imm
J
j
K
k
iktkitjj
it
GZtX
Y
βββββ
            (5.4.3.1 b) 
where, for the two models as defined in the above: 
• Pr(Yit=1) = the probability that the observations at t1 to tT of subject i equal 1 (where T is the 
number of measurements and 1 means that subject i belongs to the group of interest); 
• J = the number of independent variables; 
• K = the number of time-dependent covariates; 
• M = the number of time-independent covariates; 
• t = time; 
• Xitj= the independent variable j of subject i at time t;  
• Zikt = the time-dependent covariate k of subject i at time t; 
• Gim = time-independent covariate m of subject i;  
• β0 = overall intercept; 
• β1j = the regression coefficient of independent variable j; 
• β2 = the regression coefficient of time; 
• β3k = the regression coefficient of time-dependent covariate k; 
• β4m = the regression coefficient of time-independent covariate m.  
This regression model states that in a typical panel data set, the dependent variable is 
influenced by three factors: (1) the predictors, which are referred to as β1jXitj; (2) the 
cross-sectional information reflected in the difference between subjects, which is 
represented as β3kZikt and β4mGim; (3) the period or time, which is denoted as β2t in the 
two models above.  
However, current research on the antecedents of CEO turnover has generally used the 
traditional logit or probit regression model, namely aggregated data analysis or pooled 
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data analysis, despite the datasets combining cross-section and time series observations. 
Therefore, the estimated results are likely to be biased.  
Given this problem, it is necessary to disentangle the subject effects and time effects from 
the effect of explanatory variables for a panel data set by using an advanced analytic 
method. The Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE), first introduced by authors Zeger 
and Liang (1986), is a convenient and general approach to analysing the panel data 
(Ghisletta & Spini, 2004). This method is an extension of the generalised linear model 
(GLM), and it models between-subject effects separately from the within-subject effects 
in the marginal (or population-averaged) regression model, which is expressed as: 
g (E|Yij |) = g(μij) = Xijβ                                      (5.4.3.2) 
where Yij (i=1, …,n; j=1, …, t) is the jth outcome for the ith subject; E |Yij |= μij; Xij is a 
p×1 vector of study variables (covariates) for the ith subject at the jth outcome, β consists 
of p regression parameters and g (.) is the link function.  
The link function converts the expected value μ that may be range restricted to the 
unrestricted linear predictor X, and it allows the dependent variables to be expressed as a 
vector of parameters estimated β in the form of an additional model (Ballinger, 2004; 
Hardin & Hilbe, 2002).  
In a GEE model, the within-subject effects are calculated by the working correlation 
matrix which calculates the within-subject effects by specifying how observations from 
the same subject are correlated with each other. Some widely used correlation structures 
are independent, exchangeable, autoregressive, stationary m dependent, non-stationary m 
dependent, unstructured, and so on. 26
                                                           Vi = Ф
 The covariance structure of the correlated 
observations on a given subject of GEE is expressed as: 
2/1
iA R(α)
2/1
iA                                (5.4.3.3) 
where Ai is a diagonal matrix of variance functions v(μij), and R(α) is the working 
correlation matrix of Y indexed by a vector of parameters.  
                                                 
26  These correlation structures will be discussed in detail in Section 5.4.4 Modelling. 
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As well as the GEE model, some other methods, such as mixed or random effects models, 
have been developed for the analysis of correlated data in the social sciences (Cheong, 
Fotiu, & Raudenbush, 2001; Ghisletta & Spini, 2004; Miller & Guo, 2000). However, as 
stated by Ghisletta and Spini (2004), the GEE method has several advantages over other 
methods in detail:  
• It may provide consistent, asymptotically normal, unbiased standard errors, even 
with incorrect specification of the within-subject dependence structure.  
• It can be applied to a broad range of outcome variables often encountered in 
empirical applications (e.g., continuous, ordinal, polychotomous, dichotomous, 
and count) as it accommodates the GLM to correlated data. 
• It implies no strict distribution assumptions. Instead, it assumes the variance of the 
dependent variable to be expressed as a known function of the expectation. 
• It can be applied to incomplete data, given that individual observations are 
missing completely at random. 
• It can be implemented with several commonly available software packages, for 
example, SAS, Stata, S-Plus, and SPSS. 
• It can be applied to unbalanced data. 
According to Twisk (2002), the choice between the GEE method and other panel data 
analytical methods, especially the random effects method, depends on the research 
interests. If one is interested in the relationship between a dichotomous outcome variable 
and several other predictor variables, the GEE analysis will probably provide the most 
“valid” results. However, if one is interested in the individual development over time of a 
dichotomous outcome variable, other methods, such as random effects analysis, will 
probably provide the most “valid” results. The research objective of this study is to 
explore the impact of boards’ aspiration level and CEO power on the likelihood of CEO 
turnover. In other words, the primary research interest is the relationship between CEO 
turnover and antecedents. How the likelihood of CEO turnover develops over time is not 
the focus of this study. For this reason, the GEE analysis is applied to this research. 
It is worth noting that the GEE method used in this study is the GEE1 model, so-called 
because of its separation of the estimating equations for the regression parameters and 
association parameters. By contrast, the GEE2, developed by Prentice (1988) and Zhao 
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and Prentice (1990) in an effort to augment the efficiency of GEEs, does not achieve this 
separation of the regression parameters and association parameters (Hedeker & Gibbons, 
2006). However, the gain in efficiency seems to be minor and the GEE2 estimated 
parameters are “non-consistent” when the correlation structure is mis-specified (Ghisletta 
& Spini, 2004, p. 424). Given these disadvantages, the GEE2 model was not applied to 
this study, and when reference is made to “GEE” in this study, it refers to “GEE1”. 
STATA 10 was used as the main statistical tool to carry out the GEE analysis.  
The first two steps when using the GEE method are to define the distribution of the 
dependent variable and to specify the link function (SAS Institute Inc., 1999).27 One 
characteristic of data in this study is that dependent variables, namely, CEO turnover, 
forced turnover, and voluntary turnover, are dichotomous variables, the values of which 
must be either 1 or 0 no matter what the values of independent variables and control 
variables are. In other words, dependent variables, namely the response variables, are 
binominal data. Therefore, the distribution of the dependent variable should be defined as 
a binomial distribution in this study. 
Logit and probit link functions are the two popular link functions for binomial distribution 
functions. In terms of these two functions, the probability of CEO turnover can be 
transformed into equations as follows:  
                                                          g(p) = ln(p/(1-p))                                                        (5.4.3.4) 
     g(p) = Φ-1(p)                                                               (5.4.3.5) 
where, Equation 5.4.3.4 is a logit link function and Equation 5.4.3.5 is a probit link 
function; p is the probability of CEO turnover and Φ(p) is the standard cumulative normal 
distribution function. These two functions also can be expressed in Figure 5.3. 
In logit models, the function used is the natural log of the odds, while in probit models, 
the function used is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution. In general, 
these two models are similar and the choice between them mostly depends on personal 
preference (Bruin, 2006). In this study, the logit regression model is employed for several 
reasons: 
                                                 
27 Following these two steps, the remaining two steps in using the GEE method are to specify appropriate 
covariates and the working correlation matrix, which will be discussed in Section 5.4.4 Modelling. 
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• First, unlike in a logit model, odds ratios are not available in a probit model.  
• Second, more diagnostic tools are available in logistic regression (Ender, 
2003).  
• Third, previous research on the issue of CEO turnover has commonly 
employed logistic regression models to explore the probability of CEO 
turnover determined by various factors (see Table 5.14).  
Figure 5.3 Logit probabilities and probit probabilities 
 
Source: Ender (2003) 
Table 5.14 Statistical methods employed in previous research 
Study  Method Panel data method Sample 
Coughlan and 
Schmidt (1985) Logistic regression No 
249 companies in 1978, 1979 or 1980 with 597 
company-year observations 
Warner et al. 
(1988) Logistic regression No 
2160 year-firm observations over the period 1963-
1978 
Puffer and 
Weintrop (1991) Logistic regression No 
480 firms over the period 1982 -1984 based on the 
survey data conducted by Forbes magazine 
Boeker (1992) Logistic regression No Semiconductor producers over the period 1968-1989 
Murphy and 
Zimmerman (1993) Logistic regression No 599 firms over the period 1971 - 1990 
Cannella and 
Lubatkin (1993) Logistic regression No 
800 listed U.S. firms over the 14 year period 
1971-1985 
Datta and Guthrie 
(1994) Logistic regression No 1000 firms over the period 1980-1989 
Huson et al. (2001) Logistic regression No Public firms over the 24-year period 1971-1994 with 1316 firm-year observations 
Defond and Hung 
(2004) Logistic regression No 21,483 firm-year observations in 33 countries 
Maury (2006) Logistic regression No 145 non-financial listed companies over the period 1993-2000 
Fan et al. (2007) Logistic regression No All the listed companies on the Chinese stock markets over the period 2000-2003 
Ocasio (1994) Survival analysis No 114 U.S. industrial corporations over the period 1960-1990 
Shen and Cannella Continuous-time No 387 public companies over the period 1988-1997 
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(2002a) event history 
analysis 
5.4.4 Modelling 
The GEE model building process consists of two perspectives. One perspective is the 
selection of the covariates, that is, selecting the covariates that most appropriately explain 
the dependent variables. The other perspective is to choose the most appropriate working 
correlation matrix to represent the within-subject effects. Table 5.15 displays a number of 
common structures that may be appropriate to model the working correlation matrix.28
Table 5.15 Common working correlation matrices 
 
Structure  Definition Example #Parameters 
Independence Ru,v =1  if u=v 
       =0  otherwise 












……
……
……
……
……
100
...
...
010
001
 
0 
Exchangeable Ru,v =1  if u=v 
       =ρ  otherwise 












……
……
……
……
……
ααα
αα
αα
...
...
1
1
 
1 
Unstructured Ru,v =1     if u=v 
       =ρu,v  otherwise 














……
……
……
……
……
1
...
...
1
1
,2,1
,22,1
,12,1
tt
t
t
ρρ
ρρ
ρρ
 
T(t-1)/2 
Auto-regression Ru,v =1      if u=v 
       =ρ|u-v| otherwise 














……
……
……
……
……
−−
−
−
1
...
...
1
1
21
2
1
tt
t
t
ρρ
ρρ
ρρ
 
1 
Stationary m 
dependent 
 
Ru,v =1      if u=v 
       =ρ|u-v| if |u-v|≤m 
       =0      if |u-v|>m 














100
10
01
01
001
12
112
112
211
21
ρρ
ρρρ
ρρρ
ρρρ
ρρ
* 
0<M≤t-1 
Non-stationary m 
dependent  
Ru,v =1      if u=v 
       =ru.v   if |u-v|≤m 
       =0      if |u-v|>m 














1rr00
r1rr0
rr1rr
0rr1r
00r   r1
3,54,5
3,53,42,4
4,53,42,31,3
2,42,31,2
1,31,2
* 
0(user specified) 
* working correlation matrix for m=2.  
Sources: Horton and Lipsitz (1999) and Lam (2007) 
                                                 
28 For a detailed discussion on these structures of working correlation matrices, see Horton and Lipsitz 
(1999) and Lam (2007). 
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5.4.4.1 Modelling procedure: covariates selection 
There are many methods for choosing appropriate covariates for models, for example, 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1973) and Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) (Schwarz, 1978). However, these methods are based on the likelihood and 
asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), which is 
inappropriate for methods based non-likelihood estimators, such as the quasi-likelihood 
on which the GEE method is based (Pan, 2001). For this reason, Pan (2001) recommends 
using QIC_u, an extension of AIC, as the goodness-of-fit statistic for variable selection 
for a model based on the GEE analytical method. This is determined as: 
QIC_u = -2Q(y; g-1(xβR)) + 2r                                    (5.4.4.1) 
where, Q(y; g-1(xβR)) is the value of the quasi-likelihood, computed using the coefficients 
from the model with the assumed correlation structure R, r is the number of coefficients 
in the model.  
This goodness-of-fit statistic can be used both for non-nested and nested model selection 
(Pan, 2001). The criterion for the model selection is that the model with the smallest 
QIC_u should be chosen. Since the GEE method is used to analyse the impact of 
performance relative to an aspiration level and CEO power on CEO turnover (including 
forced and voluntary CEO turnover), QIC_u is used to select the appropriate margin 
equation, namely the subset of covariates to explain the three dependent variables in this 
study.  
On the basis of the theoretical framework and hypotheses for the study of CEO turnover 
discussed in the Chapter Four, models have been constructed with a view to facilitating 
the comparison between models for the measurement of model fit. The structure of 
modelling is summarised in Table 5.16. 
In this study, the antecedents of CEO turnover have been categorised into six groups: 
twelve control variables; one dummy variable of PRA; five variables of CEO structural 
power; nine variables of CEO ownership power; two variables of CEO prestige power; 
and two variables of CEO tenure power. They are denoted as A, B, C, D, E, and F in 
Table 5.16.  
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Table 5.16 Modelling process: covariate selection  
Model 0 Model1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
A 
 
AC 
(QIC_uM 0< 
QIC_uM 1) 
AD 
(QIC_uM 0< 
QIC_uM 2) 
AE 
(QIC_uM 0< 
QIC_uM 3) 
AF 
(QIC_uM 0<QIC_uM 4) 
AEF 
(QIC_uM 0>QIC_uM 4) 
ADE 
(QIC_uM 0> 
QIC_uM 3) 
ADF 
(QIC_uM 3<QIC_uM 4) 
ADEF 
(QIC_uM 3>QIC_uM 4) 
ACD 
(QIC_uM 0> 
QIC_uM 2) 
ACE 
(QIC_uM 2< 
QIC_uM 3) 
ACF 
(QIC_uM 2<QIC_uM 4) 
ACEF 
(QIC_uM 2>QIC_uM 4) 
ACDE 
(QIC_uM 2> 
QIC_uM 3) 
ACDF 
(QIC_uM 3<QIC_uM 4) 
ACDEF 
(QIC_uM 3>QIC_uM 4) 
AB 
ABC 
(QIC_uM 0> 
QIC_uM 1) 
ABD 
(QIC_uM 1< 
QIC_uM 2) 
ABE 
(QIC_uM 1< 
QIC_uM 3) 
ABF 
(QIC_uM 1<QIC_uM 4) 
ABEF 
(QIC_uM 1>QIC_uM 4) 
ABDE 
(QIC_uM 1> 
QIC_uM 3) 
ABDF 
(QIC_uM 3<QIC_uM 4) 
ABDEF 
(QIC_uM 3>QIC_uM 4) 
ABCD 
(QIC_uM 1> 
QIC_uM 2) 
ABCE 
(QIC_uM 2< 
QIC_uM 3) 
ABCF 
(QIC_uM 2<QIC_uM 4) 
ABCEF 
(QIC_uM 2>QIC_uM 4) 
ABCDE 
(QIC_uM 2> 
QIC_uM 3) 
ABCDF 
(QIC_uM 3<QIC_uM 4) 
ABCDEF 
(QIC_uM 3>QIC_uM 4) 
Notes: A = twelve control variables (i.e., ROA3, DAGE, SIZE, and nine year-dummy variables) 
 B = a dummy variable of PRA (i.e., DP_ROA3) 
 C= five variables of CEO structural power (i.e., RBOU, RBIN, RBMI, SIBO, DUAL) 
 D= nine variables of CEO ownership power (i.e., DRSCE, RSTA, RSTA_ST, RSTA_LE, RSLE,      
RSCA, CONC, RELA, REOT)  
 E= two variables of CEO prestige power (i.e., EDUC, ORDE) 
 F= two variables of CEO tenure power (i.e., TENU, RBCE) 
A nested-model structure was used in an effort to choose appropriate covariates to explain 
dependent variables. In other words, the six groups of variables were added into models 
one by one for each dependent variable. Model 0 was the basic model and it included only 
control variables (i.e., A). Model 1 was built to compete with Model 0 by adding the PRA 
variable into Model 0 (i.e., B). QIC_u for both models were calculated and compared. 
The model with the lower value of QIC_u was chosen to build Model 2 by adding CEO 
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structural power variables (i.e., C). Therefore, Model 2 had two possible forms. One form 
was Model 2 based on Model 0 if the value of QIC_u of Model 0 was lower than that of 
Model 1. That is, Model 2 included the A and C groups of variables. The other form was 
Model 2 based on Model 1 if the value of QIC_u of Model 0 was greater than that of 
Model 1. That is, Model 2 included the A, B, and C groups of variables. For the first of 
these forms, Model 3 was built upon the model (Model 0 or Model 2) with the lower 
QIC_u, by adding CEO ownership power variables (i.e., D), which gave rise to two 
possible forms of Model 3, that is, AD and ACD. For the latter form of Model 2, Model 3 
was also built upon the two model (Model 1 or Model 2) with the lower QIC_u by adding 
CEO ownership power variables (i.e., D), which gave rise to another two possible forms 
of Model 3, namely ABD and ABCD. In the same way, Models 4 and 5 were built by 
selecting the previous model with the lower QIC_u. Model 4 had eight possible forms, 
that is, AE, ADE, ACE, ACDE, ABE, ABDE, ABCE, and ABCDE; Model 5 had sixteen 
possible forms: AF, AEF, ADF, ADEF, ACF, ACEF, ACDF, ACDEF, ABF, ABEF, 
ABDF, ABDEF, ABCF, ABCEF, ABCDF, and ABCDEF. 
Modelling equations for these six models are presented as follows. Models 2, 3, 4, and 5 
have 2, 4, 8, and 16 different possible forms respectively. For simplicity, only ABC, 
ABCD, ABCDE, and ABCDEF have been presented as Models 2, 3, 4, and 5.  
Modelling controlling variables (Model 0) 
Model 0 is the baseline model considering the impact of twelve control variables on CEO 
turnover. 
Logit Pr (Yit=1) = +=
=−
=
0
it ]
)1Pr(1
)1YPr(ln[ β
itY
∑
=
12
1j
ijtj xβ                                       (5.4.4.2) 
where, for the model as defined above, 
Pr (Yit)        = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t. 
β0                         = the population averaged intercept term. 
βj                 = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of control variables. 
xijt               = the j×1 vector of time-varying control covariates j (j=1,2, 3,……，12) for company i 
(i=1…325) in year t (t=1…10).  
 
Equation 5.4.4.2 hypothesises that the probability of CEO turnover, forced CEO turnover, 
and voluntary CEO turnover, with respect to a company in a given year is a function of 
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twelve time-varying control covariates represented by ∑
=
12
1j
ijtj xβ with respect to that 
company in that year.  
 
Equation 5.4.4.2 can be presented in an expanded form as follows: 
Logit Pr (Yit=1) = +=
=−
=
0
it ]
)1Pr(1
)1YPr(ln[ β
itY
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(5.4.4.2a) 
Pr (Yit)                 = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t. 
a1, a2,……，and a12  = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of twelve control variables. 
 
Modelling performance relative to an aspiration level variable (Model 1) 
 
Model 1 was built upon Model 0 by including a dummy variable of PRA. It is designed to 
examine the impact of boards’ aspiration level of firm performance on their decisions 
about CEO turnover. Model 1 can be interpreted as: 
Logit Pr (Yit=1) = +=
=−
=
0
it ]
)1Pr(1
)1YPr(
ln[ β
itY
  ∑
=
1
1p
itpp zβ  + ∑
=
12
1j
ijtj xβ                            (5.4.4.3)  
where, for the model as defined above, 
Pr (Yit)          = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t. 
β0                           = the population averaged intercept term. 
βj                  = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of control variables. 
βp                 = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficient of the PRA variable. 
xijt                 = the j×1 vector of time-varying control covariates j (j=1, 2, 3, ……,12) of company i (i=1, 
2, , ……, 325) in year t (t=1…10). 
zitp                = the p×1 vector of time-varying PRA covariate p (p=1) of company i (i=1, 2, ……,325) in 
year t (t=1…10). 
 
Equation 5.4.4.3 models Hypotheses 1.1a to 1.1c. The time-varying variable, DP_ROA3, 
is represented by∑
=
1
1p
itpp zβ . Equation 5.4.4.3 can be presented in an expanded form as 
follows: 
Logit Pr (Yit=1) = +=
=−
=
0
it ]
)1Pr(1
)1YPr(ln[ β
itY
  b1 DP_ROA3it + itROAa 31  + itSIZEa2  + itDAGEa3  
+ 19984 Sa +……+ 200612 Sa                                                                                 (5.4.4.3a) 
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where, for the model as defined above, 
Pr (Yit)              = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t. 
b1                     = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficient of the PRA variable. 
 
Modelling CEO structural power variables (Model 2) 
 
Model 2 was built upon Model 1 by adding CEO structural power variables. It can be 
presented as: 
Logit Pr (Yit=1) = +=
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  ∑
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where, for the model as defined above, 
Pr (Yit)          = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t. 
β0                           = the population averaged intercept term. 
βj                  = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of control variables. 
βp                 = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficient of the PRA variable. 
βq                 = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of CEO structural power variables. 
xijt                 = the j×1 vector of time-varying control covariates j (j=1, 2, 3, ……,12) of company i 
(i=1…325) in year t (t=1…10). 
zitp                  = the p×1 vector of time-varying PRA covariate p (p=1) of company i (i=1, 2, ……, 325) in 
year t (t=1, 2, ……,10). 
sitq                 = the q×1 vector of time-varying CEO structural power covariates q (q=1, 2, ……,5) for 
company i (i=1, 2, ……, 325) in year t (t=1, 2, ……,10). 
 
Equation 5.4.4.4 models Hypotheses 1.1a to 2.3e. The five time-varying variables, 
namely RBOU, RBIN, RBMI, DUAL, and SIBO, are represented by∑
=
5
1q
itqq sβ . Equation 
5.4.4.4 can be presented in an expanded form as follows: 
 
   Logit Pr (Yit=1) = +=
=−
=
0
it ]
)1Pr(1
)1YPr(ln[ β
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  b1 DP_ROA3it +c1RBOUit + c2RBINit+ c3RBMIit+ c4DUALit 
+ c5SIBOit + itROAa 31  + itSIZEa2  + itDAGEa3   + 19984 Sa +……+ 200612 Sa              
                                                                                                                                                        (5.4.4.4a) 
Pr (Yit)    = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t (t=1, 2, ……,10). 
c1 to c5   = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of CEO structural power variables. 
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Modelling CEO ownership power variables (Model 3) 
 
Model 3 was built upon Model 2 by adding nine variables of CEO ownership power 
variables. It can be presented as: 
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 (5.4.4.5) 
where, for the model as defined above, 
Pr (Yit)        = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t. 
β0                         = the population averaged intercept term. 
βj                 = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of control variables. 
βp                = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficient of the PRA variable. 
βq                = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of CEO structural power variables. 
βk                = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of CEO ownership power variables. 
xijt               = the j×1 vector of time-varying control covariates j (j=1, 2, ……,12) of company i (i=1, 
2, ……,325) in year t (t=1, 2, ……, 10). 
zitp               = the p×1 vector of time-varying PRA covariate p (p=1) of company i (i=1, 2, ……, 325) in 
year t (t=1, 2, ……,10). 
sitq                = the q×1 vector of time-varying CEO structural power covariates q (q=1, 2, ……,5) for 
company i (i=1, 2, ……,325) in year t (t=1, 2, ……,10). 
itku              = the k×1 vector of time-varying CEO onwership power covariates k (k=1, 2, ……, 9) for 
company i (i=1, 2, ……,325) in year t (t=1, 2, ……, 10). 
Equation 5.4.4.5 models Hypotheses 1.1a to 3.6f. The nine time-varying variables, 
DRSCE, RSTA, RSTA_ST, RSTA_LE, RSLE, RSCA, CONC, RELA, and REOT, can be 
represented by∑
=
9
1k
itkk uβ . Equation 5.4.4.5 can be presented in an expanded form as 
follows: 
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19984 Sa +……+ 200612 Sa                                                                                 (5.4.4.5a)  
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Pr (Yit)          = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t (t=1, 2, ……, 10). 
d1  to d9        = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of  CEO ownership power variables. 
Modelling CEO prestige power variables (Model 4) 
Model 4 was developed from Model 3 by adding two CEO prestige power variables. It 
can be presented as: 
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where, for the model as defined above, 
Pr (Yit)         = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t. 
β0                           = the population averaged intercept term. 
βj                  = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of control variables. 
βp                 = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficient of the PRA variable. 
βq                 = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of CEO structural power variables. 
βk                 = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of CEO ownership power variables. 
βh                 = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of CEO prestige power variables. 
xijt                 = the j×1 vector of time-varying control covariates j (j=1, 2, 3, ……,12) of company i (i=1, 
2, ……, 325) in year t (t=1…10). 
zitp                  = the p×1 vector of time-varying PRA covariate p (p=1) of company i (i=1, 2, ……,325) in 
year t (t=1, 2, ……,10). 
sitq                 = the q×1 vector of time-varying CEO structural power covariates q (q=1, 2, ……,5) for 
company i (i=1, 2, ……, 325) in year t (t=1, 2, ……, 10). 
itku              = the k×1 vector of time-varying CEO onwership power covariates k (k=1, 2, ……, 9) for 
company i (i=1, 2, ……, 325) in year t (t=1, 2, ……, 10). 
ithv               = the h×1 vector of time-varying CEO prestige power covariates h (h=1, 2) for company i (i=1, 
2, ……, 325) in year t (t=1, 2, ……,10). 
 
Equation 5.4.4.6 models Hypotheses 1.1a to 4.2c. The two time-varying variables, EDUC 
and ORDE, are represented by∑
=
2
1h
ijhhvβ . Equation 5.4.4.6 can be presented in an expanded 
form as follows: 
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Pr (Yit)          = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t (t=1,…,10). 
e1 and e2        = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of  CEO prestige power variables. 
 
Modelling CEO tenure power variables (Model 5) 
 
Model 5 was built upon Model 4 by adding two variables of CEO tenure power variables. 
It can be presented as: 
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where, for the model as defined above, 
Pr (Yit)        = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t. 
β0                         = the population averaged intercept term. 
βj                 = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of control variables. 
βp                = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficient of the PRA variable. 
βq                = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of CEO structural power variables. 
βk                = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of CEO ownership power variables. 
βh                = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of CEO prestige power variables. 
βg                = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of CEO tenure power variables. 
xijt               = the j×1 vector of time-varying control covariates j (j=1, 2, 3, ……,12) of company i (i=1, 
2, ……, 325) in year t (t=1…10). 
zitp               = the p×1 vector of time-varying PRA covariate p (p=1) of company i (i=1, 2, ……,325) in year 
t (t=1, 2, ……,10). 
sitq               = the q×1 vector of time-varying CEO structural power covariates q (q=1, 2, ……,5) for 
company i (i=1, 2, ……, 325) in year t (t=1, 2, ……, 10). 
itku             = the k×1 vector of time-varying CEO onwership power covariates k (k=1, 2, ……, 9) for 
company i (i=1, 2, ……, 325) in year t (t=1, 2, ……, 10). 
ithv             = the h×1 vector of time-varying CEO prestige power covariates h (h=1, 2) for company i (i=1, 
2, ……, 325) in year t (t=1, 2, ……,10). 
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itgw               = the g×1 vector of time-varying CEO tenure power covariates g (g=1,2) for company i (i=1, 
2, ……, 325) in year t (t=1, 2, ……,10). 
 
Equation 5.4.4.7 models the Hypotheses 1.1a to 5.2c. The two time-varying variables, 
TENU and RBCE, are represented by ∑
=
2
1g
itgg wβ . Equation 5.4.4.7 can be presented in an 
expanded form as follows: 
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Pr (Yit)        = the probability of CEO turnover of company i in year t (t=1,…, 10). 
f1 and f2        = the population averaged (or marginal) coefficients of  CEO tenure power variables. 
5.4.4.2 Modelling procedure: the selection of working correlation matrix  
The second step was to select the appropriate variance-covariance structure, that is, the 
working correlation matrix, to compute the within-subject effects. Table 5.15 presents the 
possible six working correlation matrices and the working correlation matrix that best fits 
the model will be chosen in the present study. Horton and Lipsitz (1999, p. 161) propose 
the following regulations for working correlation matrices: 
• If the number of observations per subject is small in a balanced and complete 
design, then an unstructured matrix is recommended.  
• If the observations are simply clustered but not collected over time, then an 
exchangeable structure is advisable. 
• If the observations in a cluster are collected over time, it may be reasonable to use 
a model in which the correlation is a function of time between observations (e.g., 
stationary, non-stationary, or auto-regressive matrix).  
• If the number of clusters is small, an independent matrix may be best.  
Given that the characteristics of the data set in this study are longitudinal, and the large 
number of clusters (325 companies), stationary, non-stationary, and auto-regression 
should be the appropriate within-subject correlation structures. Therefore, a statistic, QIC, 
 97 
was used to choose the most appropriate within-subject correlation structure among these 
three working correlation matrices.29
QIC = -2Q(y; g-1(xβR)) + 2trace (
 Similar to QIC_u, QIC is an extension of AIC which 
uses the quasi-likelihood of a model rather than the log-likelihood, and it is calculated as: 
1−
IA VR)                                 (5.4.4.8) 
where, Q(y; g-1(xβR)) is the value of the quasi-likelihood, computed using the coefficients 
from the model with the assumed correlation structure R; AI is the variance of the 
independent model; V is the sandwich estimate of the variance using the assumed 
correlation matrix R. 
The criterion is that the working correlation matrix with the smallest value is preferred. 
Therefore, in this study, for each model, the sub-model with the smallest value of QIC 
was preferred and, correspondingly, the working correlation matrix was selected. 
5.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has justified the research methodology used in this study, that is, a positive 
research paradigm, a quantitative research approach, and a secondary data research 
strategy. Following this, the research methods to be used in this study have been 
explained from four perspectives: the detailed procedures of data collection, the 
definitions of variables, the justification of the statistical methods to be used to analyse 
the data, and the modelling processes adopted. A preliminary data analysis will be 
presented in the next chapter. 
                                                 
29 Pan (2001) recommends the statistic QIC as an objective standard to choose the best working correlation 
structure for GEE models. 
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Chapter Six: Preliminary Data Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
The research methodology and research methods were justified in the previous chapter. In 
this chapter, the preliminary results of the statistical analysis are reported. The structure of 
this chapter is summarised in Figure 6.1. Section 6.2 presents the demographic statistics 
of the sample companies. Descriptive statistics results for all the variables used in this 
study are presented in Section 6.3. Following this, Section 6.4 reports the correlation 
coefficients for all the variables. In addition, analyses for missing data patterns and 
mechanisms are described in Section 6.5. Finally, a summary for this chapter is presented 
in Section 6.6. 
Figure 6.1 Structure of Chapter Six 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Demographic statistics of sample companies 
This study includes 325 companies listed on the Chinese stock markets over the period 
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187 on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. With respect to the origins of these companies, 270 
were transformed from SOEs, which accounts for 83.1% of the sample companies. Only 
55 companies were transformed from non-SOEs, such as Chinese-foreign joint ventures, 
collective enterprises, town and village enterprises, or private enterprises (Table 6.1).30
Table 6.1 Frequency and percentage of sample companies transformed from SOEs and Non-SOEs 
 
 Frequency Percentage (%) 
Non-SOEs 55 16.9 
SOEs 270 83.1 
 
Table 6.2 presents the year of founding and company age by the end of 1997. More than 
half of the companies in this sample were founded in either 1992 or 1993, accounting for 
26.8% and 28.9% of the sample companies respectively. Three companies were founded 
in 1980, and twenty-seven companies were founded in 1996. By the end of 1997, the 
average age of the sample companies was 5.5 years. 
Table 6.2 The year of founding and company age of sample companies by the end of 1997 
Year of founding Company age (by the end of 1997) Frequency Percentage (%) 
1980 17 3 0.9 
1981 16 2 0.6 
1983 14 3 0.9 
1984 13 7 2.2 
1985 12 6 1.8 
1986 11 6 1.8 
1987 10 10 3.1 
1988 9 17 5.2 
1989 8 19 5.8 
1990 7 10 3.1 
1991 6 8 2.5 
1992 5 87 26.8 
1993 4 94 28.9 
1994 3 22 6.8 
1995 2 4 1.2 
1996 1 27 8.3 
Mean 5.5 - - 
Total - 325 100.0 
 
                                                 
30 There might be a sample selection bias due to the fact that non-surviving companies (e.g. targets of 
takeovers) were not considered in this study. The reason that non-surviving companies are not included is to 
have a complete sample as explained in Page 112, Chapter Five. 
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Figure 6.2 presents the distribution of years in which companies were listed. More than 
one-third of the sample companies were listed in 1996 and 30.5% in 1993. Companies 
listed in the other five years accounted for less than one-third of total companies in the 
sample. 
Figure 6.2 Distribution of year of listing 
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Figure 6.3 Industry distributions of sample companies in 1997 and 2006 
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Table 6.3 describes the industry background of the sample companies. The sample 
companies spanned 11 categories and 65 classes of industries.31
                                                 
31 It is worth noting that some companies in the sample have changed their major businesses during the 
period examined. Thus, the industry distribution of the sample companies is different in different years.  
 These 65 industry classes 
comprised 37 in manufacturing, one in agriculture, one in mining, one in construction, 
three in electric power, gas and water production and supply, seven in information 
technology, 14 in various service industries, and one in comprehensive. Most companies 
a. 1997 b. 2006 
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in the sample were concentrated in the manufacturing and trading industries. Figure 6.3 
displays the industry distributions of the sample companies in 1997 (Figure 6.3a) and 
2006 (Figure 6.3b). In both 1997 and 2006, more than 40% of the sample companies were 
from the manufacturing industry and almost 20% were from the trade industry.  
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Table 6.3 Industry description of sample companies 
Category Class 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
A Agriculture, forestry, livestock farming, 
fishery A0101 Planting 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
B Mining B0105 Coal dressing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 6 
C Manufacturing 
C0101 Food and feedstuff processing 2 2 3 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 27 
C0501 Alcohol and wine manufacturing 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 70 
C1105 Cotton spinning and weaving 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 2 2 1 38 
C1110 Wool spinning and weaving 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 49 
C1301 Clothes manufacturing 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 22 
C3110 Paper products 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
C4105 Crude oil production 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 31 
C4301 Basic chemical materials manufacturing 5 5 5 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 28 
C4310 Chemical fertilisers manufacturing 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 27 
C4320 Chemical pesticides manufacturing 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 11 
C4330 Organic chemical products manufacturing 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 24 
C4350 Synthetic materials manufacturing 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 63 
C4360 Special chemical products manufacturing 6 6 6 7 6 5 5 5 5 5 56 
C4701 Fibre materials manufacturing 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 
C4705 Synthetic fibres manufacturing 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 58 
C5101 Chemical medicine manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 7 
C5105 Chemical medicine preparation manufacturing 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 7 8 8 83 
C5110 Chinese herbs and Chinese patent drug manufacturing 8 8 8 8 7 6 5 6 6 7 69 
C6101 Cement manufacturing 11 9 9 9 10 10 10 9 8 8 93 
C6120 Glass and glass products 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 63 
C6125 Ceramics  3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 24 
C6510 Steel pressing 11 11 11 11 10 9 7 7 6 6 89 
C6760 Non-ferrous metal pressing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
C7101 Boilers and motors manufacturing 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 40 
C7105 Metal processing machines manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
C7115 Pumping, valve, compressor manufacturing 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 45 
C7301 Manufacturing of special equipment for metallurgy, mining, and 
construction industries 6 6 6 5 5 6 6 4 4 4 52 
C7320 Manufacturing of special equipment for textile, clothes, and fur 
industries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
C7399 Other special equipment manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
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C7610 Power transmission and distribution and controlling device 
manufacturing 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 25 
C7615 Electrical wire, cable, and optical fibre manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 10 
C7620 Battery manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
C7625 Household electric appliances manufacturing 12 11 10 10 10 10 10 9 8 7 97 
C7801 General purpose instrument and meter manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
C82 Automobile manufacturing 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 114 
C84 Motorcycle manufacturing 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 36 
D Electric power, gas and water production 
and supply 
D0101 Power manufacturing 16 17 17 19 17 17 17 17 17 15 169 
D0110 Steam, hot water production, and supply 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
D0501 Tap water production 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
E Construction E05 Civil engineering works construction 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 1 7 
F Transport and storage 
F0350 Highway management and maintenance 0 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 11 
F0710 Waterway transport 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 30 
F0750 Port service 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 
G Information Technology 
G0101 Communications equipment manufacturing 6 6 7 7 10 10 10 8 8 7 79 
G1001 Electronic computer manufacturing 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 32 
G2010 Electronic parts manufacturing 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 7 6 6 69 
G2050 Electronic components manufacturing 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 45 
G30 Daily used electronic equipment manufacturing 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 48 
G5001 Computer system service 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 15 
G60 Software industry 0 0 0 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 19 
H Wholesale and retail trade 
H Wholesale and retail trade 5 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 5 39 
H01 Wholesale trade 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
H0150 Wholesale of medicine and metical treatment apparatus 
manufacturing 0 0 1 1 3 4 5 5 5 6 30 
H0160 Wholesale of automobiles, motorcycles and parts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
H0180 Wholesale of petroleum, chemical materials, building materials 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 14 
H11 Retail trade 6 6 5 6 6 3 3 3 4 3 45 
H1101 Comprehensive retail 38 38 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 35 370 
H21 Commercial brokerage and agency service 9 10 10 9 9 8 9 9 10 9 92 
J Real estate J01 Real estate development and operation 25 26 28 27 36 38 42 42 45 45 354 
K Social service 
K01 Hotel industry 7 6 6 5 6 5 4 3 3 3 48 
K80 Travel industry 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 24 
Z Comprehensive Z Comprehensive 30 33 30 27 20 20 16 23 19 22 240 
Total number of companies 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325  
Total number of classes 44 45 47 50 53 55 58 60 61 65  
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6.3 Descriptive statistics 
This section discusses the descriptive statistics of the variables analysed. The descriptive 
statistics of the three dependent variables focussed on frequencies and percentages, and 
their trends over the whole period examined. The descriptive statistics included mean 
values and their trends, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values, and 
skewness and kurtosis where independent variables and control variables are continuous. 
For dichotomous independent variables and control variables, descriptive statistics 
included their frequencies and percentages.  
6.3.1 Dependent variables 
Table 6.4 describes the frequencies and percentages for CEO turnover, including forced 
and voluntary turnover, from 1997 to 2006. Over the ten-year period, CEO turnover 
occurred 896 times in this sample. The percentage of CEO turnover increased 
dramatically from 22.46% to 33.85% in the four years from 1997 to 2000, and then 
gradually dropped to 24.00% in 2006. The average turnover rate was 27.57% in the ten-
year period examined, which is slightly higher than the result reported by Kato and Long 
(2006a), who found the average CEO turnover rate to be 24% during 1999-2002 in 
companies listed on the Chinese stock markets. Compared with other regions of the world, 
the CEO turnover rate in China was higher. Table 6.5 presents CEO turnover rates by 
region in the world from 1995 to 2005. On average, the global CEO turnover rate 
increased progressively from 9% in 1995 to 15.3% in 2005. However, the rate was still 
much lower than that in China. 
From the perspective of different types of CEO turnover in China, a notable characteristic 
is that most CEO turnover events are forced. In total, forced CEO turnover occurred 660 
times, which is almost three times higher than voluntary CEO turnover (236 times) in the 
same period. The average turnover rate for forced turnover was 20.31%, which was much 
higher than voluntary turnover (7.26%).  
Figure 6.4 displays that the percentages of CEO turnover and the two types of CEO 
turnover (i.e., forced and voluntary turnover) follow similar increasing patterns over the 
period examined. Overall turnover rates increased and peaked at 33.85% in 2000, at 24% 
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in 2003 for forced turnover, and at 11.38% in 2000 for voluntary turnover respectively, 
followed by gradual drops to 24%, 20.92%, and 3.08% in 2006 respectively. 
Table 6.4 Incidence and rates of CEO turnover of the sample companies: 1997-2006 
Year 
Forced CEO turnover Voluntary CEO turnover CEO turnover 
Total cases Frequency Percentage (%) Frequency 
Percentage 
(%) Frequency 
Percentage 
(%) 
1997 49 15.08 24 7.38 73 22.46 325 
1998 66 20.31 21 6.46 87 26.77 325 
1999 71 21.85 36 11.08 107 32.92 325 
2000 73 22.46 37 11.38 110 33.85 325 
2001 70 21.54 31 9.54 101 31.08 325 
2002 71 21.85 22 6.77 93 28.62 325 
2003 78 24.00 18 5.54 96 29.54 325 
2004 59 18.15 17 5.23 76 23.38 325 
2005 55 16.92 20 6.15 75 23.08 325 
2006 68 20.92 10 3.08 78 24.00 325 
Total 660 20.31 236 7.26 896 27.57 3250 
Figure 6.4 Percentages of CEO turnover of sample companies: 1997-2006 
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Table 6.5 CEO succession rates, by region, for all types of successions: 1995-2005 (%) 
 North America Europe Japan 
Rest of 
Asia/Pacific Global 
1995 10.5 3.2 15.0 4.5 9.0 
1998 10.6 6.2 12.5 2.3 8.4 
2000 17.9 9.8 14.5 3.7 12.9 
2001 13.4 8.2 17.1 1.9 10.9 
2002 11.0 11.4 9.7 9.1 10.8 
2003 10.1 10.0 13.5 5.6 9.8 
2004 12.9 16.8 15.5 17.2 14.7 
2005 16.2 15.3 19.8 10.5 15.3 
Source:  Lucier et al. (2006) 
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Table 6.6 CEO resignation reasons of sample companies 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total Percentage (%) 
Change of job 16 34 34 32 44 44 34 38 36 37 349 38.95 
Expiry of contract 16 10 22 23 11 16 20 11 10 8 147 16.41 
Resignation 9 11 7 11 18 19 31 13 7 13 139 15.51 
Dual chairperson/CEO  
resigning from the 
CEO position* 
9 7 14 17 8 4 2 1 0 1 63 7.03 
No reason given 9 3 2 7 8 1 0 6 7 8 51 5.69 
Change of controlling 
shareholders 
3 7 8 9 5 2 3 2 2 2 43 4.80 
Dismissal 5 4 4 1 1 0 1 2 5 3 26 2.90 
Corporate 
governance reform** 
0 5 9 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 17 1.90 
Health 0 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 15 1.67 
Retirement 1 2 4 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 12 1.34 
Personal reasons 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 4 10 1.12 
Age reason 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 7 0.78 
Adjustment of the 
management 
3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 0.67 
Death 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 5 0.56 
Too busy to fulfil a 
CEO’s job 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.22 
Legal litigation 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.22 
Study 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.22 
Total 73 87 107 110 101 93 96 76 75 78 896 100.00 
Notes: * This type of CEO turnover is a result of the CSRC’s recommendation that the chairperson and CEO positions   
should be separated in an effort to improve corporate governance at the end of the 1990s. 
** In 1999, the CSRC required listed companies to separate their financial accounts, assets, and personnel from 
those of their parent companies. This caused CEOs who also held senior positions in the parent firms to retire 
from either position to minimise the conflict of interest between holding firms and minority shareholders 
(Chang & Wong, 2009). 
Figure 6.5 Reasons for CEO turnover 
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In annual reports, the seventeen reasons that were used as reasons for CEO turnover as 
announced by listed companies are listed in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.5. Of these, “change 
of job” was the most frequent reason and accounted for more than one-third of the 
incidence of CEO turnover. The second and third most frequent reasons given for CEO 
turnover were “expiry of contract” and “resignation”, which explained 16.41% and 
15.51% of CEO turnover respectively. These top three reasons accounted for more than 
70% of CEO turnover and the other fourteen reasons only explained roughly 30% of 
CEO turnover. 
6.3.2 Independent variables 
6.3.2.1 Variables of PRA 
Variables of PRA (i.e., performance relative to a given aspiration level) employed in this 
research were DP_ROA3, PROA3+, and PROA3-. The descriptive statistics for these 
variables are presented in Tables 6.7a and 6.7b. Over the ten-year period from 1997 to 
2006, on average 14.27% of observations (firm-year) had three-year average firm 
performance above their aspiration level. The mean values of the two continuous 
variables measured by three-year average performance PROA3+ and PROA3- were 
0.0037 and -0.0364 respectively in ten years. 
It is worth noting that PRA3+ and PRA3- have a relatively high level of skewness and 
kurtosis. The reason for this is that these two variables were created by a linear spline 
function for PRA_ROA3 with a knot at zero, which means that for the variable PRA3+, 
all values below 0 were coded as 0 and all values above 0 retained their original values. In 
a similar way, for variable PRA3- all values above 0 were coded as 0 and all values below 
0 retained their original values. This gave rise to a large number of cases with 0 values for 
this variable, and 0 was the lowest value for PRA3+ and the highest value for PRA3-. 
Therefore, PRA3+ had a significant positive skewness and PRA3- had a high level of 
negative skewness, and both of them had a very tall kurtosis. 
From the perspective of the trend over the period examined, DP_ROA3 displayed an 
increasing tendency (see Figure 6.6). 
 
 108 
Table 6.7a Descriptive statistics for the dichotomous variable of PRA 
Year 
DP_ROA3 
N 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
1997 38 12.71 299 
1998 40 12.31 325 
1999 41 12.62 325 
2000 31 9.54 325 
2001 52 16.00 325 
2002 36 11.08 325 
2003 47 14.46 325 
2004 58 17.85 325 
2005 54 16.62 325 
2006 63 19.38 325 
Total  460 14.27 3224 
* The frequency and percentage in this table is for DP_ROA3 equal one. 
Table 6.7b Descriptive statistics for continuous variables of PRA 
Variable Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
PROA3- 
1997 299 -0.0317 -0.6901 0 0.0552 -6.6726 67.3070 
1998 325 -0.0361 -1.1673 0 0.0961 -9.1841 99.4837 
1999 325 -0.0334 -0.6469 0 0.0629 -4.6827 32.3665 
2000 325 -0.0379 -0.5533 0 0.0658 -3.9996 21.3256 
2001 325 -0.0392 -0.4991 0 0.0610 -3.6483 19.2494 
2002 325 -0.0307 -0.5650 0 0.0481 -5.3925 48.9266 
2003 325 -0.0357 -0.8570 0 0.0725 -6.3435 58.1000 
2004 325 -0.0444 -1.3617 0 0.1071 -7.8084 80.7723 
2005 325 -0.0345 -0.3758 0 0.0543 -3.2131 12.3062 
2006 325 -0.0408 -0.8363 0 0.0842 -5.2564 36.2237 
Total 3224 -0.0364 -1.3617 0 0.0731 -7.3573 86.9448 
PROA3+ 
1997 299 0.0029 0 0.3000 0.0192 12.5241 182.9558 
1998 325 0.0032 0 0.1042 0.0122 5.1485 29.6236 
1999 325 0.0072 0 0.9009 0.0543 14.4806 232.0157 
2000 325 0.0014 0 0.0604 0.0062 6.0257 42.0079 
2001 325 0.0039 0 0.2722 0.0208 9.3847 103.7101 
2002 325 0.0025 0 0.1295 0.0136 7.7574 64.0125 
2003 325 0.0038 0 0.1627 0.0170 6.1792 42.7319 
2004 325 0.0032 0 0.1575 0.0158 7.2237 58.5418 
2005 325 0.0042 0 0.3680 0.0254 11.3420 146.6770 
2006 325 0.0051 0 0.1684 0.0194 5.3772 32.5690 
Total 3224 0.0037 0 0.9009 0.0239 20.7137 662.6823 
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Figure 6.7 depicts trends for the two continuous variables of PRA over the period 
examined. The trends of the means of PRA3- and PRA3+ over the ten years were less 
volatile. The mean of PRA3+ stabilised at 0.030 and varied from .0016 to 0.058, and the 
mean of PRA3- varied from -0.0307 to -0.0408. 
 
              Figure 6.6 Trend in DP_ROA3                       Figure 6.7 Trends in PRO3A+ and PRO3A-  
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6.3.2.2 CEO power variables 
Structural power variables 
The variables indicating CEO structural power in this research were the proportions of 
outside directors (RBOU), independent directors (RBIN), affiliated outside directors 
(RBMI), CEO duality (DUAL), and the size of the board (SIBO). Tables 6.8a and 6.8b 
present the descriptive statistics for these variables.  
The trend in the proportion of outside directors was upward over the ten years as it 
increased gradually from 61.58% in 1997 to 78.70% in 2003, and it stabilised at around 
79% in the following years (see Figure 6.8). On average, nearly 73% of directors were 
outside directors over the period examined. This figure is similar to the results obtained 
by Liu (2006), who reported a mean of 70.6% of outside directors on boards for all 
companies listed on the Chinese stock markets over the period 1999 – 2003. Surprisingly, 
this result is even relatively higher than those reported in studies on companies in 
Western countries, for example 72.31% by Huson et al. (2001) and 69% in the study by 
Kor and Misangyi (2008).  
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Table 6.8a Descriptive statistics for continuous variables of CEO structural power  
Variable Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
RBOU 
(%) 
1997 325 61.58 0.00 100.00 22.52 -0.72 0.09 
1998 325 66.65 0.00 100.00 19.37 -0.68 0.16 
1999 325 67.44 0.00 100.00 17.65 -0.68 0.52 
2000 325 70.33 0.00 100.00 15.03 -0.58 1.05 
2001 325 72.38 0.00 100.00 15.33 -0.63 1.29 
2002 325 75.65 28.57 100.00 13.54 -0.44 -0.11 
2003 325 78.70 33.33 100.00 12.82 -0.63 0.11 
2004 325 78.83 33.33 100.00 12.48 -0.77 0.26 
2005 325 78.80 44.44 100.00 12.08 -0.50 -0.41 
2006 325 79.26 44.44 100.00 11.45 -0.40 -0.40 
Total 3250 72.96 0.00 100.00 16.69 -1.01 1.59 
RBIN 
(%) 
1997 325 0.27 0.00 25.00 2.32 9.32 88.82 
1998 325 0.38 0.00 30.77 3.00 8.41 73.21 
1999 325 0.63 0.00 33.33 3.77 6.59 45.30 
2000 325 1.34 0.00 33.33 5.11 3.98 15.56 
2001 325 4.86 0.00 44.44 9.73 1.93 2.71 
2002 325 19.01 0.00 50.00 11.74 -0.38 -0.67 
2003 325 28.85 0.00 50.00 8.69 -1.15 1.76 
2004 325 33.23 0.00 50.00 5.55 -1.75 8.82 
2005 325 34.08 8.33 53.33 4.56 -0.39 5.02 
2006 325 34.52 18.18 60.00 4.58 0.58 4.39 
Total 3250 15.72 0.00 60.00 16.25 0.22 -1.70 
RBMI 
(%) 
1997 325 61.30 0.00 100.00 22.60 -0.71 0.04 
1998 325 66.26 0.00 100.00 19.43 -0.64 0.07 
1999 325 66.82 0.00 100.00 17.82 -0.62 0.36 
2000 325 69.00 0.00 100.00 15.60 -0.55 0.84 
2001 325 67.53 0.00 100.00 17.59 -0.58 0.48 
2002 325 56.64 11.11 100.00 17.78 -0.02 -0.39 
2003 325 49.84 11.11 90.91 15.26 -0.06 -0.22 
2004 325 45.59 11.11 88.89 12.77 -0.46 0.11 
2005 325 44.72 11.11 75.00 12.69 -0.37 -0.42 
2006 325 44.74 0.00 72.73 12.09 -0.44 0.01 
Total 3250 57.24 0.00 100.00 19.25 -0.07 -0.37 
SIBO 
(person) 
1997 325 9.62 3.00 21.00 3.10 0.82 0.76 
1998 325 9.56 5.00 19.00 2.95 0.94 0.77 
1999 325 9.55 5.00 19.00 2.83 0.84 0.73 
2000 325 9.40 5.00 18.00 2.74 0.85 0.84 
2001 325 9.34 5.00 18.00 2.63 0.78 0.72 
2002 325 9.74 5.00 19.00 2.47 0.94 1.18 
2003 325 9.65 5.00 17.00 2.15 0.80 1.07 
2004 325 9.49 5.00 15.00 2.05 0.69 0.86 
2005 325 9.41 5.00 15.00 2.03 0.69 1.07 
2006 325 9.31 5.00 18.00 2.04 0.99 2.42 
Total 3250 9.51 3.00 21.00 2.53 0.88 1.24 
Before 2000, the mean of RBIN (the proportion of independent directors) was less than 
1%, which was a relatively low level. The CSRC promulgated a regulation in August 
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2001 requiring each listed company to have at least one-third of its board made up of 
independent directors by June 2003 (Lin, T.W., 2004b). This regulation boosted the ratio 
of independent directors significantly: from less than 5% in 2001 to more than 33% in 
2004, followed by a gradual increase in the following two years (Figure 6.8). In 2006, 
independent directors represented 34.52% of total directors in this study, which was close 
to the result of 39.2% reported in the study by Byrd and Hickman (1992) by using a 
sample of 128 companies listed on the U.S. stock market over the period from 1980 to 
1988. Overall, 15.72% of directors were independent directors over the ten-year period 
examined in this study.  
Table 6.8b Descriptive statistics for dichotomous variables of CEO structural power  
Year 
DUAL 
N 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
1997 155 47.69 325 
1998 133 40.92 325 
1999 112 34.46 325 
2000 85 26.15 325 
2001 60 18.46 325 
2002 54 16.62 325 
2003 46 14.15 325 
2004 46 14.15 325 
2005 44 13.54 325 
2006 40 12.31 325 
Total 775 23.85 3250 
* The frequencies and percentages in this table are for DUAL equals one. 
Figure 6.8 Trends in proportions of outside directors 
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In contrast to the increasing trend in the ratio of independent directors over the period 
examined, the mean of RBMI (the proportion of affiliated outside directors) presented a 
decreasing tendency over the ten years. Although it increased gradually from 61.30% in 
1997 to 69.00% in 2000, it dropped rapidly in the following years and was just 44.74% in 
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2006. The average proportion of affiliated outside directors over the 10 years was 57.24%. 
This was much higher than the 23.3% reported in the study by Byrd and Hickman (1992) 
and the 30% found in the study by Peng (2004). 
Similarly, Figure 6.9 shows a decreasing trend in the ratio of CEOs who also serve as the 
chairperson on the board (DUAL=1) over the period examined. It dropped dramatically 
over the first five years from 47.69% in 1997 to 18.46% in 2001, followed by a further 
more gradual decrease to 12.31% by 2006. On average, 23.8% of CEOs simultaneously 
held the position of the chairperson of the board of directors over the years examined. 
This was higher than the 17% reported by Kato and Long (2006a), another study on CEO 
turnover in China, and the 21.6% reported by Ocasio (1994), a study on CEO turnover in 
the U.S.  
                   Figure 6.9 Trend in CEO duality                           Figure 6.10 Trend in board size  
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Compared to the three structural power variables discussed above, the board size was 
very stable with the mean size varying from 9.31 to 9.74 persons over the ten years (see 
Figure 6.10).32
Ownership power variables  
 On average, board size was 9.51 directors, which was very similar to the 
averages found in U.S. and Chinese samples. For example, Ocasio (1994) reported the 
mean of board size was 10 directors for 120 U.S. industrial corporations, and Kato and 
Long (2006a) reported the average size of a board was 9.70 directors for 638 companies 
listed on the Chinese stock markets. 
                                                 
32 SIBO increased sharply from 9.34 in 2001 to 9.74 in 2002. Examination of this suggests that no outliers 
in 2002 caused this sudden increase in board size. A possible cause of the sudden increase is that in 2001, 
the CSRC required each listed company to have at least one-third of its board made up of independent 
directors by June 2003. In order to implement this policy, some listed companies may hire independent 
directors from outside, which may significantly increase board size.  
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Variables indicating CEO ownership power in this research are CEOs’ shareholding 
(DRSCE), proportions of state-owned shares (RSTA), shares held by government 
shareholders (RSTA_ST), shares held by corporate state shareholders (RSTA_LE), legal 
person shares (RSLE), tradable A-shares (RSCA), share ownership concentration 
(CONC), representative of the top largest shareholder (RELA), representative of any 
other top ten largest shareholders (REOT). Tables 6.9a and 6.9b present the descriptive 
statistics for these nine variables. 
The proportion of CEOs holding shares in their companies (DRSCE) decreased 
continuously from 86.77% in 1997 to 27.08% in 2006, as displayed in Figure 6.11. On 
average, more than half (51.11%) of CEOs in this sample held shares in the companies 
they worked for over the period examined in this study. 
Table 6.9a Descriptive statistics for dichotomous variables of CEO ownership power 
Year 
DRSCE RELA REOT 
N Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
1997 282 86.77 249 76.62 25 7.69 325 
1998 264 81.23 254 78.15 24 7.38 325 
1999 227 69.85 249 76.62 22 6.77 325 
2000 193 59.38 246 75.69 24 7.38 325 
2001 159 48.92 238 73.23 21 6.46 325 
2002 136 41.85 231 71.08 26 8.00 325 
2003 120 36.92 229 70.46 25 7.69 325 
2004 102 31.38 225 69.23 26 8.00 325 
2005 90 27.69 223 68.62 27 8.31 325 
2006 88 27.08 223 68.62 36 11.08 325 
Total 1661 51.11 2367 72.83 256 78.77 3250 
* The frequencies and percentages in this table are for variables equalling one. 
Table 6.9b Descriptive statistics for continuous variables of CEO ownership power  
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
RSTA 
(%) 
1997 325 35.91 0.00 84.78 24.74 -0.14 -1.15 
1998 325 35.21 0.00 84.78 24.51 -0.10 -1.14 
1999 325 34.60 0.00 83.90 24.16 -0.09 -1.12 
2000 325 33.29 0.00 83.90 24.36 -0.01 -1.20 
2001 325 32.92 0.00 83.75 23.95 -0.02 -1.18 
2002 325 32.62 0.00 83.75 23.90 -0.01 -1.20 
2003 325 30.94 0.00 83.94 23.92 0.11 -1.18 
2004 325 29.87 0.00 83.75 23.75 0.12 -1.23 
2005 325 26.55 0.00 83.75 24.18 0.30 -1.23 
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2006 325 8.22 0.00 75.82 18.26 2.21 3.74 
Total 3250 30.01 0.00 84.78 24.84 0.15 -1.27 
RSTA_ST
(%) 
1997 325 21.99 0.00 83.75 24.38 0.62 -1.00 
1998 325 20.97 0.00 83.75 24.01 0.71 -0.84 
1999 325 20.12 0.00 83.75 23.35 0.75 -0.76 
2000 325 18.94 0.00 83.75 22.63 0.83 -0.60 
2001 325 18.72 0.00 83.75 22.30 0.83 -0.59 
2002 325 18.11 0.00 83.75 22.23 0.90 -0.46 
2003 325 16.48 0.00 83.75 21.42 1.05 -0.13 
2004 325 15.41 0.00 73.52 20.73 1.06 -0.22 
2005 325 12.98 0.00 73.52 19.68 1.30 0.39 
2006 325 3.69 0.00 74.44 11.90 3.71 13.87 
Total 3250 16.74 0.00 83.75 22.09 1.01 -0.29 
RSTA_LE
(%) 
1997 325 13.91 0.00 77.29 24.35 1.42 0.43 
1998 325 14.25 0.00 77.29 24.26 1.36 0.26 
1999 325 14.48 0.00 77.29 23.98 1.32 0.20 
2000 325 14.36 0.00 77.29 23.84 1.35 0.27 
2001 325 14.20 0.00 75.82 23.26 1.32 0.22 
2002 325 14.51 0.00 75.82 23.27 1.27 0.09 
2003 325 14.46 0.00 83.94 22.89 1.31 0.33 
2004 325 14.45 0.00 83.75 22.75 1.31 0.32 
2005 325 13.56 0.00 83.75 22.12 1.39 0.60 
2006 325 4.53 0.00 75.82 14.56 3.32 10.22 
Total 3250 13.27 0.00 83.94 22.85 1.44 0.60 
RSLE 
(%) 
1997 325 23.50 0.00 88.20 22.43 0.78 -0.50 
1998 325 23.15 0.00 78.77 22.02 0.73 -0.68 
1999 325 23.27 0.00 89.40 22.05 0.73 -0.63 
2000 325 23.18 0.00 74.95 21.62 0.67 -0.80 
2001 325 23.32 0.00 74.95 21.74 0.69 -0.77 
2002 325 23.41 0.00 74.95 21.57 0.66 -0.80 
2003 325 24.82 0.00 83.94 22.01 0.59 -0.84 
2004 325 25.77 0.00 78.85 22.32 0.51 -0.98 
2005 325 23.96 0.00 78.85 22.64 0.60 -0.92 
2006 325 6.08 0.00 78.85 15.72 2.85 7.38 
Total 3250 22.05 0.00 89.40 22.13 0.76 -0.66 
RSCA 
(%) 
1997 325 30.87 2.39 100.00 15.238 1.262 4.082 
1998 325 31.30 2.39 100.00 14.934 1.011 3.211 
1999 325 33.96 2.39 100.00 15.856 .824 2.521 
2000 325 36.62 2.39 100.00 16.306 .560 1.772 
2001 325 37.95 2.39 100.00 16.168 .527 1.666 
2002 325 38.37 2.39 100.00 16.094 .480 1.674 
2003 325 38.60 2.39 100.00 16.225 .460 1.560 
2004 325 38.83 2.39 100.00 16.263 .432 1.512 
2005 325 39.87 2.39 100.00 16.791 .364 1.171 
2006 325 46.60 2.39 100.00 18.715 -.007 .122 
Total 3250 37.30 2.39 100.00 16.832 .574 1.300 
CONC 
(%) 
1997 325 42.93 4.18 83.75 17.46 0.13 -0.73 
1998 325 42.57 4.18 83.75 17.30 0.14 -0.75 
1999 325 42.24 2.29 83.75 16.88 0.18 -0.69 
2000 325 41.24 2.14 83.75 16.41 0.23 -0.58 
2001 325 39.72 1.95 83.75 16.23 0.31 -0.54 
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2002 325 38.93 0.39 83.75 16.30 0.35 -0.56 
2003 325 38.13 1.06 83.75 15.90 0.46 -0.49 
2004 325 37.32 2.25 83.75 15.90 0.55 -0.36 
2005 325 36.63 4.24 83.75 15.48 0.62 -0.30 
2006 325 32.95 4.54 83.75 15.17 0.67 -0.22 
Total 3250 39.26 0.39 83.75 16.57 0.36 -0.60 
            
         Figure 6.11 Trend in DRSCE                             Figure 6.12 Trends in CEOs’ status as 
                                                                                          representatives of large shareholders  
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On average, more than 70% of CEOs were representatives of the largest shareholders 
(RELA) between 1997 and 2006. In contrast, only 7.9% of CEOs were representatives of 
any other of the top ten shareholders in the same period (REOT). These variables 
fluctuated slightly although they displayed opposite patterns, namely, the trend of RELA 
was down while REOT displayed an increasing tendency over the ten years (see Figure 
6.12). 
 
On average, the proportions of state-owned shares (RSTA), shares held by government 
shareholders (RSTA_ST), shares held by corporate state shareholders (RSTA_LE), legal 
person shares (RSLE), and tradable A-shares (RSCA) over the ten years were 30.01%, 
16.74%, 13.27%, 22.05%, and 37.30% respectively. Their trends are displayed in Figure 
6.13. The proportions of state-owned shares and shares held by government shareholders 
followed the same pattern over the ten years, that is, both of them gradually declined from 
35.91% and 21.99% respectively in 1997 to 26.55% and 12.98 % respectively in 2005, 
and then dropped dramatically to 8.22% and 3.69% respectively in 2006. On the other 
hand, the proportions of legal person shares and shares held by corporate state 
shareholders displayed a similar pattern over the period examined and they fluctuated 
slightly between 1997 and 2005, followed by a dramatic decrease in 2006. In contrast 
with the decreasing tendency of these non-tradable shares, the trend in the proportion of 
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tradable A-shares was upwards and it rose gradually from 30.87% in 1997 to 39.87% in 
2005, and then increased more remarkably to 46.60% in 2006.  
It is worth noting that the significant changes in the ownership structure in the sample 
companies in 2006 were associated with the non-tradable share reform on the Chinese 
stock markets. On April 29, 2005, the CSRC announced a new pilot program, inviting a 
first batch of four companies to transform non-tradable shares into tradable shares. On 
August 24, 2005, the Chinese government issued guidelines to extend the share reform 
project to the rest of the stock markets (Beltratti & Bortolotti, 2006). This reform gave 
rise to a significant drop in the ratio of non-tradable shares and a significant increase in 
the ratio of tradable shares.  
Figure 6.13 Trends in ownership structure and concentration 
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The share ownership was very concentrated as the average proportion of shares held by 
the top largest shareholders was 39.26%, with a maximum of 83.75% over the ten years. 
However, this variable displayed a decreasing trend as it declined gradually from nearly 
43% in 1997 to just under 33% in 2006 (Figure 6.13). Liu (2006) found that the largest 
shareholder in China on average held 44.8% of a company’s shares over the period 1999-
2002, which was higher than this study’s finding. In comparison, most companies listed 
on the U.S. stock markets were characterised by dispersed ownership. For example, Khan 
et al. (2005) reported that, on average, the largest institutional shareholder owned just 8% 
of equity. 
Prestige power variables  
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Variables indicating CEO prestige power in this research are elite education (EDUC) and 
CEO celebrity status (ORDE). Table 6.10 presents the descriptive statistics for these 
variables. 
Table 6.10 Descriptive statistics for CEO prestige power variables 
Year 
EDUC ORDE 
N 
Frequency Percentage (%) Frequency Percentage (%) 
1997 47 14.46 56 17.23 325 
1998 56 17.23 50 15.38 325 
1999 71 21.85 45 13.85 325 
2000 86 26.46 35 10.77 325 
2001 115 35.38 23 7.08 325 
2002 130 40.00 22 6.77 325 
2003 142 43.69 20 6.15 325 
2004 151 46.46 20 6.15 325 
2005 154 47.38 17 5.23 325 
2006 159 48.92 17 5.23 325 
Total 1111 34.19 305 9.39 3250 
* The frequencies and percentages in this table are for variables equalling one. 
Figure 6.14 Trends in CEOs’ prestige power 
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In 1997, only 14.46% of CEOs of sample companies held a doctoral and/or a master’s 
degree. Since then, the ratio of CEOs holding either or both of these degrees increased 
significantly and continuously and reached 48.92% in 2006 (Figure 6.14). On average, 
approximately one-third of CEOs had a doctoral or master’s degree over the ten years. In 
contrast to the increasing trend of CEOs’ educational background, the ratio of CEOs who 
had celebrity status declined gradually and continuously, from 17.23% in 1997 to 5.23% 
in 2006. The average percentage of CEOs who were celebrities over the ten years was 
9.39%.  
Tenure power variables  
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The variables used to indicate CEO tenure power in this research were CEO tenure 
(TENU) and the proportion of interdependent directors (RBCE). Table 6.11 presents the 
descriptive statistics for these variables.33
Table 6.11 Descriptive statistics for CEO tenure power variables 
 
Variable Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
TENU 
(year) 
1997 325 3.11 1 13 2.28 1.59 3.73 
1998 325 3.37 1 14 2.39 1.49 3.10 
1999 325 3.54 1 15 2.64 1.48 2.88 
2000 325 3.41 1 16 2.68 1.39 2.15 
2001 325 3.09 1 17 2.53 1.65 3.28 
2002 325 3.03 1 18 2.52 2.01 5.22 
2003 325 3.26 1 19 2.68 2.05 5.40 
2004 325 3.51 1 20 2.90 1.92 4.82 
2005 325 3.93 1 21 3.14 1.77 4.07 
2006 325 4.17 1 22 3.39 1.64 3.46 
Total 3250 3.44 1 22 2.75 1.78 4.34 
RBCE 
(%) 
1997 325 84.94 0.00 100.00 32.04 -1.83 1.67 
1998 325 70.67 0.00 100.00 40.85 -0.83 -1.11 
1999 325 61.23 0.00 100.00 42.28 -0.39 -1.59 
2000 325 52.78 0.00 100.00 40.58 -0.05 -1.63 
2001 325 46.21 0.00 100.00 37.96 0.20 -1.43 
2002 325 50.59 0.00 100.00 32.79 0.08 -1.12 
2003 325 50.14 0.00 100.00 32.62 -0.04 -1.07 
2004 325 49.06 0.00 100.00 33.48 0.00 -1.19 
2005 325 48.88 0.00 100.00 34.02 -0.03 -1.27 
2006 325 45.83 0.00 100.00 34.68 0.15 -1.30 
Total 3250 56.09 0.00 100.00 38.23 -0.17 -1.47 
The mean value of CEO tenure was 3.11 years in 1997 and it fluctuated between 3.03 
years and 4.17 years over the ten years (Figure 6.15). On average, the CEO tenure of the 
sample companies was 3.44 years between 1997 and 2006. This was longer than the 
average length of CEO tenure found in the study by Kato and Long (2006a), who  found 
the average tenure length of a CEO to be 2.3 years in China over the period from 1999-
2002. This difference might be caused by the definition of a CEO. In the study by Kato 
and Long (2006a), a CEO was defined as the chairperson of the board as long as he/she 
was paid by the listed companies, or as the “general manager” where the chairperson of 
the board as long as he/she was unpaid by the listed companies. However, in the present 
study, a CEO was defined as the “general manager” regardless of whether the chairperson 
of the board was paid by the listed company. When compared with CEO tenure in other 
                                                 
33 For the distribution of CEO tenure for CEOs who have been replaced, see Table A6.1 in Appendix, on 
page 307. 
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countries, Chinese CEOs have relatively shorter tenure. For instance, Lucier et al. (2007) 
reported that on average, CEO tenure in 2006 was 9.5 years and 9.8 years respectively in 
the Asia/Pacific region (including Australia and New Zealand) and North America 
(including the U.S. and Canada), and 5.7 years in Europe. Similarly, the average tenure of 
CEOs in the U.S. was reported by Ocasio (1994) and Shen (2002a) to be 8.65 and 6.89 
years respectively. 
It is worth noting that the skewness of TENU over the ten years was 1.78, indicating that 
TENU was not normally distributed. Therefore, a log transformation of TENU, that is, 
LN_TENU was used in regression models.34
Table 6.12 Descriptive statistics for transformed TENU (LN_TENU) 
 The skewness of LN_TENU was 0.174 over 
the ten years, which was much lower than that of TENU. The descriptive statistics for 
transformed TENU (LN_TENU) are listed in Table 6.12. 
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1997 325 0.88 .00 2.56 0.73 .044 -1.23 
1998 325 0.98 .00 2.64 0.70 .059 -1.01 
1999 325 1.00 .00 2.71 0.74 .026 -1.08 
2000 325 0.93 .00 2.77 0.78 .160 -1.22 
2001 325 0.84 .00 2.83 0.75 .363 -1.03 
2002 325 0.84 .00 2.89 0.71 .428 -0.69 
2003 325 0.92 .00 2.94 0.72 .308 -0.65 
2004 325 0.97 .00 3.00 0.76 .184 -0.89 
2005 325 1.08 .00 3.04 0.77 .050 -0.90 
2006 325 1.12 .00 3.09 0.80 .034 -1.03 
Total 3250 0.95 .00 3.09 0.75 .174 -0.99 
                       Figure 6.15 Trend in TENU                                 Figure 6.16 Trend in RBCE 
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34  In statistics, data transformation is carried out in order to ensure that a set of data has a normal 
distribution (Munro, 2005).  
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The mean value of RBCE was 84.94% in 1997, which means most directors were firstly 
appointed within the incumbent CEOs’ tenure. This proportion dropped to 46.21% in 
2001, following a slight increase to 50.59% in 2002, and then a gradual decrease to 
45.83% in 2006, as shown in Figure 6.16. On average, 56.09% of directors were firstly 
appointed within the incumbent CEOs’ tenure during the ten-year period examined in this 
study. This was lower than the result reported by Ocasio (1994), who found that 64% of 
directors of 120 U.S. industrial corporations were first appointed during CEOs’ 
incumbency. 
6.3.3 Control variables 
Control variables used in this research were three-year averaged return on assets (ROA3), 
the logarithmic size of the company (SIZE), and a CEO age dummy variable which is 
coded as 1 where a CEO is at or over 60 years (DAGE). Tables 6.13a and 6.13b present 
the descriptive statistics for these variables and their trends are displayed in Figures 6.17-
6.19. 
Table 6.13a Descriptive statistics for continuous control variables 
Variable Year N Mean Minimum Maximum   Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
ROA3 
1997 325 0.06 -0.09 0.41 0.05 1.98 11.70 
1998 325 0.05 -0.13 0.31 0.05 -0.09 3.31 
1999 325 0.04 -0.21 0.27 0.05 -0.66 3.43 
2000 325 0.03 -0.22 0.26 0.06 -0.90 3.50 
2001 325 0.02 -0.30 0.17 0.06 -2.03 6.93 
2002 325 0.01 -0.44 0.20 0.07 -3.07 15.03 
2003 325 0.01 -0.55 0.16 0.07 -3.73 20.93 
2004 325 0.00 -1.36 0.15 0.11 -7.92 86.66 
2005 325 -0.01 -0.94 0.15 0.10 -4.95 36.33 
2006 325 0.00 -0.64 0.14 0.08 -3.49 19.00 
Total 3250 0.02 -1.36 0.41 0.08 -4.86 58.01 
SIZE 
1997 325 20.57 18.31 23.76 0.95 0.57 0.26 
1998 325 20.69 18.54 23.82 0.91 0.50 0.35 
1999 325 20.76 18.62 23.81 0.92 0.41 0.19 
2000 325 20.88 18.56 23.82 0.91 0.33 0.11 
2001 325 20.95 17.88 23.93 0.93 0.13 0.35 
2002 325 20.99 18.30 24.00 0.94 0.15 0.15 
2003 325 21.11 18.53 24.04 0.97 0.15 0.03 
2004 325 21.17 17.41 24.17 1.02 0.00 0.41 
2005 325 21.17 17.12 24.38 1.08 -0.18 0.74 
2006 325 21.16 12.31 24.73 1.30 -1.37 7.88 
Total 3250 20.95 12.31 24.73 1.02 -0.05 2.06 
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The trend of the mean value of ROA3 was downward over the period examined, dropping 
from 0.06 in 1997 to -0.01 in 2005, although it increased slightly to 0.00 in 2006 (Figure 
6.17). On average, ROA3 was 0.02 over the ten years. 
Table 6.13b Descriptive statistics for dichotomous control variables  
Year 
DAGE 
N 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
1997 23 7.08 325 
1998 27 8.31 325 
1999 17 5.23 325 
2000 12 3.69 325 
2001 6 1.85 325 
2002 5 1.54 325 
2003 11 3.38 325 
2004 7 2.15 325 
2005 10 3.08 325 
2006 12 3.69 325 
Total 130 4.00 3250 
  * The frequencies and percentages in this table are for DAGE equalling one. 
Table 6.14 Descriptive statistics for transformed ROA3 (NROA3) 
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1997 325 0.72 0.64 1.00 0.03 3.43 28.31 
1998 325 0.72 0.62 0.93 0.03 0.76 8.74 
1999 325 0.71 0.58 0.90 0.03 0.07 6.05 
2000 325 0.71 0.57 0.84 0.03 -1.30 5.32 
2001 325 0.70 0.53 0.86 0.03 -1.50 8.82 
2002 325 0.70 0.49 0.81 0.03 -2.72 13.45 
2003 325 0.70 0.39 0.79 0.04 -3.92 24.13 
2004 325 0.70 0.40 0.81 0.04 -3.46 19.59 
2005 325 0.69 0.45 0.79 0.04 -2.80 13.55 
2006 325 0.69 0.36 0.78 0.04 -3.25 21.18 
Total 3250 0.70 0.36 1.00 0.04 -1.89 16.59 
  
  Figure 6.17 Trend in ROA3        Figure 6.18 Trend in SIZE           Figure 6.19 Trend in DAGE 
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The value of skewness of ROA3 was -4.86 over the period examined in this study. This 
implies that the distribution of this variable was not normally distributed because it was 
highly left skewed. Therefore, it is necessary to transform it so that its new scores display 
normality.35
In contrast to the decreasing trend of ROA3, company size (SIZE) displayed an 
increasing trend as it increased from 20.57 in 1997 to 21.17 in 2004. Following this, it 
stayed at this level till 2006 (Figure 6.18). Generally, the average company size in this 
sample was 20.95 over the ten years.  
 The descriptive statistics for transformed ROA3 (NROA3) are listed in Table 
6.14. 
Similar to ROA3, the proportion of CEOs who were at or above 60 years (i.e., DAGE=1) 
also displayed a decreasing trend over the ten years, although it fluctuated in a larger 
range (Figure 6.19). The proportion of CEOs who were at or above 60 years initially 
bottomed at 1.54% in 2002, down from 7.08% in 1997 and then gradually increased to 
3.69% in 2006. On average, 4.00% of CEOs were at or above 60 years over the ten-year 
period examined in this sample.  
6.4 Correlation coefficient analysis 
Three types of correlation coefficients, that is, Pearson’s correlation coefficient, 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, and the point biserial correlation coefficient, 
were calculated in an effort to estimate relationships among DVs, IVs, and CVs (as 
discussed in Chapter 5). Table 6.15 presents correlation coefficients of all variables in this 
study.  
                                                 
35 With negative skewness, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001, p. 81) recommend “reflecting” the variable by 
finding the largest score in the distribution, and adding one to it to form a constant that is larger than any 
other score in the distribution. The second step is to form a new variable by subtracting each observation’s 
score in the distribution. The third step is to use a square root, or log, or inverse transformation for the 
newly formed variable. ROA3 is transformed following their suggestion. It is worth noting that inverse 
transformation was adopted in the third step for two reasons. One reason is that ROA3 has smaller values of 
skewness by using inverse transformation than by the other two transformations. The other reason is that, 
more importantly, after the first two steps, the impact of the variable on CEO turnover is reversed because 
the variable is reflected. Using the inversed transformation can also reverse the impact of the newly formed 
variable on CEO turnover. As a result, the newly transformed variable retains the same direction of its 
impact on CEO turnover. 
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Table 6.15 Correlation coefficients among dependent variables and explanatory variables 
  ACT FCT VCT DP_ROA3 PROA3- PROA3+ LN_TENU RBCE RBOU RBIN RBMI DUAL 
1.ACT 1.00            
2.FCT 0.82** 1.00           
3.VCT 0.45** -0.14** 1.00          
4.DP_ROA3 -0.05** -0.05** 0.01 1.00         
5.PRA3- -0.07** -0.09** 0.01 0.20** 1.00        
6.PRA3+ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.38** 0.08** 1.00       
7.LN_TENU 0.02 -0.07** 0.07** 0.02 0.04* 0.02 1.00      
8.RBCE -0.06** -0.12** 0.08** -0.04** 0.05** 0.01 0.54** 1.00     
9.RBOU 0.00 .060** -0.09** 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.15** -0.33** 1.00    
10.RBIN -0.14** -0.08** -0.11** 0.08** 0.02 0.03 0.04** -0.42** 0.32** 1.00   
11.RBMI 0.12** 0.12** 0.01 -0.05** 0.01 0.01 -0.16** 0.07** 0.60** -0.57** 1.00  
12.DUAL 0.03 -0.08** 0.18** -0.05** 0.03 0.01 0.29** 0.38** -0.36** -0.235** -0.12** 1.00 
13.SIBO 0.02 0.00 0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.17** -0.03* 0.18** 0.02 
14.DRSCE -0.07** -0.10** 0.04* -0.06** 0.09** -0.07** 0.38** 0.50** -0.25** -0.35** 0.08** 0.23** 
15.RSTA 0.01 0.03 0.05** 0.00 0.06** 0.00 -0.06** 0.06** -0.15** -0.20** 0.04* 0.07** 
16.RSTA_ST -0.03* -0.05** 0.03 0.00 0.04* 0.01 0.01 0.06** -0.17** -0.15** 0.03 0.10** 
17.RSTA_LE 0.04* 0.02 0.03* 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.08** 0.01 0.00 -0.08** 0.07** 0.02 
18.RSLE 0.05** 0.06** 0.02 -0.04* -0.09** 0.01 -0.06** 0.01 0.08** -0.07** 0.13** -0.06** 
19.RSCA 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.04** 0.02 -0.03* 0.09** -0.06** -0.03* 0.16** -0.16** 0.02 
20.CONC 0.02 0.00 0.04* 0.03* 0.11** 0.00 -0.06** 0.05** -0.14** -0.15** 0.00 0.02 
21.RELA -0.10** -0.14** 0.04* 0.00 0.17** -0.05** 0.10** 0.07** -0.04* -0.06** 0.02 0.09** 
22.REOT 0.03* 0.05** -0.03* 0.02 -0.12** 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05** 0.02 0.03 -0.07** 
23.EDUC -0.06** -0.04* -0.04** 0.09** 0.05** 0.01 -0.13** -0.21** 0.13** 0.24** -0.09** -0.10** 
24.ORDE 0.03 -0.07** 0.06** -0.05** 0.05** -0.04* 0.21** 0.25** -0.19** -0.13** -0.05** 0.33** 
25.NROA3 -0.09** -0.12** 0.02 0.24** 0.80** 0.17** 0.05** 0.20** -0.11** -0.215** 0.08** 0.05** 
26.SIZE -0.11** -0.12** 0.00 0.02 0.28** -0.05** 0.16** -0.09** 0.07** 0.22** -0.12** -0.06** 
27.DAGE 0.08** 0.01 0.12** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.19** 0.17** -0.05** -0.07** 0.01 0.14** 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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Table 6.15 Correlation coefficients among dependent variables and explanatory variables (cont.) 
 SIBO DRSCE RSTA RSTA_ST RSTA_LE RSLE RSCA CONC RELA REOT EDUC ORDE NROA3 SIZE DAGE 
1.ACT                
2.FCT                
3.VCT                
4.DP_ROA3                
5.PRA3-                
6.PRA3+                
7.LN_TENU                
8.RBCE                
9.RBOU                
10.RBIN                
11.RBMI                
12.DUAL                
13.SIBO 1.00               
14.DRSCE 0.04* 1.00              
15.RSTA 0.04** 0.13** 1.00             
16.RSTA_ST 0.06** 0.12** 0.53** 1.00            
17.RSTA_LE 0.01 0.03 0.57** -0.39** 1.00           
18.RSLE -0.05** -0.07** -0.56** -0.34** -0.29** 1.00          
19.RSCA -0.07** -0.07** -0.37** -0.21** -0.21** -0.08** 1.00         
20.CONC -0.05** 0.08** 0.64** 0.35** 0.37** -0.31** -0.46** 1.00        
21.RELA 0.05** 0.14** 0.16** 0.04* 0.14** -0.10** -0.10** 0.29** 1.00       
22.REOT -0.04* 0.01 -0.09** -0.05** -0.04** 0.05** 0.04* -0.18** -0.48** 1.00      
23.EDUC 0.04* -0.20** -0.08** 0.01 -0.09** 0.02 0.04* -0.10** 0.01 0.02 1.00     
24.ORDE 0.01 0.23** 0.03 0.02 0.04** 0.00 0.03 0.04* 0.01 0.01 -0.03* 1.00    
25.NROA3 0.00 0.21** 0.12** 0.05** 0.08** -0.10** -0.10** 0.17** 0.18** -0.12** 0.01 0.12** 1.00   
26.SIZE 0.19** 0.08** 0.13** 0.13** 0.01 -0.30** -0.08** 0.16** 0.14** -0.06** 0.14** 0.05** 0.23** 1.00  
27.DAGE 0.08** 0.13** 0.01 0.06** -0.06** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05** -0.13** 0.14** 0.03 0.04* 1.00 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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The following conclusions are based on the results presented in Table 6.15: 
1) The correlation coefficients between FCT and ACT, and VCT and ACT were 0.818 
and 0.454 respectively, which were at a relatively high level, and both of them were 
highly significant at the 0.01 significance level. This result is not surprising because CEO 
turnover comprises forced and voluntary turnover. 
2) All correlation coefficients between dependent variables and explanatory variables 
(including independent variables and control variables) were below 0.2, which is 
relatively low in terms of the current guidelines for the interpretation of a correlation 
coefficient. For example, Guilford (1956) and Williams (1992) proposed the following 
criteria for interpreting the correlation coefficient: 
• <0.20 slight, almost negligible relationship 
• 0.20-0.40 low correlation, definite, but small relationship 
• 0.40-0.70 moderate correlation, substantial relationship 
• 0.70-0.90 high correlation, marked relationship 
• >0.9 very high correlation, very dependable relationship 
However, the correlated relationships between dependent variables and explanatory 
variables (including independent variables and control variables) were worthy of 
examination for two reasons. According to Cohen (1988), all the criteria of the correlation 
coefficients are arbitrary and should not be observed too strictly. He further explained that 
“Many effects sought in personality, social, and clinical-psychological research are likely 
to be small …. because of the attenuation in validity of the measures employed and the 
subtlety of the issue frequently involved” (p.13). In addition, the correlation coefficients 
between dependent variables and explanatory variables (including independent variables 
and control variables) were generally relatively lower in extant research on the 
antecedents of CEO turnover. For example, the absolute values of the correlation 
coefficients between dependent variables and explanatory variables varied from 0.003 to 
0.012 in the study by Shen and Cannell (2002a), and from 0.009 to 0.137 in Ocasio’s 
(1994) study.  
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The significances and directions of the correlation coefficients between ACT and 
explanatory variables are very similar to those of the correlation coefficients between 
FCT and explanatory variables. In other words, the correlation coefficients between these 
two dependent variables and DP_ROA3, PRA3-, RBCE, RBIN, DRSCE, RSTA_ST, 
RELA, RELA, EDUC, NROA3, SIZE are all are negative and statistically significant, 
while the correlation coefficients between these two dependent variables and RBMIwhich 
is consistent with Hypotheses  
3) It was of concern to notice that the correlation coefficients among a few independent 
variables and control variables were highly significant. For example, the correlation 
coefficient between PROA3- and NROA3 was 0.80, and 0.64 between CONC and RSTA. 
Therefore, it was necessary to test whether there were problems of multicollinearity36
Tolerancej =1- Rj2, 
 
among independent variables and control variables. Tolerance and the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) were the two methods which are often used to test for multicollinearity 
(Field, 2005). Hence, they were applied to this study by using the STATA 10. 
VIFj =1/Tolerancej    
where Tolerancej and VIFj are the tolerance and variance inflationary factor for variable j 
respectively, and Rj2 is the coefficient of multiple determination of explanatory variable xj 
with all other explanatory variables.  
There is no formal criterion for determining the bottom line of the value of Tolerance or 
VIF. Some scholars argue that a Tolerance value less than 0.1 or VIF greater than 10 
roughly indicates a significant problem of multicollinearity (Myers, 1990). Others provide 
a stricter criterion that a Tolerance of less than 0.20 or a VIF greater than 5 indicates a 
multicollinearity problem (e.g., Menard, 1995).  
                                                 
36  Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables in the model are approximately 
determined by a linear combination of other independent variables in the model. It becomes difficult to 
separate the effect of such variables on the dependent or response variable where there is a high level of 
multicollinearity. In this case, the value of the regression coefficients for the correlated variables may 
fluctuate drastically, depending on which independent variables are included in the model. Therefore, an 
assumption of the logistic regress is that independent variables are not linear combinations of each other.  
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Tolerances and VIFs among all independent variables and control variables are calculated 
and the results are presented in Panel A, Table 6.16. Six variables, that is, RBOU, RBIN, 
RBMI, RSTA, RSTA_ST, and RSTA_LE, have VIFs with extremely high values and 
Tolerances with a value at 0. In terms of the measurement definitions discussed in 
Chapter Five, there are two types of outside director: independent directors and affiliated 
outside directors. Therefore, their proportions represented by RBOU, RBIN, and RBMI, 
were highly correlated. In the same way, state-owned shares comprised state shares and 
state legal person shares. This gives rise to a severe problem of multicollinearity among 
these variables. All other VIFs are less than 5 (the maximum value is 3.77) and 
Tolerances are above 0.2 (the minimum value is 0.27), suggesting that the problem of 
multicollinearity may not exist among them. 
Table 6.16 Multicollinearity test among independent variables and control variables 
Variable 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
DP_ROA3 1.35 0.74 1.33 0.75 1.35 0.74 
PROA3- 3.08 0.32 3.01 0.33 3.08 0.32 
PROA3+ 1.11 0.90 1.11 0.90 1.11 0.90 
LN_TENU 2.15 0.46 2.10 0.48 2.15 0.46 
RBCE 2.15 0.47 2.14 0.47 2.15 0.47 
RBOU 5478564.00 0.00 1.30 0.77 - - 
RBIN 5388408.00 0.00 - - 2.38 0.42 
RBMI 7468431.00 0.00 - - 1.87 0.53 
DUAL 1.38 0.72 1.37 0.73 1.38 0.72 
SIBO 1.13 0.88 1.12 0.904 1.13 0.88 
DRSCE 1.57 0.64 1.47 0.68 1.57 0.64 
RSTA 8.66E+13 0.00 2.62 0.38 - - 
RSTA_ST 6.84E+13 0.00 - - 2.62 0.38 
RSTA_LE 7.32E+13 0.00 - - 2.51 0.40 
RSLE 1.94 0.51 1.91 0.52 1.94 0.51 
RSCA 1.59 0.63 1.59 0.63 1.59 0.63 
CONC 2.15 0.47 2.15 0.47 2.15 0.47 
RELA 1.47 0.68 1.45 0.69 1.47 0.68 
REOT 1.34 0.75 1.34 0.75 1.34 0.75 
EDUC 1.15 0.87 1.12 0.90 1.15 0.87 
ORDE 1.21 0.83 1.20 0.84 1.21 0.83 
NROA3 3.77 0.27 3.52 0.28 3.77 0.27 
SIZE 1.46 0.68 1.39 0.72 1.46 0.68 
DAGE 1.09 0.92 1.08 0.93 1.08 0.92 
Panel B in Table 6.16 presents VIFs and Tolerances among all independent variables and 
control variables excluding RBIN, RBMI, RSTA_LE, and RSTA_ST. Panel C in Table 
6.16 presents VIFs and Tolerances among all variables and control variables excluding 
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RBOU and RSTA. In both Panels, the maximum values of VIFs were 3.52 and 3.77 
respectively, and the minimum values of Tolerances were 0.28 and 0.27 respectively, 
indicating there was no multicollinearity problem in these two groups of variables and 
control variables. It appears that RBOU, and the other two variables, namely RBIN and 
RBMI should not be added into the same model. In a similar way, RSTA, and the other 
two variables, that is, RSTA_ST and RSTA_LE, should be presented in different models. 
6.5 Missing data patterns and mechanisms assessment 
Missing data always represent an important issue for longitudinal data statistical analysis 
due to the bias that missing data can introduce into the estimators (Diggle, Liang, & Zeger, 
1994). Therefore, it is necessary to conduct missing data analysis in an effort to check 
whether the assumptions required by GEE analytic methods are met. In this study, the 
missing data analysis consisted of the description and assessment of missing data. 
6.5.1 Descriptive analysis of the missing data patterns 
The first step in analysing missing data is to describe the extent of missing data. Table 
6.17 shows the number and percentage of missing values in each variable. Three PRA 
variables, DP_ROA3, PROA3-, and PROA3+, each have 26 missing values, which 
account for 0.8% of the total observations. None of the other variables have any missing 
data.  
At the company level, 299 companies in the sample have complete data for the whole 
period examined, which represents 92% of total sample companies. The number of 
companies with one missing observation is 26, which accounts for 8% of total sample 
companies (see Table 6.18). In addition, all of these 26 missing observations were 
concentrated in 1997, as displayed in Table 6.19.  
The missing data patterns are displayed in Table 6.20. It shows one pattern of missing 
data, which consists of the 26 observations having missing data for three PRA variables, 
DP_ROA3, PROA3-, and PROA3+. This pattern accounts for 0.8% of total observations 
in the sample. This missing pattern has been caused by the way the three variables were 
calculated. The three variables were calculated by the three-year average performance of 
the focal company and any other companies in the same industry. In other words, 
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financial data as early as 1995 were needed and these data were unavailable for some 
companies.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.17 Descriptive analysis of the missing data 
Variable N Mean 
Missing 
Count Percentage (%) 
FCT 3250 0.20 0 0.0 
VCT 3250 0.07 0 0.0 
ACT 3250 0.28 0 0.0 
DP_ROA3 3224 0.14 26 0.80 
PROA3- 3224 -0.04 26 0.80 
PROA3+ 3224 0.00 26 0.80 
Ln_TENU 3250 0.95 0 0.00 
RBCE 3250 46.34 0 0.00 
RBOU 3250 72.96 0 0.00 
RBIN 3250 15.72 0 0.00 
RBMI 3250 57.24 0 0.00 
DUAL 3250 0.24 0 0.00 
SIBO 3250 9.51 0 0.00 
DRSCE 3250 0.51 0 0.00 
RSTA 3250 30.01 0 0.00 
RSTA_ST 3250 16.74 0 0.00 
RSTA_LE 3250 13.27 0 0.00 
RSLE 3250 22.05 0 0.00 
RSCA 3250 37.30 0 0.00 
CONC 3250 39.26 0 0.00 
RELA 3250 0.73 0 0.00 
REOT 3250 0.08 0 0.00 
EDUC 3250 0.34 0 0.00 
ORDE 3250 0.09 0 0.00 
NROA3 3250 0.50 0 0.00 
SIZE 3250 20.95 0 0.00 
DAGE 3250 0.04 0 0.00 
Table 6.18 Companies with missing observations 
 Numbers Percentage (%) 
Companies with no missing observation 299 92.00 
Companies with one missing observation 26 8.00 
Total companies 325 100 
Table 6.19 Year distribution of missing observations 
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Years  Numbers Percentage (%) 
1997 26 100.00 
Other years 0 0 
Total  26 100 
Table 6.20 Tabulated pattern: missing pattern in terms of variables 
Number of observations Percentage (%) PROA3- PROA3+ DP_ROA3 Others variables 
3224 99.20 - - - - 
26 0.80 X X X - 
Note: observations with and without missing data are marked with X and - respectively. 
6.5.2 Missing data mechanisms assessment 
The missing data mechanisms describe the relationship between missingness and the 
values of variables in the data matrix (Little & Rubin, 2002). They can be categorised into 
three types: missing completely at random (MCAR); missing at random (MAR); and 
missing not at random (MNAR). MCAR is where the probability of a variable having 
missing data is independent of both unobserved and observed data; MAR is where the 
probability of a variable having missing data is dependent on observed data, but not on 
unobserved data; and MNAR is where the probability of a variable having missing data is 
dependent on unobserved data (Twisk, 2002). The GEE method generally requires that 
the missing values are MCAR (Fitzmaurice, Laird, & Ware, 2004). Given this 
requirement, it is vital to diagnose the mechanisms of the missing data. Little’s MCAR 
test is calculated and the result is: 
Chi-Square = 79.614, Sig. = .000 
It appears that missing data are not MCAR in this study, which violates the requirement 
of the GEE analytic method. However, the GEE analytic method is still used in this study 
for the following reasons: 
1. Abandoning the GEE analytic method will result in the advantages of this method 
(discussed in the previous chapter) being lost.  
2. In addition, the power of the above tests on the missingness is doubtful as the 
amount of missing data is relatively low (Twisk, 2002). Observations with missing 
values account for only 0.8% of total observations, and the cases with missing 
observations account for only 8% of total cases. In terms of Twisk (2002), when 
there are only a few (repeated) measures, and when the amount of missing data at 
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each of the (repeated) measurements is rather high, the above-mentioned 
procedures are highly suitable to investigate the missingness. However, when the 
amount of missing data at a particular measurement is rather lower, the power to 
detect differences between the subjects with data and the subjects without data at a 
particular time-point can be too low. 
3. More importantly, other methods that have more relaxed requirements on the 
missingness of data, such as the random effects method, may not better reduce the 
bias that missing data induces. After comparing the regression results of the same 
dataset with missing data using a GEE model and a random effects model 
respectively, Twisk (2002) finds that both GEE analysis and random effects 
analysis perform equally well when a dichotomous outcome variable is considered. 
However, the random effects method, which does not require the data to be missing 
completely at random, was used to estimate the impact of the aspiration level and CEO 
power on CEO turnover in an effort to compare the estimated results using the GEE 
method in this study. The random effects model is also called the “subject-specified 
model” (Carrière & Bouyer, 2002). This method allows the relationship between the 
outcome Y and the covariate X to differ between subjects. In other words, the regression 
coefficients are allowed to differ between subjects (Twisk, 2002). By comparison, the 
GEE method supposes that the relationship between outcome Y and the covariate X is the 
same for all the subjects. In addition, dependencies between observations over time are 
handled differently in these two methods (Carrière & Bouyer, 2002). In the GEE model, 
dependencies between observations for the different subjects are captured by a working 
correlation matrix, which is assumed to be the same for all the subjects and thus reflect an 
average dependence among the repeated observations for all subjects. In contrast, the 
random effects model allows this within-subject dependency to vary from one subject to 
another. More importantly, the random effects method has more relaxed requirements on 
the missingness of data and only requires the data to be missing at random. Due to these 
differences between these two methods, it could be expected that the explanation power 
of this study will be increased if the estimated results using the two methods are the same 
or similar.  
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Since the missing data are not MCAR in this study, it was necessary to choose an 
approach to deal with missing data before regression was performed. In current research, 
the main techniques to cope with missing data in a GEE analysis are: 
1. To replace the missing value by a simulated estimate and analyse the entire 
data set assuming that the missing value estimate is a real value. This is called 
imputation (Hair, Tatham, Anderson, & Black, 1998). 
2. To remove the partially completed responses from the analysis thus reducing 
the sample size. This is called list-wise deletion. One of the major benefits of 
list-wise deletion is that the analysis utilises only complete records. However, 
a drawback with this method is that the sample size can be greatly reduced, 
dependent on the number of missing values (Penn, 2005).  
3. To add a dummy variable (missing versus not missing) to the statistical model 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Haan, Shemanski, Jagust, Manolio, & Kuller, 1999). 
4. To drop the incomplete cases and generate weights for the complete cases to 
address bias induced by the missing data process (Hardin & Hilbe, 2002).  
5. Other alternative approaches (Fitzmaurice, Laird, & Lipsitz, 1994; Little, 
1993). For example, Robins, Rotnitzky, and Zhao (1995) proposed methods to 
relax the requirement of MCAR.  
The fourth and fifth techniques were excluded as they are very technical and not yet 
implemented in standard software (Hardin & Hilbe, 2002; Twisk, 2002). The third 
method is advocated by Cohen and Cohen (1983) in an effort to reflect the information 
that missing data might have. This is supported by Haan et al. (1999), who suggest that 
missing data coding will lead to a less biased estimation of the regression coefficients 
(Twisk, 2002). In addition, Jones (1996) notes that this method can lead to bias in both 
the regression coefficients and their standard errors. In a similar way, Greenland and 
Finkle (1995) question the effectiveness of missing data coding. Given this reason, the 
third method was also excluded.  
Compared to the first method, namely imputation, the second method is more appropriate 
for this study due to the size of observations with missing data. It is suggested that list-
wise deletion is a more appropriate approach when there are fewer that 5% of 
observations with missing data as any sort of simple imputation or correction may be 
more likely to generate biases (Lynch, 2003). Twisk (2002) also cautions that the 
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imputation of missing values does not necessarily lead to more “valid” results. The 
observations with missing values only accounted for 0.8% of the sample size in this study, 
and thus, the list-wise deletion method is adopted.  
6.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has presented the preliminary results of statistical analysis. The results were 
classified into four categories: demographic analysis of sample companies, which 
provided an overview of industry distribution of sample companies; descriptive analysis 
of all variables used in this study, which described the basic features (e.g., mean values, 
maximum and minimum values, and frequency) of data used in this study; correlation 
coefficients analysis, a part of inferential statistics which gave preliminary insights into 
the relationships between all variables; and missing data analysis.  
The next chapter describes the regression analysis undertaken by using the GEE method. 
This will provide insights into the impact of performance relative to an aspiration level 
and CEO power on CEO turnover, including forced and voluntary turnover. 
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Chapter Seven: Empirical Results 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact of performance relative to a given aspiration level and 
CEO power on CEO turnover by using the Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE) 
method. The processes of model selection are described; thirty-six models were 
established. Of these, twelve models used CEO turnover (ACT) as the dependent variable, 
and twelve models used each of forced CEO turnover (FCT) and voluntary CEO turnover 
(VCT) as the dependent variables, respectively. Three working correlation matrices were 
then used for all models in an effort to find the most appropriate model to explore forced, 
voluntary, and overall CEO turnover. Therefore, the processes of the model selection for 
forced CEO turnover, voluntary CEO turnover, and overall CEO turnover are described 
from two perspectives: the selection of the appropriate working correlation matrix and the 
selection of the best sub-covariates.  
In addition, the results of these thirty-six models using the most appropriate working 
correlation matrices are presented. This study also uses the random effects method, which 
is a frequently used analytical method for panel data, to analyse three dependent variables 
in an effort to compare estimated results with the GEE method.37  
The structure of this chapter is summarised in Figure 7.1. The process of selecting the 
most appropriate correlation structure, namely, the working correlation matrix, is 
explained in Section 7.2. The estimated results for CEO turnover are analysed in Section 
7.3. Following this, the estimated results for two types of CEO turnover, forced and 
voluntary turnover, are provided in Sections 7.4 and 7.5 respectively. Subsequently, a 
summary of hypothesis testing is presented in Section 7.6. Finally, a summary for this 
chapter is provided in Section 7.7. 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 The detailed reason for using the random effects method is provided in Chapter Six on page 189. 
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Figure 7.1 Structure of Chapter Seven 
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built by using three working correlation matrices: the first order auto-regression (ar 1), the 
first order stationary (stationary 1), and the first order non-stationary (non-stationary 1), 
which are appropriate for analysing a time-series dataset. As a result, thirty-six sub-
models were set up for each dependent variable. As discussed in Chapter Five (on page 
156), the QIC statistics were used to select the best working correlation matrix for the 
GEE method. The sub-model with the lowest value of QIC is preferred and the working 
correlation matrix was selected on this basis. 
The QIC values for these thirty-six models with the three working correlation matrices are 
presented in Table A7.1 in the Appendix on page 308. Generally, the QIC values in the 
three working correlation matrices for these thirty-six models were very similar. However, 
for both ACT and FCT, all the models had lower QIC values by using the non-stationary 
1 working correlation matrix than by using either of the other two types. For VCT, eleven 
out of twelve models (i.e., Models C1 to C5.5) had lower QIC values when using the non-
stationary 1 working correlation matrix than when using the other two types of working 
correlation matrix. More importantly, the QIC value with non-stationary 1 in Model C2.2, 
which has the best model fit to explain voluntary CEO turnover in the twelve models, was 
the lowest in these three working correlation matrices. Given these results, this study has 
used the non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix to analyse overall, forced, and 
voluntary CEO turnover.  
7.3 Estimated results for CEO turnover 
Table 7.1 presents the estimated results of CEO turnover by using the GEE method with 
the non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix. The discussion in Sections 7.3.1 and 
7.3.2 is based on this table. For the convenience of referring to the results within the 
discussion for each section, the summaries of these results are displayed in break-down 
tables identified as Table 7.1a, Table 7.1b, and so on. 
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Table 7.1 Results of GEE models using the non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix for ACT  
 Model A0 Model A1 Model A2.1 Model A2.2 Model A3.1 Model A3.2 Model A4 Model A5.1 Model A5.2 Model A5.3 Model A5.4 Model A5.5 
DP_ROA3  -0.209 (0.114) 
-0.207 
(0.813) 
-0.118 
(0.379) 
-0.193 
(0.824) 
-0.186 
(0.830) 
-0.194 
(0.824) 
-0.215 
(0.807) 
-0.195 
(0.823) 
-0.210 
(0.810) 
-0.181 
(0.188) 
-0.206 
(0.814) 
RBOU   0.003 (1.003)          
RBIN    -0.085
*** 
(0.919) 
-0.082*** 
(0.922) 
-0.081*** 
(0.922) 
-0.082*** 
(0.921) 
-0.077*** 
(0.926) 
-0.082*** 
(0.922) 
-0.076*** 
(0.927) 
-0.086*** 
(0.917) 
-0.081*** 
(0.922) 
RBMI    0.005
+ 
(1.005) 
0.005+ 
(1.005) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
DUAL   0.103 (1.108) 
0.115 
(1.122) 
0.213+ 
(1.238) 
0.217* 
(1.242) 
0.288** 
(1.334) 
0.332** 
(1.394) 
0.300** 
(1.349) 
0.382*** 
(1.466) 
0.333** 
(1.395) 
0.366** 
(1.442) 
SIBO   0.023 (1.023) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.014 
(1.014) 
0.016 
(1.016) 
0.016 
(1.016) 
0.020 
(1.021) 
0.015 
(1.015) 
0.017 
(1.017) 
0.016 
(1.016) 
0.021 
(1.021) 
DRSCE     -0.385
*** 
(0.680) 
-0.389*** 
(0.678) 
-0.363*** 
(0.696) 
-0.253* 
(0.776) 
-0.346** 
(0.707) 
-0.192+ 
(0.825) 
-0.323** 
(0.724) 
-0.229 
(0.795) 
RSTA     -0.001 (0.990)        
RSTA_ST      -0.004 (0.996) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.007+ 
(0.994) 
RSTA_LE      0.000 (1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
RSLE     0.002 (1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
RSCA     -0.003 (0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.002 
(0.988) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
CONC     0.010
** 
(1.011) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
0.010** 
(1.010) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
0.011** 
(1.012) 
RELA     -0.576
*** 
(0.562) 
-0.598*** 
(0.550) 
-0.616*** 
(0.540) 
-0.603*** 
(0.547) 
-0.609*** 
(0.544) 
-0.568*** 
(0.567) 
-0.652*** 
(0.521) 
-0.641*** 
(0.527) 
REOT     -0.192 (0.825) 
-0.209 
(0.811) 
-0.216 
(0.806) 
-0.159 
(0.853) 
-0.210 
(0.810) 
-0.148 
(0.862) 
-0.238 
(0.788) 
-0.181 
(0.835) 
EDUC       -0.096 (0.909) 
-0.092 
(0.912) 
-0.100 
(0.905) 
-0.115 
(0.891) 
-0.113 
(0.893) 
-0.105 
(0.900) 
ORDE       -0.389
* 
(0.678) 
-0.334* 
(0.716) 
-0.379* 
(0.684) 
-0.295+ 
(0.744) 
-0.392* 
(0.676) 
-0.346* 
(0.708) 
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LN_TENU        0.325
*** 
(1.384) 
-0.045 
(0.956)  
0.664*** 
(1.943) 
0.983*** 
(2.671) 
LN_STENU           -0.298
** 
(0.742) 
-0.271** 
(0.763) 
RBCE        -0.011
*** 
(0.989)  
-0.008*** 
(0.992)  
-0.012*** 
(0.988) 
NROA3 -4.507
** 
(0.011) 
-3.903* 
(0.024) 
-3.807* 
(0.022) 
-4.053* 
(0.017) 
-3.051+ 
(0.047) 
-3.259* 
(0.038) 
-3.007+ 
(0.049) 
-2.479 
(0.084) 
-2.995+ 
(0.050) 
-2.583+ 
(0.076) 
-3.594* 
(0.027) 
-2.984+ 
(0.051) 
SIZE -0.213
*** 
(0.808) 
-0.218*** 
(0.804) 
-0.229*** 
(0.795) 
-0.166** 
(0.847) 
-0.130* 
(0.879) 
-0.122* 
(0.885) 
-0.108* 
(0.897) 
-0.148** 
(0.863) 
-0.105* 
(0.901) 
-0.118* 
(0.889) 
-0.105* 
(0.900) 
-0.149** 
(0.861) 
DAGE 0.880
*** 
(2.412) 
0.827*** 
(2.287) 
0.789*** 
(2.202) 
0.763*** 
(2.145) 
0.853*** 
(2.437) 
0.882*** 
(2.415) 
0.913*** 
(2.492) 
0.936*** 
(2.550) 
0.923*** 
(2.516) 
0.980*** 
(2.664) 
0.995*** 
(2.704) 
1.006*** 
(2.733) 
S1998 0.217 (1.243) 
0.205 
(1.228) 
0.205 
(1.228) 
0.191 
(1.210) 
0.190 
(1.210) 
0.185 
(1.203) 
0.191 
(1.211) 
0.038 
(1.039) 
0.196 
(1.216) 
0.098 
(1.103) 
0.181 
(1.198) 
0.026 
(1.026) 
S1999 0.541
** 
(1.718) 
0.530** 
(1.699) 
0.536** 
(1.709) 
0.527** 
(1.694) 
0.495** 
(1.640) 
0.485** 
(1.624) 
0.499** 
(1.647) 
0.252 
(1.286) 
0.506** 
(1.659) 
0.349+ 
(1.418) 
0.521** 
(1.684) 
0.260 
(1.297) 
S2000 0.598
** 
(1.819) 
0.584** 
(1.793) 
0.595** 
(1.812) 
0.609** 
(1.838) 
0.563** 
(1.756) 
0.549** 
(1.731) 
0.563** 
(1.757) 
0.273 
(1.314) 
0.572** 
(1.772) 
0.388+ 
(1.474) 
0.605** 
(1.832) 
0.296 
(1.344) 
S2001 0.486
** 
(1.626) 
0.486* 
(1.625) 
0.500** 
(1.648) 
0.702*** 
(2.017) 
0.629** 
(1.875) 
0.611** 
(1.843) 
0.632** 
(1.882) 
0.310 
(1.363) 
0.638** 
(1.893) 
0.420* 
(1.521) 
0.687** 
(1.988) 
0.342 
(1.407) 
S2002 0.360
* 
(1.434) 
0.353+ 
(1.423) 
0.351+ 
(1.420) 
1.796*** 
(6.027) 
1.634*** 
(5.125) 
1.601*** 
(4.957) 
1.637*** 
(5.140) 
1.287*** 
(3.621) 
1.636*** 
(5.137) 
1.372*** 
(3.943) 
1.742*** 
(5.708) 
1.363*** 
(3.907) 
S2003 0.397
* 
(1.487) 
0.399* 
(1.490) 
0.395* 
(1.484) 
2.815*** 
(16.687) 
2.587*** 
(13.292) 
2.540*** 
(12.679) 
2.586*** 
(13.283) 
2.158*** 
(8.651) 
2.582*** 
(13.223) 
2.243*** 
(9.421) 
2.733*** 
(15.374) 
2.268*** 
(9.659) 
S2004 0.094 (1.099) 
0.102 
(1.107) 
0.101 
(1.106) 
2.955*** 
(19.195) 
2.687*** 
(14.683) 
2.632*** 
(13.906) 
2.685*** 
(14.658) 
2.209*** 
(9.106) 
2.680*** 
(14.578) 
2.300*** 
(9.973) 
2.873*** 
(17.697) 
2.356*** 
(10.548) 
S2005 0.057 (1.058) 
0.064 
(1.066) 
0.066 
(1.068) 
3.003*** 
(20.150) 
2.734*** 
(15.393) 
2.671*** 
(14.451) 
2.723*** 
(15.232) 
2.208*** 
(9.094) 
2.725*** 
(15.254) 
2.344*** 
(10.424) 
2.892*** 
(18.033) 
2.328*** 
(10.254) 
S2006 0.095 (1.100) 
0.109 
(1.115) 
0.114 
(1.121) 
3.090*** 
(21.987) 
2.903*** 
(18.226) 
2.821*** 
(16.785) 
2.885*** 
(17.899) 
2.294*** 
(9.910) 
2.884*** 
(17.877) 
2.436*** 
(11.433) 
3.070*** 
(21.542) 
2.425*** 
(11.306) 
_cons 6.328*** 6.030*** 5.735*** 4.645** 3.457** 3.543* 3.087* 4.079** 3.032* 3.555*** 3.209* 4.271** 
Wald chi2 77.71*** 81.79*** 87.92*** 188.59*** 284.31*** 287.39*** 304.53*** 380.42*** 306.99*** 381.02*** 314.38*** 380.57*** 
QIC_u 3748.552 3725.266 3727.215 3571.907 3527.326 3525.104 3521.118 3476.637 3524.844 3502.248 3510.996 3461.053 
P 13 14 17 18 25 26 28 30 29 29 30 31 
N 3250 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 
 Model A0 Model A1 Model A2.1 Model A2.2 Model A3.1 Model A3.2 Model A4 Model A5.1 Model A5.2 Model A5.3 Model A5.4 Model A5.5 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. P is the number of parameters in a model. N is the number of observations in a model.  
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7.3.1 Model fit  
Table 7.1a presents measures of model fit, namely the Wald Chi-square, the QIC_u,38
Table 7.1a: Model fit of GEE models using ACT as the dependent variable (non-stationary 1) 
 and 
the changes of QIC_u values for twelve CEO turnover models using the first order non-
stationary working correlation matrix. All models are statistically significant (as their 
Wald Chi-square has a p-value <0.001).   
 Wald chi2 QIC_u 1 2 3 4 5 P 
Model A0 77.71*** 3748.552      13 
Model A1 81.79*** 3725.266 -23.286     14 
Model A2.1 87.92*** 3727.215  1.949    17 
Model A2.2 188.59*** 3571.907  -153.359    18 
Model A3.1 284.31*** 3527.326   -44.581   25 
Model A3.2 287.39*** 3525.104   -46.803   26 
Model A4 304.53*** 3521.118    -3.986  28 
Model A5.1 380.42*** 3476.637     -44.481 30 
Model A5.2 306.99*** 3524.844     3.726 29 
Model A5.3 381.02*** 3502.248     -18.870 29 
Model A5.4 314.38*** 3510.996     -10.122 30 
Model A5.5 380.57*** 3461.053     -60.065 31 
 Notes: 1. Change in QIC_u relative to Model A0.  
  2. Change in QIC_u relative to Model A1.  
  3. Change in QIC_u relative to Model A2.2. 
  4. Change in QIC_u relative to Model A3.2. 
  5. Change in QIC_u relative to Model A4. 
  Significance: ***<0.001 
  P is the number of parameters in a model. 
First, the impact of controlling variables (i.e., NROA3, SIZE, DAGE, and nine year-
dummy variables) on CEO turnover was captured in Model A0, and its QIC_u value was 
3748.552.39
                                                 
38 QIC_u is a criterion for model selection in the GEE method, as discussed in Chapter Five on page 147. 
The lower the value of QIC_u, the better the model fit. 
 Then, Model A1 was built by adding the dummy variable of performance 
39Given that the research question for this study is to examine the impact of the board’s aspiration level and 
CEO power on CEO turnover (including forced and voluntary CEO turnover) for a given level of firm 
performance, this study included firm performance (i.e., NROA3) as a control variable. However, in 
considering DP_ROA3 (i.e., the dummy variable of performance relative to aspiration levels) was 
calculated using firm performance, this study also estimated CEO turnover by excluding firm performance 
(NROA3). The estimated results are presented in Table A7.2 in the Appendix on page 309. The estimated 
results were similar to the models including NROA3 except for DP_ROA3, which had negative and 
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relative to the aspiration level, DP_ROA3, to Model A0. Model A1 improved the model fit 
by reducing QIC_u by 23.286 units, suggesting that DP_ROA3 improves the model fit. 
Therefore, Model A1 was selected to build the most appropriate model to explain ACT by 
adding variables relating to CEO power. 
Second, Model A2.1 was developed from Model A1 by adding three CEO structural 
power variables, RBOU, DUAL, and SIBO. The model fit was not as good, because 
QIC_u increased by 1.949. However, by adding four CEO structural power variables, 
namely RBIN, RBMI, DUAL, and SIBO, to Model A1, the result was that Model A2.2 
improved the model fit by reducing the QIC_u by 153.359. It is evident so far, that CEO 
turnover is better explained by Model A2.2. 
Third, seven CEO ownership power variables other than RSTA_ST and RSTA_LE were 
added to Model A2.2. Model A3.1 further improved the model fit, as QIC_u dropped by 
44.581. Model A3.2 was developed from Model A3.1 by replacing RSTA by RSTA_ST 
and RSTA_LE and it also improved the model fit because it reduced QIC_u by 46.803 
relative to Model A2.2. Compared to Model A2.2, both Models A3.1 and A3.2 have 
lower values of QIC_u and thus the impact of CEO ownership power is evidenced. Model 
A3.2 was therefore selected to develop models to investigate CEO turnover as it had a 
lower value of QIC_u than Model A3.1. 
Fourth, Model A4 was developed by adding the two CEO prestige power variables to 
Model A3.2. The QIC_u was lower 3.986 relative to Model A3.2. The impact of CEOs’ 
prestige power on ACT is evident.  
Finally, two CEO tenure power variables, LN_TENU and RBCE, were added to Model 
A4. Model A5.1 improved the model fit with the QIC_u declining from 3521.118 to 
3476.637, providing evidence of the impact of CEO tenure and the proportion of 
interdependent directors on CEO turnover.  
Given that the correlation between CEO tenure and RBCE was 0.538, which is relatively 
high, Models A5.2 and A5.3 added only LN_TENU and RBCE respectively into Model 
A4. Relative to Model A4, Model A5.3 improved the model fit by reducing QIC_u by 
                                                                                                                                                  
statistically significant coefficients in models excluding NROA3, but negative and statistically insignificant 
coefficients in models including NROA3. 
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18.870, while Model A5.2 reduces the model fit by increasing QIC_u by 3.726. In 
addition, the estimated coefficient of LN_TENU is statistically insignificant (see Table 
7.1). In order to investigate further the impact of CEO tenure on the likelihood of CEO 
turnover, a smoothed hazard estimate was conducted. Figure 7.2 graphs the hazard rate 
for CEOs as their tenure increases after controlling for the impact of CEO age. The 
probability of CEO turnover increased along with the lengthening of CEO tenure during 
the first period and it peaked at around 0.32 at the fifth year, followed by a decline. This 
result suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO tenure and the hazard rate 
of CEO turnover. Therefore, in an effort to estimate the curve relationship between CEO 
tenure and turnover, a variable of the square of tenure (LN_STENU) was added to Model 
A5.2 to create Model A5.4. Model A5.4 further improved the model fit as it reduced the 
QIC_u from 3524.844 in Model A5.2 to 3510.996. It demonstrates that LN_STENU has a 
significant impact on CEO turnover and should be included the model. Model A5.5 was 
developed by adding RBCE into Model 5.4. Both Models A5.4 and A5.5 have lower 
QIC_u than Model A4. In addition, the direction and significance of LN_TENU and 
LN_STENU were the same in Models A5.4 and A5.5. Model A5.5 had the lowest QIC_u 
of all models for ACT, and therefore it is the best model to explain ACT. 
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Figure 7.2 Effects of CEO tenure on CEO turnover (adjusted  for CEO age)
 
Table 7.2 presents Akaika’s Information Criterion (AIC), the goodness of fit, and the 
changes in AIC of random effects models for CEO turnover. According to Hardin and 
Hilbe (2001), the AIC is a powerful and widely used model-selection criterion for non-
nested models or models calculated across different samples, and it is based on the 
 142 
likelihood and asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), which 
is used for parameter estimation in random effects models. AIC for a given model M is 
defined as: 
AIC (M) = -2 log likelihood (M) + 2×K         
where K is the number of covariance parameters of Model M. The criterion for the model 
selection is that the model with the lowest AIC has the best goodness of fit, and thus 
should be chosen. 
The results of covariate selection of random effects models are the same with GEE 
models. Model A5.5 has the lowest AIC among the twelve models, and thus is the most 
appropriate model to explain ACT. In other words, ACT is best explained by thirty 
variables, DP_ROA3, RBIN, RBMI, DUAL, SIBO, DRSCE, RSTA_ST, RSTA_LE, 
RSLE, RSCA, CONC, RELA, REOT, EDUC, ORDE, LN_TUNE, LN_STUNE, RBCE, 
NROA3, SIZE, DAGE, and nine year-dummy variables. 
Table 7.2 Model fit of random effects method using ACT as the dependent variable 
 AIC 1 2 3 4 5 K 
Model A0 3751.757      14 
Model A1 3726.135 -23.767     15 
Model A2.1 3709.54  -0.311    18 
Model A2.2 3701.839  -163.708    19 
Model A3.1 3719.293   -37.234   26 
Model A3.2 3715.632   -40.053   27 
Model A4 3695.035    -3.735  29 
Model A5.1 3586.810     -55.785 31 
Model A5.2 3529.836     -5.748 30 
Model A5.3 3518.881     -15.867 30 
Model A5.4 3518.381     -14.705 31 
Model A5.5 3516.428     -64.909 32 
Notes: 1. Change in AIC relative to Model A0.  
           2. Change in AIC relative to Model A1.  
           3. Change in AIC relative to Model A2.2. 
           4. Change in AIC relative to Model A3.2. 
           5. Change in AIC relative to Model A4. 
           K is the number of covariance parameters in a model.  
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7.3.2 The influence of explanatory variables on CEO turnover 
Following the discussion in the previous section on the model fit, this section reports the 
significance of coefficients on the dummy variable of performance relative to a given 
aspiration level and four types of CEO power variable in Models A0 to A5.5. 
7.3.2.1 The influence of the dummy variable of PRA on CEO turnover 
The dummy variable of performance relative to a given aspiration level, DP_ROA3, has 
been included in eleven models (i.e., Models A1 to A5.5). Table 7.1b presents the overall 
results, namely the estimated coefficients, odds ratios, and p-values, for this variable in 
these models. 
Table 7.1b The influence of the dummy variable of PRA on ACT 
 DP_ROA3 
Hypothesis 1.1a 
Model A1 -0.209 (0.114) 
Model 2.1 -0.207 (0.813) 
Model A2.2 -0.118 (0.379) 
Model A3.1 -0.193 (0.824) 
Model A3.2 -0.186 (0.830) 
Model A4 -0.194 (0.824) 
Model A5.1 -0.215 (0.807) 
Model A5.2 -0.195 (0.823) 
Model A5.3 -0.210 (0.810) 
Model A5.4 -0.181 (0.188) 
Model A5.5 -0.206 (0.814) 
Note: The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
DP_ROA3 is statistically insignificant in these models, indicating that the likelihood of 
CEO turnover was unrelated to whether firm performance is below or above the 
aspiration level. It is apparent, therefore, that Hypothesis 1.1a is not supported. 
7.3.2.2 The influence of CEO structural power on CEO turnover 
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CEO structural power variables, RBOU, RBIN, RBMI, DUAL, and SIBO, appear in ten 
models, that is, Models A2.1 to A5.5. The overall results, namely the estimated 
coefficients, odds ratios, and p-values, for these variables in the ten models are presented 
in Table 7.1c.  
Table 7.1c The influence of CEO structural power variables on ACT  
 RBOU RBIN RBMI DUAL SIBO 
Hypothesis 2.1a 2.1a 2.1a 2.2a 2.3a, 2.3c 
Model A2.1 0.003 (1.003) - - 
0.103 
(1.108) 
0.023 
(1.023) 
Model A2.2 - -0.085
*** 
(0.919) 
0.005+ 
(1.005) 
0.115 
(1.122) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
Model A3.1 - -0.082
*** 
(0.922) 
0.005+ 
(1.005) 
0.213+ 
(1.238) 
0.014 
(1.014) 
Model A3.2 - -0.081
*** 
(0.922) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
0.217* 
(1.242) 
0.016 
(1.016) 
Model A4 - -0.082
*** 
(0.921) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.288** 
(1.334) 
0.016 
(1.016) 
Model A5.1 - -0.077
*** 
(0.926) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.332** 
(1.394) 
0.020 
(1.021) 
Model A5.2 - -0.082
*** 
(0.922) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.300** 
(1.349) 
0.015 
(1.015) 
Model A5.3 - -0.076
*** 
(0.927) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.382*** 
(1.466) 
0.017 
(1.017) 
Model A5.4 - -0.086
*** 
(0.917) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.333** 
(1.395) 
0.016 
(1.016) 
Model A5.5 - -0.081
*** 
(0.922) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.366** 
(1.442) 
0.021 
(1.021) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
RBOU was presented only in Model A2.1 and its estimated coefficient was statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that the proportion of outside directors has no significant impact 
on CEO turnover, which refutes Hypothesis 2.1a. In the other nine models (i.e., Models 
A2.2-A5.5), RBOU was replaced by two variables, RBIN and RBMI. Estimated 
coefficients of RBIN were all statistically significant and negative in these models. In 
contrast, estimated coefficients of RBMI were all positive and statistically significant in 
Models A2.2 and A3.1, while they appeared statistically insignificant in Models A3.2 to 
A5.5. These results indicate a negative relationship between the ratio of independent 
directors and the probability of CEO turnover and an insignificant relationship between 
the ratio of affiliated outside directors and the probability of CEO turnover. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2.1a is not supported by any of the three variables relating to outside directors. 
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The fourth CEO structural variable, DUAL, had statistically significant and positive 
coefficients in the eight models other than Models A 2.1 and A2.2, indicating that a CEO 
who is also the chairperson of the board is more likely to be replaced than a CEO who 
does not hold the position of the chairperson of the board. The fifth CEO structural 
variable, SIBO, had statistically insignificant and positive coefficients in ten models. This 
indicates that board size has no significant impact on CEO turnover. As a result, 
Hypotheses 2.2a, 2.3a, and 2.3c should all be rejected. 
7.3.2.3 The influence of CEO ownership power on CEO turnover 
The nine CEO ownership power variables, DRSCE, RSTA, RSTA_ST, RSTA_LE, RSLE, 
RSCA, CONC, RELA, and REOT, were included in eight models (i.e., Models A3.1 to 
A5.5). Table 7.1d presents the overall results (i.e., the estimated coefficients, odds ratios, 
and p-values) for the nine variables in these eight models. 
Table 7.1d The influence of CEO ownership power variables on ACT  
 DRSCE RSTA RSTA_ST RSTA_LE RSLE RSCA CONC RELA REOT 
Hypothesis 3.1a 3.2a 3.2c 3.2c 3.3a 3.4a 3.5a 3.6a 3.6b 
Model 
A3.1 
-0.385*** 
(0.680) 
-0.001 
(0.990) - - 
0.002 
(1.002) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.010** 
(1.011) 
-0.576*** 
(0.562) 
-0.192 
(0.825) 
Model 
A3.2 
-0.389*** 
(0.678) - 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
-0.598*** 
(0.550) 
-0.209 
(0.811) 
Model  
A4 
-0.363*** 
(0.696) - 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
-0.616*** 
(0.540) 
-0.216 
(0.806) 
Model 
A5.1 
-0.253* 
(0.776) - 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
-0.603*** 
(0.547) 
-0.159 
(0.853) 
Model 
A5.2 
-0.346** 
(0.707) - 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
-0.609*** 
(0.544) 
-0.210 
(0.810) 
Model 
A5.3 
-0.192+ 
(0.825) - 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
0.010** 
(1.010) 
-0.568*** 
(0.567) 
-0.148 
(0.862) 
Model 
A5.4 
-0.323** 
(0.724) - 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
-0.002 
(0.988) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
-0.652*** 
(0.521) 
-0.238 
(0.788) 
Model 
A5.5 
-0.229 
(0.795) - 
-0.007+ 
(0.994) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
0.011** 
(1.012) 
-0.641*** 
(0.527) 
-0.181 
(0.835) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
In the first seven models (Models A3.1-A5.4), DRSCE had negative and statistically 
significant estimated coefficients, while it had negative but statistically insignificant 
coefficients in Model A5.5, the best model explaining CEO turnover. This result is 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 3.1a. In all eight models, CONC had positive and 
statistically significant coefficients. This result indicates that CEOs who are in companies 
with less concentrated share ownership are less likely to be replaced. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 3.5a is supported. 
 146 
One of the two variables relating to the CEOs’ status as the representative of largest 
shareholders, RELA, had statistically significant and negative estimated coefficients in 
these models, while REOT, the other variable, had no statistically significant estimated 
coefficients. These results indicate that CEOs’ status as the representative of the largest 
shareholder can increase their power and reduce their risk of being replaced, while their 
status as the representative of any of the other top ten largest shareholders cannot protect 
him/her from being replaced. Both Hypotheses 3.6a and 3.6b are therefore supported. 
The estimated coefficient of RSTA_ST was negative and statistically significant in Model 
A5.5, namely the model with the best goodness of fit, while its estimated coefficients 
were all negative but statistically insignificant in the other six models (i.e., Models A3.2-
A5.4). The other four variables, namely, RSTA, RSTA_LE, RSLE, and RSCA, had 
statistically insignificant coefficients in all models. It is evident that Hypotheses 3.2a and 
3.3a are not supported, while Hypothesis 3.4a is supported. In addition, the estimated 
coefficients of RSTA_ST were greater than those of RSTA_LE in all seven models (i.e., Models 
A3.2 to A5.5). As a result, Hypothesis 3.2c is supported. 
7.3.2.4 The influence of CEO prestige power on CEO turnover 
The two CEO ownership power variables, EDUC and ORDE, were included in six 
models (i.e., Models A4 to A5.5). The overall results, that is, the estimated coefficients, 
odds ratios, and p-values, for these two variables in the six models are presented in Table 
7.1e.  
Table 7.1e The influence of CEO prestige power variables on ACT 
 EDUC ORDE 
Hypothesis 4.1a 4.2a 
                Model A4 -0.096 (0.909) 
-0.389* 
(0.678) 
Model A5.1 -0.092 (0.912) 
-0.334* 
(0.716) 
Model A5.2 -0.100 (0.905) 
-0.379* 
(0.684) 
Model A5.3 -0.115 (0.891) 
-0.295+ 
(0.744) 
Model A5.4 -0.113 (0.893) 
-0.392* 
(0.676) 
Model A5.5 -0.105 (0.900) 
-0.346* 
(0.708) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
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In all six models, ORDE had negative and statistically significant estimated coefficients, 
while EDUC had negative but statistically insignificant estimated coefficients. This 
suggests that a CEO’s celebrity status can increase his/her power and reduce the pressure 
of being replaced, while a CEO’s elite education background has no impact on CEO 
power and the likelihood of CEO turnover. As a result, Hypothesis 4.2a is supported, 
while Hypothesis 4.1a is rejected. 
7.3.2.5 The influence of CEO tenure power on CEO turnover 
Three CEO tenure power variables, LN_TUNE, LN_STUNE, and RBCE, were included 
in five models (i.e., Models A5.1 to A5.5). The overall results (i.e., the estimated 
coefficients, odds ratios, and p-values) for these three variables in these models are 
presented in Table 7.1f.  
Table 7.1f The influence of CEO tenure power variables on ACT 
 LN_TUNE LN_STUNE RBCE 
Hypothesis 5.1a, 5.1c 5.1a, 5.1c 5.2a 
Model A5.1 0.325
*** 
(1.384) - 
-0.011*** 
(0.989) 
Model A5.2 -0.045 (0.956) - - 
Model A5.3 - - -0.008
*** 
(0.992) 
Model A5.4 0.664
*** 
(1.943) 
-0.298** 
(0.742) - 
Model A5.5 0.983
*** 
(2.671) 
-0.271** 
(0.763) 
-0.012*** 
(0.988) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
Two variables of CEO tenure power, that is, LN_TUNE and RBCE, were included in 
Model A5.1, in which LN_TUNE has a positive and statistically significant estimated 
coefficient. In Model A5.2, LN_TUNE had a negative but statistically insignificant 
estimated coefficient. In both Models A5.4 and A5.5, LN_TUNE had positive and 
statistically significant estimated coefficients, while LN_STUNE had negative and 
statistically significant estimated coefficients, indicating an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between CEO tenure and the probability of CEO turnover. These results 
demonstrate that the probability of CEO turnover first increases along with the 
lengthening of CEO tenure, which is consistent with Hypothesis 5.1c, and then decreases 
along with the further lengthening of CEO tenure, which supports Hypothesis 5.1a. 
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The estimated coefficients of RBCE were all negative and statistically significant in three 
models (i.e., Models A5.1, A5.3, and A5.5), suggesting a significant and negative 
relationship between the proportion of interdependent CEOs and the probability of CEO 
turnover. Therefore, Hypothesis 5.2a is supported. 
7.3.2.6 The influence of control variables on CEO turnover 
Three control variables, NROA3, SIZE, and DAGE, were included in twelve models (i.e., 
Models A0 to A5.2). Table 7.1g displays the overall results, namely the estimated 
coefficients, odds ratios, and p-values, for these three variables in these twelve models. 
Table 7.1g The influence of control variables on ACT 
 NROA3 SIZE DAGE 
Model A0 -4.507
** 
(0.011) 
-0.213*** 
(0.808) 
0.880*** 
(2.412) 
Model A1 -3.903
* 
(0.024) 
-0.218*** 
(0.804) 
0.827*** 
(2.287) 
Model A2.1 -3.807
* 
(0.022) 
-0.229*** 
(0.795) 
0.789*** 
(2.202) 
Model A2.2 -4.053
* 
(0.017) 
-0.166** 
(0.847) 
0.763*** 
(2.145) 
Model A3.1 -3.051
+ 
(0.047) 
-0.130* 
(0.879) 
0.853*** 
(2.437) 
Model A3.2 -3.259
* 
(0.038) 
-0.122* 
(0.885) 
0.882*** 
(2.415) 
Model A4 -3.007
+ 
(0.049) 
-0.108* 
(0.897) 
0.913*** 
(2.492) 
Model A5.1 -2.479 (0.084) 
-0.148** 
(0.863) 
0.936*** 
(2.550) 
Model A5.2 -2.995
+ 
(0.050) 
-0.105* 
(0.901) 
0.923*** 
(2.516) 
Model A5.3 -2.583
+ 
(0.076) 
-0.118* 
(0.889) 
0.980*** 
(2.664) 
Model A5.4 -3.594
* 
(0.027) 
-0.105* 
(0.900) 
0.995*** 
(2.704) 
Model A5.5 -2.984
+ 
(0.051) 
-0.149** 
(0.861) 
1.006*** 
(2.733) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
In all twelve models, the estimated coefficients of SIZE were negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that CEOs in larger companies are less likely to be replaced than 
CEOs in smaller companies. In contrast, the estimated coefficients of DAGE were 
positive and statistically significant in all models, suggesting that CEO turnover is more 
likely to occur where a CEO is at or above the retirement age. In relation to the three-year 
average performance variable NROA3, its estimated coefficients were also all negative 
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and statistically significant, indicating a negative relationship between CEO turnover and 
firm performance. 
7.3.2.7 The comparison of the influence of explanatory variables on CEO turnover 
between GEE models and random effects models 
Table 7.3 presents the estimated results of Model A5.5 in the GEE model and the random 
effects model. The estimated results of all twelve models using the random effects 
method appear in Table A7.3 in the Appendix, on page 311.   
Table 7.3 Estimated results of Model A5.5 using the GEE and random effects methods for ACT 
 GEE model Random effects model 
DP_ROA3 -0.206 (0.814) 
-0.200 
(0.819) 
RBIN -0.081
*** 
(0.922) 
-0.086*** 
(0.918) 
RBMI 0.003 (1.003) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
DUAL 0.366
** 
(1.442) 
0.443** 
(1.557) 
SIBO 0.021 (1.021) 
0.035+ 
(1.035) 
DRSCE -0.229
 
(0.795) 
-0.171 
(0.843) 
RSTA_ST -0.007
+ 
(0.994) 
-0.008* 
(0.992) 
RSTA_LE 0.000 (1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
RSLE 0.002 (1.002) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
RSCA -0.002 (0.998) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
CONC 0.011
** 
(1.012) 
0.016*** 
(1.016) 
RELA -0.641
*** 
(0.527) 
-0.733*** 
(0.481) 
REOT -0.181 (0.835) 
-0.221 
(0.802) 
EDUC -0.105 (0.900) 
-0.097 
(0.980) 
ORDE -0.346
* 
(0.708) 
-0.411* 
(0.663) 
LN_TENU 0.983
*** 
(2.671) 
1.210*** 
(3.353) 
LN_STENU -0.271
** 
(0.763) 
-0.291** 
(0.747) 
RBCE -0.012
*** 
(0.988) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
NROA3 -2.984
+ 
(0.051) 
-3.258* 
(0.038) 
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SIZE -0.149
** 
(0.861) 
-0.174** 
(0.840) 
DAGE 1.006
*** 
(2.733) 
1.111*** 
(3.037) 
S1998 0.026 (1.026) 
0.038 
(1.039) 
S1999 0.260 (1.297) 
0.302 
(1.353) 
S2000 0.296 (1.344) 
0.366+ 
(1.442) 
S2001 0.342 (1.407) 
0.450* 
(1.568) 
S2002 1.363
*** 
(3.907) 
1.508*** 
(4.516) 
S2003 2.268
*** 
(9.659) 
2.441*** 
(11.488) 
S2004 2.356
*** 
(10.548) 
2.522*** 
(12.457) 
S2005 2.328
*** 
(10.254) 
2.491*** 
(12.075) 
S2006 2.425
*** 
(11.306) 
2.609*** 
(13.579) 
_cons 4.271** 4.597** 
QIC_u 3461.053 - 
Rho - 0.084*** 
Wald chi2 380.57*** 297.26*** 
Number of observations 3224 3224 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
Comparing the results from the two models, several things stand out. First, in the random 
effects model, the value of rho is 0.084, indicating that the proportion of the total residual 
variation that is due to differences between companies is 8.4% and the likelihood-ratio 
test of rho=0 is significant at the level of 0.001.40
Second, with respect to the significance and direction of estimated coefficients, the results 
produced by the two regression methods were very similar. The only difference between 
the results of the two types of models was the size of the estimated coefficients of SIBO. 
Its coefficient was positive but statistically insignificant in GEE models, while its 
coefficient was positive and statistically significant at the 0.1 confidence level in random 
effects models. For all other variables, their coefficients were in the same directions and 
 This indicates that CEO turnover events 
over different years within a company are not independent, but rather are related to one 
another. In other words, the variance of ACT attributed to differences between companies 
cannot be neglected.  
                                                 
40 The coefficient, rho (ρ), is the estimation of the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), which indicates 
the fraction of variance of the total variance that is due to differences between groups (Twisk, 2002). A test 
of the random effects model against the pooled logit is simply a t-test of the hypothesis that ρ=0. 
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significance. In other words, in both models, DP_ROA3 was insignificantly and 
negatively related to ACT. Two CEO structural power variables, RBIN and DUAL, were 
statistically significantly related to ACT in both the random effects and the GEE models. 
In addition, according to the models, two CEO ownership power variables, RSTA_ST and 
RELA were significantly and negatively associated with ACT, and one variable of CEO 
ownership power, CONC, was positively related to ACT, in both types of model. One 
variable of CEO prestige power, ORDE, had negative and statically significant 
coefficients, while the other variable of CEO prestige power, EDUC, was negative but 
statistically insignificant. An inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO tenure and 
ACT, and a significant and negative relationship between RBCE and ACT were found in 
both types of model. In relation to control variables, the significance and directions of 
their estimated coefficients were the same in both types of model. The similarities 
between the results of the two types of model imply the validity and stability of the results. 
7.3.3 The influence of the discrepancy between firm performance and a given 
aspiration level on CEO turnover 
Models A1-A5.5 investigate whether performance below the aspiration level increases the 
likelihood of CEO turnover. However, they have not yet explored how boards respond to 
the change of the distance between firm performance and their aspiration level. In an 
effort to examine this impact, Models A6.1 and A6.2 were developed. The GEE method 
with a logit link function and non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix was used, and 
the random effects method was also used in an effort to compare the results of the two 
methods. The regression results are presented in Table 7.4.  
Table 7.4 The influence of the discrepancy between performance and a given aspiration level on ACT  
 Model A6.1 Model A6.2 GEE model Random effects model GEE model Random effects model 
Hypothesis 1.2a, 1.3a 1.2a, 1.3a 1.2a, 1.3a 1.2a, 1.3a 
PROA3- 1.271 (3.566) 
1.671 
(5.319) 
-2.124* 
(0.120) 
-2.056*** 
(0.128) 
PR0A3+ -1.031 (0.357) 
-1.378 
(0.252) 
-0.766 
(0.465) 
-0.996 
(0.369) 
RBIN -0.082
*** 
(0.921) 
-0.087*** 
(0.917)   
RBMI 0.003 (1.003) 
0.001 
(1.001)   
DUAL 0.368
** 
(1.444) 
0.445** 
(1.561)   
SIBO 0.021 0.034+   
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(1.021) (1.035) 
DRSCE -0.222
* 
(0.801) 
-0.163 
(0.849)   
RSTA_ST -0.007
+ 
(0.993) 
-0.008* 
(0.992)   
RSTA_LE 0.000 (1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000)   
RSLE 0.002 (1.002) 
0.003 
(1.003)   
RSCA -0.002 (0.998) 
-0.003 
(0.997)   
CONC 0.012
** 
(1.012) 
0.016*** 
(1.016)   
RELA -0.647
*** 
(0.524) 
-0.740*** 
(0.477)   
REOT -0.188 (0.829) 
-0.225 
(0.798)   
EDUC -0.110 (0.896) 
-0.100 
(0.905)   
ORDE -0.335
* 
(0.715) 
-0.402* 
(0.669)   
LN_TENU 1.007
*** 
(2.759) 
1.205*** 
(3.338)   
LN_STENU -0.279
** 
(0.757) 
-0.288** 
(0.750)   
RBCE -0.012
*** 
(0.988) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987)   
NROA3 -5.835
* 
(0.003 
-6.859* 
(0.001)   
SIZE -0.152
** 
(0.859) 
-0.180** 
(0.835)   
DAGE 1.015
*** 
(2.759) 
1.122*** 
(3.071)   
S1998 0.019 (1.020) 
0.030 
(1.031) 
0.201 
(1.223) 
0.210 
(1.234) 
S1999 0.250 (1.283) 
0.289 
(1.335) 
0.493** 
(1.637) 
0.513** 
(1.670) 
S2000 0.285 (1.329) 
0.352+ 
(1.421) 
0.525** 
(1.691) 
0.547** 
(1.728) 
S2001 0.312 (1.366) 
0.413+ 
(1.512) 
0.409* 
(1.505) 
0.428* 
(1.534) 
S2002 1.344
*** 
(3.834) 
1.476*** 
(4.377) 
0.280 
(1.323) 
0.293 
(1.341) 
S2003 2.247
*** 
(9.460) 
2.406*** 
(11.086) 
0.319+ 
(1.376) 
0.335+ 
(1.398) 
S2004 2.335
*** 
(10.328) 
2.487*** 
(12.019) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.007 
(1.007) 
S2005 2.300
*** 
(9.978) 
2.449*** 
(11.572) 
-0.015 
(0.985) 
-0.013 
(0.987) 
S2006 2.390
*** 
(10.914) 
2.558*** 
(12.906) 
0.030 
(1.031) 
0.033 
(1.034) 
_cons 6.359** 7.312** -1.276*** -1.323*** 
Wald chi2 385.20*** 295.89*** 38.66*** 40.50*** 
QIC_u 3463.238 - 3782.781 - 
Rho  - 0.086*** - 0.052*** 
Number of 
observations 3224 3224 3224 3224 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
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Model A6.1 was developed from Model A5.5 by replacing DP_ROA3 with two 
continuous PRA variables, PROA3- and PROA3+. The estimated coefficients of both 
these variables were statistically insignificant. Model A6.2 was developed from Model 
A6.1 by excluding the all CEO power variables (i.e., CEO structural power, ownership 
power, prestige power, and tenure power variables), and three control variables (i.e., firm 
performance, firm size, and CEO age). The estimated coefficient of PROA3+ was still 
statistically insignificant, but the coefficient of PROA3- became negative and statistically 
significant. These results are consistent with those produced by models using the random 
effects method. It is evident that the likelihood of CEO turnover is unrelated to the 
distance between firm performance and the aspiration level when firm performance is 
above the aspiration level, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1.3a. In contrast, when 
firm performance is below the aspiration level, CEOs are more likely to be replaced when 
firm performance drops further below the aspiration level, before controlling for the 
impacts of CEO power, firm performance, firm size, and CEO age. As a result, 
Hypothesis 1.2a is supported. 
7.3.4 The influence of CEO power on CEO turnover when firm performance is 
above or below a given aspiration level 
The models discussed above investigated the influence of performance relative to the 
aspiration level and CEO power on the probability of CEO turnover separately. However, 
how CEO power affects CEO turnover when firm performance is above or below the 
aspiration level has not been examined. In an effort to examine the impact of CEO power 
on CEO turnover when firm performance is above or below the aspiration level, the 
sample was divided into two subgroups in terms of the dummy variable, DP_ROA3. One 
subgroup comprised observations with performance below the aspiration level, namely, 
DP_ROA3 equalled zero, and the other subgroup consisted of observations with 
performance above the aspiration level, that is, DP_ROA3 equalled one. These two 
subgroups were estimated separately by using the same dependent variable (ACT) and 
explanatory variables. These are all independent variables and control variables except for 
DP_ROA3 in Model A5.5, because Model A5.5 has been shown to be the best model to 
explain CEO turnover. In total, twenty-nine explanatory variables were included in this 
model. The GEE method with a logit link function and non-stationary 1 working 
correlation matrix was used, and the random effects method was also used in an effort to 
compare the results of the two methods. The regression results are presented in Table 7.5.  
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Table 7.5 The impact of CEO power on ACT for firm performance above and below the aspiration 
level 
Variables GEE model Random effects model DP_ROA3=0 DP_ROA3=1 DP_ROA3=0 DP_ROA3=1 
CEO 
structural 
power 
RBIN -0.087
*** 
(0.917) 
-0.110** 
(0.896) 
-0.087*** 
(0.917) 
-0.092*** 
(0.912) 
RBMI 0.003 (1.003) 
0.014 
(1.014) 
0.001 
(1.01) 
-0.001 
(0.999) 
DUAL 0.505
** 
(1.656) 
-0.853 
(0.426) 
0.423** 
(1.526) 
0.556 
(1.743) 
SIBO 0.002 (1.002) 
0.054 
(1.056) 
0.029 
(1.030) 
0.059 
(1.061) 
CEO 
ownership 
power 
DRSCE -0.262 (0.770) 
0.607 
(1.836) 
-0.160 
(0.852) 
-0.122 
(0.885) 
RSTA_ST 0.001 (1.001) 
-0.008 
(0.992) 
-0.007+ 
(0.993) 
-0.014 
(0.986) 
RSTA_LE 0.006 (1.006) 
0.006 
(1.006) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
RSLE 0.005 (1.005) 
-0.001 
(0.999) 
0.003 
(1.000) 
0.006 
(1.006) 
RSCA -0.008 (0.992) 
0.041* 
(1.042) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
0.016+ 
(1.016) 
CONC 0.008 (1.008) 
0.009 
(1.009) 
0.016** 
(1.016) 
0.013 
(1.013) 
RELA -0.583
*** 
(0.558) 
-0.321 
(0.726) 
-0.796*** 
(0.451) 
-0.459 
(0.632) 
REOT -0.120 (0.887) 
-0.221 
(0.801) 
-0.220 
(0.809) 
-0.162 
(0.851) 
CEO 
prestige 
power 
EDUC -0.224 (0.799) 
-0.487 
(0.614) 
-0.082 
(0.921) 
-0.088 
(0.916) 
ORDE -0.282 (0.754) 
-1.087 
(0.337) 
-0.299 
(0.741) 
-1.350+ 
(0.256) 
CEO tenure 
power 
LN_TENU 0.905
** 
(2.473) 
-0.072 
(0.931) 
1.232*** 
(3.427) 
1.251* 
(3.496) 
LN_STENU -0.310
** 
(0.733) 
0.296 
(1.345) 
-0.322** 
(0.725) 
-0.182 
(0.834) 
RBCE -0.011
*** 
(0.989) 
-0.015 
(0.985) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
-0.018** 
(0.982) 
Control 
variables 
NROA3 -4.269
* 
(0.014) 
6.518 
(677.069) 
-2.672+ 
(0.069) 
0.989 
(2.689) 
SIZE -0.083 (0.920) 
0.126 
(1.134) 
-0.228** 
(0.796) 
0.289+ 
(1.335) 
DAGE 1.073
*** 
(2.925) 
1.592* 
(4.915) 
1.113*** 
(3.043) 
1.263+ 
(3.537) 
S1998 -0.103 (0.902) 
3.003 
(20.154) 
-0.046 
(0.955) 
0.592 
(1.807) 
S1999 0.241 (1.273) 
1.857 
(6.404) 
0.269 
(1.309) 
0.596 
(1.814) 
S2000 0.584
+ 
(1.793) 
0.585 
(1.794) 
0.465* 
(1.592) 
-0.857 
(0.425) 
S2001 0.375 (1.455) 
1.542 
(4.672) 
0.504* 
(1.656) 
0.202 
(1.224) 
S2002 1.523
*** 
(4.584) 
4.179* 
(65.282) 
1.573*** 
(4.822) 
1.066 
(2.902) 
S2003 2.713
*** 
(15.068) 
5.160* 
(174.150) 
2.566*** 
(13.016) 
1.784+ 
(5.954) 
S2004 2.751*** 6.049** 2.483*** 2.561* 
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(15.662) (423.678) (11.981) (12.943) 
S2005 2.647
*** 
(14.109) 
2.981 
(19.713) 
2.645*** 
(14.083) 
1.327 
(3.771) 
S2006 3.537
*** 
(34.373) 
3.527+ 
(34.036) 
2.821*** 
(16.790) 
1.320 
(3.744) 
_cons 3.918* -12.114 5.383** -8.620 
Wald chi2 213.18 *** 117.97*** 259.89*** 54.62* 
QIC_u 3530.566 4795.029 - - 
Rho  - - 0.092*** 0.001* 
Number of observations 1538 189 2764 460 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
When firm performance was below the aspiration level, that is, all observations with 
DP_ROA3 being 0 in the sample, the results from the two panel data analysis methods 
were similar. In both types of model, four variables, that is, RBIN, RELA, RBCE, and 
NROA3 had significant and negative impact on CEO turnover. In contrast, two variables, 
namely, DUAL and DAGE, had significant and positive coefficients. In addition, CEO 
tenure had an inverted U-shaped relationship with CEO turnover, as LN_TENU and 
LN_STENU had significant and positive, and significant and negative, coefficients 
respectively. Nine variables, RBMI, SIBO, DRSCE, RSTA_LE, RSLE, RSCA, REOT, 
EDUC, and ORDE had statistically insignificant coefficients in both models. It is worth 
noting that two variables, RSTA_ST and SIZE, had negative but statistically insignificant 
coefficients in the GEE model, while their estimated coefficients were negative and 
statistically significant in the random effects model. Another variable, CONC, had a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient in the random effects model, while it had a 
positive but statistically insignificant coefficient in the GEE model. 
When firm performance is above the aspiration level, that is, all observations with 
DP_ROA3 being 1, the results of the GEE model and the random effects model had more 
variations. Four variables, LN_TENU, RBCE, ORDE, and SIZE, had statistically 
insignificant coefficients in the GEE model, and statistically significant coefficients in the 
random model. RBIN was the only variable that had negative and statistically significant 
coefficients in both the GEE model and the random effects model. In contrast, the 
estimated coefficients for both RSCA and DAGE were positive and statistically 
significant in both models. In addition, all the other thirteen variables, namely, RBMI, 
SIBO, DUAL, DRSCE, RSTA_ST, RSTA_LE, RSLE, CONC, RELA, REOT, EDUC, 
LN_STENU, and NROA3, had statistically insignificant coefficients in both models.  
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For the group with firm performance below the aspiration level, the number of 
observations using the GEE model was 1538, and with the random effects model, 2764. 
For the group with firm performance above the aspiration level, the number of 
observations was 189 and 460 respectively. 41
7.3.5 Conclusion on the findings of CEO turnover 
 The variations between these two 
regressions models could be caused by the different numbers of observations in the two 
models. 
The discussion in Sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.4 leads to the following summarised findings: 
• Twelve models were developed in an effort to find the best model to explain CEO 
turnover. Model A5.5, which consists of a dummy variable of PRA (i.e., 
DP_ROA3), four CEO structural power variables (i.e., RBIN, RBMI, DUAL, and 
SIBO), eight CEO ownership power variables (i.e., DRSCE, RSTA_ST, 
RSTA_LE, RSLE, RSCA, CONC, RELA, and REOT), two CEO prestige power 
variables (i.e., EDUC and ORDE), three CEO tenure power variables (i.e., 
LN_TENU, LN_STENU, and RBCE), and twelve control variables (i.e., NROA3, 
SIZE, and DAGE, and nine dummy variables for year effects), proved to be the 
best fit model to investigate CEO turnover as it produced the lowest value of 
QIC_u. 
• On the basis of the result for the dummy variable of PRA in the best fit model 
(Model A5.5), the negative sign of the coefficient of DP_ROA3 indicated that 
CEOs in firms with performance below the aspiration level were at higher risk of 
losing their jobs. However, this negative association was statistically insignificant. 
In addition, one of the continuous variables of PRA, PROA3+, was unrelated to 
CEO turnover, while the other continuous variable, PROA3-, was negatively 
related to CEO turnover events before controlling for the influences of CEO 
power and firm performance, firm size, and CEO age in Model A6.2. 
                                                 
41 For the GEE model, 157 companies were omitted from the estimation because modal spacing is delta year 
= 1 unit when firm performance was below the aspiration level, and 67 companies were omitted from 
estimation because modal spacing is delta year = 1 unit when firm performance was above the aspiration 
level and 81 companies with fewer than 2 observations were omitted from estimation when firm 
performance was above the aspiration level.  
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• In relation to the results on CEO structural power variables in the best fit model 
(Model A5.5), the proportion of independent directors (i.e., RBIN) had a negative 
effect on the likelihood of CEO turnover, while CEOs who were the chairperson 
are more likely to depart their positions. These two relationships were also 
significant when firm performance was below the aspiration level. 
• With respect to CEO ownership power, the results in the best fit model (Model 
A5.5) showed that CEOs in firms with a higher proportion of shares held by 
government shareholders, or CEOs who represented the largest shareholder, were 
significantly less likely to be replaced. In contrast, CEOs in firms with 
comparatively higher concentrated ownership structures were at higher risk of 
losing their jobs. In addition, the negative impact of CEOs who represented the 
largest shareholder on the likelihood of CEO turnover appeared significant when 
firm performance was below the aspiration level. 
• The results based on CEO prestige power variables in the best fit model (Model 
A5.5) showed that CEOs with celebrity status were at a relatively lower risk of 
being removed from their positions. However, this relationship becomes negative 
but insignificant when performance is below the aspiration level. 
• As for CEO tenure power, an inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO tenure 
and ACT was found in the best fit model (Model A5.5). The graph (Figure 7.2) of 
smoothed hazard estimation shows that the likelihood of CEO turnover initially 
increases in the first five years of CEO tenure, and then decreases in the following 
years. In addition, the proportion of directors appointed within the CEO’s period 
of tenure (i.e., RBCE) was negatively related to the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
These two relationships also appeared significant when firm performance was 
below the aspiration level. 
• In relation to control variables, both firm performance and firm size were 
negatively associated with the probability of CEO turnover, while CEOs at or 
above retirement age were at comparatively higher risk of losing their jobs. For 
firms performing below the aspiration level, the negative relationship between 
firm size and the likelihood of CEO turnover became insignificant in the model 
using the GEE method, while the impacts of firm performance and the CEO 
retirement age dummy variable on the probability of CEO turnover were still 
significant. 
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• The modelling results using the random effects method confirmed the results of 
the GEE models, including the model selection and the significance and directions 
of explanatory variables on CEO turnover. 
A discussion of the implications of these results in the Chinese institutional context is 
provided in Chapter Eight. 
7.4 Estimated results for forced CEO turnover  
In the previous section, the results of the statistical analysis using the GEE method and 
the random effects method for CEO turnover were presented and discussed. This section 
explains the process of identification of the appropriate model using the GEE method for 
forced CEO turnover (FCT) and reports on the statistical significance and directions of 
coefficients in the models. Similarly, the results of the random effects models for forced 
CEO turnover are also presented in an effort to compare the results of the two different 
panel data analytical methods.  
Table 7.6 presents the estimated results of forced CEO turnover by using GEE method 
with the non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix. The discussion in Sections 7.4.1 and 
7.4.2 is based on this table. For the convenience of referring to the results within the 
discussion for each section, the summaries of these results are displayed in break-down 
tables identified as Table 7.6a, Table 7.6b, and so on. 
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Table 7.6 Results of GEE models using the non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix for FCT 
 Model B0 Model B1 Model B2.1 Model B2.2 Model B3.1 Model B3.2 Model B4 Model B5.1 Model B5.2 Model B5.3 Model B5.4 Model B5.5 
DP_ROA3  -0.255
+ 
(0.775) 
-0.290+ 
(0.749) 
-0.220 
(0.803) 
-0.302* 
(0.740) 
-0.297+ 
(0.743) 
-0.309* 
(0.734) 
-0.331* 
(0.719) 
-0.309* 
(0.734) 
-0.317* 
(0.728) 
-0.297+ 
(0.743) 
-0.322* 
(0.724) 
RBOU   0.006
+ 
(1.006)          
RBIN    -0.073
*** 
(0.930) 
-0.070*** 
(0.932) 
-0.069*** 
(0.933) 
-0.071*** 
(0.932) 
-0.065*** 
(0.937) 
-0.071*** 
(0.932) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.074*** 
(0.929) 
-0.068*** 
(0.934) 
RBMI    0.009
* 
(1.009) 
0.008* 
(1.008) 
0.008* 
(1.008) 
0.007* 
(1.007) 
0.006+ 
(1.006) 
0.007* 
(1.007) 
0.006+ 
(1.006) 
0.007* 
(1.007) 
0.006 
(1.006) 
DUAL   -0.526
*** 
(0.591) 
-0.542*** 
(0.582) 
-0.431** 
(0.650) 
-0.424** 
(0.654) 
-0.329* 
(0.719) 
-0.293* 
(0.746) 
-0.316* 
(0.729) 
-0.215 
(0.806) 
-0.281+ 
(0.755) 
-0.253+ 
(0.777) 
SIBO   0.010 (1.010) 
-0.010 
(0.990) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.009 
(1.009) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.008 
(1.008) 
DRSCE     -0.381
** 
(0.683) 
-0.386** 
(0.680) 
-0.349** 
(0.706) 
-0.247* 
(0.781) 
-0.333** 
(0.717) 
-0.173 
(0.184) 
-0.272* 
(0.762) 
-0.187 
(0.829) 
RSTA     -0.004 (0.996)        
RSTA_ST      -0.007
+ 
(0.993) 
-0.007+ 
(0.993) 
-0.009* 
(0.991) 
-0.007+ 
(0.993) 
-0.009* 
(0.992) 
-0.008* 
(0.992) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
RSTA_LE      -0.003 (0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
RSLE     0.001 (1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
RSCA     -0.004 (0.996) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.004 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
CONC     0.012
** 
(1.012) 
0.012** 
(1.013) 
0.013** 
(1.013) 
0.013** 
(1.013) 
0.012** 
(1.013) 
0.012** 
(1.012) 
0.013** 
(1.013) 
0.013** 
(1.013) 
RELA     -0.671
*** 
(0.511) 
-0.692*** 
(0.501) 
-0.716*** 
(0.489) 
-0.703*** 
(0.495) 
-0.709*** 
(0.492) 
-0.663*** 
(0.515) 
-0.753*** 
(0.471) 
-0.748*** 
(473) 
REOT     -0.135 (0.874) 
-0.151 
(0.860) 
-0.161 
(0.852) 
-0.100 
(0.950) 
-0.156 
(0.855) 
-0.091 
(0.913) 
-0.169 
(0.845) 
-0.113 
(0.893) 
EDUC       -0.077 (0.926) 
-0.073 
(0.930) 
-0.081 
(0.922) 
-0.104 
(0.902) 
-0.102 
(0.903) 
-0.095 
(0.910) 
ORDE       -0.601
** 
(0.548) 
-0.557** 
(0.573) 
-0.595** 
(0.552) 
-0.528* 
(0.590) 
-0.571** 
(0.565) 
-0.541* 
(0.582) 
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LN_TENU        0.377
*** 
(1.458) 
-0.038 
(0.963)  
0.879*** 
(2.408) 
1.277*** 
(3.585) 
LN_STENU           -0.450
*** 
(0.638) 
-0.436*** 
(0.647) 
RBCE        -0.012
*** 
(0.988)  
-0.008*** 
(0.992)  
-0.012*** 
(0.988) 
NROA3 -5.250
** 
(0.005) 
-4.475* 
(0.011) 
-4.331* 
(0.013) 
-4.444* 
(0.012) 
-3.307+ 
(0.037) 
-3.504* 
(0.030) 
-3.237+ 
(0.039) 
-2.736 
(0.065) 
-3.237+ 
(0.039) 
-2.913+ 
(0.054) 
-4.087* 
(0.017) 
-3.536* 
(0.029) 
SIZE -0.259
*** 
(0.772) 
-0.269*** 
(0.764) 
-0.278*** 
(0.758) 
-0.224*** 
(0.799) 
-0.180** 
(0.835) 
-0.173** 
(0.841) 
-0.159** 
(0.853) 
-0.199** 
(0.819) 
-0.156** 
(0.855) 
-0.165** 
(0.848) 
-0.150* 
(0.860) 
-0.195** 
(0.823) 
DAGE 0.266 (1.305) 
0.263 
(1.301) 
0.394+ 
(1.482) 
0.377 
(1.458) 
0.471* 
(1.602) 
0.491* 
(1.633) 
0.558* 
(1.748) 
0.595** 
(1.813) 
0.571* 
(1.771) 
0.673** 
(1.960) 
0.690** 
(1.995) 
0.719** 
(2.053) 
S1998 0.353
+ 
(1.423) 
0.284 
(1.329) 
0.238 
(1.269) 
0.223 
(1.250) 
0.221 
(1.247) 
0.216 
(1.241) 
0.223 
(1.249) 
0.048 
(1.049) 
0.227 
(1.255) 
0.122 
(1.130) 
0.199 
(1.220) 
0.036 
(1.036) 
S1999 0.446
* 
(1.563) 
0.383+ 
(1.466) 
0.307 
(1.114) 
0.295 
(1.343) 
0.251 
(1.285) 
0.243 
(1.275) 
0.256 
(1.292) 
-0.026 
(0.974) 
0.263 
(1.301) 
0.104 
(1.109) 
0.279 
(1.322) 
-0.004 
(0.997) 
S2000 0.488
* 
(1.629) 
0.421* 
(1.523) 
0.297 
(1.346) 
0.304 
(1.355) 
0.250 
(1.284) 
0.239 
(1.270) 
0.251 
(1.285) 
-0.066 
(0.939) 
0.259 
(1.296) 
0.079 
(1.082) 
0.301 
(1.351) 
-0.024 
(0.976) 
S2001 0.437
* 
(1.548) 
0.390+ 
(1.477) 
0.219 
(1.244) 
0.390+ 
(1.476) 
0.312 
(1.367) 
0.297 
(1.346) 
0.315 
(1.370) 
-0.031 
(0.969) 
0.322 
(1.379) 
0.113 
(1.119) 
0.371 
(1.449) 
0.014 
(1.014) 
S2002 0.443
* 
(1.558) 
0.387+ 
(1.472) 
0.182 
(1.199) 
1.430*** 
(4.177) 
1.266*** 
(3.547) 
1.233*** 
(3.430) 
1.271*** 
(3.653) 
0.891** 
(2.438) 
1.278*** 
(3.591) 
1.054*** 
(2.871) 
1.343*** 
(3.831) 
0.945*** 
(2.572) 
S2003 0.573
** 
(1.774) 
0.529* 
(1.697) 
0.295 
(1.344) 
2.445*** 
(11.531) 
2.227*** 
(9.274) 
2.177*** 
(8.823) 
2.230*** 
(9.303) 
1.768*** 
(5.859) 
2.239*** 
(9.386) 
1.964*** 
(7.126) 
2.342*** 
(10.405) 
1.857*** 
(6.404) 
S2004 0.222 (1.249) 
0.185 
(1.203) 
-0.045 
(0.956) 
2.519*** 
(12.410) 
2.258*** 
(9.568) 
2.201*** 
(9.038) 
2.262*** 
()9.60 
1.744*** 
(5.719) 
2.272*** 
(9.696) 
1.962*** 
(7.110) 
2.420*** 
(11.247) 
1.875*** 
(6.520) 
S2005 0.121 (1.129) 
0.081 
(1.084) 
-0.153 
(0.858) 
2.490*** 
(12.065) 
2.219*** 
(9.200) 
2.155*** 
(8.625) 
2.214*** 
(9.156) 
1.643*** 
(5.171) 
2.231*** 
(9.307) 
1.919*** 
(6.814) 
2.355*** 
(10.538) 
1.747*** 
(5.739) 
S2006 0.377
+ 
(1.458) 
0.346 
(1.414) 
0.105 
(1.110) 
2.787*** 
(16.238) 
2.542*** 
(12.699) 
2.459*** 
(11.689) 
2.531*** 
(12.568) 
1.879*** 
(6.546) 
2.546*** 
(12.761) 
2.174*** 
(8.797) 
2.692*** 
(14.756) 
1.997*** 
(7.369) 
_cons 7.358*** 7.101*** 6.880*** 5.928*** 4.633** 4.693** 4.256* 5.282** 4.214* 4.694** 4.445** 5.530** 
Wald chi2 53.37*** 57.78*** 96.98*** 173.32*** 265.39*** 268.55*** 273.58*** 300.93*** 276.06*** 311.23*** 303.90*** 324.58*** 
QIC_u 3219.773 3206.665 3183.111 3074.240 3024.913 3023.987 3018.261 2977.505 3020.914 2996.432 3001.722 2958.433 
P 13 14 17 18 25 26 28 30 29 29 30 31 
N 3250 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 
 Model B0 Model B1 Model B2.1 Model B2.2 Model B3.1 Model B3.2 Model B4 Model B5.1 Model B5.2 Model B5.3 Model B5.4 Model B5.5 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. P is the number of parameters in a model. N is the number of observations in 
a model. 
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7.4.1 Model fit  
Table 7.6a presents measures of model fit (i.e., the Wald Chi-square, the QIC_u, and the 
changes of values of QIC_u) for twelve models of forced CEO turnover using the first 
order non-stationary working correlation matrix. All models are statistically significant 
(as their Wald Chi-square has a p-value < 0.001).   
Table 7.6a:  Model fit of GEE models using FCT as the dependent variable (non-stationary 1) 
 Wald chi2 QIC_u 1 2 3 4 5 P 
Model B0 53.37*** 3219.773      13 
Model B1 57.78*** 3206.665 -36.662     14 
Model B2.1 96.98*** 3183.111  -23.554    17 
Model B2.2 40.18*** 3213.633  -132.425    18 
Model B3.1 265.39*** 3024.913   -49.327   25 
Model B3.2 268.55*** 3023.987   -50.253   26 
Model B4 273.58*** 3018.261    -5.726  28 
Model B5.1 300.93*** 2977.505     -40.756 30 
Model B5.2 276.06*** 3020.914     2.653 29 
Model B5.3 311.23*** 2996.432     -21.829 29 
Model B5.4 303.90*** 3001.722     -16.539 30 
Model B5.5 324.58*** 2958.433     -59.828 31 
Notes: 1. Change in QIC_u relative to Model B0.  
  2. Change in QIC_u relative to Model B1.  
  3. Change in QIC_u relative to Model B2.2. 
  4. Change in QIC_u relative to Model B3.2. 
  5. Change in QIC_u relative to Model B4. 
            P is the number of parameters in a model. 
            Significance: ***<0.001 
First, the impact of controlling for variables (i.e., NROA3, SIZE, DAGE, and nine year-
dummy variables) on forced CEO turnover was captured in Model B0, and its QIC_u 
measure was 3219.773.42
                                                 
42 Given that this study’s research question is to examine the impact of the board’s aspiration level and CEO 
power on CEO turnover (including forced and voluntary CEO turnover) for a given level of firm 
performance, this study included firm performance (i.e., NROA3) as a control variable. However, in 
considering that DP_ROA3 (i.e., the dummy variable of performance relative to aspiration levels) was 
calculated using firm performance, this study also estimated forced CEO turnover by excluding firm 
performance (NROA3). The estimated results are presented in Table A7.4 in the Appendix, on page 313. 
The estimated results are similar to the models including NROA3. 
 Then, Model B1 was set up by adding the dummy variable of 
PRA, DP_ROA3, to Model B0. Model B1 improved the model fit by reducing 36.662 
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units of QIC_u, suggesting that DP_ROA3 improves the model fit. Therefore, CEO 
power variables were added to Model B1.     
Second, Model B2.1 was developed from Model B1 by adding three variables relating to 
CEO structural power, RBOU, DUAL, and SIBO. The model fit improved as QIC_u 
dropped a further 23.554. Model B2.2 was developed from Model B1 with four added 
variables of CEO structural power, RBIN, RBMI, DUAL, and SIBO. Model B2.2 also 
improved the model fit by reducing QIC_u by 132.425. The impact of CEO structural 
power was evident. Model B2.2 was chosen to develop models to explain forced CEO 
turnover because it had a lower value of QIC than Models B1 and B2.1. 
Third, seven variables of CEO ownership power other than RSTA_ST and RSTA_LE 
were added to Model B2.2. The resultant Model B3.1 further improved the modelling fit 
as QIC_u dropped by 49.327. Model B3.2 was developed from Model B3.1 by replacing 
RSTA by RSTA_ST and RSTA_LE and it improved the model fit because QIC_u was 
further reduced by 50.253 relative to Model B2.2. Compared to Model B2.2, both Models 
B3.1 and B3.2 had lower values of QIC and thus the impact of CEO ownership power 
was evidenced. Model B3.2 was selected to develop models to investigate forced CEO 
turnover as it had a lower value of QIC than Model B3.1. 
Fourth, Model B4 was developed by adding the two CEO prestige power variables to 
Model B3.2. The QIC_u dropped by 5.726, suggesting an improvement of the model fit. 
Hence, the impact of CEO prestige power was evident.  
Finally, CEO tenure power was added to Model B4. Two CEO tenure power variables, 
LN_TENU and RBCE, were added to Model B4, and the resultant Model B5.1 improved 
the model fit because QIC_u declined from 3018.261 to 2977.505, suggesting that the 
impacts of CEO tenure and the proportion of interdependent directors on forced CEO 
turnover are evidenced. LN_TENU and RBCE were added to Model B4 to create Models 
B5.2 and B5.3 respectively. Model B5.3 improved the model fit by reducing QIC_u by 
21.829, while Model B5.2 had reduced the model fit because QIC_u increased by 2.653. 
In addition, the estimated coefficient of LN_TENU was statistically insignificant (see 
Table 7.6). In order to investigate further the impact of CEO tenure on the likelihood of 
forced CEO turnover, a smoothed hazard estimate was conducted. Figure 7.3 graphs the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover as tenure is extended after controlling for the impact of 
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CEO age. The probability of forced CEO turnover increases along with the lengthening of 
CEO tenure during the first period and it peaks at around 0.29 in the fifth year, followed 
by a monotonic decline. This result suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
CEO tenure and the hazard rate of forced CEO turnover. Therefore, in an effort to 
estimate the curve relationship between CEO tenure and forced CEO turnover, Model 
B5.4 was created. This was the same as Model B5.2, but with a variable of the square of 
tenure (LN_STENU) added. Model B5.4 further improved the model fit as its QIC_u 
dropped from 3020.914 in Model 5.2 to 3001.722. It demonstrates that LN_STENU has a 
significant impact on CEO turnover and should be included in the model. Model B5.5 
was developed by adding RBCE into Model B5.4. Both Models B5.4 and B5.5 had a 
lower QIC_u than Model B4. In addition, the direction and significance of LN_TENU 
and LN_STENU were the same in both Models B5.4 and B5.5. Model B5.5 has the 
lowest QIC_u of all models for FCT, and therefore it is the best model to explain FCT. 
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Figure 7.3 Effects of CEO tenure on forced CEO turnover (adjusted  for CEO age)
 
Table 7.7 presents AIC, namely the goodness of fit, and the changes in AIC under random 
effects models for forced CEO turnover. The results of covariate selection of random 
effects models were the same as with GEE models. Model B5.5 had the lowest AIC 
among the twelve models, and thus was the most appropriate model to explain FCT. In 
other words, FCT can be best explained by thirty variables, DP_ROA3, RBIN, RBMI, 
DUAL, SIBO, DRSCE, RSTA_ST, RSTA_LE, RSLE, RSCA, CONC, RELA, REOT, 
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EDUC, ORDE, LN_TUNE, LN_STUNE, RBCE, NROA3, SIZE, DAGE, and nine year-
dummy variables. 
Table 7.7 Model fit of random effects methods using FCT as the dependent variable  
 AIC 1 2 3 4 5 K 
Model B0 3211.337      14 
Model B1 3198.832 -12.505     15 
Model B2.1 3179.543  -19.289    18 
Model B2.2 3066.475  -132.357    19 
Model B3.1 3022.616   -43.859   26 
Model B3.2 3021.759   -44.716   27 
Model B4 3015.700    -6.059  29 
Model B5.1 2970.307     -45.393 31 
Model B5.2 3015.730     0.030 30 
Model B5.3 2996.090     -19.610 30 
Model B5.4 2998.402     -17.298 31 
Model B5.5 2953.784     -61.916 32 
 Notes: 1. Change in AIC relative to Model B0.  
  2. Change in AIC relative to Model B1.  
  3. Change in AIC relative to Model B2.2. 
  4. Change in AIC relative to Model B3.2. 
  5. Change in AIC relative to Model B4. 
  K is the number of covariance parameters in a model. 
7.4.2 The influence of explanatory variables on forced CEO turnover 
Following the discussion in the previous section on the model fit, this section reports the 
significance of coefficients on the dummy variable of performance relative to a given 
aspiration level and four types of CEO power variables in Models B0 to B5.5. 
7.4.2.1 The influence of the dummy variable of PRA on forced CEO turnover 
The dummy variable of performance relative to an aspiration level, DP_ROA3, was 
included in eleven models, that is, Models B1 to B5.5. Table 7.6b present the overall 
results (i.e., the estimated coefficients, odds ratios, and p-values) for this variable in the 
eleven models. 
DP_ROA3 had statistically significant and negative coefficients in all eleven models, 
indicating that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is lower when firm performance is 
above the aspiration level. It is apparent that Hypothesis 1.1b is supported. 
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Table 7.6b The influence of the dummy variable of PRA on FCT 
 DP_ROA3 
Hypothesis 1.1b 
Model B1 -0.255
+ 
(0.775) 
Model B2.1 -0.290
+ 
(0.749) 
Model B2.2 -0.220 (0.803) 
Model B3.1 -0.302
* 
(0.740) 
Model B3.2 -0.297
+ 
(0.743) 
Model B4 -0.309
* 
(0.734) 
Model B5.1 -0.331
* 
(0.719) 
Model B5.2 -0.309
* 
(0.734) 
Model B5.3 -0.317
* 
(0.728) 
Model B5.4 -0.297
+ 
(0.743) 
Model B5.5 -0.322
* 
(0.724) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
7.4.2.2 The influence of CEO structural power on forced CEO turnover 
Ten models (i.e., Models B2.1 to B5) included five variables of CEO structural power, 
that is, RBOU, RBIN, RBMI, DUAL, and SIBO. The overall results, that is, the estimated 
coefficients, odds ratios, and p-values, for these five variables in these models are 
presented in Table 7.6c.  
Model B2.1 included three variables of CEO structural power, namely RBOU, DUAL, 
and SIBO, and the estimated coefficient of RBOU was positive and statistically 
significant at the 0.1 level. In order to examine the impact of RBOU on forced CEO 
turnover after controlling for the impact of CEO ownership power, prestigious power, and 
tenure power, a model was developed from Model B5.5 by replacing RBIN and RBMI 
with RBOU. The estimated results showed that the negative coefficient of RBOU was 
statistically insignificant (see Table A7.5 in the Appendix on page 315). This result 
suggests that the proportion of outside directors has no significant impact on forced CEO 
turnover, which is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2.1 b.  
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Table 7.6c The influence of CEO structural power variables on FCT 
 RBOU RBIN RBMI DUAL SIBO 
Hypothesis 2.1b 2.1b 2.1b 2.2b 2.3b, 2.3d 
Model B2.1 0.006
+ 
(1.006) - - 
-0.526*** 
(0.591) 
0.010 
(1.010) 
Model B2.2 - -0.073
*** 
(0.930) 
0.009* 
(1.009) 
-0.542*** 
(0.582) 
-0.010 
(0.990) 
Model B3.1 - -0.070
*** 
(0.932) 
0.008* 
(1.008) 
-0.431** 
(0.650) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
Model B3.2 - -0.069
*** 
(0.933) 
0.008* 
(1.008) 
-0.424** 
(0.654) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
Model B4 - -0.071
*** 
(0.932) 
0.007* 
(1.007) 
-0.329* 
(0.719) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
Model B5.1 - -0.065
*** 
(0.937) 
0.006+ 
(1.006) 
-0.293* 
(0.746) 
0.009 
(1.009) 
Model B5.2 - -0.071
*** 
(0.932) 
0.007* 
(1.007) 
-0.316* 
(0.729) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
Model B5.3 - -0.066
*** 
(0.936) 
0.006+ 
(1.006) 
-0.215 
(0.806) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
Model B5.4 - -0.074
*** 
(0.929) 
0.007* 
(1.007) 
-0.281+ 
(0.755) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
Model B5.5 - -0.068
*** 
(0.934) 
0.006 
(1.006) 
-0.253+ 
(0.777) 
0.008 
(1.008) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
In the other nine models (i.e., Models B2.2 to B5.5), RBOU was replaced by two 
variables, RBIN and RBMI. The estimated coefficients of RBIN were statistically 
significant and negative in nine models, while estimated coefficients of RBMI were 
positive and statistically significant in eight models other than Model B5.5. These results 
imply a negative relationship between the ratio of independent directors and the 
probability of forced CEO turnover, and a positive but insignificant relationship between 
forced CEO turnover and the proportion of affiliated outside directors in the board. 
Consequently, Hypothesis 2.1b is not supported by any of the three variables relating to 
outside directors. 
The fourth CEO structural variable, DUAL, had statistically significant and negative 
coefficients in nine of the models but not in Model B5.3, indicating that a CEO who is 
also the chairperson of the board is less likely to be replaced involuntarily than a CEO 
who does not hold the position of the chairperson of the board. The estimated coefficients 
of the fifth CEO structural variable, SIBO, were positive and insignificant in all these 
models, indicating that board size has no significant impact on forced CEO turnover. 
These results indicate that Hypothesis 2.2b is supported, while neither Hypotheses 2.3b 
nor 2.3d is supported. 
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7.4.2.3 The influence of CEO ownership power on forced CEO turnover 
Nine variables of CEO ownership power, namely DRSCE, RSTA, RSTA_ST, RSTA_LE, 
RSLE, RSCA, CONC, RELA, and REOT, were included in eight models (i.e., Models 
B3.1 to B5.5). The overall results (i.e., the estimated coefficients, odds ratios, and p-
values) for these nine variables in these models are presented in Table 7.6d.  
RSTA appears only in Model B3.1 and its estimated coefficient is negative but 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the proportion of state-owned shares is unrelated 
to forced CEO turnover. Therefore, Hypothesis 3.2b is not supported. In seven models 
(i.e., Models B3.2 to B5.5) RSTA was replaced by another two variables, RSTA_ST and 
RSTA_LE. The estimated coefficients of RSTA_ST were negative and statistically 
significant, while RSTA_LE had negative but statistically insignificant coefficients in all 
seven models. In addition, the negative coefficients of RSTA_ST were greater than those 
of RSTA_LE in all seven models. Therefore Hypothesis 3.2d is supported. 
Table 7.6d The influence of CEO ownership power variables on FCT 
 DRSCE RSTA    RSTA_ST RSTA_LE RSLE RSCA CONC RELA REOT 
Hypothesis 3.1b 3.2b 3.2d 3.2d 3.3b 3.4b 3.5b 3.6c 3.6d 
Model 
B3.1 
-0.381** 
(0.683) 
-0.004 
(0.996) - - 
0.001 
(1.001) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
0.012** 
(1.012) 
-0.671*** 
(0.511) 
-0.135 
(0.874) 
Model 
B3.2 
-0.386** 
(0.680) - 
-0.007+ 
(0.993) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
0.012** 
(1.013) 
-0.692*** 
(0.501) 
-0.151 
(0.860) 
Model 
B4 
-0.349** 
(0.706) - 
-0.007+ 
(0.993) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
0.013** 
(1.013) 
-0.716*** 
(0.489) 
-0.161 
(0.852) 
Model 
B5.1 
-0.247* 
(0.781) - 
-0.009* 
(0.991) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.013** 
(1.013) 
-0.703*** 
(0.495) 
-0.100 
(0.950) 
Model 
B5.2 
-0.333** 
(0.717) - 
-0.007+ 
(0.993) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.012** 
(1.013) 
-0.709*** 
(0.492) 
-0.156 
(0.855) 
Model 
B5.3 
-0.173 
(0.184) - 
-0.009* 
(0.992) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.012** 
(1.013) 
-0.663*** 
(0.515) 
-0.091 
(0.913) 
Model 
B5.4 
-0.272* 
(0.762) - 
-0.008* 
(0.992) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.013** 
(1.013) 
-0.753*** 
(0.471) 
-0.169 
(0.845) 
Model 
B5.5 
-0.187 
(0.829) - 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.013** 
(1.013) 
-0.748*** 
(473) 
-0.113 
(0.893) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
In the first five models (i.e., Models B3.1-B5.2) and Model B5.4, DRSCE had negative 
and statistically significant estimated coefficients, while it had negative but statistically 
insignificant coefficients in Models B5.3 and B5.5 (i.e., the best model explaining forced 
CEO turnover). This result is inconsistent with Hypothesis 3.1b. In contrast, the estimated 
coefficients of CONC were positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all 
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eight models. This implies that concentrated ownership structures restrict CEO power and 
increase the likelihood of forced CEO turnover, and thus Hypothesis 3.5b is supported. 
Neither RSLE nor RSCA had statistically significant estimated coefficients, indicating 
that the proportion of shares held by legal person or individual shareholders has no 
significant impact on forced CEO turnover. As a result, Hypothesis 3.3b is not supported, 
while Hypothesis 3.4b is supported. 
With respect to the two variables of the status of the CEO as the representative of the 
largest shareholders, RELA had statistically significant and negative estimated 
coefficients in all eight models. In contrast, the other variable, REOT, had no statistically 
significant estimated coefficients. These results indicated that a CEO’s status as the 
representative of the largest shareholder can increase his/her power and reduce the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover, while a CEO’s status as the representative of any 
other top ten largest shareholder cannot protect him/her from being replaced in China. 
Consequently, Hypotheses 3.6c and 3.6d are both supported. 
7.4.2.4 The influence of CEO prestige power on forced CEO turnover 
The two CEO prestige power variables, EDUC and ORDE, were included in six models 
(i.e., Models B4 to B5.5). The overall results, namely the estimated coefficients, odds 
ratios, and p-values, for these two variables in Model B5.5 are presented in Table 7.6e.  
Table 7.6e The influence of CEO prestige power variables on FCT 
 EDUC ORDE 
Hypothesis 4.1b 4.2b 
Model B4 -0.077 (0.926) 
-0.601** 
(0.548) 
Model B5.1 -0.073 (0.930) 
-0.557** 
(0.573) 
Model B5.2 -0.081 (0.922) 
-0.595** 
(0.552) 
Model B5.3 -0.104 (0.902) 
-0.528* 
(0.590) 
Model B5.4 -0.102 (0.903) 
-0.571** 
(0.565) 
Model B5.5 -0.095 (0.910) 
-0.541* 
(0.582) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
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Both variables have negative estimated coefficients in these six models. The coefficients 
of ORDE were statistically significant at the level of 0.05 or 0.01, while the coefficients 
of EDUC were statistically insignificant at any level. This suggests that a CEO’s celebrity 
status can increase his/her power and reduce the pressure of being replaced involuntarily, 
while a CEO’s elite education background has no impact on CEO power and the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover. As a result, Hypothesis 4.2b is supported, while 
Hypothesis 4.1b is rejected. 
7.4.2.5 The influence of CEO tenure power on forced CEO turnover 
Three variables of CEO tenure power, namely LN_TUNE, LN_STUNE, and RBCE, were 
included in five models (i.e., Models B5.1 to B5.5). The overall results, that is, the 
estimated coefficients, odds ratios, and p-values, for these three variables in these models 
are presented in Table 7.6f. 
Table 7.6f The influence of CEO tenure power variables on FCT 
 LN_TUNE LN_STUNE RBCE 
Hypothesis  5.1b, 5.1d  5.1b, 5.1d  5.2b 
Model B5.1 0.377
*** 
(1.458) - 
-0.012*** 
(0.988) 
Model B5.2 -0.038 (0.963) - - 
Model B5.3 - - -0.008
*** 
(0.992) 
Model B5.4 0.879
*** 
(2.408) 
-0.450*** 
(0.638) - 
Model B5.5 1.277
*** 
(3.585) 
-0.436*** 
(0.647) 
-0.012*** 
(0.988) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
The association between LN_TUNE and FCT was statistically insignificant in Model 
B5.2, which did not include LN_STUNE and RBCE. In Model B5.5, where both 
LN_STUNE and RBCE were present, the estimated coefficient of LN_TUNE was 
positive and statistically significant, and the estimated coefficient of LN_STUNE was 
negative and statistically significant. This revealed an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between CEO tenure and forced CEO turnover. Model 5.4, which did not include RBCE, 
LN_TUNE and LN_STUNE, still had statistically significant coefficients and their 
directions were the same as in Model B5.5. It is evident that the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between CEO tenure and forced CEO turnover appears regardless of whether 
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RBCE is present or not. These results demonstrate that the probability of forced CEO 
turnover first increases with the lengthening of CEO tenure, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 5.1d, and then decreases with the further lengthening of CEO tenure, which 
supports Hypothesis 5.1b. 
The estimated coefficients of RBCE were all negative and statistically significant in three 
models (i.e., Models B5.1, B5.3, and B5.5), suggesting a significant and negative 
relationship between the proportion of interdependent directors and the probability of 
forced CEO turnover. Therefore, Hypothesis 5.2b is supported. 
7.4.2.6 The influence of control variables on forced CEO turnover 
Three control variables, NROA3, SIZE, and DAGE, are included in twelve models (i.e., 
Model B0 to Model B5.5). The overall results (i.e., the estimated coefficients, odds ratios, 
and p-values) for these three variables in these twelve models are presented in Table 7.6g.  
Table 7.6g The influence of control variables on FCT 
 NROA3 SIZE DAGE 
Model B0 -5.250
** 
(0.005) 
-0.259*** 
(0.772) 
0.266 
(1.305) 
Model B1 -4.475
* 
(0.011) 
-0.269*** 
(0.764) 
0.263 
(1.301) 
Model B2.1 -4.331
* 
(0.013) 
-0.278*** 
(0.758) 
0.394+ 
(1.482) 
Model B2.2 -4.444
* 
(0.012) 
-0.224*** 
(0.799) 
0.377 
(1.458) 
Model B3.1 -3.307
+ 
(0.037) 
-0.180** 
(0.835) 
0.471* 
(1.602) 
Model B3.2 -3.504
* 
(0.030) 
-0.173** 
(0.841) 
0.491* 
(1.633) 
Model B4 -3.237
+ 
(0.039) 
-0.159** 
(0.853) 
0.558* 
(1.748) 
Model B5.1 -2.736 (0.065) 
-0.199** 
(0.819) 
0.595** 
(1.813) 
Model B5.2 -3.237
+ 
(0.039) 
-0.156** 
(0.855) 
0.571* 
(1.771) 
Model B5.3 -2.913
+ 
(0.054) 
-0.165** 
(0.848) 
0.673** 
(1.960) 
Model B5.4 -4.087
* 
(0.017) 
-0.150* 
(0.860) 
0.690** 
(1.995) 
Model B5.5 -3.536
* 
(0.029) 
-0.195** 
(0.823) 
0.719** 
(2.053) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
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In all twelve models, the estimated coefficients of SIZE were negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that CEOs in larger companies were less likely to be replaced 
involuntarily than CEOs in smaller companies. The estimated coefficients of DAGE were 
positive in all the models, while they were insignificant in three models (i.e., Models B0, 
B1, and B2.2) but were significant in the other nine models (i.e., Models B2.1, B3.1 to 
B5.5), suggesting that forced CEO turnover was less likely to occur where a CEO is under 
the retirement age. In relation to firm performance variable, NROA3 had negative and 
statistically significant estimated coefficients. This demonstrates that forced CEO 
turnover is more likely to occur when firm performance is poor.  
7.4.2.7 The comparison of the influence of explanatory variables on forced CEO 
turnover between GEE models and random effects models 
Table 7.8 presents the estimated results of Model B5.5 in the GEE model and the random 
effects model. The estimated results from all twelve models using the random effects 
method appear in Table A7.6 in the Appendix, on page 317. 
Table 7.8 Estimated results of Model B5.5 using the GEE and random effects methods for FCT 
 GEE model Random effects model 
DP_ROA3 -0.322
* 
(0.724) 
-0.313* 
(0.731) 
RBIN -0.068
*** 
(0.934) 
-0.070*** 
(0.932) 
RBMI 0.006 (1.006) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
DUAL -0.253
+ 
(0.777) 
-0.275+ 
(0.760) 
SIBO 0.008 (1.008) 
0.017 
(1.017) 
DRSCE -0.187 (0.829) 
-0.154 
(0.857) 
RSTA_ST -0.010
* 
(0.990) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
RSTA_LE -0.003 (0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
RSLE 0.000 (1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
RSCA -0.003 (0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
CONC 0.013
** 
(1.013) 
0.015** 
(1.015) 
RELA -0.748
*** 
(473) 
-0.811*** 
(0.444) 
REOT -0.113 (0.893) 
-0.137 
(0.872) 
EDUC -0.095 (0.910) 
-0.094 
(0.911) 
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ORDE -0.541
* 
(0.582) 
-0.590** 
(0.555) 
LN_TENU 1.277
*** 
(3.585) 
1.352*** 
(3.866) 
LN_STENU -0.436
*** 
(0.647) 
-0.422*** 
(0.656) 
RBCE -0.012
*** 
(0.988) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
NROA3 -3.536
* 
(0.029) 
-3.765* 
(0.023) 
SIZE -0.195
** 
(0.823) 
-0.204** 
(0.816) 
DAGE 0.719
** 
(2.053) 
0.719** 
(2.053) 
S1998 0.036 (1.036) 
0.039 
(1.040) 
S1999 -0.004 (0.997) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
S2000 -0.024 (0.976) 
-0.022 
(0.978) 
S2001 0.014 (1.014) 
0.027 
(1.028) 
S2002 0.945
*** 
(2.572) 
0.981*** 
(2.667) 
S2003 1.857
*** 
(6.404) 
1.909*** 
(6.743) 
S2004 1.875
*** 
(6.520) 
1.916*** 
(6.793) 
S2005 1.747
*** 
(5.739) 
1.799*** 
(6.041) 
S2006 1.997
*** 
(7.369) 
2.068*** 
(7.911) 
_cons 5.530** 5.667*** 
Wald chi2 324.58*** 278.36*** 
QIC_U 3461.053 - 
Rho - 0.055** 
Number of observations 3224 3224 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
In the random effects model, the value of rho was 0.055, indicating that the proportion of 
the total residual variation due to differences between companies was 5.5% and the 
likelihood-ratio test of rho=0 was significant at the level of 0.01. This implies that the 
variance of FCT attributed to differences between companies is important and should not 
be neglected.  
In relation to the significance and directions of estimated coefficients, the results of the 
two regression methods were almost identical. The similarities between the results of the 
two model types imply the validity and stability of the results in this study. 
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7.4.3 The influence of the discrepancy between firm performance and a given 
aspiration level on forced CEO turnover 
Models B1-B5.5 investigated whether performance below the aspiration level increases 
the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. However, it has not yet been explored how boards 
respond to the change of the gap between firm performance and the aspiration level. In an 
effort to examine this impact, Models B6.1 and B6.2 were developed. The GEE method 
with a logit link function and non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix was used, and 
the random effects method was also used in an effort to compare the results of the two 
methods. The regression results are presented in Table 7.9.  
Table 7.9 The influence of the discrepancy between performance and a given aspiration level on FCT 
 
Model B6.1 Model B6.2 
GEE model Random effects model GEE model 
Random effects 
model 
Hypothesis 1.2b, 1.3b 1.2b, 1.3b 1.2b, 1.3b 1.2b, 1.3b 
PROA3- 1.515 (4.550) 
1.856 
(6.398) 
-2.457* 
(0.086) 
-2.466*** 
(0.085) 
PROA3+ -1.494 (0.224) 
-1.679 
(0.187) 
-0.562 
(0.570) 
-0.708 
(0.493) 
RBIN -0.068
*** 
(0.934) 
-0.071*** 
(0.932)   
RBMI 0.006 (1.006) 
0.006 
(1.006)   
DUAL -0.251
+ 
(0.778) 
-0.273+ 
(0.761)   
SIBO 0.008 (1.008) 
0.016 
(1.016)   
DRSCE -0.177 (0.838) 
-0.141 
(0.868)   
RSTA_ST -0.010
* 
(0.890) 
-0.010* 
(0.990)   
RSTA_LE -0.003 (0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997)   
RSLE 0.000 (1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002)   
RSCA -0.003 (0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997)   
CONC 0.013
** 
(1.013) 
0.015** 
(1.015)   
RELA -0.748
*** 
(0.473) 
-0.817*** 
(0.442)   
REOT -0.121 (0.885) 
-0.144 
(0.866)   
EDUC -0.104 (0.901) 
-0.101 
(0.904)   
ORDE -0.522
* 
(0.593) 
-0.579* 
(0.560)   
LN_TENU 1.270
*** 
(3.562) 
1.344*** 
(3.836)   
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LN_STENU -0.433
*** 
(0.649) 
-0.416*** 
(0.660)   
RBCE -0.012
*** 
(0.988) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987)   
NROA3 -7.291
* 
(0.001) 
-8.168** 
(0.000)   
SIZE -0.195
** 
(0.823) 
-0.207** 
(0.813)   
DAGE 0.727
** 
(2.068) 
0.729** 
(2.073)   
S1998 0.029 (1.029) 
0.028 
(1.029) 
0.271 
(1.311) 
0.287 
(1.333) 
S1999 -0.019 (0.981) 
-0.022 
(0.978) 
0.359+ 
(1.431) 
0.378+ 
(1.460) 
S2000 -0.039 (0.961) 
-0.042 
(0.959) 
0.383+ 
(1.466) 
0.404+ 
(1.498) 
S2001 -0.029 (0.971) 
-0.023 
(0.977) 
0.340 
(1.405) 
0.362+ 
(1.436) 
S2002 0.912
** 
(2.489) 
0.939** 
(2.559) 
0.344+ 
(1.411) 
0.367+ 
(1.443) 
S2003 1.815
*** 
(6.144) 
1.859*** 
(6.415) 
0.460* 
(1.583) 
0.488* 
(1.629) 
S2004 1.830
*** 
(6.237) 
1.866*** 
(6.460) 
0.104 
(1.110) 
0.117 
(1.124) 
S2005 1.698
*** 
(5.462) 
1.741*** 
(5.704) 
0.020 
(1.020) 
0.025 
(1.025) 
S2006 1.930
*** 
(6.896) 
1.997*** 
(7..367) 
0.278 
(1.321) 
0.293 
(1.340) 
_cons 8.217** 8.872*** -1.719*** -1.813*** 
Wald chi2 335.75*** 274.99*** 21.16*** 29.86*** 
QIC_u 2962.357 - 3256.638 - 
rho - 0.059** - 0.075** 
Number of observations 3224 3224 3224 3224 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
Model B6.1 was developed from Model B5.5 by replacing DP_ROA3 with two 
continuous PRA variables: PROA3- and PROA3+. The estimated coefficients of PROA3- 
and PROA3+ were both statistically insignificant. Model B6.2 was developed from 
Model B6.1 by excluding the twenty variables of CEO structural power, ownership power, 
prestige power, tenure power, and three control variables (i.e., firm performance, firm 
size, and CEO age). The estimated coefficient of PROA3+ was still statistically 
insignificant. However, the coefficient of PROA3- became negative and statistically 
significant. These results were consistent with those in models using the random effects 
method. These results indicate that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is unrelated to 
the distance between firm performance and the aspiration level when the firm 
performance is above the aspiration level, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1.3b. In 
contrast, when the firm performance is below the aspiration level, CEOs are more likely 
to be replaced when firm performance drops further below the aspiration level before 
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controlling for the impacts of CEO power, firm performance, firm size, and CEO age. As 
a result, Hypothesis 1.2b is supported. 
7.4.4 The influence of CEO power on forced CEO turnover when firm performance 
is above or below a given aspiration level 
The models discussed above investigated the influence of performance relative to a given 
aspiration level and CEO power on the probability of forced CEO turnover separately. In 
an effort to explore the impact of CEO power on forced CEO turnover when firm 
performance is below or above the aspiration level, a model was run for two subgroups. 
One subgroup consisted of observations when firm performance was above the aspiration 
level and the other subgroup comprised observations when firm performance was below 
the aspiration level. All the independent variables and control variables except for 
DP_ROA3 in Model B5.5, the best model to explain forced CEO turnover, were used. In 
total, twenty-nine explanatory variables were included in the model. The GEE method 
with a logit link function and non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix was used. The 
random effects method was also used in an effort to draw comparisons with the results of 
the GEE model. The regression results are presented in Table 7.10.  
Table 7.10 The impact of CEO power on FCT for firm performance above or below the aspiration 
level 
Variables GEE model Random effects model OLR model DP_ROA3=0 DP_ROA3=0 DP_ROA3=1 DP_ROA3=1 
CEO structural 
power 
RBIN -0.072
*** 
(.931) 
-0.071*** 
(0.931) 
-0.088*** 
(0.002) 
-0.088*** 
(0.916) 
RBMI 0.004 (1.004) 
0.007+ 
(1.007) 
-0.007 
(0.993) 
-0.007 
(0.993) 
DUAL -0.163 (0.850) 
-0.254+ 
(0.776) 
-0.513 
(0.599) 
-0.513 
(0.599) 
SIBO 0.000 (1.000) 
0.013 
(1.013) 
0.068 
(1.070) 
0.068 
(1.071) 
CEO 
ownership 
power 
DRSCE -0.182 (0.834) 
-0.125 
(0.882) 
-0.145 
(0.865) 
-0.145 
(0.865) 
RSTA_ST -0.005 (0.995) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
-0.015 
(0.985) 
-0.015 
(0.985) 
RSTA_LE 0.001 (1.001) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
RSLE 0.005 (0.995) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
RSCA -0.010 (0.991) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
0.012 
(1.012) 
0.012 
(1.012) 
CONC 0.010
+ 
(1.010) 
0.017** 
(1.017) 
0.009 
(1.009) 
0.009 
(1.009) 
RELA -0.593
** 
(0.553) 
-0.857*** 
(0.425) 
-0.699+ 
(0.497) 
-0.699+ 
(0.497) 
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REOT 0.057 (1.058) 
-0.131 
(0.877) 
-0.077 
(0.926) 
-0.077 
(0.926) 
CEO prestige 
power 
EDUC -0.172 (0.842) 
-0.046 
(0.955) 
-0.364 
(0.695) 
-0.364 
(0.695) 
ORDE -0.472 (0.624) 
-0.513* 
(0.599) 
-1.686 
(0.185) 
-1.686 
(0.185) 
CEO tenure 
power 
LN_TENU 1.319
*** 
(3.739) 
1.368*** 
(3.928) 
1.756*** 
(5.787) 
1.756** 
(5.788) 
LN_STENU -0.495
** 
(0.610) 
-0.443*** 
(0.642) 
-0.394 
(0.674) 
-0.394 
(0.674) 
RBCE -0.013
*** 
(0.860) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
-0.020** 
(0.980) 
-0.020** 
(0.980) 
Control 
variables 
NROA3 -5.590
* 
(0.004) 
-3.652* 
(0.026) 
1.908 
(6.743) 
1.908 
(6.743) 
SIZE -0.150 (0.860) 
-0.243*** 
(0.784) 
0.242 
(1.274) 
0.242 
(1.274) 
DAGE 0.484 (1.623) 
0.685* 
(1.983) 
0.967 
(2.630) 
0.967 
(2.630) 
S1998 -0.214 (0.807) 
-0.031 
(0.970) 
0.475 
(1.608) 
0.475 
(1.608) 
S1999 0.084 (1.088) 
0.035 
(1.035) 
-0.210 
(0.811) 
-0.210 
(0.811) 
S2000 0.167 (1.182) 
0.092 
(1.097) 
-1.147 
(0.318) 
-1.147 
(0.318) 
S2001 -0.032 (0.968) 
0.074 
(1.077) 
-0.285 
(0.752) 
-0.285 
(0.752) 
S2002 1.102
** 
(3.010) 
1.146*** 
(3.145) 
-0.173 
(0.841) 
-0.173 
(0.841) 
S2003 2.225
*** 
(9.251) 
2.122*** 
(8.348) 
0.816 
(2.261) 
0.816 
(2.261) 
S2004 2.240
*** 
(9.389) 
1.987*** 
(7.295) 
1.718 
(5.576) 
1.719 
(5.576) 
S2005 1.857
** 
(6.402) 
2.023*** 
(7.557) 
0.315 
(1.370) 
0.315 
(1.370) 
S2006 2.844
*** 
(17.193) 
2.341*** 
(10.395) 
0.599 
(1.820) 
0.599 
(1.820) 
_cons 6.034** 6.207*** -7.166 -7.166 
Wald chi2 217.70*** 244.80*** 48.59* - 
LR chi2 - - - 64.47*** 
Pseudo R2 - - - 0.163 
QIC_u 3007.603 - - - 
Rho  - 0.079** 0.000 - 
Number of observations 1538 2764 460 460 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
When firm performance was below the aspiration level, RBIN, RELA, RBCE, and 
NROA3 had negative and statistically significant coefficients, while the coefficients 
CONC were positive and statistically significant in both the GEE and the random effects 
models. In addition, the relationship between CEO tenure and forced CEO turnover was 
an inverted U-shape in both models. However, six variables, namely RBMI, DUAL, 
RSTA_ST, ORDE, SIZE, and DAGE, had statistically significant coefficients in the 
random effects model, but statistically insignificant coefficients in the GEE model. All 
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other variables had statistically insignificant coefficients in both models. As was the case 
with ACT, the numbers of observations made in the GEE model and the random effects 
model for the group with firm performance below the aspiration level were different, 
being 1538 and 2764 respectively.43
When firm performance was above the aspiration level, the GEE model could not be used 
because of estimates diverging. In addition, the rho of the random effects model was 0, 
indicating that the proportion of the total residual variation due to differences between 
companies was 0% and the likelihood-ratio test of rho=0 was insignificant. This implies 
that the variance of FCT attributed to differences between companies can be neglected. 
As a result, the estimated results of the random effects model equalled those of the 
ordinary logistic regression (OLR) method.
 The variations between these two regression models 
could also have been caused by the different numbers of observations in the two models. 
44
7.4.5 Conclusion on the findings of forced CEO turnover 
 The results of the OLR model showed that 
RBIN, RELA, and RBCE had negative and statistically significant coefficients. In 
addition, a positive relationship between CEO tenure and forced CEO turnover was 
evidenced. All other variables had statistically insignificant relationships with forced 
CEO turnover. 
The discussion in Sections 7.4.1 to 7.4.4 leads to the following summarised findings: 
• Twelve models were developed in an effort to find the best model to explain the 
event of forced CEO turnover. Model B5.5, which consisted of a dummy variable 
of PRA (i.e., DP_ROA3), four variables of structural power (i.e., RBIN, RBMI, 
DUAL, and SIBO), eight variables of CEO ownership power (i.e., DRSCE, 
RSTA_ST, RSTA_LE, RSLE, RSCA, CONC, RELA, and REOT), two variables 
of CEO prestige power (i.e., EDUC and ORDE), three variables of CEO tenure 
power (i.e., LN_TENU, LN_STENU, and RBCE), twelve control variables (i.e., 
NROA3, SIZE, DAGE, and nine dummy variables for year effects), was the best 
fit model to investigate forced CEO turnover as it had the lowest value of QIC_u. 
                                                 
43 For the GEE model, 157 companies are omitted from estimation because modal spacing is delta year = 1 
unit when firm performance is below the aspiration level.  
44 In terms of STATA (2007, p. 211), “when rho is zero, the panel-level variance component is unimportant, 
and the panel estimator is no different from the pooled estimator”. 
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• On the basis of the result on the PRA variable in the best fit model (Model B5.5), 
the negative and statistically significant coefficients of DP_ROA3 indicated that 
CEOs in firms with performance below the aspiration level were at higher risk of 
losing their jobs. In addition, similar to the estimated results of overall CEO 
turnover, PROA3- was negatively associated with forced CEO turnover before 
controlling for the impacts of CEO power, firm performance, firm size, and CEO 
age, while PROA3+ is insignificantly associated with forced CEO turnover in 
Model B6.2. 
• The results on CEO structural power variables in the best fit model (Model B5.5) 
indicated that CEOs in firms with a relatively higher proportion of independent 
directors, and CEOs who are the chairperson of the board were less likely to be 
replaced involuntarily. When firm performance was below the aspiration level, 
only the negative relationship between RBIN and FCT was still significant.  
• With respect to CEO ownership power, the significance and directions of 
variables in the best fit model (Model B5.5) were similar to those in the best 
model of ACT. In other words, RSTA_ST and RELA were negatively related to 
FCT, while CONC is positively associated with FCT. When firm performance was 
below the aspiration level, only the effects of RELA and CONC on forced CEO 
turnover remained significant. 
• On the basis of the results on CEO prestige power variables in the best fit model 
(Model B5.5), CEOs with celebrity status were at relatively lower risk of being 
involuntarily removed from their position. However, this negative relationship 
became insignificant when performance was below the aspiration level. 
• In relation to the results on CEO tenure power variables in the best fit model 
(Model B5.5), an inverted U-shaped relationship was found. Similar to the result 
for CEO turnover, the graph of smoothed hazard estimation indicated that the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover initially increased in the first five years of CEO 
tenure, and then decreased in the following years. This relationship still appears 
when firm performance is below the aspiration level, but does not appear when 
firm performance is above the aspiration level. In addition, the proportion of 
directors appointed with CEO tenure (i.e., RBCE) was negatively related to the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover. This relationship appeared regardless of 
whether firm performance was below or above the aspiration level. 
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• In relation to control variables, both firm performance and firm size were 
negatively related to the probability of forced CEO turnover, while CEOs who 
were at or above retirement age were at comparatively higher risk of being 
replaced. For firms with performance levels below the aspiration level, the 
influences of firm size and CEO age became insignificant, while the effect of firm 
performance was still significant. 
• The modelling results using the random effects method confirmed the results of 
the GEE models, including the model selection and the significance and directions 
of explanatory variables on forced CEO turnover. 
A discussion of the implications of these results for the Chinese institutional context is 
provided in Chapter Eight. 
7.5 Estimated results for voluntary CEO turnover  
In Sections 7.3 and 7.4, the results of the statistical analysis using the GEE and random 
effects methods for CEO turnover and forced CEO turnover respectively were presented 
and discussed. This section explains the process of the appropriate model using the GEE 
method for voluntary CEO turnover and reports the statistical significance and directions 
of coefficients in the models. In a similar way, the results of the random effects method 
for voluntary CEO turnover are also presented in an effort to compare the results of the 
two different panel data analytical methods.  
Table 7.11 presents the estimated results of voluntary CEO turnover by using the GEE 
method with the non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix. The discussion in Sections 
7.5.1 and 7.5.2 is based on this table. For the convenience of referring to the results within 
the discussion for each section, the summaries of these results are displayed in break-
down tables named Table 7.11a, Table 7.11b, and so on. 
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Table 7.11 Results of GEE models using the non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix for VCT 
 Model C0 Model C1 Model C2.1 Model C2.2 Model C3.1 Model C3.2 Model C4 Model C5.1 Model C5.2 Model C5.3 Model C5.4 Model C5.5 
DP_ROA3  -0.074 (0.929) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
0.117 
(1.124) 
0.115 
(1.122) 
0.121 
(1.129) 
0.118 
(1.125) 
0.110 
(1.116) 
0.123 
(1.131) 
0.106 
(1.112) 
0.123 
(1.131) 
0.110 
(1.116) 
RBOU   -0.008
+ 
(0.992)          
RBIN    -0.066
*** 
(0.936) 
-0.065*** 
(0.937) 
-0.064*** 
(0.938) 
-0.066*** 
(0.935) 
-0.064*** 
(0.938) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.064*** 
(0.938) 
RBMI    -0.005 (0.995) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
DUAL   1.197
*** 
(3.310) 
1.215*** 
(3.372) 
1.228*** 
(3.413) 
1.227*** 
(3.411) 
1.236*** 
(3.440) 
1.204*** 
(3.335) 
1.181*** 
(3.259) 
1.260*** 
(3.526) 
1.190*** 
(3.288) 
1.213*** 
(3.362) 
SIBO   0.043 (1.044) 
0.036 
(1.036) 
0.036 
(1.037) 
0.037 
(1.037) 
0.036 
(1.037) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
0.036 
(1.036) 
0.037 
(1.037) 
0.036 
(1.035) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
DRSCE     -0.083 (0.920) 
-0.083 
(0.920)       
RSTA     0.007 (1.007)        
RSTA_ST      0.005 (1.005)       
RSTA_LE      0.008 (1.008)       
RSLE     0.005 (1.005) 
0.004 
(1.004)       
RSCA     0.002 (1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002)       
CONC     0.003 (1.003) 
0.004 
(1.004)       
RELA     0.009 (1.009) 
-0.008 
(0.992)       
REOT     -0.224 (0.800) 
-0.233 
(0.793)       
EDUC       -0.156 (0.856)      
ORDE       -0.091 (0.913)      
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LN_TENU        0.273
+ 
(1.314) 
0.074 
(1.077)  
0.198 
(1.220) 
0.387 
(1.473) 
LN_STENU           -0.057 (0.945) 
-0.051 
(0.950) 
RBCE        -0.006
+ 
(0.994)  
-0.002 
(0.998)  
-0.006+ 
(0.994) 
NROA3 1.082 (2.952) 
1.095 
(2.990) 
0.991 
(2.965) 
1.156 
(3.176) 
0.842 
(2.322) 
0.705 
(2.024) 
1.362 
(3.902) 
1.586 
(4.884) 
1.135 
(3.112) 
1.377 
(3.962) 
1.055 
(2.871) 
1.505 
(4.502) 
SIZE 0.004 (1.004) 
0.013 
(1.013) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.053 
(1.054) 
0.045 
(1.046) 
0.048 
(1.049) 
0.060 
(1.062) 
0.022 
(1.022) 
0.045 
(1.046) 
0.053 
(1.054) 
0.047 
(1.048) 
0.024 
(1.024) 
DAGE 1.372
*** 
(3.945) 
1.305* 
(3.689) 
1.026*** 
(2.789) 
0.964*** 
(2.622) 
1.001*** 
(2.721) 
1.021*** 
(2.775) 
0.941*** 
(2.564) 
0.951*** 
(2.588) 
0.930*** 
(2.534) 
1.010*** 
(2.744) 
0.938*** 
(2.555) 
0.958*** 
(2.607) 
S1998 -0.174 (0.840) 
-0.060 
(0.942) 
0.038 
(1.039) 
0.032*** 
(1.032) 
0.032 
(1.003) 
0.028 
(1.028) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
-0.040 
(0.961) 
0.024 
(1.024) 
0.012 
(1.012) 
0.023 
(1.023) 
-0.039 
(0.962) 
S1999 0.506
+ 
(1.658) 
0.611* 
(1.842) 
0.818** 
(2.266) 
0.815 
(2.259) 
0.809** 
(2.245) 
0.801** 
(2.228) 
0.827** 
(2.286) 
0.687* 
(1.987) 
0.801** 
(2.228) 
0.781** 
(2.184) 
0.807** 
(2.241) 
0.693* 
(1.999) 
S2000 0.573
* 
(1.773) 
0.673* 
(1.959) 
1.024** 
(2.783) 
1.035** 
(2.816) 
1.027** 
(2.793) 
1.017** 
(2.764) 
1.052** 
(2.864) 
0.860** 
(2.364) 
1.021** 
(2.776) 
0.983** 
(2.674) 
1.032** 
(2.807) 
0.871** 
(2.389) 
S2001 0.418 (1.519) 
0.519 
(1.681) 
0.977** 
(2.656) 
1.115** 
(3.051) 
1.101** 
(3.009) 
1.087** 
(2.967) 
1.143** 
(3.137) 
0.923** 
(2.518) 
1.103** 
(3.013) 
1.055** 
(2.873) 
1.112** 
(3.040) 
0.932** 
(2.539) 
S2002 0.061 (1.063) 
0.159 
(1.173) 
0.670* 
(1.954) 
1.561** 
(4.765) 
1.533*** 
(4.631) 
1.506*** 
(4.509) 
1.597*** 
(4.940) 
1.352** 
(3.863) 
1.555*** 
(4.735) 
1.486*** 
(4.421) 
1.566*** 
(4.789) 
1.362** 
(3.902) 
S2003 -0.201 (0.818) 
-0.100 
(0.905) 
0.518 
(1.679) 
2.093*** 
(8.108) 
2.052*** 
(7.780) 
2.013*** 
(7.489) 
2.135*** 
(8.455) 
1.845*** 
(6.328) 
2.086*** 
(8.056) 
2.004*** 
(7.415) 
2.105*** 
(8.207) 
1.862*** 
(6.436) 
S2004 -0.226 (0.798) 
-0.124 
(0.883) 
0.485 
(1.624) 
2.378*** 
(10.778) 
2.335*** 
(10.326) 
2.289*** 
(9.869) 
2.425*** 
(11.297) 
2.102*** 
(8.183) 
2.363*** 
(10.627) 
2.288*** 
(9.855) 
2.386*** 
(10.873) 
2.123*** 
(8.354) 
S2005 -0.079 (0.924) 
0.024 
(1.024) 
0.631+ 
(1.880) 
2.590*** 
(13.333) 
2.565*** 
(12.995) 
2.515*** 
(12.369) 
2.634*** 
(13.929) 
2.273*** 
(9.709) 
2.561*** 
(12.955) 
2.504*** 
(12.230) 
2.579*** 
(13.188) 
2.289*** 
(9.868) 
S2006 -0.828
* 
(0.437) 
-0.721+ 
(0.486) 
-0.090 
(0.914) 
1.883** 
(6.573) 
2.075** 
(7.965) 
2.014** 
(7.494) 
1.929** 
(6.880) 
1.543** 
(4.679) 
1.852** 
(6.374) 
1.790** 
(5.992) 
1.877** 
(6.533) 
1.565** 
(4.785) 
_cons -3.557* -3.843* -4.211* -5.447** -5.583* -5.488* -5.729** -4.880* -5.329** -5.409** -5.375** -4.914* 
Wald chi2 67.39*** 63.54*** 127.06*** 147.73*** 165.16*** 164.78*** 149.64*** 157.26*** 147.42*** 157.42*** 148.58*** 158.55*** 
QIC_u 1655.630 1637.266 1568.348 1545.054 1553.304 1554.918 1548.396 1545.824 1547.499 1545.315 1549.476 1547.771 
P 13 14 17 18 25 26 20 20 19 19 20 21 
N 3250 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 
 Model C0 Model C1 Model C2.1 Model C2.2 Model C3.1 Model C3.2 Model C4 Model C5.1 Model C5.2 Model C5.3 Model C5.4 Model C5.5 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. P is the number of parameters in a model. N is the number of observations in a model.
 182 
7.5.1 Model fit  
Table 7.11a presents measures of model fit, namely the Wald Chi-square, the QIC_u, and 
the changes of values of QIC_u for twelve models of voluntary CEO turnover using the 
first order non-stationary working correlation matrix. All models are statistically 
significant as their Wald Chi-square has a p-value <0.001.   
Table 7.11a:  Model fit of GEE models using VCT as the dependent variable (non-stationary 1) 
 Wald chi2 QIC_u 1 2 3 P 
Model C0 67.39*** 1655.630    13 
Model C1 63.54*** 1637.266 -18.364   14 
Model C2.1 127.06*** 1568.348  -68.918  17 
Model C2.2 147.73*** 1545.054  -92.212  18 
Model C3.1 165.16*** 1553.304   8.250 25 
Model C3.2 164.78*** 1554.918   9.864 26 
Model C4 149.64*** 1548.396   3.342 20 
Model C5.1 157.26*** 1545.824   0.770 20 
Model C5.2 147.42*** 1547.499   2.445 19 
Model C5.3 157.42*** 1545.315   0.261 19 
Model C5.4 148.58*** 1549.476   4.422 20 
Model C5.5 158.55*** 1547.771   2.717 21 
Notes: 1. Change in QIC_u relative to Model C0.  
  2. Change in QIC_u relative to Model C1.  
  3. Change in QIC_u relative to Model C2.2. 
            Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. 
            P is the number of parameters in a model. 
First, the impact of controlling variables (i.e., NROA3, SIZE, DAGE, and nine year-
dummy variables) on voluntary CEO turnover was captured in Model C0, and its QIC_u 
measure was 1655.630. 45
                                                 
45Given that the research question of this study is to examine the impact of the board’s aspiration level and 
CEO power on CEO turnover (including forced and voluntary CEO turnover) for a given level of firm 
performance, this study includes firm performance (i.e., NROA3) as a control variable. However, in 
considering that DP_ROA3 (i.e., the dummy variable of performance relative to aspiration levels) was 
calculated using firm performance, this study also estimated voluntary CEO turnover by excluding firm 
performance (NROA3). The estimated results are presented in Table A7.7 in the Appendix on page 319. 
The estimated results were similar to the models that included NROA3. 
 Model C1 was set up by adding the dummy variable of 
performance relative to aspiration, DP_ROA3, to Model C0. Models C1 improved the 
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model fit by reducing QIC_u by 18.364 units. The impact of DP_ROA3 on voluntary 
CEO turnover was shown. As a result, CEO power variables were added to Model C1. 
Second, variables of CEO structural power were added to Model C1. Model C2.1 was 
developed from Model C1 with three added CEO structural power variables, namely 
RBOU, DUAL, and SIBO. The goodness of model fit was significantly improved because 
the QIC_u dropped by 68.918. When RBOU was replaced by RBIN and RBMI in Model 
C2.1, Model C2.2 significantly improved the model fit by further reducing the QIC_u 
from 1568.348 in Model C2.1 to 1545.054. Both Models C2.1 and C2.2 had better 
goodness of fit than Model C1. The contribution of CEO structural power on voluntary 
CEO turnover was evident. Model C2.2 is chosen to develop models to investigate 
voluntary CEO turnover because it has a lower QIC than Model C2.1.  
The third step was to add CEO ownership power factors to Model C2.2. When seven 
variables of CEO ownership power other than RSTA_ST and RSTA_LE were added to 
Model C2.2, Model C3.1 reduced the model fit as QIC_u increased by 8.250. Model C3.2 
was developed from Model C3.1 by replacing RSTA by RSTA_ST and RSTA_LE and it 
also reduced the model fit because it increased QIC_u from 1553.304 in Model C3.1 to 
1554.918 in Model C3.2. Thus, the model fit of these two models was inferior to Model 
C2.2 and CEO ownership power variables should therefore not be included in the model.  
Fourth, Model C4 added the two variables of CEO prestige power to Model C2.2. Model 
C4 had poorer model fit as its QIC_u was greater than that of Model C2.2. It was evident 
that CEO prestige power variables made no contribution to explaining voluntary CEO 
turnover. Based on these findings, CEO prestige power variables should not be added to 
the model.  
Finally, five models (i.e., Models C5.1 to C5.5) were developed by adding CEO tenure 
power variables into Model C2.2. However, all of these five models decreased the 
modelling fit because the values of their QIC were all greater than that of Model C2.2. 
This evidence indicates that CEO tenure power variables should not be included in the 
model. 
Given all of the above, Model C2.2 had the lowest QIC_u and thus was the best model for 
investigating voluntary CEO turnover. 
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Table 7.12 presents AIC, the goodness of fit, and the changes in AIC of random effects 
models for the twelve models using VCT as the dependent variable.  
Table 7.12 Model fit of the random effects models using VCT as the dependent variable  
 AIC 1 2 3 K 
Model C0 1657.542    14 
Model C1 1639.174 -18.368   15 
Model C2.1 1564.161  -75.013  18 
Model C2.2 1540.321  -98.853  19 
Model C3.1 1549.420   9.099 26 
Model C3.2 1550.493   10.172 27 
Model C4 1543.707   3.386 21 
Model C5.1 1540.675   0.354 21 
Model C5.2 1541.733   1.412 20 
Model C5.3 1541.699   1.378 20 
Model C5.4 1543.723   3.402 21 
Model C5.5 1542.663   2.342 22 
 Notes: 1. Change in AIC relative to Model C0.  
  2. Change in AIC relative to Model C1.  
  3. Change in AIC relative to Model C2.2. 
  K is the number of covariance parameters in a model. 
The results of model selection of random effects models using VCT as the dependent 
variable were the same as with the GEE models. Model C2.2 had the lowest AIC among 
the twelve models, and thus it was the most appropriate model to explain VCT. In other 
words, seventeen variables, DP_ROA3, RBIN, RBMI, DUAL, SIBO, NROA3, SIZE, 
DAGE, and the nine year-dummy variables, best explained VCT. 
7.5.2 The influence of explanatory variables on voluntary CEO turnover 
Following the discussion in the previous section on the model fit, this section reports the 
impact of explanatory variables on voluntary CEO turnover. 
7.5.2.1 The influence of the dummy variable of PRA on voluntary CEO turnover 
The dummy variable of performance relative to a given aspiration level, DP_ROA3, was 
included in eleven models other than Model C0. The overall results, namely the estimated 
coefficients, odds ratios, and p-values, for this variable in these eleven models are 
 185 
presented in Table 7.11b. The estimated coefficients of DP_ROA3 were all statistically 
insignificant. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1.1c. 
Table 7.11b The influence of the dummy variable of PRA on VCT 
 DP_ROA3 
Hypothesis 1.1c 
Model C1 -0.074 (0.929) 
Model C2.1 0.037 (1.038) 
Model C2.2 0.117 (1.124) 
Model C3.1 0.115 (1.122) 
Model C3.2 0.121 (1.129) 
Model C4 0.118 (1.125) 
Model C5.1 0.110 (1.116) 
Model C5.2 0.123 (1.131) 
Model C5.3 0.106 (1.112) 
Model C5.4 0.123 (1.131) 
Model C5.5 0.110 (1.116) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
7.5.2.2 The influence of CEO structural power on voluntary CEO turnover 
CEO structural power variables, RBOU, RBIN, RBMI, DUAL, and SIBO, were included 
in ten models (i.e., Models C2.1 to C5.5). Table 7.11c presents the overall results (i.e., the 
estimated coefficients, odds ratios, and p-values) for CEO structural power variables in 
these models. 
Of these five variables, only DUAL had positive and statistically significant coefficients 
in all ten of these models, indicating that a CEO who simultaneously served as the 
chairperson on the board in a company had a higher probability of voluntarily 
relinquishing the position of CEO. In contrast, the estimated coefficients of SIBO were 
positive and statistically insignificant in all these ten models. This suggests that board size 
had no significant impact on voluntary CEO turnover. RBOU was only added to Model 
C2.1 and its estimated coefficient was negative and statistically significant at the 0.1 level, 
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implying that the ratio of outside directors was negatively related to the probability of 
voluntary CEO turnover. RBIN and RBMI were included in nine models, namely Models 
C2.2 to C5.5. The estimated coefficients of RBIN were all statistically significant and 
negative, while RBMI had statistically insignificant coefficients in these nine models. 
This indicates that voluntary CEO turnover was less likely to occur where the ratio of 
independent directors is higher, while it is unrelated with the ratio of affiliated outside 
directors. Consequently, Hypothesis 2.3e is supported, while Hypotheses 2.1c and 2.2c are 
rejected. 
Table 7.11c The influence of CEO structural power variables on VCT 
 RBOU RBIN RBMI DUAL SIBO 
Hypothesis 2.1c 2.1c 2.1c 2.2c 2.3e 
Model C2.1 -0.008
+ 
(0.992) - - 
1.197*** 
(3.310) 
0.043 
(1.044) 
Model C2.2 - -0.066
*** 
(0.936) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
1.215*** 
(3.372) 
0.036 
(1.036) 
Model C3.1 - -0.065
*** 
(0.937) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
1.228*** 
(3.413) 
0.036 
(1.036) 
Model C3.2 - -0.064
*** 
(0.938) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
1.227*** 
(3.411) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
Model C4 - -0.066
*** 
(0.935) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
1.236*** 
(3.440) 
0.036 
(1.036) 
Model C5.1 - -0.064
*** 
(0.938) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
1.204*** 
(3.335) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
Model C5.2 - -0.066
*** 
(0.936) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
1.181*** 
(3.259) 
0.036 
(1.036) 
Model C5.3 - -0.066
*** 
(0.936) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
1.260*** 
(3.526) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
Model C5.4 - -0.066
*** 
(0.936) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
1.190*** 
(3.288) 
0.036 
(1.036) 
Model C5.5 - -0.064
*** 
(0.938) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
1.213*** 
(3.362) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
7.5.2.3 The influence of CEO ownership power on voluntary CEO turnover 
Nine variables of CEO ownership power, DRSCE, RSTA, RSTA_ST, RSTA_LE, RSLE, 
RSCA, CONC, RELA, and REOT, were included in two models (i.e., Models C3.1 and 
C3.2). The overall results (i.e., the estimated coefficients and p-values) for these nine 
variables in these models are presented in Table 7.11d.  
In both models, none of the nine variables of CEO ownership power had a significant 
coefficient, suggesting that CEO ownership power was unrelated to voluntary CEO 
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turnover. These results are consistent with Hypotheses 3.1c, 3.2e, 3.3c, 3.4c, 3.5c, 3.6e, 
and 3.6f. 
Table 7.11d The influence of CEO ownership power variables on VCT 
 DRSCE RSTA RSTA_ST RSTA_LE RSLE RSCA CONC RELA REOT 
Hypothesis 3.1c 3.2e 3.2e 3.2e 3.3c 3.4c 3.5c 3.6e 3.6f 
Model 
C3.1 
-0.083 
(0.920) 
0.007 
(1.007) - - 
0.005 
(1.005) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.009 
(1.009) 
-0.224 
(0.800) 
Model 
C3.2 
-0.083 
(0.920) - 
0.005 
(1.005) 
0.008 
(1.008) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
-0.008 
(0.992) 
-0.233 
(0.793) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
7.5.2.4 The influence of CEO prestige power on voluntary CEO turnover 
The two variables of CEO prestige power, EDUC and ORDE, were included in Model C4. 
Table 7.11e presents the overall results (i.e., the estimated coefficients, odds rations, and 
p-values) for these two variables in Model C4.  
Table 7.11e The influence of CEO prestige power variables on VCT 
 EDUC ORDE 
Hypothesis 4.1c 4.2c 
Model C4 -0.156 (0.856) 
-0.091 
(0.913) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
Both estimated coefficients of these two variables were statistically insignificant, 
indicating that neither the celebrity status nor the elite educational background of a CEO 
had any significant impact on the probability of voluntary CEO turnover. This is 
consistent with Hypotheses 4.1c and 4.2c. 
7.5.2.5 The influence of CEO tenure power on voluntary CEO turnover 
The three variables of CEO tenure power (i.e., LN_TUNE, LN_STENU, and RBCE) 
were included in five models (i.e., Models C5.1 to C5.5). The overall results, namely the 
estimated coefficients, odds ratios, and p-values, for these three variables in these models 
are presented in Table 7.11f.  
Both LN_TENU and LN_STENU were present in Models C5.4 and C5.5, while neither 
of them had a statistically significant coefficient in either of these two models. These 
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findings indicate that, unlike forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover, the relationship 
between CEO tenure and voluntary turnover is not an inverted U-shape. LN_TENU was 
included in Models C5.1 and C5.2 without the presence of LN_STENU. However, the 
estimated coefficient of LN_TENU was positively and statistically significant in Model 
C5.1 when RBCE was included and was positively but statistically insignificant in Model 
C5.2 when RBCE was not included. In addition, RBCE had statistically significant 
coefficients in Models C5.1 and C5.5 when LN_TENU was included and a statistically 
insignificant coefficient in Model C5.3 when LN_TENU was excluded. These results 
indicate that the impacts of CEO tenure and the proportion of interdependent directors on 
voluntary CEO turnover were not robust. In addition, these three variables did not 
improve the model fit. Therefore, it is evident that CEO tenure power had no impact on 
voluntary CEO turnover, which is consistent with Hypothesis 5.2c, but is contradictory to 
Hypothesis 5.1e.  
Table 7.11f The influence of CEO tenure power variables on VCT 
 LN_TENU LN_STENU RBCE 
Hypothesis 5.1e 5.1e 5.2c 
Model C5.1 0.273
+ 
(1.314) - 
-0.006+ 
(0.994) 
Model C5.2 0.074 (1.077) - - 
Model C5.3 - - -0.002 (0.998) 
Model C5.4 0.198 (1.220) 
-0.057 
(0.945) - 
Model C5.5 0.387 (1.473) 
-0.051 
(0.950) 
-0.006+ 
(0.994) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
7.5.2.6 The influence of control variables on voluntary CEO turnover 
Three control variables, NROA3, SIZE, and DAGE, were included in twelve models (i.e., 
Model C0 to Model C5.5). Table 7.11g presents the overall results (i.e., the estimated 
coefficients, odds ratios, and p-values) for these three variables in twelve models.  
In all models, the estimated coefficients of DAGE were positive and statistically 
significant at the level of 0.001. This suggested that CEOs who were above the retirement 
age were more likely to depart their positions voluntarily. In contrast, another control 
variable, SIZE, had statistically insignificant coefficients in these models. Similarly, the 
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performance variable, NROA3, had statistically insignificant coefficients. These results 
imply that voluntary CEO turnover is unrelated to either the size of a company or firm 
performance. 
Table 7.11g The influence of control variables on VCT 
 NROA3 SIZE DAGE 
Model C0 1.082 (2.952) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
1.372*** 
(3.945) 
Model C1 1.095 (2.990) 
0.013 
(1.013) 
1.305* 
(3.689) 
Model C2.1 0.991 (2.965) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
1.026*** 
(2.789) 
Model C2.2 1.156 (3.176) 
0.053 
(1.054) 
0.964*** 
(2.622) 
Model C3.1 0.842 (2.322) 
0.045 
(1.046) 
1.001*** 
(2.721) 
Model C3.2 0.705 (2.024) 
0.048 
(1.049) 
1.021*** 
(2.775) 
Model C4 1.362 (3.902) 
0.060 
(1.062) 
0.941*** 
(2.564) 
Model C5.1 1.586 (4.884) 
0.022 
(1.022) 
0.951*** 
(2.588) 
Model C5.2 1.135 (3.112) 
0.045 
(1.046) 
0.930*** 
(2.534) 
Model C5.3 1.377 (3.962) 
0.053 
(1.054) 
1.010*** 
(2.744) 
Model C5.4 1.055 (2.871) 
0.047 
(1.048) 
0.938*** 
(2.555) 
Model C5.5 1.505 (4.502) 
0.024 
(1.024) 
0.958*** 
(2.607) 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
7.5.2.7 The comparison of the influence of explanatory variables on voluntary CEO 
turnover between GEE models and random effects models 
Table 7.13 presents the estimated results of Model C2.2, the best model explaining 
voluntary CEO turnover, in the GEE model and the random effects model. The estimated 
results of the twelve models of the random effects method appear in Table A7.8 in the 
Appendix, on page 321. 
In the random effects model, the value of rho was 0.113, indicating that the proportion of 
the total variance contributed by the subject level (i.e., the differences between companies) 
was 11.3% and the likelihood-ratio test of rho=0 was significant at the level of 0.001. 
This implied that the variance of VCT attributed to differences between companies is 
important and should not be neglected.  
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Table 7.13 Estimated results of Model C2.2 using the GEE and random effects methods for VCT 
 GEE Model Random effects model 
DP_ROA3 0.117 (1.124) 
0.115 
(1.121) 
RBIN -0.066
*** 
(0.936) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
RBMI -0.005 (0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
DUAL 1.215
*** 
(3.372) 
1.438*** 
(4.212) 
SIBO 0.036 (1.036) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
NROA3 1.156 (3.176) 
1.130 
(3.096) 
SIZE 0.053 (1.054) 
0.052 
(1.054) 
DAGE 0.964 (2.622) 
1.139 
(3.123) 
S1998 0.032
*** 
(1.032) 
0.067*** 
(1.069) 
S1999 0.815 (2.259) 
0.909** 
(2.482) 
S2000 1.035
** 
(2.816) 
1.166*** 
(3.209) 
S2001 1.115
** 
(3.051) 
1.257*** 
(3.516) 
S2002 1.561
** 
(4.765) 
1.665*** 
(5.284) 
S2003 2.093
*** 
(8.108) 
2.154*** 
(8.616) 
S2004 2.378
*** 
(10.778) 
2.458*** 
(11.680) 
S2005 2.590
*** 
(13.333) 
2.704*** 
(14.934) 
S2006 1.883
** 
(6.573) 
1.988** 
(7.298) 
_cons -5.447** -5.745* 
Wald chi2 147.73*** 121.47*** 
QIC_u 1545.054 - 
Rho  - 0.113*** 
Number of observations 3224 3224 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios.  
In relation to the significance and directions of estimated coefficients, the results of the 
two regression methods were almost identical. The similarities between the results of the 
two types of models implied the validity and stability of results. 
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7.5.3 The influence of the discrepancy between firm performance and a given 
aspiration level on voluntary CEO turnover 
Whether performance below the aspiration level increases the likelihood of voluntary 
CEO turnover was investigated in eleven models (i.e., Models C1-C5.5). However, 
whether the likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover is associated with the distance between 
firm performance and the aspiration level has not yet been explored. In an effort to 
examine this relationship, Models C6.1 and C6.2 were developed for VCT by including 
PROA3- and PROA3+, two continuous variables of PRA. The GEE method with a logit 
link function and non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix was used, and the random 
effects method was also used in an effort to compare the results of the two methods. The 
regression results are presented in Table 7.14.  
Model C6.1 was developed from Model C2.2 by replacing DP_ROA3 with two 
continuous variables of PRA, PROA3- and PROA3+. The estimated coefficients of 
PROA3- and PROA3+ were statistically insignificant in both the GEE model and the 
random effects model. Model C6.2 was developed from Model C6.1 by excluding the 
four variables of CEO structural power and three control variables (i.e., firm performance, 
firm size, and CEO age). Neither PROA3- nor PROA3+ had a statistically significant 
coefficient in Model C6.2 estimated in the GEE model. The rho of the random effects 
model was 0, indicating that the proportion of the total residual variation due to 
differences between companies was 0% and the likelihood-ratio test of rho=0 was 
insignificant. This implies that the variance of VCT attributed to differences between 
companies was unimportant and the estimated results were not different from the results 
using OLR (i.e., the pooled estimating method). Similarly, the estimated coefficients of 
PROA3- and PROA3+ were statistically insignificant at all levels of the model using the 
OLR method. These results indicated that the likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover did 
not change along with the discrepancy between firm performance and the aspiration level 
regardless of whether firm performance was below or above the aspiration level. As a 
result, both Hypotheses 1.2c and 1.3c are supported.  
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Table 7.14 The influence of the discrepancy between performance and a given aspiration level on 
VCT 
 
Model C6.1 Model C6.2 
GEE model Random effects model GEE model 
Random 
effects model OLR model 
Hypothesis 1.2c, 1.3c 1.2c, 1.3c 1.2c, 1.3c 1.2c, 1.3c 1.2c, 1.3c 
PROA3- 1.640 (5.154) 
1.446 
(4.244) 
0.883 
(2.418) 
0.691 
(1.995) 
0.691 
(1.995) 
PROA3+ 0.041 (1.042) 
-0.054 
(0.947) 
-1.806 
(0.164) 
-1.362 
(0.256) 
-1.362 
(0.256) 
RBIN -0.066
*** 
(0.936) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936)    
RBMI -0.006 (0.994) 
-0.006 
(0.994)    
DUAL 1.209
*** 
(3.351) 
1.435*** 
(4.199)    
SIBO 0.036 (1.037) 
0.037 
(1.038)    
NROA3 -0.711 (0.491) 
-0.551 
(0.577)    
SIZE 0.042 (1.043) 
0.041 
(1.042)    
DAGE 0.969
*** 
(2.635) 
1.144*** 
(3.138)    
S1998 0.029 (1.030) 
0.064 
(1.066) 
-0.031 
(0.970) 
-0.036 
(0.965) 
-0.036 
(0.965) 
S1999 0.810
** 
(2.249) 
0.907** 
(2.476) 
0.563+ 
(1.756) 
0.557+ 
(1.745) 
0.557+ 
(1.745) 
S2000 1.021
** 
(2.777) 
1.155*** 
(3.174) 
0.596* 
(1.814) 
0.589* 
(1.803) 
0.589* 
(1.803) 
S2001 1.094
** 
(2.987) 
1.242*** 
(3.462) 
0.401 
(1.493) 
0.393 
(1.482) 
0.393 
(1.482) 
S2002 1.536
*** 
(4.647) 
1.640*** 
(5.157) 
0.028 
(1.028) 
0.019 
(1.019) 
0.019 
(1.019) 
S2003 2.066
*** 
(7.895) 
2.129*** 
(8.404) 
-0.187 
(0.829) 
-0.192 
(0.825) 
-0.192 
(0.825) 
S2004 2.359
*** 
(10.577) 
2.439*** 
(11.467) 
-0.244 
(0.784) 
-0.251 
(0.778) 
-0.251 
(0.778) 
S2005 2.563
*** 
(12.977) 
2.679*** 
(14.467) 
-0.074 
(0.929) 
-0.081 
(0.923) 
-0.081 
(0.923) 
S2006 1.867
** 
(6.467) 
1.973** 
(7.192) 
-0.800* 
(0.449) 
-0.807* 
(0.446) 
-0.807* 
(0.446) 
_cons -3.820 -4.236 -2.611*** -2.613*** -2.613*** 
Wald chi2 147.91*** 120.94*** 27.59** 29.68** 29.68** 
LR chi2 - - - - 31.56*** 
QIC 1546.821 - 1659.832 - - 
QIC_u 1547.068 - 1660.450 - - 
Rho - 0.114** - 0.000 - 
Pseudo R2 - - - - 0.0189 
Number of 
observations 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. 
 193 
7.5.4 Conclusion on the findings of voluntary CEO turnover 
The discussion in Section 7.5.1 on model selection, in Section 7.5.2 on the influence of 
explanatory variables on voluntary CEO turnover, and in Section 7.5.3 on the influence of 
the discrepancy between performance and the aspiration level on voluntary CEO turnover 
leads to the following summarised findings: 
• Twelve models were developed in an effort to find the best sub-covariate to 
explain the event of voluntary CEO turnover. Model C2.2, which consists of a 
PRA dummy variable (i.e., DP_ROA3), four variables of CEO structural power 
(i.e., RBIN, RBMI, DUAL, and SIBO), twelve control variables (i.e., NROA3, 
SIZE, DAGE, and nine dummy variables for year effects), was the best fit 
model to investigate voluntary CEO turnover as it had the lowest value of 
QIC_u. 
• The results on the PRA variable in the best fit model (Model C2.2) indicated 
that DP_ROA3 had statistically insignificant coefficients, implying that 
performance relative to the aspiration level had no significant impact on 
voluntary CEO turnover. In addition, neither PROA3- nor PROA3+ had a 
significant relationship with voluntary CEO turnover in Model C6.1 and C6.2. 
• On the basis of the results on CEO structural power variables in the best fit 
model (Model C2.2), the proportion of independent directors (i.e., RBIN) and 
outside directors (i.e., RBOU) had negative relationships with voluntary CEO 
turnover, while joint CEO/chairperson was positively related to voluntary CEO 
turnover. The other two variables, RBMI and SIBO, had no significant effect on 
voluntary CEO turnover. 
• Three types of CEO power, namely ownership power, prestige power, and 
tenure power, had no significant impact on voluntary CEO turnover. 
• In relation to control variables, neither firm performance nor firm size had a 
significant relationship with voluntary CEO turnover, while CEOs who were at 
or above retirement age were more likely to depart their positions voluntarily. 
• The modelling results using the random effects method confirmed the results of 
the GEE models, including the model selection and the significance and 
directions of explanatory variables on voluntary CEO turnover. 
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A discussion of the implications of these results for the Chinese institutional context is 
provided in Chapter Eight. 
7.6 Summary of hypothesis testing 
On the basis of the results on the influence of explanatory variables on three dependent 
variables in the best fit models, a summary of hypothesis testing is presented in Table 
7.15.  
Table 7.15 Summary of hypothesis testing 
Variable ACT FCT VCT Hypothesis Result Hypothesis Result Hypothesis Result 
DP_ROA3 H 1.1a Rejected H 1.1b Supported H 1.1c Supported 
PROA3- H 1.2a Supported H 1.2b Supported H 1.2c Supported 
PROA3+ H1.3a Supported H1.3b Supported H1.3c Supported 
RBOU, 
RBIN, 
RBMI 
H 2.1a Rejected H 2.1b Rejected H 2.1c Supported for RBMI 
DUAL H 2.2a Rejected H 2.2b Supported H 2.2c Rejected 
SIBO H2.3a Rejected H 2.3b Rejected H 2.3e Supported H 2.3c Rejected H 2.3d Rejected 
DRSCE H 3.1a Rejected H 3.1b Rejected H 3.1c Supported 
RSTA, H 3.2a Rejected H 3.2b Rejected 
H 3.2e Supported RSTA_ST, 
RSTA_LE H 3.2c Supported H 3.2d Supported 
RSLE H 3.3a Rejected H 3.3b Rejected H 3.3c Supported 
RSCA H 3.4a Supported H 3.4b Supported H 3.4c Supported 
CONC H 3.5a Supported H 3.5b Supported H 3.5c Supported 
RELA H 3.6a Supported H 3.6c Supported H 3.6e Supported 
REOT H 3.6b Supported H 3.6d Supported H 3.6f Supported 
EDUC H 4.1a Rejected H4.1b Rejected H 4.1c Supported 
ORDE H 4.2a Supported H4.2b Supported H 4.2c Supported 
LN_TENU H 5.1a Supported H 5.1b Supported H 5.1e Rejected H 5.1c Supported H 5.1d Supported 
RBCE H 5.2a Supported H 5.2b Supported H 5.2c Supported 
7.7 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter presented the entire procedure of the model selection using the GEE method 
and the results of twelve models of CEO turnover, twelve models of forced CEO turnover, 
and twelve models of voluntary CEO turnover. The major findings were: 
• DP_ROA3, the dummy variable of PRA measured by three-year average 
performance, was significantly and negatively related to FCT, while it was 
unrelated to ACT and VCT. The continuous variable, PROA3-, was negatively 
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related to both ACT and FCT, while the other continuous variable, PROA3+, was 
unrelated to ACT and FCT. 
• Two variables of CEO structural power, namely RBIN and DUAL, were 
significantly related to three dependent variables. 
• In relation to CEO ownership power variables, two of them, RSTA_ST and RELA, 
had significant and negative relationships with FCT and ACT, and one of them, 
CONC, was positively related to FCT and ACT. However, none of the CEO 
ownership power variables was significantly related to VCT. 
• One of the two CEO prestige power variables, ORDE, was negatively related to 
FCT and ACT, while for VCT, neither of them had a significant estimated 
coefficient. 
• CEO tenure was found to have an inverted U-shaped relationship with FCT and 
ACT, but no relationship with VCT. The other variable of CEO tenure, RBCE, 
was negatively related to FCT and ACT, but not to VCT. 
• Among controlling variables, SIZE and NROA3 had negative and statistically 
significant influences on both FCT and ACT, but not on VCT. DAGE was 
significantly associated with all three dependent variables. 
In addition, these findings were confirmed by models using the random effects methods. 
The next chapter provides an interpretation of these findings. 
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Chapter Eight: Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
The basic discussion of results, including a comparison with previous research, is 
presented in this chapter. The chapter also discusses additional topics in a more detailed 
manner. The structure of this chapter is presented in Figure 8.1. The implication of the 
estimated results of the impact of performance relative to the aspiration level on CEO 
turnover (including forced and voluntary CEO turnover) is explained in Section 8.2. 
Section 8.3 discusses the estimated results of the relationship between CEO power and 
CEO turnover (including forced and voluntary CEO turnover). Following this, the 
estimated results of control variables are explained in Section 8.4. Finally, a summary for 
this chapter is provided in Section 8.5. 
Figure 8.1 Structure of Chapter Eight 
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8.2 Performance relative to a given aspiration level and CEO turnover 
The strategic management literature has examined the crucial roles of problemistic search 
and risk-taking propensities in strategic change from various perspectives (see Chapter 
Three). The empirical results are consistent, that is, performance below the aspiration 
level of decision makers triggers their problemistic search and increases their willingness 
to take a risk, which in turn, increases the probability of organisational changes. However, 
this relationship has not been examined in the CEO turnover literature (Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan, 2006). Does the aspiration level also affect the board’s problemistic search 
and risk-taking propensities in its decision on CEO turnover? The answer to this question 
is affirmative according to the results obtained in this study. In this study, DP_ROA3, the 
dummy variable of performance relative to the aspiration level, was negatively related to 
forced CEO turnover. This implies that CEOs in firms with performance above the 
aspiration level are at relatively less risk of being replaced involuntarily. This result 
demonstrates that boards of directors’ aspiration level matters because their decision-
making on forced CEO turnover is guided by their aspiration level. In other words, their 
aspiration level is an important borderline between perceived success and failure and the 
starting point of doubt and conflict in decision making (Greve, 1998; Schneider, 1992). 
Firm performance below the aspiration level is interpreted as a failure, which triggers the 
board’s problemistic search. As a result, the likelihood of forced CEO turnover increases. 
In contrast, performance above the aspiration level is viewed as a success or satisfactory 
situation by the board. Consequently, the board is unlikely to conduct problemistic search 
and take the risk of replacing the CEO. These findings clearly indicate that problemistic 
search is a driver of an important organisational change, that is, forced CEO turnover. 
Consequently, Cyert and March’s (1963) behavioural theory of the firm is supported.  
In relation to the effects of the discrepancy between firm performance and the aspiration 
level on CEO turnover, it is positively related to the likelihood of both forced CEO 
turnover and CEO turnover when performance is below the aspiration level. In other 
words, the CEO of a firm performing far below the aspiration level is more likely to be 
replaced than the CEO of a firm performing slightly below the aspiration level. This is 
consistent with the views of the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963): 
that decision makers are generally reluctant to search for alternative courses of action 
unless they are motivated by a significant performance shortfall.  
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When performance is above the aspiration level, previous research suggested that 
increases in the resources of an organisation lead to experimentation and organisational 
change because success provides managers with access to additional or lower cost 
resources (e.g., Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Baum et al., 2005). As a result, the increases in 
performance above the aspiration level trigger slack search. In contrast with this view, it 
has been found that the probabilities of both CEO turnover and forced CEO turnover are 
reduced when performance exceeds the aspiration level. In addition, these probabilities do 
not change with the size of the difference between firm performance and the aspiration 
level. This implies that the slack search (Greve, 2003b) does not cause CEO turnover 
when firm performance is far better than the aspiration level. It is evident that this result is 
consistent with both power theories (Ocasio, 1994; Shen, 2003) and agency theory 
(Jensen, 1994): that is, the oversight on CEOs who have met or exceeded the expectations 
of boards is less vigilant. In addition, they not only gain significant expert power but also 
will be in a good position to develop other sources of power (Shen, 2003). As a result, 
they are unlikely to be replaced.  
With respect to voluntary CEO turnover, the results show that it is not associated with 
whether firm performance is above or below the aspiration level. In addition, it is 
unrelated to the discrepancy between firm performance and the aspiration level regardless 
of whether firm performance is above or below the aspiration level. These results are 
consistent with the assumption that voluntary CEO turnover is the normal succession 
process and it is not caused by performance pressure. 
 8.3 CEO power and CEO turnover 
8.3.1 CEO structural power and CEO turnover 
8.3.1.1 Outside directors, affiliated outside directors, and independent directors 
Before controlling for the impact of CEO ownership power, prestige power, and tenure 
power, the proportion of outside directors (defined as non-executive directors) had a 
significant and positive impact on forced CEO turnover, while it had an insignificant 
impact on CEO turnover. However, after controlling for the impact of CEO ownership 
power, prestige power, and tenure power, the proportion of outside directors is not 
associated with either CEO turnover or forced CEO turnover. This is consistent with the 
result of Fan et al. (2007), who found that the proportion of non-executive directors was 
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unrelated to the likelihood of forced CEO turnover for a sample of all Chinese listed 
companies over the period 1999 to 2003. By comparison, the finding of the present study 
is inconsistent with the results commonly found in studies in Western economies (e.g., 
Dahya et al., 2002; Shen & Cannella, 2002a; Weisbach, 1988). In other words, this result 
implies that outside directors are ineffective in monitoring CEOs, and having a greater 
proportion of them on the board cannot significantly restrict CEO power and increase the 
likelihood of CEO turnover. This seems to be inconsistent with agency theory, which 
suggests that outside directors serve as a monitoring mechanism for executives’ activities 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Higgs, 2003).  
In relation to affiliated outside directors (a category of outside directors which is defined 
as directors who are neither executive directors nor independent directors), the results of 
the present study show that their proportion on the board has a positive but insignificant 
impact on both forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover. These results imply that 
affiliated outside directors are inefficient in monitoring CEOs and challenging their power 
and decisions, which is consistent with the result of studies in Western economies (e.g., 
Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Byrd & Hickman, 1992) and in the Chinese context (e.g., Peng, 
2004). Conventionally, outside affiliated directors have been classified as “grey” area 
directors as they have a relationship with the company that may potentially affect their 
independence (Agarwalla, 2008; Baysinger & Butler, 1985).  
With respect to independent directors, the other type of outside directors, in this study 
their proportion on the board is negatively and significantly related to both CEO turnover 
and forced CEO turnover. In addition, this negative relationship still appears significant 
when firm performance is below the aspiration level. This is similar to the results of Kato 
and Long (2006a), who also found the proportion of independent directors to be 
negatively related to CEO turnover, in their study which used a sample of 638 Chinese 
listed companies over the period from 1999 to 2002. More specifically, Kato and Long 
discovered that if the proportion of independent directors on the board increases from 0% 
to 33.33% (i.e., one-third), the predicted CEO turnover rate decreased considerably from 
19% to 8%. This result implies that independent directors serve as pawns of CEOs, which 
challenges the conventional assumption and belief about the role of independent directors 
in monitoring CEOs and other senior managers. Independent directors are commonly 
expected to effectively prevent insider control and reduce losses to other shareholders 
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caused by the misuse of power by executives (Guan, 2007). Accordingly, both Baysinger 
and Butler (1985) and Byrd and Hickman (1992) found support for their hypothesis that 
board monitoring is effective when independent directors dominate the board of directors. 
Why are independent directors ineffective in monitoring CEOs in China? One possible 
reason is the election process for independent directors. According to the Research Center 
of the SHSE (2004), due to the dominant influence of the largest shareholder, 90% of 
independent directors are nominated by the largest shareholders on the Chinese stock 
markets. Given the close relationship between the largest shareholder and CEOs and other 
senior managers, 46
In addition, the ineffectiveness of independent directors may be explained by resource 
dependence theory. The role of directors, especially outside directors, is frequently 
described as having two principal components: monitoring executive activities and 
contributing to the development of strategy (Higgs, 2003). The effectiveness of the 
monitoring role depends not only on directors’ willingness to monitor, but also their 
power relative to CEOs and other executives. In terms of resource dependence theory, the 
board’s power relative to a CEO rests with its ability to provide resources to deal with 
uncertainties in the environment (Finkelstein, 1992). As Agarwalla (2008) stated, 
qualitative independence of directors should include their willingness and ability in terms 
of knowledge and experience to ask the hard questions required to provide effective 
oversight, and their character and integrity in general and especially in dealing with 
potential conflicts of interest. However, in China, around 40% of independent directors 
are university teachers and researchers and only 10% are industrialists (Research Center 
of the SHSE, 2004). The occupational background of independent directors may render 
them unable to monitor CEOs effectively. This may invite a questioning of the 
independent director system in China, as the system only prescribes the minimum number 
of independent directors and the criteria to be considered “independent”
 it is unlikely that independent directors nominated by the largest 
shareholder will be truly “independent” of CEOs.  
47
                                                 
46 According to the survey conducted by the Research Center of the SHSE (2003), 79.1% of CEOs are 
promoted by the largest shareholders, and most other senior managers are also promoted by the largest 
shareholders. 
 without 
47 According to the Guidelines for Establishing Independent Director System in Listed Firms issued by the 
CSRC on August 16, 2001, each listed firm in China would be required to have at least two “independent 
directors” on its board of directors by June 30, 2002, and by June 30, 2003, at least one-third of the board 
members would be required to be “independent directors”. Also, the Guidlines state that an individual must 
meet the following conditions to be considered “independent”: (i) neither the individual nor his or her 
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specifying any criteria for the task-specific knowledge and expertise required of 
independent directors. In other words, independent directors in China are only 
independent in terms of the legislative and stock exchange listing standards, but may not 
be ‘qualitatively independent’ in terms of their thoughts and actions (Agarwalla, 2008). 
The third possible reason for independent directors’ apparent inability to restrict CEOs’ 
power is the information asymmetries between CEOs and the independent directors. 
Independent directors rely heavily on CEOs to acquire firm-specific information and 
knowledge because they generally are not involved in the company’s daily operation 
(Chen & Jia, 2002). As the number of independent directors increases, the problem of 
information asymmetries may deteriorate. Under this situation, CEOs may be able to limit 
the amount and type of information that independent directors can access, or use their 
knowledge advantage to present information to independent directors in such a way as to 
enhance the perception of firm performance (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006, p. 1013). 
As a result, the monitoring effectiveness of the board may be reduced as the proportion of 
independent directors increases (Chen & Jia, 2002; Tan, Li, Li, Zheng, Wu, & Liang, 
2007). 
The results of this study imply that in contrast to what is suggested by agency theory, two 
types of outside director are inefficient in monitoring CEOs, although they each have a 
different impact on CEO power and the likelihood of CEO turnover. Affiliated outside 
directors have no significant impact on CEO power and the likelihood of CEO turnover, 
while independent directors provide power to CEOs to insulate them from performance 
pressure.  
8.3.1.2 CEO duality 
In this study, CEO duality was shown to be negatively related to forced CEO turnover. 
This is consistent with the view of agency theory that the board is ineffective in 
monitoring CEOs when there is concentration of the roles of CEO and chairperson of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
relatives (including spouses, parents, children, siblings, parents-in-law, sons- and daughters-in-law, spouses 
of siblings, and siblings of spouses) work for the listed firm or its subsidiaries; (ii) the individual does not 
directly or indirectly own more than 1% of the stock of the listed firm; (iii) neither the individual nor his or 
her close relatives (including spouses, parents, and children) are among the largest ten shareholders of the 
listed firm; (iv) neither the individuals or his or her close relatives work for a company that owns more than 
5% of the stock of the listed firm; (v) neither the individual nor his or her close relatives work for one of the 
largest five shareholder companies. 
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board (Jensen, 1994). The reason for this is that the joint CEO/chairperson position 
provides more power to CEOs as it enables CEOs to control the agenda of board meetings, 
determine what information directors receive in advance of meetings, and lead board 
meeting discussions (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1994).  
Interestingly, this study found that CEO duality is positively associated with the overall 
and voluntary CEO turnover, which contradicts the assumptions on their relationships 
adopted in this study. In a similar way, Fan et al. (2007), in their empirical study of CEO 
turnover on the Chinese stock markets, also reported that a joint CEO/chairperson 
increases the probability of voluntary CEO turnover and CEO turnover. This phenomenon 
can be explained by the corporate governance reform from the 1990s to the early 21st 
century in China. In the early 1990s, most CEOs of listed companies held the titles of 
both CEO and chairperson of the board of directors. This duality structure was viewed by 
regulators and financial analysts as a corporate governance feature that promoted 
managerial entrenchment. Although there was no clear stipulation in the Company Law or 
other laws in China, many Chinese scholars and policy makers recommended the 
separation of these roles as a good corporate governance practice (Kato & Long, 2006a). 
In response, some listed companies separated the two positions in the name of improving 
corporate governance (Chang, 2004). Many CEOs who also held the position of the 
chairperson of the board relinquished the position of CEO and remained as the 
chairperson of the board for companies within this sample. This type of CEO turnover has 
been identified as voluntary CEO turnover in this study. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
find positive associations between CEO duality and voluntary CEO turnover and CEO 
turnover. 
8.3.1.3 Board size 
This study found that board size was unrelated to forced and overall CEO turnover, both 
before and after considering the impact of the performance relative to the aspiration level. 
Similarly, Fan et al. (2007), also found no relationship between board size and CEO 
turnover (including forced CEO turnover). This implies that board size has no significant 
impact on CEO turnover and power in Chinese listed companies. Therefore, neither 
agency theory (Yermack, 1996) nor power circulation theory (Ocasio, 1994) is supported.  
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The absence of this relationship may be due partially to the conflicting hypotheses. In 
terms of agency theory, board size is positively associated with the inertia and 
ineffectiveness of a board (Hermalin, 2003). As a result, board size should be positively 
related to CEO power and negatively related to the likelihood of CEO turnover, especially 
forced CEO turnover. In contrast, power circulation theory suggests that a CEO is less 
powerful in a larger board because alternative political coalitions that challenge the CEO 
are more likely to be generated (Ocasio, 1994).  
The insignificant estimated coefficient between voluntary CEO turnover and board size is 
consistent with the view that voluntary CEO turnover is associated with a normal 
succession process rather than power contestation. 
8.3.2 CEO ownership power and CEO turnover 
8.3.2.1 CEOs’ shareholdings 
Prior research suggests that CEOs obtain significant power from their ownership status 
because they have ability to influence boards’ decisions through both their management 
and ownership capacities (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992). This study’s 
findings were inconsistent with that view; the likelihood of forced CEO turnover was 
unrelated to whether CEOs held shares in the focal company or not. It is evident that, 
unlike their counterparts in Western countries, CEOs do not derive significant power from 
their shareholder status in China. A possible explanation for this is the low proportion of 
shares typically held by Chinese CEOs. In contrast to the high stock ownership of 
executives in capitalist countries, executives of Chinese listed firms generally have a very 
low level of share ownership (Buck, Liu, & Skovoroda, 2008; Firth et al., 2006). The 
average and highest ratios of shares held by CEOs of the sample companies in this study 
were 0.0066% and 0.47% respectively.48
                                                 
48 In this study, the maximum value of the proportion of shares held by CEOs (RSCE) was 71.21 times of 
its average value, which implied the impact of outliers. In addition, RSCE’s skewness and kurtosis were 
12.085 and 197.325 respectively, indicating the non-normality of RSCE. Thus, this study used the dummy 
variable of CEO shareholdings (DRSCE), which was coded as 1 where a CEO held shares of a focal 
company and 0 otherwise. The results of descriptive statistics for RSCE are presented at Table A8.1a in the 
Appendix, on page 323. 
 Under this circumstance, CEOs are unlikely to 
have an incentive to improve firm performance. In addition, the low level of shares held 
by CEOs is unlikely to protect a CEO from the pressure of being replaced. In a similar 
way, Fan et al. (2007) found that the percentage of shares held by CEOs is unrelated to 
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forced CEO turnover on the Chinese stock markets.49
8.3.2.2 The proportion of state-owned shares 
 Based on their findings, Fan et al. 
(2007) draw the conclusion that the low proportion of shares typically held by CEOs 
barely protects a CEO from the pressure of being replaced. 
The proportion of state-owned shares (including shares held by government shareholders 
and corporate state shareholders) was found in this study to be negatively but 
insignificantly related to both forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover. In a similar way, 
Fan et al. (2007) also reported that the proportion of state shares was unrelated to either 
forced or overall CEO turnover. However, these results were inconsistent with the 
traditional view that state ownership has a negative effect on the quality of corporate 
governance because state shareholders might impose less discipline on CEOs and other 
senior managers (e.g., Qi, Wu, & Zhang, 2000; Xu & Wang, 1999).  
In the further analysis of the impact of two types of state-owned shareholders (i.e., 
government shareholders and corporate state shareholders) on forced CEO turnover, it 
was found that the proportion of shares held by government shareholders was negatively 
related to forced CEO turnover, while the proportion of shares held by corporate state 
shareholders was unrelated to forced CEO turnover. This indicates that CEOs were more 
powerful and less overseen when government shareholders hold a greater ratio of shares, 
while CEO power was unchanged where corporate state shareholders held a greater 
portion of shares. These results were consistent with the assumption that government 
shareholders could be expected to be more detrimental to corporate governance because 
they were purely government agencies and exercised a high degree of government 
intervention, while corporate state shareholders had less government intervention because 
they had much more autonomy (Wang, J., 2003a).  
The different impacts of the two types of state shareholder on CEO power and CEO 
turnover in this study may explain the mixed empirical results of the relationship between 
state ownership and firm performance of listed companies in China. Some researchers 
                                                 
49This study also examined the effect of CEOs’ shareholding on CEO turnover and forced CEO turnover 
using the proportion of shares held by CEOs (RSCE). The estimated results showed that the proportion of 
shares held by CEOs was unrelated to either CEO turnover or forced CEO turnover. The results of these 
models are presented at Table A8.1b in the Appendix, on page 323, which were consistent with the 
estimated results of Fan et al. (2007). 
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reported a positive effect on firm performance, for example, Xu and Wang (1997), Sun et 
al. (2002), and Peng et al. (2007), while some other studies found a negative impact on 
firm performance, for instance, Qi et al. (2000). Moreover, some other scholars reported 
no relationship between the state shareholdings and firm performance, such as Sun and 
Tong (2003). A common factor in these studies is that they do not clearly differentiate 
between different types of state shareholder, who could have different objectives and be 
subject to differing degrees of intervention by the state. This issue may explain the mixed 
empirical results of previous research. 
8.3.2.3 The proportion of legal person shares 
The proportion of legal person shares was found to be unrelated to CEO turnover and 
forced CEO turnover regardless of whether firm performance was above or below the 
aspiration level. In other words, CEO power was not undermined by the shareholdings of 
legal person shareholders even when firm performance was below the aspiration level. 
Therefore, the view that legal person shareholders play an effective monitoring role, as 
they are in a better position to monitor the firm’s operation (Qi et al., 2000; Xu & Wang, 
1997), was not supported by this study. A potential explanation for this might come from 
the nature of legal person shareholders. According to Sun et al. (2002), legal persons are 
typically business agencies or local government enterprises that help in starting up the 
public company either by giving permission to operate or by allowing public resources to 
be used for the start up. Therefore, it is unlikely that legal person shareholders would 
behave very differently from state shareholders. No existing China-related research has 
yet examined the influence of the proportion of legal person shares on CEO turnover.  
8.3.2.4 The proportion of tradable A-shares 
With respect to the proportion of tradable A-shares, neither forced CEO turnover and 
CEO turnover was found to be related to this variable, regardless of whether the 
performance of the firm was above or below the aspiration level. This result implied that 
shareholders of tradable A-shares, consisting of institutional shareholders and individual 
shareholders, do not effectively challenge the CEO even when firm performance is poor. 
That is, they are indifferent to firm performance. This result is consistent with the passive 
role of individual shareholders, namely the major shareholders of tradable A-shares, in 
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monitoring CEOs, as proposed in prior studies on performance (e.g., Gao, 2002; Xu & 
Wang, 1999) and CEO turnover (Fan et al., 2007) in Chinese listed companies 
8.3.2.5 Ownership concentration 
It was found that ownership concentration was positively related to both forced CEO 
turnover and CEO turnover in the present study. Moreover, this positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and forced CEO turnover still appeared significant 
when firm performance was below the aspiration level. These results implied that in 
China, ownership concentration was an effective mechanism for monitoring CEOs and 
restricting their power, and was therefore a significant determinant of forced CEO 
turnover and CEO turnover, especially when firm performance was poorer than the 
board’s aspiration level. As a result, the alignment effect of ownership concentration 
proposed by agency theory was supported by this study.50
8.3.2.6 Representative of large shareholders 
 This finding is consistent with 
the empirical studies that focused on developed market economies, such as the U.S. 
(Boeker, 1992), Japan and the U.S. (Kaplan, 1994a), and Italy (Volpin, 2002). In addition, 
Kato and Long (2006a), by analysing a sample of 638 companies listed on the Chinese 
stock markets over the period 1999-2002, report that the relationship between CEO 
turnover and firm performance was greater in firms in which the largest shareholder held 
more than 50% of the company’s total shares . 
Among the two variables for representative of large shareholders, the representative of the 
largest shareholder was negatively related to both forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover. 
In addition, when firm performance was below the aspiration level, the CEO who was the 
representative of the largest shareholder also was less likely to be replaced. In a similar 
way, Kato and Long (2006a) found that the turnover-performance link is weaker where 
CEOs also hold positions in the largest shareholder firms. This indicated that, in China, a 
CEO can obtain significant ownership power from his/her status as the representative of 
the largest shareholder to insulate him/her from performance pressure. This also 
                                                 
50 In an effort to explore whether the entrenchment effect of concentrated ownership has an effect on forced 
and overall CEO turnover, Models A5.5 and B5.5 were re-estimated by adding SCONC, the square of the 
proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder in the focal company. However, neither CONC nor 
SCONC had a significant coefficient in the two models, indicating that the entrenchment effect of 
concentrated ownership has no significant impact on CEO turnover. The full estimated results are presented 
at Table A8.2 in the Appendix, on page 324. 
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demonstrated the existence of insider control on the Chinese stock markets. More than 
70% of CEOs were representatives of the largest shareholders, that is, the controlling 
shareholders. Therefore, CEOs generally had significant power to protect themselves 
from being replaced due to the substantial number of shares held by the largest 
shareholder (on average, almost 40% of the total shares in companies in this study). CEOs 
who performed below the boards’ expectation could still maintain their positions in 
companies. 
In contrast, CEOs’ status as the representative of any other top ten shareholders was 
unrelated to either forced CEO turnover or CEO turnover in this study. This suggests that 
a CEO cannot obtain such power on the basis of his/her representative status of any other 
top ten largest shareholders. In other words, large shareholders other than the controlling 
shareholder of a company were not able to protect their interests. To some degree, these 
findings implied the conflicts of interest between the largest shareholder and other 
shareholders, that is, the agency problem between principals.  
8.3.3 CEO Prestige power and CEO turnover 
8.3.3.1 Elite education background 
Prior empirical research has commonly found an elite education background to have a 
positive effect on CEO power (e.g., Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Daily & Johnson, 1997). 
In contrast to this positive effect, this study found no evidence that elite educational 
background bestowed remarkable prestige power on CEOs to enable them to hold on to 
their positions. However, this finding was consistent with the empirical results of James, 
Alsalam, Conaty, and To (1989), who found that the effect of university prestige on 
earnings was relatively small compared with the effects of family background and 
academic experiences. In a similar way, Hengartner (2006) used the doctoral degree as an 
indicator of a CEO’s credibility power and found that holding a doctoral degree did not 
provide a CEO with more power to increase his/her remuneration. In addition, in their 
empirical study of CEO power-compensation relationship, Veliyath and Ramaswamy 
(2000) reported evidence that a CEO’s educational level, measured by the number of 
years of education that a CEO had had, was unrelated to his/her power. No previous 
literature on the Chinese context has examined the relationship between CEO educational 
background and CEO turnover. 
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Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, and Kochhar (2001) provided an explanation for why educational 
background has no significant impact on CEO power. They suggested that knowledge 
gained through formal education is articulable knowledge, which can be written and 
easily transferred. The prestige passed on by educational background is a valuable human 
capital because the elite social networks can provide access to valuable external resources 
for the firm. Apart from formal education, individuals can build tacit knowledge through 
their experience, namely “learning by doing” (Pisano, 1994). Compared to articulable 
knowledge, tacit knowledge is often unique, difficult to imitate and embodies 
considerable uncertainty (Mowery, Olexy, & Silverman, 1996) and has a higher 
probability of creating strategic value (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). In relation to the job of 
CEO, it is substantially different from other organisational positions and is characterised 
by the job being idiosyncratic, non-routine, unstructured, and highly complex (Kesner & 
Sebora, 1994). As a result, the CEO’s job places much higher requirements on tacit 
knowledge than on the articulable knowledge gained through the formal education. 
Therefore, the elite educational background may not provide sufficient prestige power to 
CEOs.  
Gottesman and Morey (2006) provided another potential explanation for the insignificant 
relationship between CEOs’ elite educational background and forced CEO turnover. They 
reported in their empirical study that neither firms with CEOs from more prestigious 
schools nor firms managed by CEOs with graduate degrees performed better than firms 
with CEOs from less prestigious schools or firms with CEOs without graduate degrees. 
Their explanation for this finding was that the length of time between the CEO’s 
completion of the degree and the attainment of the CEO position might be sufficiently 
long to diminish any benefit that can flow from a superior education (including the 
education and the social connections picked up at the school).  
8.3.3.2 Celebrity  
An important finding of this study was that CEOs with celebrity status in China were at a 
lower risk of losing their jobs than those without celebrity status, which supports the view 
that CEOs with celebrity status enjoy more prestige power.51
                                                 
51  However, it is worth noting that to some degree, this result could imply the impact of political 
connections of CEOs on their power and forced CEO turnover. According to the Chinese Constitution, the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) is the highest organ of state power in China. The National Committee of 
 This outcome was consistent 
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with the empirical result of Wade et al. (2006), who found that CEOs with celebrity status 
were more powerful in terms of total remuneration. Their sample comprised 278 
companies that were members of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 during the period 
1992 to 1996. No prior literature on the Chinese context has examined the relationship 
between CEOs’ celebrity status and CEO turnover.   
8.3.4 CEO tenure power and CEO turnover 
8.3.4.1 CEO tenure 
Most previous studies on firms in Western countries have found a negative linear 
relationship between CEO tenure and CEO turnover (e.g., Boeker, 1992; Goyal & Park, 
2002), while the existing literature on the Chinese context has not examined the 
relationship between CEO tenure and CEO turnover. In contrast, an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between CEO tenure and forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover was found 
in this study.52
This implies that CEO power in China is affected by two mechanisms, that is, the 
contestation of power and the institutionalisation of power at different stages of CEO 
tenure. During the first stage of CEO tenure, that is, the first five years, CEOs had a 
relatively low level of expert power due to their low level of task knowledge. This was 
consistent with the empirical results of Shen and Cannella (2002b), who reported that 
CEOs were at higher risk of dismissal during their first five years in office. As stated by 
Gabarro (1987), in Western countries new CEOs normally spent their first one or two 
years acquiring needed task knowledge, and then started to undertake major actions to 
 This was consistent with the results of Ocasio (1994), who also found an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO tenure and CEO turnover. In other words, 
the likelihoods of both forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover first increase, and then 
decrease with the lengthening of CEO tenure. 
                                                                                                                                                  
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is an advisory body to the 
party/government in China and its main functions are to hold political consultations and to exercise 
democratic supervision of the party and governments (Li, Meng, & Zhang, 2006). Serving as a deputy of 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) or National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) provides a CEO with opportunities to cultivate formal and informal ties 
with important government bureaucrats who are also deputies of the NPC or the CPPCC, enables firms to 
access resources which are not accessible through markets and allows firms to circumvent government 
regulations (Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008). 
52 When CEO tenure was measured by TENU (the number of years a CEO has been in his/her job), the 
relationship between forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover and CEO tenure still appeared to be an 
inverted U-shape. The full estimated results are presented in Table A8.3 in the Appendix, on page 326. 
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reshape their organisations in their second and third years. In addition, it takes extra time 
for these actions to show their impact on their organisations. At this stage, CEOs are 
vulnerable to challenges by forces from inside and outside the firm and might lose their 
jobs because they have not proved themselves in office (Shen, 2003). In other words, with 
the lengthening of CEO tenure, if new CEOs had not proved themselves in office, they 
were more likely to be challenged and replaced because their power had not been 
institutionalised. 
In addition, the likelihood of either forced CEO turnover or CEO turnover decreased with 
the lengthening of CEO tenure after the fifth year of CEO turnover in the present study. 
This implied a positive relationship between CEO tenure and CEO power. The reason for 
this might be that in the first five years, poorly performing CEOs have been replaced, and 
those who have survived “the evaluation period” (Goyal & Park, 2002) have normally 
met the expectations of the board. This not only provides significant expert power, but 
also enables CEOs to develop other sources of power (Shen, 2003). For example, CEOs 
might acquire power by promoting executives who are loyal to them and replacing those 
who challenge their power (Daily & Johnson, 1997). Another example is that CEOs  
could obtain significant ownership power from their stocks and/or stock options that are 
awarded to them for their success (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). As a result, they can 
accumulate power with the lengthening of their tenure. Consequently, their power is 
institutionalised, which insulates them from the pressure of corporate performance. It is 
evident that at this stage, the institutionalisation of power surpasses the challenges on 
CEO power and reduces the probability of forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover.  
An insignificant association between CEO tenure and voluntary CEO turnover was found 
in this study. This was inconsistent with the assumption that CEOs with longer tenure are 
more likely to depart their positions voluntarily because long tenure is a clue that the CEO 
is closer to retirement (Goyal & Park, 2002). CEO tenure (LN_TENU) was not highly 
correlated with the CEO retirement age dummy variable (DUAL) as the correlation 
coefficient between them was 0.189, although it was significant at the 0.01 level in this 
study (see Table 6.15). This might explain the insignificant relationship between CEO 
tenure and voluntary CEO turnover. 
 8.3.4.2 Interdependent directors and CEO turnover 
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Prior research has suggested that board members who were appointed during the 
incumbent CEO’s tenure were more likely to be individuals with whom the CEO felt 
comfortable and who, in turn, were likely to feel some loyalty to the CEO for their 
appointment (Boeker, 1992; Ocasio, 1994). Therefore, the proportion of directors 
appointed during the incumbent CEO’s tenure was an indicator of CEO power over the 
board of directors. Consistent with this view, the proportion of interdependent directors 
was found to be negatively associated with both forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover 
in this study.53
It is worth noting that the proportion of interdependent directors was highly correlated 
with CEO tenure as the correlation coefficient between them is 0.538 (p-value<0.01) in 
this study. This implies that CEOs have greater power or opportunity to affect the 
selection and appointment of directors along with the lengthening of their tenure in the 
Chinese context. 
 This demonstrated that CEOs might obtain their power over the board of 
directors by influencing the appointment of directors. As a result, they might have more 
influence over the board’s decision making, including the decision on CEO turnover. 
Moreover, this negative relationship also appeared significant when performance was 
below the aspiration level. This further proved that CEOs might acquire power by 
influencing the selection and appointment of directors to insulate themselves from firm 
performance pressure.  
                                                 
53 In China, the concept of independent directors was introduced in 2001 and fully implemented in 2003, 
which was during the period examined in this study. As a result, a large number of independent directors 
was hired during this examination period, which might affect the relationship between the proportion of 
interdependent directors and CEOs’ power to maintain their positions in companies. Given this situation, 
another variable, the proportion of interdependent directors measured by the number of non-independent 
directors who were first appointed during the incumbent CEO’s tenure divided by the total number of 
directors on the boards (RBCE_NI), replaced RBCE in Models A5.5 and B5.5 in an effort to control for the 
impact of the independent directors who were first hired during the incumbent CEO’s tenure. The estimated 
results showed that RBCE_NI had negatively and statistically significant effects on both forced CEO 
turnover and CEO turnover. In addition, CEO tenure still appeared as an inverted U-shaped association for 
both forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover. The full estimated results are presented at Table A8.4 in the 
Appendix, on page 327. 
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8.4 Control variables and CEO turnover 
8.4.1 Firm performance and CEO turnover 
Firm performance was negatively associated with forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover 
in the present study. This result supports the conventional view that a poorly performing 
CEO is at higher risk of being replaced. This finding was consistent with results of most 
empirical studies focusing on companies in Western economies (e.g., Denis & Denis, 
1995; Weisbach, 1988). In addition, some empirical studies focusing on executive 
turnover in companies listed on the Chinese stock markets also reported similar results 
(e.g., Fan et al., 2007; Firth et al., 2006; Kato & Long, 2006a). 
No evidence that firm performance was related to voluntary CEO turnover was found in 
this study. This is consistent with the assumption that voluntary CEO turnover entails the 
normal succession of the firm and is not a penalty for poorly performing CEOs.  
8.4.2 Firm size and CEO turnover 
There was evidence from this study that CEOs in larger firms were less likely to be 
replaced involuntarily. The explanation for this might be the lower availability of 
alternative candidates in larger firms. Firm size is typically associated with greater 
complexity and management challenges for executives (Hamori, 2006). Larger firms are 
more structurally complex and culturally diverse than smaller ones and have subunits that 
are more specialised and differentiated. It is evident that larger firms have higher 
requirements on CEOs’ managerial ability and hence the availability of alternative 
candidates is lower, especially in China where the managerial labour market is still 
underdeveloped. In addition, compared to smaller firms, larger firms are more formalised 
and bureaucratic (Guthrie & Datta, 1997) and thus have greater structural inertia (Hannan 
& Freeman, 1984). Therefore, it might take longer to react to poor firm performance. This 
finding is not only consistent with the result of studies in Western countries (e.g., Huson 
et al., 2001) but also with the result of the studies in the Chinese context (e.g., Fan et al., 
2007; Firth et al., 2006). Consistent with the assumption that voluntary CEO turnover is 
the normal succession of the firm, no evidence that firm size was related to voluntary 
CEO turnover was found in this study.  
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8.4.3 CEO age and CEO turnover 
The dummy variable, DAGE, represents the effect of mandatory retirement policies on 
CEO removal. This effect was found in this study because CEOs who were under the 
retirement age, which is age 60 in China, were found to be less likely to depart their 
positions voluntarily and involuntarily. These findings are consistent with the empirical 
result of prior studies in Western countries (e.g., Goyal & Park, 2002; Huson et al., 2001) 
and in the Chinese context (e.g., Fan et al., 2007; Firth et al., 2006). 
8.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the empirical evidence regarding the relationships among the 
performance relative to the aspiration level, four types of CEO power, control variables, 
and CEO turnover, including forced and voluntary CEO turnover, in the Chinese context. 
The estimated results of some factors were found to be consistent with empirical results 
of prior research focusing on CEO turnover in Western countries. These factors include 
the dummy variable of performance relative to the aspiration level, CEO duality, 
ownership concentration, CEOs’ celebrity, CEO tenure, the proportion of interdependent 
directors, firm performance, firm size, and CEO age. This may indicate that as the 
Western-style corporate governance structure has been established in China, some factors 
that are effective in Western countries also have similar impacts on CEO turnover in 
China. By comparison with previous studies on CEO turnover in Western countries, some 
factors were found to have a different impact on CEO turnover, for example, CEOs’ elite 
educational background and the board size. In addition, the estimated results of some 
factors were found to be consistent with previous research based on China, while they 
were different from prior research that focused on CEO turnover in Western countries. 
Factors included outside directors, including two types of outside directors (i.e., 
independent directors and affiliated outside directors) and CEOs’ shareholdings. 
Moreover, some factors which were derived from the unique characteristics in the 
Chinese context appeared to have the same impact on CEO turnover as those found in 
previous studies on CEO turnover in Chinese listed firms. These unique factors include 
state shareholdings, legal person shareholdings, tradable A-shares and representatives of 
the largest shareholders. The implications of these results and explanations for the 
unsupported hypotheses were also included in this chapter.  
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In next chapter, a summary of the principal findings of this study will be provided. In 
addition, the contributions and limitations of this study will be identified. Some 
suggestions for future research will also be advanced. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
The central research question in this study is “for a given level of firm performance, what 
is the impact of the board’s aspiration level and the CEO’s power on CEO turnover, 
including both voluntary and involuntary departure, in Chinese listed companies?” 
Building on theoretical concepts from strategic management, economics, organisation 
theory and finance, this study has estimated the relationships between aspiration levels,  
CEO power, and CEO turnover (including forced and voluntary CEO turnover) by using a 
sample of 325 Chinese listed companies over the ten-year period 1997-2006. This chapter 
summarises the findings of the study and their practical and theoretical implications. 
Following this, the contributions made by the study are evaluated and discussed. The 
limitations of the study are identified and avenues for further research are also explored. 
The structure of this chapter is depicted in Figure 9.1. 
Figure 9.1 Structure of Chapter Nine 
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9.2 Principal findings 
This study has examined the antecedents of CEO turnover including forced and voluntary 
CEO turnover for companies listed on the Chinese stock markets. The Chinese context 
was described in Chapter Two. It was followed by a review of literature on resource-
dependence theory, agency theory, and the power and social-political perspectives used to 
explain the antecedents of CEO turnover. In addition, the literature on organisational 
decision-making based on performance feedback, namely, using an aspiration level to 
evaluate organisational performance, was reviewed. Based on the literature review, some 
research gaps were identified. In order to fill the gaps, a CEO turnover model was 
proposed in Chapter Four to explore the impact of the aspiration level and four types of 
CEO power on CEO turnover. Hypotheses were developed based on the theoretical 
framework articulated. 
To examine these hypotheses, a sample of Chinese listed companies was identified and 
this resulted in a large panel data set of 325 such companies. This provided 3250 cross 
sectional observations and time series for the ten-year period 1997-2006. The nature of 
the data set in this study required a panel data analytical method, and thus the GEE 
method was applied to analyse the data. In addition, the random effects method, another 
analytical method that is often applied to panel data analysis, was also used in this study 
(because of the “missingness” of data problems discussed in Chapter Six) in an effort to 
confirm the estimated results of the GEE models. The process of data collection and 
justification of analytical methods were explained in Chapter Five. The preliminary data 
analysis and regression analysis were described in Chapters Six and Seven respectively. 
The results of the study were discussed in Chapter Eight. Overall, the principal findings 
from this study are:  
(1) Performance relative to the aspiration level was found to exert a strong influence 
on forced CEO turnover. In other words, forced CEO turnover was more likely to 
occur when firm performance was below the aspiration level than when firm 
performance was above the aspiration level. This implies that performance 
relative to aspiration levels affects boards of directors’ decisions about retaining 
or replacing a CEO. In addition, this study also provided preliminary evidence 
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that likelihoods of forced CEO turnover and CEO turnover increase when firm 
performance further dropped below the aspiration level, while they did not vary 
when firm performance further increased above the aspiration level. In contrast, 
no evidence that performance relative to the aspiration level had an impact on 
voluntary CEO turnover was found in this study. 
(2) CEO structural power had significant impacts on both forced and voluntary CEO 
turnover. CEOs who also served as the chairperson of the board were at 
noticeably less risk of being replaced involuntarily, while CEO duality had a 
positive impact on voluntary CEO turnover. Inconsistent with agency theory, this 
study found that the proportion of independent directors, through its effect on 
corporate governance, had a negative impact on forced CEO turnover. No 
evidence was found that board size had an impact on forced and voluntary CEO 
turnover, which was inconsistent with both agency theory and power circulation 
theory. 
(3) CEO ownership power had strong effects on forced CEO turnover, while it was 
unrelated to voluntary CEO turnover. Inconsistent with the results of most prior 
research on large corporations in Western countries, CEOs’ shareholdings in 
Chinese companies had no significant effect on CEO power or forced CEO 
turnover. In contrast, this study demonstrated that concentrated ownership was an 
important internal mechanism to monitor CEOs and restrict their discretion in 
organisations. In particular, it increased the likelihood of forced CEO turnover, 
especially when firm performance was below the aspiration level. This study was 
not concerned with a comparison of CEO turnover between Western countries 
and China. However, it highlighted some factors associated with Chinese 
corporations that might also influence CEO turnover in China. Of these factors, 
neither legal person share ownership nor individual ownership measured by the 
tradable A-shares showed a significant impact on CEO power and forced CEO 
turnover. As for state ownership, unlike previous research, this study separated 
the state shareholders into government shareholders and corporate state 
shareholders due to the different degrees of political interference that they exerted 
and the relatively different motivations that they had. The results showed that 
government shareholders had a significant and negative impact on forced CEO 
turnover, while corporate state shareholders had a negative but insignificant 
impact on forced CEO turnover. In relation to the status of being the 
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representative of large shareholders, CEOs could acquire strong ownership power 
by serving as the representative of the largest shareholder, but not by serving as 
the representative of any other top ten shareholders. 
(4) CEO prestige power also influenced only forced CEO turnover and was unrelated 
to voluntary CEO turnover. Inconsistent with Finkelstein’s (1992) assumption, no 
evidence that elite educational background provided CEOs with additional power 
to protect them from being replaced involuntarily was discovered. In contrast, 
CEOs’ celebrity status strengthened their ability to hold their jobs. 
(5) No linear relationship between CEO tenure and forced CEO turnover was found 
in this study, which was inconsistent with most prior research of CEO turnover in 
corporations of Western countries. In contrast, an inverted U-shaped relationship 
was found. This implies that CEO power and the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover were affected differently by the two power mechanisms, namely 
contestation and institutionalisation, in the different stages of CEO tenure. 
Specifically, in the early stage of CEO tenure, CEOs were more likely to be 
challenged and contested because they had not proved themselves. However, as 
the length of tenure increased, the mechanism of power institutionalisation 
gradually surpassed the mechanism of power contestation and became the 
dominant force. In addition, this study discovered a positive correlation between 
CEO tenure and the proportion of interdependent directors and a negative 
relationship between the proportion of interdependent directors and forced CEO 
turnover. These results suggested that with the lengthening of CEO tenure, CEOs 
could strengthen their power by influencing the appointment of directors. 
9.3 Implications 
This study has three important implications for policy makers and practitioners. One 
implication is derived from the evidence that the aspiration level has an impact on forced 
CEO turnover. This result suggests that the aspiration level is useful to guide the board of 
directors to make appropriate decisions on CEO turnover. Generally, boards of directors, 
especially boards dominated by outside directors, rely on CEOs to enable them to learn 
about the organisation, including firm performance (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006). The 
board of directors can perceive better firm performance by comparing firm performance 
with the aspiration level which comprises the social aspiration level and historical 
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aspiration level. For example, a CEO may attribute poor performance to external causes, 
such as the poor industrial environment (Morck et al., 1989). By comparing firm 
performance with the average performance of companies in the same industry, the board 
can perceive and interpret firm performance more accurately and thus it is unlikely to 
retain the CEO inappropriately if the poor performance is actually due to the CEO. This is 
meaningful to the proper development of a company. As suggested by prior research (e.g., 
Denis & Denis, 1995; Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006), an appropriate CEO replacement, 
which is based on accurate performance perception and other factors (e.g., performance 
attributions), may lead to improved firm performance, while both inappropriate dismissal 
and inappropriate retention decisions may be detrimental to subsequent firm performance. 
Another implication is based on the finding that independent directors serve as pawns of 
CEOs. This is opposed to the conventional view that independent directors are effective 
in monitoring CEOs. This surprising result challenges the effectiveness of the 
independent director system in China, where independent directors are often appointed 
from universities and have little industrial background. Chinese regulation only specifies 
the quantity of independent directors required for listed companies and independence in 
terms of professional interests and kinship. One possible suggestion is that the regulation 
on independent directors should also specify criteria for task specific knowledge and 
expertise in an effort to ensure that independent directors are qualitatively independent 
and can oversee CEOs and other management effectively. 
The third implication is generated from the result that both CEO power and the likelihood 
of CEO turnover vary along with the lengthening of CEO tenure. In other words, this 
study found that new CEOs were less powerful and at higher risk of being replaced. In 
contrast, CEOs with a relative longer tenure were more powerful and at lower risk of 
being replaced. This dynamic development of CEO power sheds light on the notion that 
the board of directors should play different roles at different stages of CEO tenure.  
At the early stage of CEO tenure, CEOs have a relatively low level of expert power 
because they lack task knowledge and skills. Facing the challenges posed by the 
promotion, new CEOs have strong incentives to develop their leadership capacity and, 
therefore, they are unlikely to behave opportunistically (Shen, 2003). As a result, the 
board of directors should give them adequate time and primarily focus on helping CEOs 
develop their competence and leadership so that they can maximise their potential 
 220 
performance. In this study, it was found that more than half of CEOs were replaced in the 
first two years in office, that is, the new CEOs’ learning period. This is not only a waste 
of executive talent but very disruptive to the firm, because it hinders the establishment of 
reliable and predictable routines that are highly regarded by inside and outside 
stakeholders (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Shen, 2003). 
Once CEOs have proved themselves in office, their power is likely to be gradually 
institutionalised, which provides them with discretion to pursue personal interests at the 
cost of shareholders’ interests. It is evident that the problem of managerial opportunism is 
likely to occur at this stage (Shen, 2003). Given this situation, the board of directors 
should shift its focus from helping CEOs develop their leadership to monitoring CEOs in 
an effort to protect shareholders’ interests, as most agency theorists suggest. 
9.4 Contributions 
This thesis has broadened the usual empirical approach to the study of CEO turnover by 
firstly applying the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) and prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) to investigate the antecedents of CEO turnover. 
These two theories suggest that the aspiration level plays a crucial role in problemistic 
search and decision-making in strategic change. As discussed in the literature review in 
Chapter Three, although prior research has indicated that performance below the 
aspiration level triggers various organisational changes (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 2003c; 
Kyung Min, 2007), this relationship has not previously been examined in the literature on 
CEO turnover, one of the most important and riskiest decisions within an organisation. 
Realising the importance of the aspiration level on organisational decision making, 
Haleblian and Rajagopalan (2006) called for exploration of CEO turnover from the 
perspective of performance perceptions based on the aspiration level. This thesis is the 
first investigation of the role of aspiration levels in CEO turnover. It has found that a focal 
company’s performance and aspiration level significantly influence the board’s decision 
on retaining or replacing the CEO. In other words, the board of directors is more likely to 
replace a CEO when firm performance is below the aspiration level than when firm 
performance is above the aspiration level. The findings of this research have partially 
filled the gap that no prior study on the relationship between CEO turnover and an 
aspiration level is available. 
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The second major contribution of this thesis is that it is the first application of 
Finkelstein’s (1992) typology of four types of executive power to the study of antecedents 
of CEO turnover.54
The third contribution of this thesis is that it investigates the antecedents of CEO turnover 
for listed companies in China, the largest transitional and developing economy in the 
world. Most prior research on CEO turnover has commonly focused on companies in 
mature market economies, while developing and transitional economies have received 
limited attention. Only a small number of articles published in international journals have 
investigated CEO turnover in the Chinese context. In addition, these articles investigated 
CEO turnover only from the perspective of corporate governance, leaving the aspiration 
level and some power elements which are not determined by corporate governance, such 
as CEO tenure power and prestige power, unexplored. This study contributes to the 
general study of CEO turnover by extending it to the Chinese context and by explaining 
both corporate governance factors, such as structural power and ownership power, and 
non-corporate governance factors. It also offers a fresh insight into the antecedents of 
CEO turnover in the context of rapidly growing and transitional economy.  
 Although some measures of CEO power in Finkelstein’s typology 
have been used to investigate the determinants of forced CEO turnover, such as duality 
(Ocasio, 1994), and the proportion of outside directors (Kaplan & Minton, 1994), no 
previous study has systematically used his typology of CEO power to explore CEO 
turnover. However, this study does not just replicate Finkelstien’s model to analyse CEO 
turnover in China. Some measures in the model proposed by Finkelstein (1992) which 
were not suitable in the Chinese context were not used. However, some additional 
measures which reflect the peculiar nature of Chinese listed companies were applied to 
this study. For instance, the measure “family shares”, was not used in this study although 
it was used in Finkelstein’s model, because family companies are not a common feature 
of the Chinese stock markets. On the contrary, severe state control and insider control are 
two characteristics of companies listed on the Chinese stock markets. Given these 
situations, the proportion of state-owned shares and large shareholders’ representatives 
were used, while the proportion of family shares was not used. In other words, this study 
attempted to contextualise existing theories within Chinese realities. 
                                                 
54 In this study, CEO tenure was used as not only a proxy for CEO tenure power but also an indictor of 
expert power proposed by Finkelstein (1992). The other three types of power proposed by Finkelstein 
(1992), namely structural power, ownership power, and prestige power, were directly examined. 
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In addition, most studies of CEO turnover have adopted conventional regression methods, 
such as probit and logit regression, to explore the antecedents of CEO turnover even 
though the data were panel datasets. As a result, the estimated results of these studies 
were biased because company-specific effects and time-variant effects caused by the 
nature of panel datasets were not separated from the estimated coefficients of explanatory 
variables. This thesis has also contributed to the development of the methodology for 
studying the antecedents of CEO turnover by using the GEE method, a frequently used 
panel data analytical method. This technique can avoid the problems of heterogeneity and 
auto-regression caused by panel data. Consequently, the company-specific effects and 
time-variant effects have been disentangled from the estimated results by using the GEE 
method in this study.  
9.5 Limitations 
The findings and implications of this study must be considered in the light of its 
limitations because, like much other research, this thesis is subject to some of limitations.  
First, following most prior research on CEO turnover, this study relied upon archival and 
published data sources to categorise forced and voluntary CEO turnover because most 
organisations are reluctant to disclose the real reasons for executive succession, especially 
when it is caused by poor performance. The empirical results of this study showed that 
CEOs were more likely to depart involuntarily from their positions where firm 
performance was below the aspiration level. In contrast, neither performance relative to 
the aspiration level nor firm performance per se was related to voluntary CEO turnover. 
In addition, voluntary turnover was related to CEO age, but unrelated to CEO ownership 
power, prestige power, tenure power and firm size. These results demonstrated that the 
categorising of two types of CEO turnover was generally reasonable in this study. 
However, this identification of two types of CEO turnover might include some errors in 
spite of the efforts to avoid them because the identification was not based on first hand 
information. For example, it has not been possible to trace where CEOs went after 
departing their companies despite the effort to identify CEOs’ new positions within the 
same companies.55
                                                 
55  In this study, CEOs departed their positions for different reasons. Of these, CEOs departing their 
positions for three reasons – “change of job”, “expiry of contract”, and “resignation” – were categorised as 
voluntary turnover if the CEOs relinquished their positions to assume the role of chairperson of the board or 
 For this reason, it was difficult to discern whether the outgoing CEOs 
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went on to more or less prestigious positions. This makes empirical investigations of CEO 
turnover and further replications and extensions of CEO turnover studies difficult (Boeker, 
1992). Therefore, in the future researchers may examine much more closely the 
motivations behind CEO turnover events through interview or survey. 
Second, like most prior studies on CEO turnover, this study used secondary data to 
investigate the antecedents of CEO turnover. Measurements of the aspiration level and 
CEO power were constructed to examine the hypotheses proposed based on performance 
feedback theory, agency theory, and relevant power theories. In other words, this study 
only examined the antecedents and outcomes of the process of the aspiration level and the 
power dynamics leading to CEO turnover discussed in theories. However, the process of 
the board of directors making decisions on retaining or replacing the CEO based on the 
aspiration level and the power dynamics described in theories was not directly observed. 
Third, the sample of this study included only companies listed on the Chinese stock 
markets. In China, the stock markets were established with the primary aim of 
transforming the traditional large- and medium-sized SOEs into modern style 
corporations with a Western-style corporate governance structure. As a result, the 
company size and corporate governance of listed companies are different compared to 
non-listed companies. Given these situations, it is not safe to claim that these results 
would necessarily hold for non-listed companies in China.  
Fourth, this study only used accounting performance measures to evaluate the relationship 
between CEO turnover and firm performance. Stock price measures were not applied to 
this study because of the unique characteristics on the Chinese stock markets, such as 
market segmentation and the strong speculative atmosphere, as discussed in Chapter Five. 
In addition, some measures of executive-level power proposed by Finkelstein (1992), that 
is executive remuneration, the number of different functional areas in which a CEO had 
had experience, and CEOs’ directorships in other companies, were not applied to this 
study because relevant information was not available. These factors limit the capacity of 
this study to explore CEO turnover from a complete perspective. 
                                                                                                                                                  
if CEOs who also served as the chairperson on the board relinquished the position of CEO but still served as 
the chairperson.  
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9.6 Directions for future study 
The limitations of this study as discussed in Section 9.5 shed light on possible directions 
for future study. First, this study was limited to the companies listed on the Chinese stock 
markets, which account for less than 10% of all companies in China (Shen et al., 2009). 
Further study could be done on the Chinese non-listed companies and a comparative 
analysis of the differences between these two groups of companies would be necessary. 
Second, it is anticipated that as the development and reform of the Chinese stock markets 
continue, especially the completion of the non-tradable share reform launched in 2005, 
the stock prices can more accurately reflect companies’ true value. Thus, this indicates 
that the future research should examine the impact of firm performance measured by 
stock prices on CEO turnover in the Chinese context. In addition, with the gradual 
development and completion of the institutional environment for information disclosure 
on the Chinese stock markets, some information related to CEOs and other senior 
managers have been disclosed in the later stages of this research. For example, listed 
companies started to report the remuneration of every executive in annual reports in 
2005. 56
Third, qualitative research methods, such as case studies and interviews, could be applied 
to explore the processes by which CEO power and the board’s aspiration level influences 
CEO turnover. This has also been recommended by some previous studies (e.g., 
Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). In addition, it is anticipated that 
qualitative research methods can help large-sample researchers to better understand their 
estimated results and to refine their hypotheses and their measurements (Pitcher et al., 
2000). However, qualitative research methods also have some limitations. For example, 
Pitcher et al. (2000) pointed out that only large-sample research can control for all the 
important variables that influence CEO turnover, while qualitative research methods, 
especially case studies, cannot achieve this. Due to the advantages and disadvantages of 
 In future, researchers should construct relevant variables based on this 
information to explore CEO power comprehensively and its impact on CEO turnover, 
especially forced CEO turnover.  
                                                 
56 Before 2005, some companies disclosed the total compensation for the highest-paid three executives, the 
total compensation for the highest-paid three directors, and the total compensation for all directors, 
supervisors, and senior managers, although disclosing the executive compensation in the annual reports was 
not compulsory. However, the compensation of individual executives was not reported in the annual reports. 
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qualitative research methods and large-sample research methods, researchers in the future 
could use a mixed-method approach, namely using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods to investigate the antecedents of CEO turnover more thoroughly. 
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Figure A1.1 CEO turnover rates in the world: 1995-2007 
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Figure A1.2 The number of listed companies on the Chinese stock markets: 1990 - 2006 
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Figure A1.3 The total raised capital of stock markets in China: 1990 -2006 (RMB, Billion) 
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Table A6.1 CEO tenure and CEO turnover 
Tenure 
(year) 
Forced CEO turnover Voluntary CEO turnover CEO turnover 
Incidence Percentage (%) Incidence 
Percentage 
(%) Incidence 
Percentage 
(%) 
1 194 29.39 52 22.03 246 27.46 
2 170 25.76 38 16.10 208 23.21 
3 100 15.15 29 12.29 129 14.40 
4 61 9.24 28 11.86 89 9.93 
5 52 7.88 24 10.17 76 8.48 
6 36 5.45 17 7.20 53 5.92 
7 17 2.58 16 6.78 33 3.68 
8 13 1.97 14 5.93 27 3.01 
9 7 1.06 7 2.97 14 1.56 
10 2 0.30 2 0.85 4 0.45 
11 1 0.15 2 0.85 3 0.33 
12 2 0.30 2 0.85 4 0.45 
13 5 0.76 2 0.85 7 0.78 
14 0 0.00 2 0.85 2 0.22 
15 0 0.00 1 0.42 1 0.11 
16 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
17 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
18 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
19 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
20 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
21 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
22 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total 660 100.00 236 100.00 896 100.00 
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Table A7.1 A summary of model fit for all models using three working correlation matrices  
CEO turnover Forced CEO turnover Voluntary CEO turnover 
Model AR 1 
Stationary 
1 
Non- 
stationary 
1 
P Model AR 1 
Stationary 
1 
Non- 
stationary 
1 
P Model AR 1 
Stationary 
1 
Non- 
stationary 
1 
P 
Model A0 3751.516 3751.518 3751.115 13 Model B0 3223.138 3223.138 3222.938 13 Model C0 1654.842 1654.842 1654.851 13 
Model A1 3728.135 3728.137 3727.696 14 Model B1 3209.872 3209.872 3209.658 14 Model C1 1636.583 1636.583 1636.528 14 
Model A2.1 3730.273 3730.277 3729.797 17 Model B2.1 3186.638 3186.638 3186.420 17 Model C2.1 1568.618 1568.611 1568.273 17 
Model A2.2 3576.120 3576.120 3575.688 18 Model B2.2 3078.695 3078.695 3078.565 18 Model C2.2 1545.837 1545.829 1545.486 18 
Model A3.1 3531.192 3531.206 3530.185 25 Model B3.1 3029.998 3029.999 3029.863 25 Model C3.1 1553.934 1553.918 1552.850 25 
Model A3.2 3529.153 3529.169 3528.027 26 Model B3.2 3029.100 3029.101 3028.935 26 Model C3.2 1555.995 1555.979 1554.719 26 
Model A4 3525.344 3525.357 3524.082 28 Model B4 3023.454 3023.455 3023.237 28 Model C4 1549.488 1549.476 1548.965 20 
Model A5.1 3480.447 3480.700 3478.552 30 Model B5.1 2982.531 2982.537 2982.222 30 Model C5.1 1548.522 1548.509 1547.901 20 
Model A5.2 3525.137 3525.497 3524.844 29 Model B5.2 3025.807 3025.823 3025.571 29 Model C5.2 1548.994 1548.964 1548.374 19 
Model A5.3 3501.451 3501.541 3500.888 29 Model B5.3 2997.620 2997.696 2997.547 29 Model C5.3 1546.767 1546.756 1546.017 19 
Model A5.4 3517.764 3517.742 3516.392 30 Model B5.4 3013.706 3013.705 3013.482 30 Model C5.4 1550.139 1550.102 1549.257 20 
Model A5.5 3466.980 3466.980 3465.462 31 Model B5.5 2973.109 2973.109 2972.800 31 Model C5.5 1548.049 1548.050 1546.945 21 
P is the number of parameters in a model. 
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Table A7.2 Results of GEE models using the non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix for ACT (excluding NROA3) 
 Model A0 Model A1 Model A2.1 Model A2.2 Model A3.1 Model A3.2 Model A4 Model A5.1 Model A5.2 Model A5.3 Model A5.4 Model A5.5 
DP_ROA3  -0.318
* 
(0.712) 
-0.314* 
(0.731) 
-0.233+ 
(0.792) 
-0.285* 
(0.752) 
-0.284* 
(0.753) 
-0.284* 
(0.753) 
-0.288* 
(0.750) 
-0.285* 
(0.752) 
-0.288* 
(0.749) 
-0.285* 
(0.752) 
-0.291* 
(0.747) 
RBOU   0.003 
(1.003)          
RBIN   
 
-0.085*** 
(0.919) 
-0.082*** 
(0.922) 
-0.081*** 
(0.922) 
-0.082*** 
(0.921) 
-0.077*** 
(0.925) 
-0.082*** 
(0.922) 
-0.076*** 
(0.927) 
-0.086*** 
(0.918) 
-0.081*** 
(0.922) 
RBMI   
 
0.005*** 
(1.005) 
0.005+ 
(1.005) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
DUAL   0.095 
(1.099) 
0.104 
(1.109) 
0.209+ 
(1.233) 
0.212+ 
(1.236) 
0.288** 
(1.334) 
0.333** 
(1.396) 
0.300** 
(1.350) 
0.385*** 
(1.469) 
0.329** 
(1.389) 
0.363** 
(10438) 
SIBO   0.026 
(1.027) 
0.007 
(1.007) 
0.016 
(1.017) 
0.018 
(1.018) 
0.018 
(1.018) 
0.022 
(1.022) 
0.017 
(1.018) 
0.018 
(1.019) 
0.018 
(1.018) 
0.023 
(1.023) 
DRSCE   
  
-0.401*** 
(0.669) 
-0.406*** 
(0.666) 
-0.377*** 
(0.686) 
-0.263* 
(0.769) 
-0.360** 
(0.698) 
-0.202* 
(0.817) 
-0.341** 
(0.711) 
-0.242* 
(0.785) 
RSTA   
  
-0.001 
(0.999)        
RSTA_ST   
   
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
RSTA_LE   
   
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
RSLE   
  
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
RSCA   
  
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
CONC   
  
0.010** 
(1.010) 
0.010** 
(1.010) 
0.010** 
(1.010) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
0.010** 
(1.010) 
0.010** 
(1.010) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
RELA   
  
-0.591*** 
(0.554) 
-0.612*** 
(0.542) 
-0.630*** 
(0.533) 
-0.613*** 
(0.542) 
-0.622*** 
(0.537) 
-0.578*** 
(0.561) 
-0.662*** 
(0.516) 
-0.649*** 
(0.522) 
REOT   
  
-0.169 
(0.844) 
-0.182 
(0.833) 
-0.191 
(0.826) 
-0.137 
(0.872) 
-0.186 
(0.830) 
-0.125 
(0.882) 
-0.208 
(0.812) 
-0.153 
(0.858) 
EDUC    
   
-0.107 
(0.899) 
-0.101 
(0.904) 
-0.111 
(0.895) 
-0.125 
(0.883) 
-0.124 
(0.884) 
-0.114 
(0.892) 
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ORDE    
   
-0.410* 
(0.663) 
-0.351 
(0.704) 
-0.400* 
(0.670) 
-0.314* 
(0.731) 
-0.414* 
(0.661) 
-0.364* 
(0.695) 
LN_TENU    
    
0.330*** 
(1.390) 
-0.048 
(0.953)  
0.573** 
(1.774) 
0.918*** 
(2.504) 
LN_STENU    
       
-0.260** 
(0.771) 
-0.241** 
(0.786) 
RBCE  
      
-0.012*** 
(0.988)  
-0.009*** 
(0.991)  
-0.012*** 
(0.988) 
SIZE -0.263
*** 
(0.769) 
-0.261*** 
(0.770) 
-0.273*** 
(0.761) 
-0.211*** 
(0.809) 
-0.159** 
(0.853) 
-0.155** 
(0.857) 
-0.137** 
(0.872) 
-0.171** 
(0.843) 
-0.133** 
(0.876) 
-0.142** 
(0.868) 
-0.139** 
(0.870) 
-0.178** 
(0.837) 
DAGE 0.892
*** 
(2.440) 
0.832*** 
(2.297) 
0.792*** 
(2.209) 
0.767*** 
(2.154) 
0.859*** 
(2.360) 
0.885*** 
(2.422) 
0.916*** 
(2.499) 
0.937*** 
(2.553) 
0.926*** 
(2.525) 
0.983*** 
(2.674) 
0.991*** 
(2.694) 
1.000*** 
(2.719) 
1998 0.259 (1.296) 
0.234 
(1.263) 
0.234 
(1.264) 
0.220 
(1.246) 
0.210 
(1.234) 
0.206 
(1229) 
0.212 
(1.236) 
0.051 
(1.052) 
0.217 
(1.242) 
0.113 
(1.119) 
0.206 
(1.229) 
0.041 
(1.042) 
1999 0.608
*** 
(1.837) 
0.581** 
(1.788) 
0.586** 
(1.798) 
0.578*** 
(1.782) 
0.531** 
(1.700) 
0.525** 
(1.690) 
0.537** 
(1.710) 
0.277 
(1.319) 
0.544** 
(1.723) 
0.378* 
(1.459) 
0.563** 
(1.756) 
0.288 
(1.334) 
2000 0.695
*** 
(2.003) 
0.657** 
(1.928) 
0.667** 
(1.949) 
0.681*** 
(1.997) 
0.614** 
(1.848) 
0.605** 
(1.831) 
0.616** 
(1.851) 
0.309 
(1.363) 
0.625*** 
(1.868) 
0.428* 
(1.535) 
0.663** 
(1.940) 
0.336 
(1.399) 
2001 0.601
** 
(1.824) 
0.582** 
(1.789) 
0.595** 
(1.812) 
0.796 
(2.216) 
0.692*** 
(1.999) 
0.681*** 
(1.976) 
0.698*** 
(2.011) 
0.357+ 
(1.429) 
0.705*** 
(2.023) 
0.471* 
(1.602) 
0.759*** 
(2.136) 
0.394+ 
(1.483) 
2002 0.499
** 
(1.646) 
0.463* 
(1.589) 
0.459* 
(1.583) 
1.908*** 
(6.738) 
1.709*** 
(5.524) 
1.684*** 
(5.385) 
1.716*** 
(5.563) 
1.346*** 
(3.841) 
1.716*** 
(5.561) 
1.436*** 
(4.205) 
1.823*** 
(6.193) 
1.426*** 
(4.160) 
2003 0.555
** 
(1.741) 
0.530** 
(1.699) 
0.524** 
(1.690) 
2.948*** 
(19.074) 
2.677*** 
(14.540) 
2.640*** 
(14.008) 
2.682*** 
(14.615) 
2.229*** 
(9.295) 
2.678*** 
(14.550) 
2.321*** 
(10.189) 
2.829*** 
(16.937) 
2.343*** 
(10.416) 
2004 0.259 (1.296) 
0.242 
(1.273) 
0.240 
(1.271) 
3.095*** 
(22.081) 
2.780*** 
(16.115) 
2.736*** 
(15.427) 
2.785*** 
(16.192) 
2.284*** 
(9.816) 
2.779*** 
(16.108) 
2.383*** 
(10.835) 
2.969*** 
(19.479) 
2.431*** 
(11.372) 
2005 0.229 (1.258) 
0.208 
(1.232) 
0.210 
(1.234) 
3.146*** 
(23.237) 
2.828*** 
(16.916) 
2.777*** 
(16.069) 
2.825*** 
(16.861) 
2.284*** 
(9.818) 
2.827*** 
(16.899) 
2.430*** 
(11.357) 
2.994*** 
(19.958) 
2.407*** 
(11.097) 
2006 0.268 (1.308) 
0.258 
(1.295) 
0.263 
(1.300) 
3.239*** 
(25.510) 
3.010*** 
(20.280) 
2.942*** 
(18.948) 
3.001*** 
(20.099) 
2.381*** 
(10.815) 
3.000*** 
(20.084) 
2.533*** 
(12.593) 
3.187*** 
(24.214) 
2.517*** 
(12.391) 
_cons 4.086*** 4.118*** 3.891*** 2.664* 1.913+ 1.897+ 1.544 2.817* 1.492 2.222* 1.393 2.773* 
Wald chi2 79.19*** 82.60*** 88.23*** 192.11*** 275.57*** 276.53*** 297.77*** 366.50*** 299.32*** 361.02*** 303.55*** 362.44*** 
QIC_u 3761.040 3733.916 3734.814 3578.878 3532.367 3529.153 3524.178 3477.946 3528.044 3504.422 3515.714 3463.993 
P 12 13 16 17 24 25 27 29 28 28 29 30 
N 3250 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 
 Model A0 Model A1 Model A2.1 Model A2.2 Model A3.1 Model A3.2 Model A4 Model A5.1 Model A5.2 Model A5.3 Model A5.4 Model A5.5 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratios. P is the number of parameters in a model. N is the number of observations.  
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Table A7.3 Results of random effects models for CEO turnover  
 Model A0 Model A1 Model A2.1 Model A2.2 Model A3.1 Model A3.2 Model A4 Model A5.1 Model A5.2 Model A5.3 Model 5.4 Model A5.5 
DP_ROA3  -0.211 (0.810) 
-0.204 
(0.815) 
-0.134 
(0.875) 
-0.182 
(0.834) 
-0.174 
(0.840) 
-0.178 
(0.837) 
-0.198 
(0.820) 
-0.176 
(0.839) 
-0.189 
(0.828) 
-0.176 
(0.838) 
-0.200 
(0.819) 
RBOU   0.001 (1.001)          
RBIN    -0.091
*** 
(0.913) 
-0.090*** 
(0.914) 
-0.089*** 
(0.914) 
-0.090*** 
(0.914) 
-0.086*** 
(0.918) 
-0.091*** 
(0.913) 
-0.086*** 
(0.917) 
-0.091*** 
(0.913) 
-0.086*** 
(0.918) 
RBMI    0.003 (1.003) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.001 
(1.490) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
DUAL   0.198
+ 
(1.219) 
0.231+ 
(1.260) 
0.322** 
(1.380) 
0.333** 
(1.395) 
0.407** 
(1.502) 0.399
** 0.360
** 
(1.443) 
0.463*** 
(1.589) 
0.403** 
(1.497) 
0.443** 
(1.557) 
SIBO   0.030
+ 
(1.031) 
0.014 
(1.014) 
0.023 
(1.024) 
0.025 
(1.025) 
0.026 
(1.026) 
0.038+ 
(1.039) 
0.031 
(1.032) 
0.023 
(1.023) 
0.028 
(1.029) 
0.035+ 
(1.035) 
DRSCE     -0.226
* 
(0.798) 
-0.224* 
(0.799) 
-0.206+ 
(0.814) 
-0.200 
(0.818) 
-0.303* 
(0.738) 
-0.080 
(0.923) 
-0.272* 
(0.762) 
-0.171 
(0.843) 
RSTA     -0.002 (0.998)        
RSTA_ST      -0.006 (0.994) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.008+ 
(0.992) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.006+ 
(0.994) 
-0.007+ 
(0.993) 
-0.008* 
(0.992) 
RSTA_LE      0.000 (1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
RSLE     0.004 (1.004) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.004 
(1.000) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
RSCA     -0.003 (0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.003 
(1.004) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.002 
(1.014) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
CONC     0.014
** 
(1.015) 
0.015** 
(1.015) 
0.015** 
(1.015) 
0.017*** 
(1.017) 
0.016*** 
(1.106) 
0.014** 
(0.529) 
0.016*** 
(1.016) 
0.016*** 
(1.016) 
RELA     -0.641
*** 
(0.527) 
-0.667*** 
(0.513) 
-0.683*** 
(0.505) 
-0.730*** 
(0.482) 
-0.733*** 
(0.480) 
-0.636*** 
(0.817) 
-0.735*** 
(0.479) 
-0.733*** 
(0.481) 
REOT     -0.226 (0.798) 
-0.245 
(0.783) 
-0.252 
(0.777) 
-0.223 
(0.800) 
-0.281 
(0.755) 
-0.202 
(0.529) 
-0.279 
(0.757) 
-0.221 
(0.802) 
EDUC       -0.121 (0.886) 
-0.079 
(0.924) 
-0.091 
(0.913) 
-0.140 
(0.817) 
-0.106 
(0.900) 
-0.097 
(0.980) 
ORDE       -0.439
* 
(0.645) 
-0.441* 
(0.643) 
-0.488** 
(0.614) 
-0.374* 
(0.688) 
-0.456* 
(0.634) 
-0.411* 
(0.663) 
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LN_TENU        0.680
*** 
(1.974) 
0.230** 
(1.259)  
0.755*** 
(2.128) 
1.210*** 
(3.353) 
LN_STENU           -0.288
** 
(0.750) 
-0.291** 
(0.747) 
RBCE        -0.013
*** 
(0.987)  
-0.006*** 
(0.994)  
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
NROA3 -4.755
*** 
(0.009) 
-4.167** 
(0.016) 
-4.117** 
(0.016) 
-4.040** 
(0.018) 
-3.380* 
(0.034) 
-3.616* 
(0.027) 
-3.338* 
(0.036) 
-2.757+ 
(0.063) 
-3.498* 
(0.030) 
-2.886* 
(0.056) 
-3.982** 
(0.019) 
-3.258* 
(0.038) 
SIZE -0.210
*** 
(0.811) 
-0.216*** 
(0.806) 
-0.231*** 
(0.794) 
-0.175** 
(0.840) 
-0.141* 
(0.869) 
-0.131* 
(0.877) 
-0.118* 
(0.889) 
-0.187** 
(0.829) 
-0.134* 
(0.875) 
-0.126* 
(0.881) 
-0.122* 
(0.885) 
-0.174** 
(0.840) 
DAGE 1.041
*** 
(2.831) 
0.990*** 
(2.690) 
0.936*** 
(2.551) 
0.920*** 
(2.509) 
0.993*** 
(2.669) 
1.023*** 
(2.783) 
1.054*** 
(2.870) 
1.032*** 
(2.807) 
1.000*** 
(2.719) 
1.112*** 
(3.04) 
1.080*** 
(2.946) 
1.111*** 
(3.037) 
S1998 0.220 (1.246) 
0.209 
(1.233) 
0.225 
(1.253) 
0.221 
(1.248) 
0.228 
(1.256) 
0.223 
(1.250) 
0.230 
(1.258) 
0.034 
(1.035) 
0.216 
(1.241) 
0.152 
(1.164) 
0.209 
(1.232) 
0.038 
(1.039) 
S1999 0.559
** 
(1.749) 
0.550** 
(1.734) 
0.581** 
(1.789) 
0.594** 
(1.812) 
0.583** 
(1.792) 
0.574** 
(1.776) 
0.588** 
(1.801) 
0.278 
(1.321) 
0.561** 
(1.753) 
0.474* 
(1.606) 
0.578** 
(1.783) 
0.302 
(1.353) 
S2000 0.619
** 
(1.858) 
0.606** 
(1.833) 
0.656** 
(1.928) 
0.704*** 
(2.021) 
0.691** 
(1.995) 
0.679** 
(1.971) 
0.691** 
(1.996) 
0.330 
(1.391) 
0.662** 
(1.938) 
0.554** 
(1.740) 
0.692** 
(1.997) 
0.366+ 
(1.442) 
S2001 0.507
** 
(1.660) 
0.508** 
(1.663) 
0.574** 
(1.775) 
0.828*** 
(2.288) 
0.807*** 
(2.240) 
0.792*** 
(2.209) 
0.810*** 
(2.247) 
0.424+ 
(1.529) 
0.788*** 
(2.199) 
0.648** 
(1.911) 
0.810*** 
(2.249) 
0.450* 
(1.568) 
S2002 0.375
+ 
(1.455) 
0.369+ 
(1.446) 
0.424* 
(1.527) 
1.975*** 
(7.209) 
1.900*** 
(6.683) 
1.873*** 
(6.509) 
1.902*** 
(6.697) 
1.489*** 
(4.431) 
1.881*** 
(6.560) 
1.722*** 
(5.596) 
1.897*** 
(6.666) 
1.508*** 
(4.516) 
S2003 0.408
* 
(1.503) 
0.412* 
(1.510) 
0.474* 
(1.607) 
3.047*** 
(21.059) 
2.931*** 
(18.741) 
2.892*** 
(18.023) 
2.926*** 
(18.649) 
2.414*** 
(11.175) 
2.898*** 
(18.134) 
2.705*** 
(14.950) 
2.919*** 
(158.526) 
2.441*** 
(11.488) 
S2004 0.097 (1.102) 
0.106 
(1.112) 
0.171 
(1.186) 
3.201*** 
(24.560) 
3.064*** 
(21.402) 
3.018*** 
(20.449) 
3.056*** 
(21.247) 
2.470*** 
(11.825) 
3.016*** 
(20.402) 
2.817*** 
(16.720) 
3.061*** 
(21.350) 
2.522*** 
(12.457) 
S2005 0.059 (1.061) 
0.066 
(1.069) 
0.136 
(1.145) 
3.261*** 
(26.075) 
3.123*** 
(22.710) 
3.068*** 
(21.496) 
3.105*** 
(22.309) 
2.435*** 
(11.418) 
3.037*** 
(20.836) 
2.862*** 
(17.504) 
3.086*** 
(21.880) 
2.491*** 
(12.075) 
S2006 0.098 (1.103) 
0.113 
(1.119) 
0.188 
(1.206) 
3.354*** 
(28.610) 
3.322*** 
(27.702) 
3.249*** 
(25.758) 
3.294***(26
.962) 
2.552*** 
(12.830) 
3.234*** 
(25.381) 
3.007*** 
(20.222) 
3.285*** 
(26.710) 
2.609*** 
(13.579) 
_cons 6.378*** 6.121*** 5.932*** 4.734*** 3.584** 3.640** 3.195* 4.587** 3.414* 3.540** 3.428** 4.597** 
Rho  0.042** 0.043** 0.051*** 0.073*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.095** 0.090*** 0.035* 0.081* 0.084*** 
Wald chi2 95.05*** 93.64*** 97.23*** 211.47*** 248.65*** 250.43*** 255.99*** 287.92*** 253.79*** 279.15*** 263.06*** 297.26*** 
AIC 3741.342 3717.575 3717.264 3553.867 3516.633 3513.814 3510.079 3454.294 3504.331 3494.212 3495.374 3445.170 
K 14 15 18 19 26 27 29 31 30 30 31 32 
N  3250 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 
 Model A0 Model A1 Model A2.1 Model A2.2 Model A3.1 Model A3.2 Model A4 Model A5.1 Model A5.2 Model A5.3 Model 5.4 Model A5.5 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratio. K is the number of parameters in a model. N is the number of observations in a model. 
 255 
Table A7.4 Results of GEE models using the non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix for FCT (excluding NROA3) 
 Model B0 Model B1 Model B2.1 
Model 
B2.2 
Model 
B3.1 
Model 
B3.2 Model B4 
Model 
B5.1 
Model 
B5.2 
Model 
B5.3 
Model 
B5.4 
Model 
B5.5 
DP_ROA3  -0.380
** 
(0.684) 
-0.413** 
(0.662) 
-0.348* 
(0.706) 
-0.403** 
(0.668) 
-0.404** 
(0.667) 
-0.408** 
(0.665) 
-0.413** 
(0.662) 
-0.408** 
(0.665) 
-0.406** 
(0.667) 
-0.417** 
(0.659) 
-0.425** 
(0.654) 
RBOU   0.006
+ 
(1.006)          
RBIN   
 
-0.073*** 
(0.930) 
-0.071*** 
(0.932) 
-0.070*** 
(0.932) 
-0.071*** 
(0.931) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.071*** 
(0.931) 
-0.067*** 
(0.935) 
-0.074*** 
(0.928) 
-0.069*** 
(0.934) 
RBMI   
 
0.008* 
(1.008) 
0.008* 
(1.008) 
0.007* 
(1.007) 
0.007* 
(1.007) 
0.006 
(1.006) 
0.007* 
(1.007) 
0.006+ 
(1.006) 
0.007+ 
(1.007) 
0.006 
(1.006) 
DUAL  
 
-0.537*** 
(0.585) 
-0.554*** 
(0.575) 
-0.434** 
(0.648) 
-0.429** 
(0.651) 
-0.329* 
(0.720) 
-0.292* 
(0.747) 
-0.316* 
(0.7298) 
-0.213 
(0.808) 
-0.286+ 
(0.751) 
-0.256+ 
(0.774) 
SIBO   0.014 
(1.014) 
-0.007 
(0.993) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
0.010 
(1.010) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.010 
(1.010) 
DRSCE     -0.397
*** 
(0.672) 
-0.402*** 
(0.669) 
-0.362** 
(0.696) 
-0.256* 
(0.774) 
-0.348** 
(0.706) 
-0.183 
(0.883) 
-0.294* 
(0.745) 
-0.202+ 
(0.817) 
RSTA     -0.004 
(0.996)        
RSTA_ST     
 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.007 
(0.993) 
-0.008* 
(0.992) 
-0.007+ 
(0.993) 
-0.008* 
(0.992) 
-0.007+ 
(0.993) 
-0.009* 
(0.991) 
RSTA_LE     
 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
RSLE     0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
RSCA     -0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
CONC     0.012
** 
(1.012) 
0.012** 
(1.012) 
0.012** 
(1.012) 
0.012** 
(1.012) 
0.012** 
(1.012) 
0.011** 
(1.011) 
0.012** 
(1.012) 
0.012** 
(1.012) 
RELA     -0.689
*** 
(0.502) 
-0.708*** 
(0.493) 
-0.732*** 
(0.481) 
-0.715*** 
(0.489) 
-0.725*** 
(0.484) 
-0.675*** 
(0.509) 
-0.769*** 
(0.464) 
-0.760*** 
(0.468) 
REOT     -0.106 
(0.899) 
-0.119 
(0.888) 
-0.131 
(0.877) 
-0.072 
(0.930) 
-0.127 
(0.881) 
-0.063 
(0.939) 
-0.134 
(0.874) 
-0.079 
(0.924) 
EDUC    
   
-0.088** 
(0.916) 
-0.083 
(0.921) 
-0.092 
(0.912) 
-0.114 
(0.892) 
-0.113 
(0.893) 
-0.105 
(0.900) 
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ORDE   
    
-0.624** 
(0.536) 
-0.577** 
(0.562) 
-0.618** 
(0.539) 
-0.549** 
(0.578) 
-0.601** 
(0.548) 
-0.567** 
(0.567) 
LN_TENU   
     
0.386*** 
(1.471) 
-0.036 
(0.964)  
0.810*** 
(2.248) 
1.228*** 
(3.414) 
LN_STENU   
        
-0.414*** 
(0.661) 
-0.406*** 
(0.667) 
RBCE  
      
-0.012*** 
(0.988)  
-0.008*** 
(0.992)  
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
SIZE -0.325
*** 
(0.722) 
-0.326*** 
(0.722) 
-0.335*** 
(0.716) 
-0.281*** 
(0.753) 
-0.218*** 
(0.804) 
-0.213*** 
(0.808) 
-0.195** 
(0.823) 
-0.230*** 
(0.795) 
-0.192** 
(0.825) 
-0.196*** 
(0.822) 
-0.196** 
(0.822) 
-0.235*** 
(0.791) 
DAGE 0.278 
(1.320) 
0.266 
(1.305) 
0.393+ 
(1.481) 
0.382+ 
(1.465) 
0.477* 
(1.612) 
0.494* 
(1.639) 
0.564* 
(1.758) 
0.597** 
(1.816) 
0.577* 
(1.780) 
0.679** 
(1.971) 
0.690** 
(1.994) 
0.715** 
(2.044) 
1998 0.405
+ 
(1.499) 
0.319 
(1.376) 
0.273 
(1.314) 
0.258 
(1.294) 
0.244 
(1.276) 
0.241 
(1.273) 
0.247 
(1.280) 
0.063 
(1.065) 
0.251 
(1.286) 
0.141 
(1.152) 
0.230 
(1.259) 
0.055 
(1.057) 
1999 0.529
** 
(1.698) 
0.444* 
(1.559) 
0.366+ 
(1.442) 
0.354+ 
(1.424) 
0.293 
(1.340) 
0.288 
(1.334) 
0.300 
(1.350) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.307 
(1.360) 
0.140 
(0.150) 
0.331 
(1.393) 
0.032 
(1.033) 
2000 0.607
** 
(1.835) 
0.509* 
(1.664) 
0.382+ 
(1.465) 
0.387+ 
(1.473) 
0.308 
(1.360) 
0.301 
(1.352) 
0.310 
(1.364) 
-0.024 
(0.977) 
0.318 
(1.374) 
0.128 
(1.136) 
0.370 
(1.448) 
0.026 
(1.027) 
2001 0.579
** 
(1.784) 
0.506* 
(1.659) 
0.331 
(1.392) 
0.499* 
(1.647) 
0.386+ 
(1.471) 
0.377*** 
(1.457) 
0.391+ 
(1.478) 
0.023 
(1.024) 
0.397+ 
(1.487) 
0.175 
(1.191) 
0.460* 
(1.584) 
0.080 
(1.083) 
2002 0.613
** 
(1.846) 
0.520* 
(1.682) 
0.310 
(1.363) 
1.564*** 
(4.780) 
1.356*** 
(3.880) 
1.331*** 
(3.786) 
1.364*** 
(3.913) 
0.962*** 
(2.616) 
1.372*** 
(3.943) 
1.134*** 
(3.110) 
1.456*** 
(4.287) 
1.032*** 
(2.808) 
2003 0.767
*** 
(2.153) 
0.687** 
(1.987) 
0.449* 
(1.567) 
2.608*** 
(13.568) 
2.337*** 
(10.347) 
2.299*** 
(9.963) 
2.346*** 
(10.445) 
1.856*** 
(6.400) 
2.355*** 
(10.540) 
2.065*** 
(7.885) 
2.480*** 
(11.940) 
1.965*** 
(7.135) 
2004 0.427
+ 
(1.533) 
0.355 
(1.426) 
0.121 
(1.128) 
2.692*** 
(14.755) 
2.374*** 
(10.737) 
2.330*** 
(10.276) 
2.384*** 
(10.848) 
1.837*** 
(6.277) 
2.394*** 
(10.958) 
2.070*** 
(7.923) 
2.561*** 
(12.954) 
1.986*** 
(7.285) 
2005 0.336 (1.399) 
0.256 
(1.292) 
0.018 
(1.018) 
2.665*** 
(14.368) 
2.335*** 
(10.331) 
2.285*** 
(9.823) 
2.338*** 
(10.360) 
1.736*** 
(5.676) 
2.354*** 
(10.532) 
2.030*** 
(7.611) 
2.499*** 
(12.173) 
1.859*** 
(6.418) 
2006 0.588
** 
(1.801) 
0.524* 
(1.689) 
0.278 
(1.321) 
2.966*** 
(19.421) 
2.671*** 
(14.449) 
2.605*** 
(13.529) 
2.671*** 
(14.448) 
1.985*** 
(7.277) 
2.686*** 
(14.670) 
2.298*** 
(9.957) 
2.855*** 
(17.381) 
2.126*** 
(8.382) 
_cons 4.915*** 5.047*** 4.934*** 3.915** 3.068* 3.039* 2.706* 3.990*** 2.664* 3.292** 2.507* 3.880** 
Wald chi2 54.43*** 58.81*** 98.65*** 176.59*** 260.28*** 261.41*** 267.14*** 289.94*** 268.97*** 297.77*** 289.31*** 300.36*** 
QIC_u 3223.057 3216.441 3191.878 3082.100 3028.520 3028.207 3021.524 2979.130 3024.141 2998.786 3007.877 2962.530 
P 12 13 16 17 24 25 27 29 28 28 29 30 
N 3250 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 
 Model B0 Model B1 Model B2.1 Model B2.2 Model B3.1 Model B3.2 Model B4 Model B5.1 Model B5.2 Model B5.3 Model B5.4 Model B5.5 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratio. P is the number of parameters in a model. N is the number of observations in a model. 
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Table A7.5 Results of Models A5.5 and B5.5 after replacing RBIN and RBMI by RBOU 
Variable 
Model A5.5 Model B5.5 
GEE model Random effects model GEE model Random effects model 
DP_ROA3 -0.280
* 
(0.756) 
-0.264+ 
(0.768) 
-0.378* 
(0.686) 
-0.363* 
(0.696) 
RBOU 0.001 (1.001) 
-0.001 
(0.999) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
DUAL 0.335
** 
(1.339) 
0.408** 
(1.503) 
-0.256+ 
(0.774) 
-0.272+ 
(0.762) 
SIBO 0.040
* 
(1.040) 
0.053** 
(1.055) 
0.029 
(1.030) 
0.036+ 
(1.037) 
DRSCE -0.239
* 
(0.787) 
-0.196+ 
(0.822) 
-0.207+ 
(0.813) 
-0.178 
(0.837) 
RSTA_ST -0.006
+ 
(0.994) 
-0.009* 
(0.991) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
-0.011* 
(0.990) 
RSTA_LE 0.001 (1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
RSLE 0.002 (1.002) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
RSCA 0.000 (1.000) 
-0.001 
(0.999) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
CONC 0.012
** 
(1.012) 
0.016*** 
(1.016) 
0.014** 
(1.014) 
0.015** 
 1.016() 
RELA -0.615
*** 
(0.541) 
-0.730*** 
(0.482) 
-0.746*** 
(0.474) 
-0.814*** 
(0.443) 
REOT -0.132 (0.877) 
-0.169 
(0.845) 
-0.086 
(0.917) 
-0.105 
(0.901) 
EDUC -0.123 (0.885) 
-0.117 
(0.889) 
-0.121 
(0.886) 
-0.120 
(0.887) 
ORDE -0.252 (0.778) 
-0.335+ 
(0.715) 
-0.461* 
(0.631) 
-0.510* 
(0.600) 
LN_TENU 0.833
*** 
(2.300) 
1.220*** 
(3.388) 
1.258*** 
(3.518) 
1.359*** 
(3.891) 
LN_STENU -0.190
* 
(0.827) 
-0.248** 
(0.781) 
-0.387*** 
(0.679) 
-0.376*** 
(0.687) 
RBCE -0.014
*** 
(0.986) 
-0.015*** 
(0.985) 
-0.015*** 
(0.986) 
-0.015*** 
(0.985) 
NROA3 -2.720
+ 
(0.066) 
-3.191* 
(0.041) 
-3.362* 
(0.035) 
-3.725* 
(0.024) 
SIZE -0.217
*** 
(0.805) 
-0.244*** 
(0.783) 
-0.256*** 
(0.774) 
-0.267*** 
(0.766) 
DAGE 1.025
*** 
(2.787) 
1.130*** 
(3.095) 
0.729** 
(2.074) 
0.736** 
(2.087) 
S1998 0.012 (1.012) 
0.009 
(1.009) 
0.018 
(1.018) 
0.014 
(1.014) 
S1999 0.210 (1.234) 
0.227 
(1.255) 
-0.058 
(0.944) 
-0.063 
(0.939) 
S2000 0.210 (1.233) 
0.249 
(1.282) 
-0.109 
(0.896) 
-0.117 
(0.890) 
S2001 0.068 (1.070) 
0.133 
(1.142) 
-0.224 
(0.799) 
-0.228 
(0.796) 
S2002 -0.052 (0.950) 
0.006 
(1.006) 
-0.241 
(0.786) 
-0.243 
(0.784) 
S2003 -0.040 (0.960) 
0.011 
(1.011) 
-0.167 
(847) 
-0.166 
(0.847) 
S2004 -0.380
+ 
(0.684) 
-0.352 
(0.703) 
-0.547* 
(0.579) 
-0.562* 
(0.570) 
S2005 -0.482
* 
(0.618) 
-0.487* 
(0.615) 
-0.759** 
(1.468) 
-0.781** 
(0.458) 
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S2006 -0.440
+ 
(0.644) 
-0.438 
(0.645) 
-0.558* 
(0.573) 
-0.570* 
(0.565) 
_cons 5.475*** 6.033*** 6.655*** 6.939*** 
Wald chi2 275.98*** 218.49*** 259.31*** 223.17*** 
QIC_u 3590.641 - 3045.385 - 
AIC - 3576.494 - 3041.966  
Rho  - 0.072 - 0.050*  
Number of 
observations 3224 3224 3224 3224 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratio. 
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Table A7.6 Results of random effects models for forced CEO turnover  
 Model B0 Model B1 Model B2.1 Model B2.2 Model B3.1 Model B3.2 Model B4 Model B5.1 Model B5.2 Model B5.3 Model B5.4 Model B5.5 
DP_ROA3  -0.251
+ 
(0.778) 
-0.281+ 
(0.755) 
-0.224 
(0.800) 
-0.285+ 
(0.752) 
-0.280+ 
(0.756) 
-0.288+ 
(0.749) 
-0.312* 
(0.732) 
-0.288+ 
(0.750) 
-0.298+ 
(0.742) 
-0.287+ 
(0.750) 
-0.313* 
(0.731) 
RBOU   0.005 (1.005)          
RBIN    -0.076
*** 
(0.927) 
-0.074*** 
(0.929) 
-0.073*** 
(0.929) 
-0.075*** 
(0.928) 
-0.069*** 
(0.933) 
-0.075*** 
(0.928) 
-0.071*** 
(0.932) 
-0.076*** 
(0.927) 
-0.070*** 
(0.932) 
RBMI    0.007
* 
(1.007) 
0.007* 
(1.007) 
0.007+ 
(1.007) 
0.006+ 
(1.006) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
0.007+ 
(1.007) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
0.007+ 
(1.007) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
DUAL   -0.518
*** 
(0.596) 
-0.539*** 
(0.583) 
-0.429** 
(0.651) 
-0.422** 
(0.656) 
-0.324* 
(0.723) 
-0.347* 
(0.707) 
-0.367* 
(0.693) 
-0.227+ 
(0.797) 
-0.299* 
(0.741) 
-0.275 
(0.760) 
SIBO   0.015 (1.015) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
0.008 
(0.651) 
0.010 
(1.010) 
0.010 
(1.010) 
0.021 
(1.021) 
0.013 
(1.013) 
0.008 
(1.008) 
0.008 
(1.009) 
0.017+ 
(1.017) 
DRSCE     -0.287
* 
(0.750) 
-0.288* 
(0.750) 
-0.251* 
(0.778) 
-0.200 
(0.819) 
-0.304* 
(0.738) 
-0.100 
(0.905) 
-0.251* 
(0.778) 
-0.154 
(0.857) 
RSTA     -0.005 (0.996)        
RSTA_ST      -0.008
+ 
(0.993) 
-0.008+ 
(0.992) 
-0.009* 
(0.991) 
-0.008+ 
(0.992) 
-0.009* 
(0.991) 
-0.008* 
(0.992) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
RSTA_LE      -0.003 (0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
RSLE     0.002 (1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
RSCA     -0.003 (0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
CONC     0.014
** 
(1.014) 
0.014** 
(1.014) 
0.015** 
(1.015) 
0.016** 
(1.016) 
0.015** 
(1.015) 
0.013** 
(1.014) 
0.014** 
(1.014) 
0.015** 
(1.015) 
RELA     -0.725
*** 
(0.484) 
-0.745*** 
(0.475) 
-0.771*** 
(0.462) 
-0.802*** 
(0.449) 
-0.801*** 
(0.449) 
-0.714*** 
(0.490) 
-0.808*** 
(0.446) 
-0.811*** 
(0.444) 
REOT     -0.156 (0.855) 
-0.171 
(0.843) 
-0.181 
(0.834) 
-0.138 
(0.871) 
-0.197 
(0.821) 
-0.123 
(0.884) 
-0.194 
(0.824) 
-0.137 
(0.872) 
EDUC       -0.099 (0.906) 
-0.073 
(0.929) 
-0.085 
(0.919) 
-0.121 
(0.886) 
-0.103 
(0.903) 
-0.094 
(0.911) 
ORDE       -0.631
** 
(0.532) 
-0.635** 
(0.530) 
-0.665** 
(0.515) 
-0.552* 
(0.576) 
-0.614** 
(0.541) 
-0.590** 
(0.555) 
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LN_TENU        0.598
*** 
(1.818) 
0.123 
(1.131)  
0.902*** 
(2.465) 
1.352*** 
(3.866) 
LN_STENU           -0.432
*** 
(0.649) 
-0.422*** 
(0.656) 
RBCE        -0.013
*** 
(0.987)  
-0.007*** 
(0.993)  
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
NROA3 -5.713
*** 
(0.003) 
-4.910** 
(0.007) 
-4.649** 
(0.010) 
-4.543** 
(0.011) 
-3.556* 
(0.029) 
-3.749* 
(0.024) 
-3.487* 
(0.031) 
-3.004+ 
(0.050) 
-3.579* 
(0.028) 
-3.046* 
(0.048) 
-4.356** 
(0.013) 
-3.765* 
(0.023) 
SIZE -0.255
*** 
(0.775) 
-0.266*** 
(0.766) 
-0.278*** 
(0.757) 
-0.229*** 
(0.795) 
-0.183** 
(0.833) 
-0.175** 
(0.840) 
-0.160** 
(0.852) 
-0.220** 
(0.803) 
-0.168** 
(0.845) 
-0.170** 
(0.844) 
-0.153* 
(0.858) 
-0.204** 
(0.816) 
DAGE 0.339 (1.403) 
0.337 
(1.401) 
0.456* 
(1.577) 
0.426+ 
(1.531) 
0.505* 
(1.657) 
0.524* 
(1.688) 
0.594* 
(1.811) 
0.582* 
(1.789) 
0.553* 
(1.738) 
0.695** 
(2.004) 
0.686** 
(1.987) 
0.719** 
(2.053) 
S1998 0.358
+ 
(1.431) 
0.294 
(1.342) 
0.247 
(1.281) 
0.240 
(1.271) 
0.241 
(1.272) 
0.236 
(1.266) 
0.244 
(1.276) 
0.036 
(1.037) 
0.233 
(1.263) 
0.151 
(1.163) 
0.215 
(1.240) 
0.039 
(1.040) 
S1999 0.455
* 
(1.577) 
0.396+ 
(1.486) 
0.320 
(1.377) 
0.317 
(1.373) 
0.288 
(1.334) 
0.279 
(1.322) 
0.294 
(1.342) 
-0.034 
(0.966) 
0.273 
(1.314) 
0.165 
(1.180) 
0.292 
(1.340) 
-0.002 
(0.998) 
S2000 0.497
* 
(1.644) 
0.434* 
(1.544) 
0.313 
(1.367) 
0.335 
(1.399) 
0.299 
(1.348) 
0.287 
(1.333) 
0.301 
(1.351) 
-0.072 
(0.931) 
0.277 
(1.319) 
0.154 
(1.167) 
0.317 
(1.373) 
-0.022 
(0.978) 
S2001 0.446
* 
(1.562) 
0.403+ 
(1.496) 
0.239 
(1.270) 
0.434+ 
(1.544) 
0.386+ 
(1.472) 
0.372 
(1.450) 
0.391+ 
(1.478) 
-0.007 
(0.993) 
0.369 
(1.447) 
0.224 
(1.251) 
0.398+ 
(1.488) 
0.027 
(1.028) 
S2002 0.451
* 
(1.570) 
0.399+ 
(1.491) 
0.205 
(1.227) 
1.506*** 
(4.510) 
1.380*** 
(3.974) 
1.349*** 
(3.855) 
1.389*** 
(4.010) 
0.954** 
(2.596) 
1.364*** 
(3.913) 
1.208*** 
(3.347) 
1.387*** 
(4.004) 
0.981*** 
(2.667) 
S2003 0.582
** 
(1.789) 
0.543* 
(1.721) 
0.322 
(1.380) 
2.551*** 
(12.820) 
2.376*** 
(10.759) 
2.330*** 
(10.279) 
2.384*** 
(10.852) 
1.856*** 
(6.396) 
2.355*** 
(10.539) 
2.162*** 
(8.684) 
2.399*** 
(11.007) 
1.909*** 
(6.743) 
S2004 0.221 (1.247) 
0.187 
(1.206) 
-0.027 
(0.974) 
2.625*** 
(13.805) 
2.421*** 
(11.255) 
2.369*** 
(10.684) 
2.430*** 
(11.364) 
1.828*** 
(6.224) 
2.394*** 
(10.960) 
2.186*** 
(8.896) 
2.473*** 
(11.861) 
1.916*** 
(6.793) 
S2005 0.114 (1.120) 
0.077 
(1.080) 
-0.140 
(0.869) 
2.607*** 
(13.553) 
2.389*** 
(10.905) 
2.330*** 
(10.278) 
2.391*** 
(10.927) 
1.713*** 
(5.544) 
2.340*** 
(10.379) 
2.143*** 
(8.524) 
2.418*** 
(11.223) 
1.799*** 
(6.041) 
S2006 0.377
+ 
(1.458) 
0.350 
(1.419) 
0.125 
(1.133) 
2.910*** 
(18.366) 
2.737*** 
 (15.434) 
2.660*** 
(14.301) 
2.734*** 
 (15.396) 
1.978*** 
(7.230) 
2.690*** 
(14.727) 
2.427*** 
 (11.329) 
2.774*** 
(16.015) 
2.068*** 
(7.911) 
_cons 7.536*** 7.286*** 7.081*** 6.034*** 4.661** 4.706** 4.249** 5.566*** 4.356** 4.681** 4.484** 5.667*** 
Rho  0.055** 0.053** 0.039** 0.056** 0.039* 0.038* 0.040* 0.065** 0.055** 0.016** 0.047* 0.055** 
Wald chi2 72.65*** 72.89*** 97.98*** 182.27*** 231.76*** 233.75*** 238.17*** 263.89*** 233.93*** 266.58*** 247.51*** 278.36*** 
AIC 3211.337 3198.832 3179.543 3066.475 3022.616 3021.759 3015.700 2970.307 3015.730 2996.090 2998.402 2953.784 
K 14 15 18 19 26 27 29 31 30 30 31 32 
N 3250 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 
 Model B0 Model B1 Model B2.1 Model B2.2 Model B3.1 Model B3.2 Model B4 Model B5.1 Model B5.2 Model B5.3 Model B5.4 Model B5.5 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratio. K is the number of parameters in a model. N is the number of observations in a model. 
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Table A7.7 Results of GEE models using the non-stationary 1 working correlation matrix for VCT (excluding NROA3) 
 Model C0 Model C1 Model C2.1 
Model 
C2.2 
Model 
C3.1 
Model 
C3.2 Model C4 
Model 
C5.1 
Model 
C5.2 
Model 
C5.3 
Model 
C5.4 
Model 
C5.5 
DP_ROA3  -0.046 
(0.825) 
0.061 
(1.063) 
0.146 
(1.157) 
0.136 
(1.146) 
0.139 
(1.149) 
0.152 
(1.164) 
0.150 
(1.161) 
0.151 
(1.163) 
0.141 
(1.151) 
0.149 
(1.160) 
0.146 
(1.158) 
RBOU   -0.008
+ 
(0.992)   
 
      
RBIN   
 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.065*** 
(0.937) 
-0.064*** 
(0.938) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.064*** 
(0.938) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.066*** 
(0.937) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.064*** 
(0.938) 
RBMI  
  
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
DUAL   1.199
*** 
(3.315) 
1.217*** 
(3.378) 
1.228*** 
(3.414) 
1.227*** 
(3.411) 
1.235*** 
(3.439) 
1.204*** 
(3.335) 
1.182*** 
(3.261) 
1.259*** 
(3.523) 
1.192*** 
(3.293) 
1.214*** 
(3.367) 
SIBO   0.042 
(1.043) 
0.035 
(1.035) 
0.035 
(1.036) 
0.036 
(1.037) 
0.035 
(1.036) 
0.035 
(1.036) 
0.034 
(1.035) 
0.035 
(1.036) 
0.035 
(1.035) 
0.035 
(1.036) 
DRSCE    
 
-0.078 
(0.925) 
-0.079 
(0.924)     
 
 
RSTA    
 
0.007 
(1.007)      
 
 
RSTA_ST    
  
0.005 
(1.005)       
RSTA_LE    
  
0.008 
(1.008)       
RSLE    
 
0.005 
(1.005) 
0.004 
(1.004)       
RSCA    
 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.002 
(1.002)       
CONC    
 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.004 
(1.004)       
RELA    
 
0.013 
(1.013) 
-0.005 
(0.995)       
REOT    
 
-0.231 
(0.794) 
-0.239 
(0.787)       
EDUC    
   
-0.152 
(0.859)      
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ORDE   
    
-0.079 
(0.924)      
LN_TENU   
     
0.270+ 
(1.309) 
0.076 
(1.079)  
0.216 
(1.241) 
0.406 
(1.501) 
LN_STENU   
 
 
      
-0.063 
(0.939) 
-0.061 
(0.941) 
RBCE  
  
 
   
-0.006+ 
(0.994)  
-0.002 
(0.998)  
-0.006+ 
(0.994) 
SIZE 0.013 
(1.013) 
0.022 
(1.022) 
0.010 
(1.010) 
0.063 
(1.063) 
0.051 
(1.052) 
0.053 
(1.055) 
0.071 
(1.073) 
0.036 
(1.036) 
0.054 
(1.055) 
0.064 
(1.066) 
0.056 
(1.058) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
DAGE 1.370
*** 
(3.937) 
1.304*** 
(3.686) 
1.025*** 
(2.788) 
0.963*** 
(2.620) 
1.000*** 
(2.718) 
1.020*** 
(2.774) 
0.940*** 
(2.559) 
0.948*** 
(2.580) 
0.928*** 
(2.529) 
1.006*** 
(2.734) 
0.937*** 
(2.553) 
0.957*** 
(2.603) 
1998 -0.183 (0.833) 
-0.067 
(0.935) 
0.032 
(1.032) 
0.024 
(1.025) 
0.027 
(1.028) 
0.024 
(1.024) 
0.029 
(1.029) 
-0.047 
(0.954) 
0.017 
(1.017) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
0.016 
(1.016) 
-0.045 
(0.956) 
1999 0.491
+ 
(1.634) 
0.598* 
(1.818) 
0.806** 
(2.239) 
0.802** 
(2.229) 
0.800** 
(2.225) 
0.793** 
(2.211) 
0.811** 
(2.249) 
0.673* 
(1.960) 
0.788** 
(2.199) 
0.767* 
(2.154) 
0.796** 
(2.216) 
0.681* 
(1.976) 
2000 0.552
+ 
(1.736) 
0.654* 
(1.923) 
1.006** 
(2.734) 
1.015** 
(2.761) 
1.014** 
(2.756) 
1.005** 
(2.732) 
1.028** 
(2.796) 
0.839* 
(2.314) 
1.001** 
(2.722) 
0.963** 
(2.620) 
1.015** 
(2.761) 
0.853* 
(2.346) 
2001 0.393 (1.481) 
0.495 
(1.640) 
0.954** 
(2.595) 
1.090** 
(2.974) 
1.085** 
(2.958) 
1.073** 
(2.924) 
1.113** 
(3.042) 
0.896** 
(2.449) 
1.077** 
(2.937) 
1.029** 
(2.799) 
1.090** 
(2.974) 
0.907*** 
(2.477) 
2002 0.031 (1.031) 
0.131 
(1.140) 
0.644* 
(1.904) 
1.528*** 
(4.609) 
1.512*** 
(4.538) 
1.488*** 
(4.429) 
1.557*** 
(4.746) 
1.314** 
(3.722) 
1.522*** 
(4.582) 
1.452*** 
(4.272) 
1.538*** 
(7.930) 
1.329** 
(3.776) 
2003 -0.236 (0.790) 
-0.133 
(0.875) 
0.488 
(1.628) 
2.052*** 
(7.785) 
2.026*** 
(7.587) 
1.992*** 
(7.328) 
2.086*** 
(8.050) 
1.798 
(6.040) 
2.046*** 
(7.738) 
1.961*** 
(7.109) 
2.071*** 
(10.472) 
1.822*** 
(6.182) 
2004 -0.262 (0.769) 
-0.160 
(0.852) 
0.452 
(1.571) 
2.333*** 
(10.312) 
2.308*** 
(10.053) 
2.266*** 
(9.640) 
2.371*** 
(10.708) 
2.051 
(7.773) 
2.319*** 
(10.168) 
2.242*** 
(9.410) 
2.349*** 
(10.472) 
2.079*** 
(7.993) 
2005 -0.115 (0.892) 
-0.012 
(0.989) 
0.599+ 
(1.820) 
2.549*** 
(12.789) 
2.538*** 
(12.659) 
2.492*** 
(12.086) 
2.584*** 
(13.248) 
2.226 
(9.262) 
2.520*** 
(12.424) 
2.460*** 
(11.709) 
2.543*** 
(12.721) 
2.248*** 
(9.472) 
2006 -0.864
* 
(0.421) 
-0.758* 
(0.469) 
-0.124 
(0.883) 
1.838** 
(6.287) 
2.045** 
(7.729) 
1.987** 
(7.295) 
1.875** 
(6.522) 
1.493** 
(4.451) 
1.808** 
(6.096) 
1.744** 
(5.719) 
1.839** 
(6.290) 
1.523** 
(1.586) 
_cons -2.957* -3.245* -3.657* -4.805** -5.098** -5.083** -4.959** -4.019* -4.696** -4.652** -4.796** -4.110* 
Wald chi2 67.10*** 63.38** 127.34*** 147.62*** 164.95*** 164.60*** 149.56*** 157.33*** 147.32***   157.51*** 148.54*** 158.67*** 
QIC_u 1653.795 1635.393 1566.398 1544.046 1551.335 1552.932 1546.581 1544.137 1545.630 1543.558 1547.591 1546.053 
P 12 13 16 17 24 25 19 19 18 18 19 20 
N  3250 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 
 Model C0 Model C1 Model C2.1 Model C2.2 Model C3.1 Model C3.2 Model C4 Model C5.1 Model C5.2 Model C5.3 Model C5.4 Model C5.5 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratio. P is the number of parameters in a model. N is the number of observations in a model. 
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Table A7.8 Results of random effects models for voluntary CEO turnover  
 Model C0 Model C1 Model C2.1 Model C2.2 Model C3.1 Model C3.2 Model C4 Model C5.1 Model C5.2 Model C5.3 Model C5.4 Model C5.5 
DP_ROA3  -0.057 (0.945) 
0.052 
(1.053) 
0.115 
(1.121) 
0.118 
(1.125) 
0.124 
(1.132) 
0.120 
(1.128) 
0.107 
(1.113) 
0.120 
(1.127) 
0.107 
(1.113) 
0.120 
(1.127) 
0.107 
(1.113) 
RBOU   -0.008 (0.992)          
RBIN    -0.066
*** 
(0.936) 
-0.065*** 
(0.937) 
-0.065*** 
(0.937) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.064*** 
(0.938) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.066*** 
(0.936) 
-0.066** 
(0.936) 
-0.064*** 
(0.938) 
RBMI    -0.006 (0.994) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
-0.005 
(0.995) 
-0.006 
(0.994) 
DUAL   1.424
*** 
(4.152) 
1.438*** 
(4.212) 
1.439*** 
(4.215) 
1.452*** 
(4.273) 
1.448*** 
(4.256) 
1.424*** 
(4.155) 
1.412*** 
(4.103) 
1.460*** 
(4.308) 
1.413** 
(4.109) 
1.426*** 
(4.162) 
SIBO   0.045 (1.046) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
0.037 
1.038() 
0.038 
(1.039) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
0.038 
(1.039) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
0.037 
(1.038) 
0.038 
(1.039) 
DRSCE     -0.066 (0.936) 
-0.063 
(0.939)       
RSTA     0.006 (1.006)        
RSTA_ST      0.004 (1.004)       
RSTA_LE      0.008 (1.008)       
RSLE     0.005 (1.005) 
0.005 
(1.005)       
RSCA     0.001 (1.001) 
0.001 
(1.001)       
CONC     0.004 (1.004) 
0.004 
(1.004)       
RELA     0.062 (1.064) 
0.044 
(1.045)       
REOT     -0.261 (0.770) 
-0.273 
(0.761)       
EDUC       -0.135 (0.874)      
ORDE       -0.044 (0.957)      
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LN_TENU        0.271
+ 
(1.312) 
0.088 
(1.093)  
0.117 
(1.124) 
0.302 
(1.353) 
LN_STENU           -0.014 (0.986) 
-0.015 
(0.985) 
RBCE        -0.005
+ 
(0.995)  
-0.002 
(0.998)  
-0.005+ 
(0.995) 
NROA3 0.919 (2.506) 
0.866 
(2.378) 
0.790 
(2.204) 
1.130 
(3.096) 
0.700 
(2.013) 
0.540 
(1.715) 
1.292 
(3.640) 
1.541 
(4.669) 
1.086 
(2.963) 
1.319 
(3.740) 
1.058 
(2.882) 
1.510 
(4.528) 
SIZE 0.007 (1.007) 
0.016 
(1.017) 
0.007 
(1.007) 
0.052 
(1.054) 
0.042 
1.043 
0.047 
(1.048) 
0.056 
(1.057) 
0.024 
(1.024) 
0.042 
(1.043) 
0.053 
(1.055) 
0.043 
(1.004) 
0.024 
(1.025) 
DAGE 1.438
*** 
(4.213) 
1.370*** 
(3.936) 
1.198*** 
(3.312) 
1.139 
(3.123) 
1.157*** 
(3.182) 
1.183*** 
(3.265) 
1.113*** 
(3.042) 
1.122*** 
(3.070) 
1.103*** 
(3.015) 
1.169*** 
(3.220) 
1.106** 
(3.022) 
1.124*** 
(3.078) 
S1998 -0.170 (0.844) 
-0.063 
(0.939) 
0.074 
(1.077) 
0.067*** 
(1.069) 
0.066 
(1.069) 
0.063 
(1.065) 
0.072 
(1.075) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.060 
(1.062) 
0.050 
(1.051) 
0.060 
(1.062) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
S1999 0.510
+ 
(1.665) 
0.610* 
(1.840) 
0.908** 
(2.480) 
0.909** 
(2.482) 
0.901** 
(2.461) 
0.896** 
(2.451) 
0.919** 
(2.506) 
0.788* 
(2.199) 
0.900** 
(2.460) 
0.876** 
(2.402) 
0.901* 
(2.463) 
0.790* 
(2.202) 
S2000 0.581
* 
(1.787) 
0.675* 
(1.965) 
1.151*** 
(3.161) 
1.166*** 
(3.209) 
1.157*** 
(3.181) 
1.151*** 
(3.161) 
1.181*** 
(3.259) 
1.007** 
(2.738) 
1.160*** 
(3.190) 
1.118** 
(3.059) 
1.162** 
(3.196) 
1.009** 
(2.744) 
S2001 0.426 (1.531) 
0.521+ 
(1.683) 
1.120** 
(3.064) 
1.257*** 
(3.516) 
1.248*** 
(3.482) 
1.239*** 
(3.453) 
1.283*** 
(3.608) 
1.081** 
(2.949) 
1.253*** 
(3.502) 
1.202*** 
(3.327) 
1.255** 
(3.507) 
1.083** 
(2.954) 
S2002 0.061 (1.062) 
0.152 
(1.164) 
0.794* 
(2.211) 
1.665*** 
(5.284) 
1.654*** 
(5.227) 
1.634*** 
(5.122) 
1.693*** 
(5.436) 
1.472*** 
(4.356) 
1.661*** 
(5.265) 
1.604*** 
(4.970) 
1.663** 
(5.273) 
1.473*** 
(4.364) 
S2003 -0.202 (0.817) 
-0.107 
(0.899) 
0.597 
(1.816) 
2.154*** 
(8.616) 
2.135*** 
(8.453) 
2.103*** 
(8.187) 
2.183*** 
(8.873) 
1.922*** 
(6.837) 
2.140*** 
(8.503) 
2.089*** 
(8.075) 
2.142** 
(8.520) 
1.925*** 
(6.853) 
S2004 -0.229 (0.795) 
-0.135 
(0.874) 
0.569 
(1.767) 
2.458*** 
(11.680) 
2.439*** 
(11.456) 
2.399*** 
(11.009) 
2.491*** 
(12.078) 
2.201*** 
(9.034) 
2.439*** 
(11.457) 
2.391*** 
(10.920) 
2.442** 
(11.492) 
2.205*** 
(9.066) 
S2005 -0.080 (0.924) 
0.016 
(1.016) 
0.742* 
(2.099) 
2.704*** 
(14.934) 
2.707*** 
(14.988) 
2.661*** 
(14.306) 
2.738*** 
(15.454) 
2.412*** 
(11.151) 
2.676*** 
(14.523) 
2.633*** 
(13.919) 
2.679** 
(14.573) 
2.415*** 
(11.194) 
S2006 -0.829
* 
(0.437) 
-0.730+ 
(0.482) 
0.016 
(1.016) 
1.988** 
(7.298) 
2.209** 
(9.107) 
2.146** 
(8.552) 
2.022** 
(7.555) 
1.671** 
(5.317) 
1.955** 
(7.061) 
1.914** 
(6.782) 
1.959* 
(7.096) 
1.676** 
(5.346) 
_cons -3.515+ -3.766+ -4.509* -5.745* -5.770* -5.689* -5.923* -5.268* -5.610* -5.730* -5.609* -5.267* 
Rho  0.005 0.006 0.110** 0.113*** 0.106* 0.112** 0.112* 0.118** 0.112** 0.105* 0.121** 0.117** 
Wald chi2 62.25*** 58.54*** 105.52*** 121.47*** 123.51*** 123.39*** 121.71*** 122.88*** 121.01*** 122.44*** 121.11*** 122.99*** 
AIC 1657.542 1639.174 1564.161 1540.321 1549.420 1550.493 1543.707 1540.675 1541.733 1541.699 1543.723 1542.663 
K 14 15 18 19 26 27 21 21 20 20 21 22 
  N 3250 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 3224 
 Model C0 Model C1 Model C2.1 Model C2.2 Model C3.1 Model C3.2 Model C4 Model C5.1 Model C5.2 Model C5.3 Model C5.4 Model C5.5 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratio. K is the number of parameters in a model. N is the number of observations in a model. 
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Table A8.1a Descriptive statistics for RSCE 
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1997 325 0.0109 0.0000 0.4700 0.0301 11.6480 165.7020 
1998 324 0.0110 0.0000 0.4658 0.0319 10.4323 135.8209 
1999 321 0.0103 0.0000 0.4043 0.0337 9.6827 106.9027 
2000 322 0.0078 0.0000 0.2972 0.0213 8.9697 110.2599 
2001 320 0.0062 0.0000 0.2975 0.0209 9.6227 121.4779 
2002 320 0.0050 0.0000 0.2704 0.0185 10.1944 135.2823 
2003 322 0.0035 0.0000 0.0937 0.0102 5.4006 35.6696 
2004 321 0.0032 0.0000 0.0937 0.0102 5.5102 36.6507 
2005 321 0.0033 0.0000 0.0937 0.0104 5.3220 34.0013 
2006 320 0.0047 0.0000 0.2806 0.0202 9.5175 115.0711 
Total 3216 0.0066 0.0000 0.4658 0.0226 12.0309 195.4730 
Table A8.1b Results of Models A5.5 and B5.5 after replacing DRSCE by RSCE 
Variable 
Model A5.5 Model B5.5 
GEE model Random effects model GEE model 
Random effects 
model 
DP_ROA3 -0.192 
(0.812) 
-0.191 
(0.826) 
-0.309* 
(0.734) 
-0.305+ 
(0.734) 
RBIN -0.082
*** 
(0.924) 
-0.086*** 
(0.917) 
-0.068*** 
(0.935) 
-0.070*** 
(0.934) 
RBMI 0.003 
(1.002) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.006+ 
(1.006) 
0.006 
(1.006) 
DUAL 0.381
** 
(1.474) 
0.455*** 
(1.576) 
-0.239+ 
(0.787) 
-0.265+ 
(0.788) 
SIBO 0.019 
(1.021) 
0.035+ 
(1.036) 
0.008 
(1.010) 
0.019 
(1.008) 
RSCE -1.373 
(0.348) 
-0.049 
(0.952) 
1.368 
(4.630) 
2.369 
(3.929) 
RSTA_ST -0.007
+ 
(0.993) 
-0.008* 
(0.992) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
RSTA_LE 0.000 
(0.999) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.003 
(0.996) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
RSLE 0.002 
(1.002) 
0.004 
(.1004) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
RSCA -0.002 
(0.998) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
CONC 0.012
** 
(1.013) 
0.016*** 
(1.016) 
0.013** 
(1.013) 
0.015** 
(1.013) 
RELA -0.667
*** 
(0.513) 
-0.753*** 
(0.471) 
-0.774*** 
(0.460) 
-0.840*** 
(0.461) 
REOT -0.211 
(0.810) 
-0.245 
(0.783) 
-0.140 
(0.867) 
-0.161 
(0.869) 
EDUC -0.092 
(0.916) 
-0.086 
(0.918) 
-0.085 
(0.923) 
-0.086 
(0.919) 
ORDE -0.364
* 
(0.686) 
-0.434* 
(0.648) 
-0.592** 
(0.555) 
-0.654** 
(0.553) 
LN_TENU 1.005
*** 
(2.960) 
1.205*** 
(3.336) 
1.283*** 
(3.655) 
1.355*** 
(3.609) 
LN_STENU -0.295
** 
(0.717) 
-0.300** 
(0.034) 
-0.457*** 
(0.629) 
-0.436*** 
(0.633) 
RBCE -0.012
*** 
(0.988) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
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NROA3 -3.155
* 
(0.043) 
-3.375* 
(0.034) 
-3.690* 
(0.024) 
-3.896* 
(0.025) 
SIZE -0.156
** 
(0.849) 
-0.181** 
(0.834) 
-0.202** 
(0.814) 
-0.212** 
(0.817) 
DAGE 1.005
*** 
(2.912) 
1.113*** 
(3.043) 
0.730** 
(2.101) 
0.732** 
(2.075) 
S1998 0.031 (1.036) 
0.043 
(1.044) 
0.039 
(1.047) 
0.042 
(1.040) 
S1999 0.286 (1.350) 
0.324 
(1.383) 
0.022 
(1.034) 
0.021 
(1.023) 
S2000 0.340 (1.438) 
0.403+ 
(1.497) 
0.019 
(1.028) 
0.017 
(1.019) 
S2001 0.397
+ 
(1.529) 
0.498* 
(1.646) 
0.071 
(1.083) 
0.080 
(1.074) 
S2002 1.446
*** 
(4.102) 
1.576*** 
(4.835) 
1.018*** 
(2.723) 
1.049*** 
(2.767) 
S2003 2.372
*** 
(10.076) 
2.525*** 
(12.496) 
1.951*** 
(6.802) 
1.997*** 
(7.033) 
S2004 2.478
*** 
(10.974) 
2.618*** 
(13.710) 
1.983*** 
(6.925) 
2.016*** 
(7.263) 
S2005 2.459
*** 
(10.881) 
2.596*** 
(13.410) 
1.865*** 
(6.258) 
1.907*** 
(6.457) 
S2006 2.558
*** 
(11.928) 
2.718*** 
(15.154) 
2.119*** 
(8.000) 
2.185*** 
(8.322) 
_cons 4.391** 4.696** 5.662** 5.782*** 
Wald chi2 361.30 *** 295.43*** 312.91*** 275.59*** 
QIC_u 3464.628 - 2960.682 - 
AIC - 3447.105 - 2954.53 
Rho  - 0.088***  - 0.061** 
Number of 
observations 3224 3224 3224 3224 
Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratio. 
Table A8.2 Results of Models A5.5 and B5.5 after adding SCONC 
Variable  
Model A5.5 Model B5.5 
GEE model Random effects model GEE model 
Random effects 
model 
DP_ROA3 -0.206 (0.800) 
-0.200 
(0.819) 
-0.324* 
(0.724) 
-0.314* 
(0.730) 
RBIN -0.081
*** 
(0.924) 
-0.086*** 
(0.918) 
-0.068*** 
(0.935) 
-0.070*** 
(0.932) 
RBMI 0.003 (1.002) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.006 
(1.006) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
DUAL 0.365
** 
(1.455) 
0.444** 
(1.558) 
-0.251+ 
(0.777) 
-0.273+ 
(0.761) 
SIBO 0.021 (1.022) 
0.035+ 
(1.035) 
0.008 
(1.009) 
0.017 
(1.017) 
DRSCE -0.230
* 
(0.811) 
-0.170 
(0.843) 
-0.186 
(0.834) 
-0.152 
(0.859) 
RSTA_ST -0.006
+ 
(0.993) 
-0.008* 
(0.992) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
RSTA_LE 0.000 (1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.003 
(0.996) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
RSLE 0.002 (1.002) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
RSCA -0.002 (0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
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CONC 0.013 (1.011) 
0.014 
(1.014) 
0.010 
(1.011) 
0.011 
(1.011) 
SCONC 0.000 (1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
RELA -0.642
*** 
(0.525) 
-0.732*** 
(0.481) 
-0.747*** 
(0.472) 
-0.810*** 
(0.445) 
REOT -0.180 (0.833) 
-0.221 
(0.801) 
-0.114 
(0.889) 
-0.138 
(0.871) 
EDUC -0.105 (0.905) 
-0.097 
(0.908) 
-0.094 
(0.914) 
-0.093 
(0.911) 
ORDE -0.347
* 
(0.700) 
-0.410* 
(0.664) 
-0.538* 
(0.587) 
-0.586** 
(0.556) 
LN_TENU 0.982
*** 
(2.906) 
1.211*** 
(3.355) 
1.278*** 
(3.639) 
1.354*** 
(3.873) 
LN_STENU -0.271
** 
(0.732) 
-0.292** 
(0.747) 
-0.437*** 
(0.642) 
-0.423*** 
(0.655) 
RBCE -0.012
*** 
(0.988) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
-0.012*** 
(0.988) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
NROA3 -2.991
+ 
(0.051) 
-3.251* 
(0.039) 
-3.522* 
(0.028) 
-3.748* 
(0.024) 
SIZE -0.149
** 
(0.854) 
-0.174** 
(0.840) 
-0.195** 
(0.820) 
-0.204** 
(0.815) 
DAGE 1.006
*** 
(2.915) 
1.110*** 
(3.035) 
0.717** 
(2.073) 
0.717** 
(2.049) 
S1998 0.025 (1.031) 
0.039 
(1.039) 
0.036 
(1.044) 
0.040 
(1.040) 
S1999 0.260 (1.319) 
0.303 
(1.354) 
0.009 
(1.009) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
S2000 0.295 (1.381) 
0.367+ 
(1.444) 
-0.022 
(0.986) 
-0.020 
(0.980) 
S2001 0.341 (1.453 
0.451* 
(1.570) 
0.016 
(1.025) 
0.030 
(1.031) 
S2002 1.362
*** 
(3.796) 
1.509*** 
(4.521) 
0.947*** 
(2.539) 
0.984*** 
(2.675) 
S2003 2.267
*** 
(9.154) 
2.443*** 
(11.505) 
1.860*** 
(6.219) 
1.913*** 
(6.771) 
S2004 2.355
*** 
(9.812) 
2.524*** 
(12.472) 
1.877*** 
(6.238) 
1.919*** 
(6.817) 
S2005 2.327
*** 
(9.636) 
2.493*** 
(12.093) 
1.750*** 
(5.582) 
1.803*** 
(6.066) 
S2006 2.425
*** 
(9.636) 
2.609** 
(13.588) 
1.999*** 
(7.099) 
2.071*** 
(7.932) 
_cons 4.252** 4.622*** 5.575** 5.730*** 
Wald chi2 386.24*** 297.26*** 329.24*** 278.31*** 
QIC_u 3463.079 - 2960.405 - 
AIC - 3447.16 - 2955.729 
Rho  - 0.084** - 0.055** 
Number of 
observations 3224 3224 3224 3224 
     Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratio. 
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Table A8.3 Results of Models A5.5 and B5.5 after replacing LN_TENU and LN_STENU by TENU 
and STENU 
Variable 
Model A5.5 Model B5.5 
GEE model Random effects model GEE model 
Random effects 
model 
DP_ROA3 -0.203 
(0.801) 
-0.179 
(0.836) 
-0.305* 
(0.735) 
-0.287+ 
(0.751) 
RBIN -0.077
*** 
(0.928) 
-0.085*** 
(0.918) 
-0.066*** 
(0.937) 
-0.070*** 
(0.933) 
RBMI 0.003 
(1.003) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.006 
(1.005) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
DUAL 0.347
** 
(1.427) 
0.421** 
(1524) 
-0.260+ 
(0.771) 
-0.294* 
(0.745) 
SIBO 0.021 
(1.022) 
0.037+ 
(1.038) 
0.009 
(1.010) 
0.019 
(1.019) 
DRSCE -0.238
* 
(0.803) 
-0.181 
(0.834) 
-0.207+ 
(0.817) 
-0.167 
(0.847) 
RSTA_ST -0.006
+ 
(0.993) 
-0.008* 
(0.992) 
-0.009* 
(0.991) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
RSTA_LE 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
RSLE 0.002 
(1.002) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
RSCA -0.002 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.996) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
CONC 0.011
** 
(1.011) 
0.015** 
(1.016) 
0.012** 
(1.012) 
0.015** 
(1.015) 
RELA -0.620
*** 
(0.537) 
-0.731*** 
(0.481) 
-0.720*** 
(.0.485) 
-0.800*** 
(0.449) 
REOT -0.177 
(0.839) 
-0.229 
(0.795) 
-0.105 
(0.900) 
-0.139 
(0.870) 
EDUC -0.101 
(0.91) 
-0.096 
(0.909) 
-0.090 
(0.919) 
-0.092 
(0.912) 
ORDE -0.349
* 
(0.694) 
-0.452* 
(0.636) 
-0.560** 
(0.575) 
-0.621** 
(0.538) 
TENU 0.256
*** 
(1.309) 
0.447*** 
(1.564) 
0.341*** 
(1.414) 
0.448*** 
(1.565) 
STENU -0.017
*** 
(0.982) 
-0.028*** 
(0.972) 
-0.027*** 
(0.973) 
-0.033*** 
(0.968) 
RBCE -0.012
*** 
(0.989) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
-0.012*** 
(0.988) 
-0.013*** 
(0.987) 
NROA3 -2.761
+ 
(0.066) 
-3.096* 
(0.045) 
-3.478* 
(0.030) 
-3.741* 
(0.024) 
SIZE -0.142
** 
(0.861) 
-0.175** 
(0.840) 
-0.189** 
(0.824) 
-0.202** 
(0.817) 
DAGE 1.000
*** 
(2.919) 
1.119*** 
(3.063) 
0.711** 
(2.060) 
0.712** 
(2.038) 
S1998 0.040 (1.044) 
0.046 
(1.047) 
0.057 
(1.062) 
0.054 
(1.055) 
S1999 0.260 (1.320) 
0.300 
(1.351) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
S2000 0.286 (1.359) 
0.354+ 
(1.424) 
-0.028 
(0.978) 
-0.026 
(0.975) 
S2001 0.322 (1.417) 
0.446* 
(1.562) 
0.008 
(1.020) 
0.036 
(1.036) 
S2002 1.302
*** 
(3.587) 
1.512*** 
(4.534) 
0.942*** 
(2.526) 
1.005*** 
(2.731) 
S2003 2.175*** 2.440*** 1.835*** 1.919*** 
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(8.427) (11.473) (6.071) (6.814) 
S2004 2.229
*** 
(8.781) 
2.501*** 
(12.192) 
1.823*** 
(5.953) 
1.907*** 
(6.734) 
S2005 2.229
*** 
(8.760) 
2.475*** 
(11.881) 
1.724*** 
(5.397) 
1.797*** 
(6.034) 
S2006 2.311
*** 
(9.504) 
2.585*** 
(13.261) 
1.960*** 
(6.805) 
2.056*** 
(7.817) 
_cons 3.928** 4.227** 5.237** 5.344*** 
Wald chi2 387.35*** 291.74*** 309.01*** 267.02*** 
QIC_u 3469.452 - 2968.784 - 
AIC - 3450.874 - 2964.391 
Rho  - 0.082***  - 0.053** 
Number of 
observations 3224 3224 3224 3224 
   Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratio. 
   Table A8.4 Results of Models A5.5 and B5.5 after replacing RBCE by RBCE_NI 
Variable  
Model A5.5 Model B5.5 
GEE model Random effects model GEE model 
Random effects 
model 
DP_ROA3 -0.208 
(0.812) 
-0.189 
(0.828) 
-0.309* 
(0.734) 
-0.300+ 
(0.741) 
RBIN -0.086
*** 
(0.917) 
-0.094*** 
(0.910) 
-0.075*** 
(0.928) 
-0.079*** 
(0.924) 
RBMI 0.002 
(1.002) 
0.001 
(1.001) 
0.006+ 
(1.006) 
0.005 
(1.005) 
DUAL 0.385
** 
(1.469) 
0.457*** 
(1.580) 
-0.237 
(0.789) 
-0.257+ 
(0.773) 
SIBO 0.019 
(1.019) 
0.032 
(1.033) 
0.006 
(1.006) 
0.014 
(1.014) 
DRSCE -0.222
* 
(0.801) 
-0.183 
(0.833) 
-0.184 
(0.832) 
-0.151 
(0.860) 
RSTA_ST -0.007
+ 
(0.993) 
-0.008* 
(0.992) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
-0.010* 
(0.990) 
RSTA_LE -0.001 
(0.999) 
0.000 
(1.004) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
RSLE 0.002 
(1.002) 
0.003 
(1.003) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
RSCA -0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
-0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.003 
(0.997) 
CONC 0.013
** 
(1.013) 
0.016*** 
(1.017) 
0.014** 
(1.014) 
0.016** 
(1.016) 
RELA -0.671
*** 
(0.511) 
-0.759*** 
(0.468) 
-0.781*** 
(0.458) 
-0.846*** 
(0.429) 
REOT -0.198 
(0.820) 
-0.240 
(0.787) 
-0.124 
(0.883) 
-0.149 
(0.861) 
EDUC -0.098 
(0.907) 
-0.096 
(0.908) 
-0.089 
(0.915) 
-0.094 
(0.910) 
ORDE -0.367
* 
(0.726) 
-0.418* 
(0.658) 
-0.539* 
(0.583) 
-0.596** 
(0.551) 
LN_TENU 0.961
*** 
(2.972) 
1.067*** 
(2.908) 
1.188*** 
(3.279) 
1.256*** 
(.510) 
LN_STENU -0.321
** 
(0.726) 
-0.290** 
(0.748) 
-0.445*** 
(0.641) 
-0.425*** 
(0.654) 
RBCE_NI -0.010
*** 
(0.990) 
-0.011*** 
(0.029) 
-0.011*** 
(0.989) 
-0.012*** 
(0.988) 
 270 
NROA3 -3.245
* 
(0.039) 
-3.551* 
(1.499) 
-3.753* 
(0.023) 
-3.977* 
(0.019) 
SIZE -0.147
** 
(0.863) 
-0.163** 
(0.850) 
-0.191** 
(0.826) 
-0.197** 
(0.821) 
DAGE 1.089
*** 
(2.972) 
1.132*** 
(3.100) 
0.767** 
(2.154) 
0.760** 
(2.138) 
S1998 0.059 (1.061) 
0.068 
(1.071) 
0.055 
(1.057) 
0.050 
(1.051) 
S1999 0.324 (1.383) 
0.352+ 
(1.422) 
0.029 
(1.029) 
0.017 
(1.017) 
S2000 0.384 (1.468) 
0.429* 
(1.535) 
0.011 
(1.011) 
0.002 
(1.002) 
S2001 0.420
+ 
(1.522) 
0.496* 
(1.642) 
0.027 
(1.027) 
0.028 
(1.028) 
S2002 1.360
*** 
(3.896) 
1.524*** 
(4.590) 
0.906** 
(2.474) 
0.950*** 
(2.585) 
S2003 2.277
*** 
(9.752) 
2.494*** 
(12.106) 
1.836*** 
(6.269) 
1.913*** 
(6.746) 
S2004 2.390
*** 
(10.916) 
2.620*** 
(13.742) 
1.887*** 
(6.600) 
1.971*** 
(7.179) 
S2005 2.419
*** 
(11.233) 
2.642*** 
(14.037) 
1.828*** 
(6.221) 
1.909*** 
(6.746) 
S2006 2.549
*** 
(12.795) 
2.804*** 
(16.511) 
2.108*** 
(8.233) 
2.222*** 
(9.223) 
_cons 4.295** 4.558** 5.694** 5.736*** 
Wald chi2 366.95*** 285.54*** 322.67*** 271.62*** 
QIC_u 3480.300 - 2967.021 - 
AIC - 3462.95 - 2961.316 
Rho  - 0.086***  - 0.059** 
Number of 
observations 3224 3224 3224 3224 
    Significance: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, +<0.1. The figures in parentheses are odds ratio. 
 
 
 
 
